[Cites 37, Cited by 0]
Kerala High Court
The Federal Bank Ltd vs Federal Bank Officers Association on 27 February, 2026
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"C.R."
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
FRIDAY, THE 27TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2026 / 8TH PHALGUNA, 1947
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AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 28.03.2025 IN WP(C) NO.9196 OF 2023 OF HIGH COURT OF
KERALA
APPELLANT/S:
THE FEDERAL BANK LTD.,
REGISTERED OFFICE, ALUVA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, KOCHI, REPRESENTED BY ITS
VICE PRESIDENT (HR)., PIN - 683101
BY ADVS. SRI C.U. SINGH (SR); SRI BENNY P THOMAS (SR)
SHRI.ABEL TOM BENNY
SRI.D.PREM KAMATH
SRI.TOM THOMAS (KAKKUZHIYIL)
RESPONDENT/S:
1 FEDERAL BANK OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,
CENTRAL OFFICE, FBOA ROAD, ALUVA, REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL SECRETARY
SHIMITH P.R., PIN - 683101
2 THE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER (CENTRAL),
KENDRIYA SHRAM BHAVAN, OLIMUGAL, KAKKANAD, KOCHI, PIN - 682030
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BY ADV SRI P CHIDAMBARAM (SR); SRI P RAMAKRISHNAN
SRI.P.R. AJITH KUMAR, CGC
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING RESRVED ON 09.01.2026, THE COURT ON 27.02.2026 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
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JUDGMENT
"C.R."
Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J.
The present appeal arises out of the judgment dated 28.03.2025
passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in WP (C) No. 9196/2023.
By the judgment under challenge, the learned Single Judge, while
allowing the writ petition, quashed the notices issued by the first
respondent therein, namely the Regional Labour Commissioner
(Central) (for short, "RLC"), calling upon the petitioners to participate in
conciliation proceedings instituted under Section 22 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, "ID Act").
2. The notice impugned in the writ proceedings had restrained
the respondent writ petitioner (for short, "RWP") from proceeding with
the call for strike/abstention from work issued in relation to the
employees/officers employed with the appellant Bank.
2.1 Aggrieved thereby, the Federal Bank has preferred the
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present appeal before this Court, calling into question the reasoning and
rationale of the judgment under challenge.
About the parties
3. The appellant describes itself as a Company engaged in the
business of banking, governed by the provisions of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949 and bound by the directions issued by the Reserve
Bank of India (for short, "RBI") under the Reserve Bank of India Act,
1934. It has more than 1,500 branches across India and employs over
15,000 employees in various managerial and non-managerial cadres.
3.1 The RWP is an association of officers employed by the
appellant, comprising members holding posts in Scale I to Scale III
cadres.
3.2 Although the appellant initially commenced its operations in
the State of Kerala, over time it has expanded beyond Kerala and
presently has a pan-India presence, serving a customer base of more
than 2 crore.
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3.3 The RWP is a trade union registered under the provisions of
the Trade Unions Act, 1926, (for short, "TU Act") constituted with the
objective of protecting, safeguarding, and furthering the interests of its
member officers of the appellant Bank.
3.4 The core submission of the RWP is that it represents the
officer cadre of the appellant Bank and does not fall within the definition
of "workman" under the ID Act.
Verdict of the learned Single Judge
4. Upon a challenge being laid to the conciliation proceedings
initiated at the instance of the appellant under Section 22 of the ID Act,
the learned Single Judge accepted the submissions advanced by the RWP
that the members of its trade union cannot be classified as "workmen"
within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID Act. Consequently, it was
held that the RLC lacked jurisdiction to initiate conciliation proceedings
under the ID Act.
4.1 The learned Single Judge observed that officers holding
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higher ranks in the appellant Bank do not fall within the definition of
"workman" as defined under the ID Act, and that the provisions thereof
are inapplicable to employees falling in the "non-workman" category. It
was further held that for an "industrial dispute" to exist, there must be a
relationship of employer and workman between the parties; in the
absence of such a relationship, conciliation proceedings under Section
22 of the ID Act cannot be triggered.
4.2 The Court also observed that the provisions contained in
Chapter V of the ID Act relate only to strikes and lockouts by "workmen"
or "employers" and cannot be extended to apply to the officer cadre
represented by the RWP.
4.3 Rejecting the contention of the appellant that a Conciliation
Officer is appointed by the appropriate Government under the ID Act for
the purpose of settling industrial disputes, the impugned judgment
further held that a Conciliation Officer can act only when an industrial
dispute, as defined under Section 2(k) of the ID Act, exists or is
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apprehended. Thus, the existence of the status of "workman" was held to
be central to the applicability of the ID Act and inseparable therefrom.
Since the member officers of the RWP were held not to be "workmen,"
the learned Single Judge concluded that no industrial dispute could arise
between the parties and, therefore, the powers under Section 22 of the
ID Act could not be invoked. Consequently, the impugned judgment
quashed the notices/directives issued by the RLC referring the RWP to
conciliation proceedings for settlement.
