[Cites 14, Cited by 0]
Kerala High Court
D+H Solutions India Private Limited vs Jayakrishnan Ramachandran Nair on 20 January, 2026
2026:KER:4896
W.P (C) Nos.38729/2025 & 43396/2025 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
TUESDAY, THE 20TH DAY OF JANUARY 2026 / 30TH POUSHA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 38729 OF 2025
PETITIONER/S:
D+H SOLUTIONS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED,
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF INDIA, HAVING
ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT: 6TH FLOOR, CARNIVAL
TECHNOPARK, TECHNOPARK CAMPUS, TRIVANDRUM, KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY, MR. MATHEW
JACOB, PIN - 695581
BY ADVS.
SRI. BENNY P. THOMAS (SR. ADV.)
SHRI.ABEL TOM BENNY
SRI.D.PREM KAMATH
SRI.TOM THOMAS (KAKKUZHIYIL)
SHRI.AARON ZACHARIAS BENNY
SMT.TESSA ROSE
SHRI.CLINT JUDE LEWIS
SHRI. MATHEW ANGELO DAVIS
SMT.ANANDITHA RAJEEV
RESPONDENT/S:
1 JAYAKRISHNAN RAMACHANDRAN NAIR,
S/O K.N. RAMACHANDRAN NAIR,
VALIYAVEETTIL PLAPPLLIL VEEDU,
IRUMPANANGADU, (P.O), EZHUKONE, KOLLAM, PIN - 691505
2 LABOUR COURT KOLLAM,
T D NAGAR, KOLLAM, KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING OFFICER, PIN - 691013
3 FINASTRA SOFTWARE SOLUTIONS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED,
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF INDIA, HAVING
ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT: VIRGO BUILDING, BAGMANE
CONSTELLATION BUSINESS PARK, OUTER RING ROAD,
DODDANEKUNDI, BENGALURU, KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER, PIN - 560037
2026:KER:4896
W.P (C) Nos.38729/2025 & 43396/2025 -2-
BY ADVS.
SRI.V.A.VINOD
SHRI.SUHAIL M.
OTHER PRESENT:
SRI. SHARAN SHAHIER (FOR RES) SRI. V.K SUNIL(GP)
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
17.10.2025, ALONG WITH WP(C).43396/2025, THE COURT ON 20.01.2026
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2026:KER:4896
W.P (C) Nos.38729/2025 & 43396/2025 -3-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
TUESDAY, THE 20TH DAY OF JANUARY 2026 / 30TH POUSHA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 43396 OF 2025
PETITIONER/S:
FINASTRA SOFTWARE SOLUTIONS (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED,
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF INDIA, HAVING
ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT: VIRGO BUILDING, BAGMANE
CONSTELLATION BUSINESS PARK, OUTER RING ROAD,
DODDANEKUNDI, BENGALURU, KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED SIGNATORY,
MR. CHANDRASEKHAR CHINGACHAM, PIN - 560037
BY ADVS.
SRI.SHARAN SHAHIER
SMT.ANGELINA JOY
SMT.RHEA SHERRY
RESPONDENT/S:
1 JAYAKRISHNAN RAMACHANDRAN NAIR,
S/O. K.N. RAMACHANDRAN NAIR, VALIYAVEETTIL PLAPPLLIL
VEEDU, IRUMPANANGADU (P.O.), EZHUKONE, KOLLAM, PIN -
691505
2 LABOUR COURT, KOLLAM,
KOLLAM, KERALA, REPRESENTED BY
ITS PRESIDING OFFICER, PIN - 691013
3 D+H SOLUTIONS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED,
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF INDIA,
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT: 6TH FLOOR, CARNIVAL
TECHNOPARK, TECHNOPARK CAMPUS, TRIVANDRUM, KERALA, PIN
- 695581
BY ADVS.
SRI.V.A.VINOD
SHRI.SUHAIL M.
2026:KER:4896
W.P (C) Nos.38729/2025 & 43396/2025 -4-
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
20.11.2025, ALONG WITH WP(C).38729/2025, THE COURT ON 20.01.2026
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2026:KER:4896
W.P (C) Nos.38729/2025 & 43396/2025 -5-
JUDGMENT
These writ petitions raise a common question as to whether a petition
can be filed under Section 33 C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 19471
(hereinafter referred to as 'the 1947 Act) without there being an independent
adjudication of the claim by the Labour Court / Industrial Tribunal. It is not
disputed before me that the orders impugned in these writ petitions are
orders on claim petitions filed under Section 33 C (2) of the 1947 Act without
there being any prior adjudication before the Labour Court or the Industrial
Tribunal. The question raised is no longer res integra in the light of the law
laid down by the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.