Contentions and submissions of the parties
5. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant Bank,
taking exception to the impugned judgment, advanced the following
submissions:
a. Sec. 2(q) of the ID Act, defining 'strike' uses two different expressions
viz. 'any person' and not 'any workman'. It is referable to cessation of
work by a body of persons employed in any industry acting in
combination or a concerned refusal so employed by the employer
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establishment. The expression "body of persons" is of much wider
amplitude than "workman." Consequently, the regulation of strikes
cannot be confined only to workmen and excluded in respect of
officers. Therefore, when a strike notice was issued on behalf of the
RWP, recourse to Section 22 of the ID Act was justified, as the
provision deals with the prohibition of strikes and lockouts.
b. Section 22 of the ID Act is a special provision enacted to address the
menace of strikes and lockouts being used as instruments of
pressure or intimidation by employees, whether officers or
workmen, in an industrial establishment. The prohibition under
Section 22 of the ID Act is broader than that under Section 23 of the
ID Act, inasmuch as the former restrains "any person" employed in a
Public Utility Service (for short, "PUS") from going on strike in
breach of contract. In essence, for the prohibition on strikes and
lockouts to be attracted under Section 22 of the ID Act, it is sufficient
that the person concerned is employed in a PUS.
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c. Section 24(1) of the ID Act specifically declares strikes and lockouts
to be illegal if they are commenced or continued in contravention of
Section 22 of the ID Act. Thus, by statutory mandate, strikes and
lockouts conducted in violation of Section 22 of the ID Act are
rendered illegal, irrespective of whether the employee concerned
answers the description of a "workman."
d. Referring to the definition of "public utility service" under Section
2(n)of the ID Act, the appellant contended that once a service or
sector is notified as a PUS, Section 22 of the ID Act is automatically
attracted, and it is not necessary to establish the existence of an
"industrial dispute." What is required is merely a proposed call for
strike or lockout by employees of the concerned industrial
establishment, which would, by itself, fall within the prohibition
contained in Section 22 of the ID Act. It was further contended that
the learned Single Judge failed to take note of the fact that, on earlier
occasions, the RWP had participated in conciliation proceedings
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initiated in similar circumstances. Reference was also made to
orders passed in earlier rounds of writ petitions between the parties,
wherein the High Court had restrained the RWP from proceeding
with a strike pending the conclusion of conciliation proceedings. It
was therefore argued that, over the years, the RWP has been
conscious of its status and the applicability of Section 22 of the ID
Act to its proposed calls for strike or abstention from work.
e. The learned Single Judge, it was contended, failed to properly
appreciate the issue and was unduly influenced by the definitions of
"workman," "industrial dispute," and "employer," thereby adopting a
pedantic interpretation of Sections 22 and 24 of the ID Act.
f. Although the RWP may enjoy the fundamental right guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India (for short, "COI"),
it cannot claim an unfettered or absolute right to resort to strikes,
lockouts, or abstention from work at its discretion. Banking, being
integral to the nation's economy, constitutes a vital public service.
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Any attempt to exert pressure on the employer through strikes,
lockouts, or similar measures is likely to disrupt the banking sector,
with consequential adverse effects on the economy and the large
body of customers dependent upon it.
6. The contentions advanced by the RWP Association, in
opposition to those of the appellant, are as follows:
a. The members of the RWP Association do not fall within the
definition of "workman" under Section 2(s) of the ID Act.
Consequently, an "industrial dispute" as defined under Section 2(k) of
the ID Act cannot arise in the absence of a dispute between an
employer and a workman. It is contended that an industrial dispute
can exist only between the categories contemplated under the Act,
namely: (i) employer and employer, (ii) employer and workman, or
(iii) workman and workman. There is no fourth category recognized
under the ID Act. Resultantly, the Conciliation Officer under Section
2(d) of the ID Act also for holding the conciliation proceedings under
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Section 2(e) of the ID Act cannot be appointed by the respondent RLC
under the ID Act. It is nobody's case that members of RWP
association fall under the definition of "workman", under Sec. 2(s) of
the ID Act.
b. Although, on earlier occasions, the RWP Association or its members
may have participated in conciliation proceedings or furnished
undertakings, the core legal issue regarding the applicability of
Sections 22 and 23 of the ID Act was never adjudicated. Since the
issue pertains to jurisdiction, it is open to the Court to determine it
notwithstanding any earlier orders or conduct of the parties.
c. As a registered trade union, the RWP Association asserts that it
enjoys the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c) of
the COI. The right to resort to lawful modes of protest, including
strikes or demonstrations, is asserted to be one such permissible
mode, subject to law.
d. The service conditions of the officers of the appellant Bank are
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governed by settlement agreements and the Federal Bank Ltd.
(Officers' Service) Rules. It is contended that the settlements entered
into between the Confederation and the Indian Banks' Association
are not settlements under the ID Act, but are agreements governing
service conditions independently of the Act.
e. Placing reliance on Clauses 5.14, 5.15, and 5.16 of the Federal Bank
Ltd. (Officers' Service) Rules, it is submitted that a comprehensive
mechanism already exists regulating calls for strike, bandh, or
similar actions in the banking sector. These Rules constitute a self-
contained code governing the conduct and service conditions of
officers, and therefore the provisions of the ID Act are inapplicable
to the RWP Association.
f. Relying upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea
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Estate1, and Mukand Ltd. v. Mukand Staff & Officers' Association2, it
is contended that where an Industrial Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to
adjudicate disputes relating to employees who are not "workmen"
under the ID Act, a Conciliation Officer likewise lacks jurisdiction to
entertain such disputes.
g. It is further contended that conciliation proceedings under Section
22 of the ID Act can be initiated only upon a notice given by a
workman or an employer in relation to a dispute involving
workmen. Referring to the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules,
particularly Rules 12, 17, and 18, it is argued that the Conciliation
Officer must, upon failure of conciliation, submit a failure report,
whereafter the dispute between the employer and the workman
may be referred for adjudication. This statutory mechanism, it is
submitted, operates only where the dispute involves workmen, and
AIR 1958 SC 353
(2004) 10 SCC 460
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not non-workmen.
h. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in
Narendra Kumar Sen & Ors. v. The All India Industrial Disputes
(Labour Appellate) Tribunal & Ors3., (paragraph 31), to contend that
the grievance for which conciliation is proposed under Section 22 of
the ID Act must be a grievance of a workman, and the expression
"any person" cannot be read in isolation or divorced from the
surrounding provisions of the ID Act. It must be construed
harmoniously with the scheme of the Act. Therefore, a Conciliation
Officer cannot be appointed, nor can a failure report be submitted,
unless the dispute relates to workmen. In other words, the
expression "any person" must be understood in the context of, and
limited to, "workman" as defined under the ID Act.
i. Lastly, referring to Section 4 of the ID Act, it is contended that the
AIR 1953 Bom 325
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appointment of a Conciliation Officer and the institution of
conciliation proceedings are intended solely for the settlement of
"industrial disputes". The impugned notices, issued at the instance of
the employer, are alleged to be actuated by mala fides and ulterior
motives, particularly when no other nationalised, scheduled, or
commercial banks in the country had initiated similar proceedings
under the ID Act. It is therefore submitted that the learned Single
Judge rightly exercised jurisdiction in quashing the impugned
notices.
Banking Industry in the Indian Economy & its indispensable role in
Nation's growth trajectory
7. As urged on behalf of the appellant, and not disputed by the
RWP, the Central Government, through the Ministry of Labour and
Employment, issued a Gazette Notification dated 5th June 2023 under the
provisions of the ID Act, notifying services engaged in the banking
industry as a PUS for the purposes of the ID Act. The same is deemed to
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fall under Item 2 of the First Schedule to the ID Act. The notification was
issued upon the objective satisfaction of the Central Government that
treating the banking industry as a PUS is necessary in the public interest.
7.1 The said notification dated 5th June 2023 forms part of the
record and appears to have been glossed over by the learned Single
Judge. There evidently existed compelling reasons for the Central
Government to issue such a notification, and we deem it apposite to
briefly advert to the possible considerations underlying the same.
8. At this juncture, certain prefatory observations, by way of
background to the interpretation of Sections 22 and 24 of the ID Act,
become necessary with regard to the indispensable role played by the
banking sector in the Indian economy. Particularly in the post-COVID
period, the banking sector has emerged as a crucial engine driving
economic growth.
8.1 As per official information released by the Press Information
Bureau, Government of India, (for short, "PIB, GOI") dated 10th December
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2025, banking activity has witnessed unprecedented growth between
2015 and 2025. Domestic deposits and credit have nearly tripled, with
deposits increasing from Rs. 88.35 lakh crores to Rs. 231.90 lakh crores,
and credit expanding from Rs. 66.91 lakh crores to Rs. 181.34 lakh crores.
Gross Non-Performing Assets (NPAs), which once posed a significant
threat to economic stability, have declined from a peak of 11.46% in 2018
to 2.31% in 2025.
8.2 The net profits of public sector banks have strengthened
considerably, rising from Rs. 1.05 lakh crores in FY 2022-23 to Rs. 1.78
lakh crores in FY 2024-25. Scheduled commercial banks, including the
appellant Bank, have also posted robust earnings, with net profits
increasing from Rs. 2.63 lakh crores in FY 2022-23 to Rs. 4.01 lakh crores
in FY 2024-25.
8.3 These figures demonstrate that the banking sector has
evolved into a resilient and dynamic force, capable of supporting the
country's growth ambitions and investment needs. This progress is
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attributable to strengthened capital buffers, improved asset quality,
declining loan losses, and sustained profitability, notwithstanding
periodic economic disturbances. The transformation of India's banking
sector is often described as a transition "from crisis to confidence",
contributing significantly to India's emergence among the world's top
five economies. Across key parameters, deposits, credit growth, capital
adequacy, asset quality, and profitability, the banking sector has shown
remarkable improvement over the past decade, as reflected in the
aforementioned PIB, GOI report.
9. As a result of the Government's macro-level strategy of
recognition, resolution, recapitalisation, and reforms, the gross NPA
ratio has declined substantially. In particular, the gross NPA ratio of
Scheduled Commercial Banks (for short, "SCBs") has fallen from 9.8% as
on 31st March 2014 to 3.55% as on 31st March 2025.
9.1 The aforesaid report of the PIB, GOI, being an official
document containing statistical data and financial indicators, cannot
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lightly be disregarded and must be accepted at face value insofar as it
reflects the performance and stability of the banking sector in the
country.
10. The foregoing discussion has been undertaken to emphasise
that the banking sector constitutes a PUS indispensable to the Indian
economy. It cannot be gainsaid that the employees and workmen form
the backbone of this sector and provide the foundation upon which it
progresses.
10.1 These ground realities and practical considerations must be
duly borne in mind by a Constitutional Court while interpreting the
provisions of the ID Act and ought not to be viewed in isolation
therefrom.
Analysis of statutory provisions and the judgements governing the field
11. Since all the contesting parties have extensively referred to
various provisions of the ID Act and the Rules framed thereunder, it
would be appropriate to reproduce certain relevant provisions for a
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proper and complete understanding of the controversy.