Danesh Razak and others, (1995) 1 SCC 235 and Bombay Chemical
Industries v. Deputy Labour Commissioner and others, (2022) 5
SCC 629. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) the Supreme
Court held as follows;
"8. Reference may be made first to the Constitution Bench
decision in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan on
which Shri Rao placed heavy reliance. That was a case in
which the question of maintainability of proceedings under
Section 33-C(2) of the Act was considered in a claim made by
the workmen on the basis of the Sastry Award. The employer
disputed the claim of the workmen on several grounds
including the applicability of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It was
1.Section 33 C (2) of the 1947 Act corresponds to Section 59 of the Industrial Relations
Code, 2020
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urged that since the applications involved a question of
interpretation of the Sastry Award, they were outside the
purview of Section 33-C(2) because interpretation of awards
or settlements has been expressly provided for by Section 36-
A. This objection was rejected. This Court pointed out the
difference in the scope of Section 36-A and Section 33-C(2)
indicating that the distinction lies in the fact that Section 36-A
is not concerned with the implementation or execution of the
award whereas that is the sole purpose of Section 33-C(2);
and whereas Section 33-C(2) deals with cases of
implementation of individual rights of workmen falling under
its provisions, Section 36-A deals merely with a question of
interpretation of the award where a dispute arises in that
behalf between the workmen and the employer and the
appropriate Government is satisfied that the dispute deserves
to be resolved by reference under Section 36-A. In this context,
this Court also indicated that the power of the Labour Court in
a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) being akin to that of the
Executing Court, the Labour Court is competent to interpret
the award or settlement on which a workman bases his claim
under Section 33-C(2), like the power of the Executing Court to
interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. Relevant
extract from that decision is as under: (SCR pp. 154-155)
"Besides, there can be no doubt that when the
Labour Court is given the power to allow an
individual workman to execute or implement his
existing individual rights, it is virtually
exercising execution powers in some cases, and it
is well settled that it is open to the Executing
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Court to interpret the decree for the purpose of
execution. It is, of course, true that the Executing
Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it
add to or subtract from the provision of the
decree. These limitations apply also to the
Labour Court; but like the Executing Court, the
Labour Court would also be competent to
interpret the award or settlement on which a
workman bases his claim under Section 33-C(2).
Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that
for the purpose of making the necessary
determination under Section 33-C(2), it would,
in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour
Court to interpret the award or settlement on
which the workman's right rests."
This decision itself indicates that the power of the Labour
Court under Section 33-C(2) extends to interpretation of the
award or settlement on which the workman's right rests, like
the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the
purpose of execution, where the basis of the claim is referable
to the award or settlement, but it does not extend to
determination of the dispute of entitlement or the basis of the
claim if there be no prior adjudication or recognition of the
same by the employer. This decision negatives instead of
supporting the submission of learned counsel for the
respondents.
9. Another decision on the point is Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v.
Gopal Bhiva wherein also Gajendragadkar, J., (as he then
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was) speaking for the Bench, referring to the above
Constitution Bench decision, stated that the proceedings
contemplated by Section 33-C(2) are analogous to execution
proceedings and the Labour Court, like the Executing Court in
the execution proceedings governed by the Code of Civil
Procedure, would be competent to interpret the award on
which the claim is based. It is obvious that the power of the
Executing Court is only to implement the adjudication already
made by a decree and not to adjudicate a disputed claim
which requires adjudication for its enforcement in the form of
decree. The Executing Court, after the decree has been passed,
is however competent to interpret the decree for the purpose of
its implementation. This position was settled by the above
Constitution Bench decision and has been the consistent view
of this Court ever since then.
10. Next case on this point is Chief Mining Engineer, East
India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameswar wherein the above decisions
were relied on. It was held that the right to the benefit which is
sought to be computed under Section 33-C(2) must be "an
existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or
provided for". The propositions on the question as to the scope
of Section 33-C(2) deducible from the earlier decisions of this
Court were summarised and they include the following,
namely: (SCR pp. 142-144)
"(1) The legislative history indicates that the
legislature, after providing broadly for the
investigation and settlement of disputes on the
basis of collective bargaining, recognised the need
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of individual workmen of a speedy remedy to
enforce their existing individual rights and
therefore inserted Section 33-A in 1950 and
Section 33-C in 1956. These two sections illustrate
cases in which individual workmen can enforce
their rights without having to take recourse to
Section 10(1) and without having to depend on
their union to espouse their case.