11.1 Section 2 of the ID Act, being the definition clause, provides
for various definitions, some of which having relation with the instant
dispute, are extracted below:
Section 2(d) - "conciliation officer" means a conciliation officer
appointed under this Act;
Section 2(e) - "conciliation proceeding" means any proceeding held by a
conciliation officer or Board under this Act;
Section 2(k) - "industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference
between employers and employers, or between employers and
workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with
the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with
the conditions of labour, of any person;
Section 2(n) - "public utility service" means--
(i) any railway service or any transport service for the carriage of
passengers or goods by air;
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(ia) any service in, or in connection with the working of, any major port
or dock or any industrial establishment or unit engaged in essential
defence services;
(ii) any section of an industrial establishment on the working of which
the safety of the establishment or the workmen employed therein
depends;
(iii) any postal, telegraph or telephone service;
(iv) any industry which supplies power, light or water to the public;
(v) any system of public conservancy or sanitation;
(vi) any industry specified in the First Schedule which the appropriate
Government may, if satisfied that public emergency or public interest so
requires, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a public utility
service for the purposes of this Act, for such period as may be specified in the
notification:
Provided that the period so specified shall not, in the first instance,
exceed six months but may, by a like notification, be extended from time
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to time by any period not exceeding six months at any one time, if in the
opinion of the appropriate Government public emergency or public
interest so requires.
Section 2(q) - "strike" means a cessation of work by a body of persons
employed in any industry acting in combination, or a concerted refusal, or
a refusal under a common understanding, of any number of persons who
are or have been so employed, to continue to work or to accept
employment;
Section 2(s) - "workman" means any person (including an apprentice)
employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical,
operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the
terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any
proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes
any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in
connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose
dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does
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not include any such person--
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950, the Army Act, 1950, or the
Navy Act, 1957; or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other
employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity;
or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages
exceeding ten thousand rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the
nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers
vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.
11.2 A reading of the aforesaid definitions reveals a nuanced
distinction between the expressions consciously employed by
Parliament, namely "workman" under Section 2(s) of the ID Act and "any
body" of persons occurring in the definition of "strike" under Section 2(q)
of the ID Act.
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11.3 An "industrial dispute" as per Section 2(k) of the ID Act is a
dispute or difference between employers and employers, employers and
workman, workman and workman connected with the employment.
Other than this, there may be a fourth category of dispute which is
referable to the 'conditions of labour of any person'. Therefore the
definition of strike is not referable per se to cessation of work only by
workman or employer, but can be by 'any body' of persons employed in
any industry. The expression 'any body of persons' or 'persons' is an
expression having larger territory, meaning and encompasses within
itself not only the workmen, but also even non-workmen employed in the
industry.
11.4 While Parliament has expressly defined "workman," it has not
stipulated that the expression "any person employed" occurring in the ID
Act must be read as synonymous exclusively with "workman." This subtle
but significant distinction must be borne in mind while interpreting the
remaining provisions of the ID Act.
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12. Proceeding further in the aforesaid background, Sections 10A
and 10B of the ID Act assume significance.
Section 10A, titled "Voluntary reference of disputes to arbitration," provides
for the voluntary reference of an industrial dispute to arbitration by
agreement between the employer and the workmen. The dispute
contemplated therein is expressly referable to an "industrial dispute"
between the employer and the workmen, and the provision prescribes
the manner and procedure for such reference.
12.1 Likewise, Section 10B (as applicable in the State of Kerala
being a State amendment) titled as 'Power to issue orders regarding terms
and conditions of service pending settlement of disputes' empowers the State
Government to issue appropriate orders for securing public safety or
convenience or the maintenance of public order or supplies of public
order or supplies in services or for maintaining industrial peace in any
industrial establishment in respect of which reference to the arbitration
has been made under Sec. 10 or Sec. 10A of the ID Act.
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12.2 A conjoint reading of Sections 10, 10A, and 10B of the ID Act
would indicate that the statutory scheme consistently contemplates an
industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen.
Section 10B reads as follows:
Section 10B - Power to issue orders regarding terms and conditions of
service pending settlement of disputes
(1) Where an industrial dispute has been referred by the State
Government to a Labour Court or Tribunal under sub-section (1) of
Section 10 and, if in the opinion of that Government it is necessary or
expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience or the
maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life
of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in
the establishment concerning which such reference has been made, it
may, by general or special order, make provision--
(a) for requiring the employers or workmen or both to observe such
terms and conditions of employment as may be specified in the order or
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as may be determined in accordance with the order, including payment
of money by the employer to any person who is or has been a workman;
(b) for requiring any public utility service not to close or remain closed
and to work or continue to work on such terms and conditions as may
be specified in the order; and
(c) for any incidental or supplementary matters which appear to it to be
necessary or expedient for the purposes of the order:
Provided that no order made under this sub-section shall require any employer
to observe terms and conditions of employment less favourable to the workmen
than those which were applicable to them at any time within three months
immediately preceding the date of the order.
Explanation.-- For the purposes of this sub-section, "public utility
service" means--
(i) any section of an industrial establishment on the working of which
the safety of the establishment or the workmen employed therein
depends;
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(ii) any industry which supplies power, light or water to the public;
(iii) any industry which has been declared by the State Government to
be a public utility service for the purposes of this Act.
(2) An order made under sub-section (1) shall cease to operate on the
expiry of a period of six months from the date of the order or on the date
of the award of the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be,
whichever is earlier. Any money paid by an employer to any person in
pursuance of any order under sub-section (1) may be deducted by that
employer from any monetary benefit to which such person becomes
entitled under an award passed by the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as
the case may be.
12.3 The language employed in Section 10B of the ID Act further
reinforces that the statutory mechanism under these provisions is
predicated upon the existence of an industrial dispute involving
workmen, and the powers conferred are structured accordingly.
13 Section 12 of the ID Act, titled "Duties of Conciliation Officers",
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obligates the Conciliation Officer, whenever any industrial dispute is
referred, to conduct conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner.
The Conciliation Officer is empowered to investigate the merits and all
issues pertaining to the dispute and to take such steps as may be
necessary to facilitate a fair and amicable settlement.
13.2 The Conciliation Officer is further obligated, on the success or
failure of the conciliation proceedings, to prepare and forward a report
to the appropriate Government. In the event of failure, the dispute is to
be referred to the competent authority, such as a Board, Labour Court,
Tribunal, or National Tribunal, as the circumstances may require.
13.3 The relevant provisions of Section 12 of the ID Act read as
follows:
"12. Duties of conciliation officers
(1) Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation
officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a
notice under Section 22 has been given, shall hold conciliation
proceedings in the prescribed manner.
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(2) The conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a
settlement of the dispute, without delay, investigate the dispute and all
matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof, and may
do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties
to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute.
(3) If a settlement of the dispute, or of any of the matters in dispute, is
arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings, the conciliation
officer shall send a report thereof to the appropriate Government [or an
officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government]
together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to
the dispute.
(4) If no such settlement is arrived at, the conciliation officer shall, as soon
as practicable after the close of the investigation, send to the appropriate
Government a full report setting forth the steps taken by him for
ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the dispute and for
bringing about a settlement thereof, together with a full statement of
such facts and circumstances, and the reasons on account of which, in his
opinion, a settlement could not be arrived at.
(5) If, on consideration of the report referred to in sub-section (4), the
appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to
a Board, [Labour Court, Tribunal, or National Tribunal], it may make such
reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a
reference, it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its
reasons therefor.
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(6) A report under this Section shall be submitted within fourteen days of
the commencement of the conciliation proceedings, or within such
shorter period as may be fixed by the appropriate Government:
Provided that, subject to the approval of the conciliation officer, the time
for submission of the report may be extended by such period as may be
agreed upon in writing by all the parties to the dispute.
This provision underscores that the role of the Conciliation Officer is
procedural and facilitative, aimed at promoting settlement between the
parties to an industrial dispute, with a clear mandate for reporting to
the appropriate Government.
14. Chapter V - Strikes and Lockouts
Chapter V of the ID Act, titled "Strikes and Lockouts", contains
independent, standalone provisions relating to the prohibition of strikes
and lockouts. The relevant provisions, Sections 22, 23, and 24 of the ID
Act, read as follows:
14.1 Section 22 - Prohibition of strikes and lock-outs
(1) No person employed in a public utility service shall go on strike in breach
of contract--
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(a) without giving the employer notice of strike, as hereinafter
provided, within six weeks before striking; or
(b) within fourteen days of giving such notice; or
(c) before the expiry of the date of strike specified in any such
notice as aforesaid; or
(d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a
conciliation officer and seven days after the conclusion of such
proceedings.
(2) No employer carrying on any public utility service shall lock-out any
of his workmen--
(a) without giving them notice of lock-out as hereinafter provided,
within six weeks before locking out; or
(b) within fourteen days of giving such notice; or
(c) before the expiry of the date of lock-out specified in any such
notice as aforesaid; or
(d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a
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conciliation officer and seven days after the conclusion of such
proceedings.
(3) The notice of lock-out or strike under this Section shall not be
necessary where there is already in existence a strike or, as the case
may be, a lock-out in the public utility service, but the employer
shall send intimation of such lock-out or strike on the day on which
it is declared to such authority as may be specified by the
appropriate Government.
(4) The notice of strike referred to in sub-section (1) shall be given by
such number of persons to such person or persons and in such
manner as may be prescribed.
(5) The notice of lock-out referred to in sub-section (2) shall be given in
such manner as may be prescribed.
(6) If on any day an employer receives from any persons employed by
him any such notices as referred to in sub-section (1) or gives to any
persons employed by him any such notices as referred to in sub-
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section (2), he shall within five days report the same to the
appropriate Government or to such authority as that Government
may prescribe.
14.2 Section 23 - General prohibition of strikes and lock-outs
No workman who is employed in any industrial establishment shall go on strike
in breach of contract, and no employer of any such workman shall declare
a lock-out--
(a) during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before a Board and seven
days after the conclusion of such proceedings;
(b) during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court,
Tribunal, or National Tribunal, and two months after the conclusion
thereof;
(bb) during the pendency of arbitration proceedings before an
arbitrator and two months after the conclusion thereof, where a
notification has been issued under sub-section (3A) of Section 10A;
or
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(c) during any period in which a settlement or award is in operation, in
respect of any of the matters covered by the settlement or award.
14.3 Section 24 - Illegal strikes and lock-outs
(1) A strike or a lock-out shall be illegal if--
(i) it is commenced or declared in contravention of Sections 22 or 23; or
(ii) it is continued in contravention of an order made under sub-section
(3) of Section 10 or sub-section (4A) of Section 10A.
(2) Where a strike or lock-out pursuant to an industrial dispute has
already commenced and is in existence at the time of reference of
the dispute to a Board, Labour Court, Tribunal, or National Tribunal,
the continuance of such strike or lock-out shall not be deemed
illegal, provided that it was not at its commencement in
contravention of the Act or prohibited under sub-section (3) of
Section 10 or sub-section (4A) of Section 10A.
(3) A lock-out declared in consequence of an illegal strike, or a strike
declared in consequence of an illegal lock-out, shall not be deemed
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illegal.
(emphasis supplied)
15. Observations on Sections 22, 23, and 24 of the ID Act
1. Expression "no person employed" under Section 22 of the ID Act
Section 22 of the ID Act uses the expression "no person employed in a
public utility service" as opposed to the specific expressions
"employer" or "workman" used elsewhere in the ID Act. The statutory
embargo on strikes and lockouts therefore applies not only to
workmen but also to non-workmen, provided they are employed in
a PUS.