***
(3) Section 33-C which is in terms similar to those
in Section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate
Tribunal) Act, 1950 is a provision in the nature of
an executing provision.
***
(5) Section 33-C(2) takes within its purview cases
of workmen who claim that the benefit to which
they are entitled should be computed in terms of
money even though the right to the benefit on
which their claim is based is disputed by their
employers. It is open to the Labour Court to
interpret the award or settlement on which the
workmen's right rests.
***
(7) Though the court did not indicate which cases
other than those under sub-section (1) would fall
under sub-section (2), it pointed out illustrative
cases which would not fall under sub-section (2),
viz., cases which would appropriately be
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adjudicated under Section 10(1) or claims which
have already been the subject-matter of
settlement to which Sections 18 and 19 would
apply.
(8) Since proceedings under Section 33-C(2) are
analogous to execution proceedings and the
Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of
money the benefit claimed by a workman is in
such cases in the position of an Executing Court,
the Labour Court like the Executing Court in
execution proceedings governed by the Code of
Civil Procedure, is competent under Section 33-
C(2) to interpret the award or settlement where
the benefit is claimed under such award or
settlement and it would be open to it to consider
the plea of nullity where the award is made
without jurisdiction."
After stating the propositions, the decision proceeds to state as
under: (SCR p. 144)
"It is clear that the right to the benefit which is
sought to be computed must be an existing one,
that is to say, already adjudicated upon or
provided for and must arise in the course of and
in relation to the relationship between an
industrial workman and his employer."
11. In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v.
Workmen it was held with reference to the earlier decisions
2026:KER:4896
that a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) being in the nature of
an execution proceeding, it would appear that an
investigation of the alleged right of re-employment is outside
its scope and the Labour Court exercising power under Section
33-C(2) of the Act cannot arrogate to itself the functions of
adjudication of the dispute relating to the claim of re-
employment. Distinction between proceedings in a suit and
execution proceedings thereafter was pointed out. It was
indicated that the plaintiff's right to relief against the
defendant involves an investigation which can be done only in
a suit and once the defendant's liability had been adjudicated
in the suit, the working out of such liability with a view to give
relief is the function of an execution proceeding. This
distinction is clearly brought out in that decision as under:
(SCR p. 159 : SCC pp. 701-02)
"In a suit, a claim for relief made by the plaintiff
against the defendant involves an investigation
directed to the determination of (i) the plaintiff's
right to relief; (ii) the corresponding liability of
the defendant, including, whether the defendant
is, at all, liable or not; and (iii) the extent of the
defendant's liability, if any. The working out of
such liability with a view to give relief is
generally regarded as the function of an
execution proceeding. Determination No. (iii)
referred to above, that is to say, the extent of the
defendant's liability may sometimes be left over
for determination in execution proceedings. But
that is not the case with the determinations
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under heads (i) and (ii). They are normally
regarded as the functions of a suit and not an
execution proceeding. Since a proceeding under
Section 33-C(2) is in the nature of an execution
proceeding it should follow that an investigation
of the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) above
is, normally, outside its scope. It is true that in a
proceeding under Section 33-C(2), as in an
execution proceeding, it may be necessary to
determine the identity of the person by whom or
against whom the claim is made if there is a
challenge on that score. But that is merely
'Incidental'. To call determinations (i) and (ii)
'Incidental' to an execution proceeding would be
a perversion, because execution proceedings in
which the extent of liability is worked out are just
consequential upon the determinations (i) and
(ii) and represent the last stage in a process
leading to final relief. Therefore, when a claim is
made before the Labour Court under Section 33-
C(2) that court must clearly understand the
limitations under which it is to function. It
cannot arrogate to itself the functions--say of an
Industrial Tribunal which alone is entitled to
make adjudications in the nature of
determinations (i) and (ii) referred to above, or
proceed to compute the benefit by dubbing the
former as 'Incidental' to its main business of
computation. In such cases, determinations (i)
and (ii) are not 'Incidental' to the computation.