2. Legislative intent
Had Parliament intended Section 22 of the ID Act to apply only to
workmen, it would have used the term "workman" instead of "any
person." The use of a broader expression indicates that Section 22
of the ID Act applies to all employees in a PUS, including non-
workmen.
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3. Distinction between Sections 22 and 23 of the ID Act
Section 23 of the ID Act specifically restrains workmen from
resorting to strikes and lockouts, whereas Section 22 of the ID Act
imposes a broader statutory embargo applicable to any person
employed in a PUS. The existence of separate provisions
demonstrates that Section 22 of the ID Act is intended to cover non-
workmen as well.
4. Section 24 of the ID Act - Declaration of illegality
Section 24 of the ID Act reinforces the statutory prohibition by
declaring strikes and lockouts illegal if undertaken in contravention
of Sections 22 or 23 of the ID Act. Sub-section (1)(i) of Section 24 of
the ID Act targets strikes and lockouts before their commencement,
while sub-section (1)(ii) of Section 24 of the ID Act addresses those
continuing in contravention of Section 10A of the ID Act.
5. Omnibus applicability of Section 22 of the ID Act
The statutory embargo under Section 22 of the ID Act operates
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perpetually and applies to all persons employed in the concerned
industrial establishment once it is notified as a PUS under Section
2(n) of the ID Act by the Central Government. Any person employed
with a PUS is statutorily prohibited from participating in strikes and
lockouts.
This framework highlights the legislative distinction and clear intent of
Parliament to impose restrictions on both workmen and non-workmen
employed in a PUS.
16. Viewed in the above perspective, a strike or lockout cannot
be resorted to, declared, or commenced by any person without fulfilling
the prerequisites prescribed under Sections 22(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), and
(1)(d) of the ID Act.
16.1 Section 22(1)(d) of the ID Act, insofar as it states, "during the
pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer," cannot
be construed as restricting the debarment only to workmen. It is a
settled principle of statutory interpretation that a sub-clause cannot be
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elevated to serve as the principal or charging provision, nor can it be
used to interpret the main charging clause. A sub-clause must be given
subsidiary status relative to the principal clause.
16.2 Accordingly, Section 22(1)(d) of the ID Act cannot dictate the
interpretation of Section 22(1) of the ID Act, which is the principal or
charging provision. What Section 22(1)(d) indicates, in fact, is that no
person employed in a public utility service may go on strike during the pendency
of conciliation proceedings. The focus is on the conduct of the strike, not
the status of the person - whether workman or non-workman.
16.3 Interpreting Section 22(1) through the lens of Section 22(1)(d)
of the ID Act would dilute the principal provision, undermining its scope
and purpose. Such an interpretation is impermissible, as it would
subordinate the main charging provision to its sub-clause, defeating the
very object for which Section 22 of the ID Act was enacted.
17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that
the conduct of employees, including proceeding on strike in
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establishments, organizations, or any vital sector of the financial
economy, cannot be treated as a facet of Article 19(1)(c) of the COI. In the
judgment of T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors.4, the
Apex Court categorically held that the right to strike cannot be
considered a fundamental right. Even the most liberal interpretation of
Article 19(1)(c) of the COI does not confer upon trade unions a
guaranteed right to collective bargaining or to strike.
17.1 Subversive activities that disrupt or halt the functioning,
operation, and working of an industrial establishment can never be
justified as an exercise of a fundamental right, nor can any legal or
statutory right be attached to such activities. Referring to the provisions
of the ID Act, as well as the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct
Rules, 1973, the Supreme Court observed that if strikes were treated as a
permissible mode of protest, the tool would likely cause more harm than
(2003) 6 SCC 581
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good, with society and the public at large being the ultimate sufferers.
17.2 Strikes affect the social fabric, particularly when a large
number of employees participate en masse, bringing administration to a
standstill. Employees who go on strike thereby commit misconduct of
the highest order by jeopardizing the peaceful functioning and
operation of public sector organizations, which renders such activity
unconstitutional.
17.3 Referring extensively to the judgments in Ex-Capt. Harish
Uppal v. Union of India5, and Communist Party of India (M) v. Bharat
Kumar6, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Paras 19 to 21 of T.K. Rangarajan
(supra), held as follows:
"19. Apart from statutory rights, government employees cannot claim that they
can take the society at ransom by going on strike. Even if there is injustice to
some extent, as presumed by such employees, in a democratic welfare State, they
have to resort to the machinery provided under different statutory provisions for
redressal of their grievances. Strike as a weapon is mostly misused which results
(2003) 2 SCC 45
(1998) 1 SCC 201
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in chaos and total maladministration. Strike affects the society as a whole and
particularly when two lakh employees go on strike en masse, the entire
administration comes to a grinding halt. In the case of strike by a teacher, the
entire educational system suffers; many students are prevented from appearing
in their exams which ultimately affects their whole career. In case of strike by
doctors, innocent patients suffer; in case of strike by employees of transport
services, entire movement of the society comes to a standstill: business is
adversely affected and number of persons find it difficult to attend to their work,
to move from one place to another or one city to another. On occasions, public
properties are destroyed or damaged and finally this creates bitterness among
the public against those who are on strike.
20. Further, Mr K.K. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State
of Tamil Nadu also submitted that there are about 12 lakh government employees
in the State. Out of the total income from direct tax, approximately 90% of the
amount is spent on the salary of the employees. Therefore, he rightly submits
that in a society where there is large scale unemployment and number of
qualified persons are eagerly waiting for employment in government
departments or in public sector undertakings, strikes cannot be justified on any
equitable ground.
21. We agree with the said submission. In the prevailing situation, apart from
being conscious of rights, we have to be fully aware of our duties, responsibilities
and effective methods for discharging the same. For redressing their grievances,
instead of going on strike, if employees do some more work honestly, diligently
and efficiently, such gesture would not only be appreciated by the authority but
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also by people at large. The reason being, in a democracy even though they are
government employees, they are part and parcel of the governing body and owe
duty to the society."
(emphasis supplied)
18. Ready reference may also be made to the Constitution Bench
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in All India Bank Employees'
Association v. National Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), Bombay &
Others7, wherein the question arose regarding the constitutional validity
of Section 34A of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, as amended by the
1960 amendment. It was contended that the right to collective
bargaining is implicit under Article 19(1)(c) of the COI and cannot be
restricted.
18.1 The Supreme Court, repelling this contention, held that
reasonable restrictions on the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c)
of the COI can always be imposed by statute, particularly when such
restrictions are enacted in the interest of the general public. By no
1961 SCC OnLine SC 5
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stretch of imagination was Article 19(1)(c) of the COI intended to
encompass a right to go on strike, whether as part of collective
bargaining or otherwise. Such a right to strike, or the right to declare a
lockout, can always be regulated, controlled, or even prohibited by
appropriate industrial legislation.
18.2 The Court further held that the right to strike cannot be
justified as a concomitant of the right to assemble and form associations
under Article 19(1)(c). The following observations of the Supreme Court
in All India Bank Employees' Association (supra) are particularly
pertinent in this context:
"Besides the qualification subject to which the right under sub clause (c) is
guaranteed, viz., the contents of clause (4) of article 19 throw considerable light
upon the scope of the freedom, for the significance and contents of the grants of
the Constitution are best understood and read in the light of the restrictions
imposed. If the right guaranteed included not merely that which would flow on a
literal reading of the article, but every right which is necessary in order that the
association brought into existence fulfils every object for which it is formed, the
qualifications therefor would be not merely those in clause (4) of article 19, but
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would be more numerous and very different, restrictions which bore upon and
took into account the several fields in which associations or unions of citizens
might legitimately engage themselves. Merely by way of illustration we might
point out that learned counsel admitted that though the freedom guaranteed to
workmen to form labour unions carried with it the concomitant right to collective
bargaining together with the right to strike, still the provision in the Industrial
Disputes Act forbidding strikes in protected industries as well as in the event of
a reference of the dispute to adjudication under section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act was conceded to be a reasonable restriction on the right guaranteed
by sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of article 19. It would be seen that if the right to
strike were by implication a right guaranteed by sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of
article 19, then the restriction on that right in the interests of the general public,
viz., of national economy while perfectly legitimate if tested by the criteria in
clause (6) of article 19, might not be capable of being sustained as a reasonable
restriction imposed for reasons of morality or public order. On the construction
of the article, therefore, apart from the authorities to which we shall refer
presently, we have reached the conclusion that even a very liberal interpretation
of sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of article 19 cannot lead to the conclusion that the
trade unions have a guaranteed right to an effective collective bargaining or to
strike, either as part of collective bargaining or otherwise. The right to strike or
the right to declare a lock-out may be controlled or restricted by appropriate
industrial legislation, and the validity of such legislation would have to be tested
not with reference to the criteria laid down in clause (4) of article 19 but by totally
different considerations."
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(emphasis supplied)
19. From the foregoing, it is evident that the reliance placed by
the RWP on the judgment is of no avail. On the contrary, the judgments
in T.K. Rangarajan (supra) and All India Bank Employees' Association
(supra) support the submissions of the appellant bank. It can be safely
concluded that the right to collective bargaining by resorting to strikes
or lockouts by employees of any establishment falls outside the
constitutional protections of Article 19(1)(c) of the COI. There is no
dispute with the legal position that the right to form an association, or a
trade union, does not automatically confer a right to go on strike or
disrupt the functioning of the employer through anti-establishment
actions. This is precisely the Parliamentary intent behind the enactment
of the provisions under Chapter V of the ID Act, namely Sections 22, 23,
and 24 of the ID Act.
20. This legal position is further echoed in the judgment of B.R.
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Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors8, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court
considered the legitimacy of strikes in non-public utility services at the
behest of employee workmen of the Trade Fair Authority of India (TFAI).
The Court, interpreting the provisions of the TU Act, the ID Act, and
related enactments, held that the right to form associations or unions is
a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c) of the COI.
However, the right to strike is not absolute under Indian industrial
jurisprudence, as statutory restrictions have been imposed on it. This is
evident from provisions regulating and restricting the right to strike
under certain conditions, particularly Sections 10 and 10A of the ID Act.
Sections 22 and 23 of the ID Act operate in a different field and are
distinct from the cognate provisions of Sections 10 and 10A of ID Act.
21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Sections 22 and 23 of
the ID Act prohibit strikes at the threshold by placing an omnibus
(1989) 4 SCC 710
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embargo on 'any person' associated with the relevant industry. In Paras
16 and 17 of B.R. Singh (supra), the Supreme Court observed as follows:
"16. The field of operation of Sec. 22 and 23 is different. While Sec. 10(3) and Sec.
10-A(4-A) confer power to prohibit continuance of strike which is in progress, Sec.