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The computation itself is consequential upon and
subsidiary to determinations (i) and (ii) as the
last stage in the process which commenced with
a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. It was,
therefore, held in State Bank of Bikaner and
Jaipur v. R.L. Khandelwal that a workman
cannot put forward a claim in an application
under Section 33-C(2) in respect of a matter
which is not based on an existing right and
which can be appropriately the subject-matter of
an industrial dispute which requires a reference
under Section 10 of the Act."
12. The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but
missed the true import thereof. The ratio of these decisions
clearly indicates that where the very basis of the claim or the
entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed,
there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by
the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not
incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly
outside the scope of a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the
Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the
workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the
benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power
under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It is only when the
entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the
employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or
enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation
that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour
Court's power under Section 33-C(2) like that of the Executing
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Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its
execution."
In Bombay Chemical Industries (supra) the Supreme Court referred to
the judgment in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) and held as
follows;
"7. At the outset it is required to be noted that Respondent 2
herein filed an application before the Labour Court under
Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, demanding
difference of wages from 1-4- 2006 to 31-3-2012. It was thus the
case on behalf of Respondent 2 that he was working with the
appellant as a salesman. However, the appellant had taken a
categorical stand that Respondent 2 was never engaged by the
appellant. It was specifically the case on behalf of the appellant
that Respondent 2 had never worked in the establishment in the
post of salesman. Therefore, once there was a serious dispute
that Respondent 2 had worked as an employee of the appellant
and there was a very serious dispute raised by the appellant
that Respondent 2 was not in employment as a salesman as
claimed by Respondent 2, thereafter, it was not open for the
Labour Court to entertain disputed questions and adjudicate
upon the employer-employee relationship between the
appellant and Respondent 2.
8. As per the settled proposition of law, in an application
under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour
Court has no jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate dispute of
entitlement or the basis of the claim of workmen. It can only
interpret the award or settlement on which the claim is based.
As held by this Court in Ganesh Razak, the Labour Court's
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jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
is like that of an executing court. As per the settled proposition
of law without prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed
claim of the workmen, proceedings for computation of the
arrears of wages and/or difference of wages claimed by the
workmen shall not be maintainable under Section 33-C(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act.
9. In Kankuben, it is observed and held that whenever a
workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or
any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of
money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and
is denied of such benefit can approach the Labour Court under
Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the
benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act
is necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-
existing right. The difference between a pre-existing right or
benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered
just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court exercising powers under Section
33-C(2) of the ID Act while the latter does not."
The learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent in both the writ petitions
does not dispute the proposition of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in
the decisions referred to above. Therefore, these writ petitions are allowed,
and Ext.P4 in W.P (C) No.38729/2025 and Ext.P5 in W.P (C) No.43396/2025
will stand set aside, reserving liberty of the 1st respondent to have any claim
adjudicated in accordance with the law. Since it has come to the notice of this
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court that in several cases, claims have been considered under Section 33 C
(2) of the 1947 Act even in the absence of any prior adjudication, the Registry
is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the Labour Courts and
Industrial Tribunals functioning within the jurisdiction of this court. All other
contentions on merits raised by either side are left open.
These writ petitions are ordered accordingly.
Sd/-
GOPINATH P.
JUDGE
AMG
2026:KER:4896
APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 38729 OF 2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE JOB DESCRIPTION OF THE
1ST RESPONDENT.
Exhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF AN EMAIL SENT TO THE
RESPONDENT HIGHLIGHTING THE DISCREPANCIES
THAT WERE DISCOVERED PURSUED TO THE RECENT
AUDIT CONDUCTED DATED 23.05.2019
Exhibit P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE CLAIM PETITION FILED BY
THE 1ST RESPONDENT BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT
Exhibit P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 09.04.2025 IN
C.P.NO.32/ 2024 PASSED BY THE 2ND
RESPONDENT.
2026:KER:4896
APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 43396 OF 2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED
17.10.2025 IN WP(C)NO.38729 OF 2025
Exhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE JOB DESCRIPTION OF THE
1ST RESPONDENT
Exhibit P3 A TRUE COPY OF AN EMAIL SENT TO THE
RESPONDENT HIGHLIGHTING THE DISCREPANCIES
THAT WERE DISCOVERED PURSUED TO THE RECENT
AUDIT CONDUCTED DATED 23.05.2019
Exhibit P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE CLAIM PETITION FILED BY
THE 1ST RESPONDENT BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT
Exhibit P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 09.04.2025 IN
C.P.NO. 32/2024 PASSED BY THE 2ND
RESPONDENT.