22 and 23 seek to prohibit strike at the threshold. Sec. 22 provides that no person
employed in a public utility service shall proceed on strike unless the
requirements of clauses (a) to (d) of sub-Sec. (1) thereof are fulfilled. The
expression "public utility service" is defined in Sec. 2(n) and indisputably TFAI
does not fall within that expression. Sec. 23 next imposes a general restriction on
declaring strikes in breach of contract during pendency of (1) conciliation
proceedings, (ii) proceedings before Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal,
(iii) arbitration proceedings and (iv) during the period of operation of any
settlement or award. In the present case no proceedings were pending before any
of the aforementioned fora nor was it contended that any settlement or award
touching these workmen was in operation during the strike period and hence this
provision too can have no application. Under Sec. 24 a strike will be illegal only if
it is commenced or declared in contravention of Sec. 22 or 23 or is continued in
contravention of an order made under Sec. 10(3) or 10-A(4-A) of the ID Act. Except
the above provisions, no other provision was brought to our attention to support
the contention that the strike was illegal. we, therefore, reject this contention.
17. The next question is whether the material on record reveals that the of ice-
bearers of the Union had given threats to officials of TFAI as alleged. The Labour
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Court has negatived the involvement of office-bearers of the Union in giving
threats either in person or on telephone. we have perused the evidence on record
in this behalf and we are inclined to think that there were angry protests and
efforts to obstruct the of icers from entering the precincts of TFAI but there is no
convincing evidence of use of force or violence."
(emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, from the foregoing, it is clear that the fundamental right
under Article 19(1)(c) of COI does not encompass the right to go on strike
or declare lockouts, independent of the statutory provisions of the ID
Act.
Consideration and findings
22. As stated supra, the RWP has vehemently contended that the
embargo under Sections 22 and 23 of the ID Act applies only to workmen,
and that the very purpose of instituting conciliation proceedings is to
settle an industrial dispute, which, it is argued, cannot arise without a
workman on one side. This contention is rejected for the fundamental
reason that Sections 22 and 23 of the ID Act operate in different spheres.
While Section 22 of the ID Act places a statutory embargo on "any
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person", Section 23 of the ID Act imposes an embargo specifically on
"workmen". For the reasons discussed supra, the ambit and scope of
Section 22 cannot be controlled by the provisions of Section 12 or Section
22(1)(d) of the ID Act, but must be given an independent interpretation,
regardless of whether the employees are classified as workmen. If this
distinction is not recognized, the very purpose of enacting Section 22 of
the ID Act would be defeated.
22.1 Section 22 of the ID Act, as discussed above, applies even when
workmen are not involved, whereas Section 23 of the ID Act applies only
when a dispute involves workmen. The gravamen of Section 22 of the ID
Act is triggered the moment it concerns a PUS as notified under Section
2(n) of the ID Act. Strikes or lockouts as modes of protest are statutorily
prohibited because they have the effect of paralyzing the functioning of
establishments of immense public utility, such as the banking sector,
which is at the forefront of the Indian economy.
22.2 The reasoning of the learned Single Judge is therefore based
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on a misunderstanding of the statutory scheme and is, consequently,
erroneous. The Single Judge relied extensively on the judgment in
Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea (supra) to conclude that conciliation
proceedings can only be initiated in the context of an industrial dispute,
which, by necessary implication, cannot arise without the involvement
of workmen. We are not addressing the broader question of whether the
members of the RWP are workmen, as on other issues we are already
persuaded that the findings of the learned Single Judge are
unsustainable and incorrect.
23. The judgment in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate (supra)
did not concern the interpretation of Section 22 of the Act. To the
contrary, it held that the expression "any person" must be interpreted
differently from "workman". The expression "any person" cannot be
treated as equivalent or synonymous with "workman" under the ID Act.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court explicitly held that nothing in the ID Act
suggests that the word "person," as employed in Section 22(1) of the ID
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Act, refers only to a workman. The Court expressly rejected the
contention that the focus of Section 22 of the ID Act would be displaced
from workmen if the expression "any person" is interpreted to include
non-workmen as well.
24. Reference may be made to the observations of the Supreme
Court in paragraphs 38 to 40 of Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate
(supra), which read as follows:
"38. The first reason, then, is that in certain sections, the Act uses the words "any
person". I will assume that by the use of these words only workmen are intended
to be referred to in these sections. But the question arises why is such intention
to be inferred? Clearly, because the context requires it. I will refer to some of these
sections to make my point clear. Section 2(1) defines a lock-out as "the closing of
a place of employment, or the suspension of work, or the refusal by the employer
to continue to employ any number of persons employed by him". Section 2(q)
defines a strike as "a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any
industry acting in combination, or concerted refusal, or a refusal under a
common understanding, of any number of persons who are or have been so
employed to continue to work or to accept employment". Lock-outs and strikes
are dealt with in Sections 22, 23 and 24 of the Act. Section 22(2) says that no
employer carrying on any public utility service shall lock-out any of his workmen
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except on certain conditions mentioned in the section. Section 23 says that no
employer of any workman employed in any industrial establishment shall
declare a lock-out during the periods mentioned in the section. Section 24 states
that a strike or a lock-out shall be illegal if commenced or declared in
contravention of Section 22 or Section 23. The definitions of lock-outs and strikes
are for the purposes of Sections 22, 23 and 24. There are other sections in which
lock-outs and strikes are mentioned but they make no difference for our present
purpose. The lock-outs and strikes dealt with in Sections 22(2), 23 and 24 are lock-
outs of and strikes by workmen. It may hence be said that in Section 2(1) and (q)
by the word person a workman is meant. Therefore, it is these sections viz. 22(2),
23 and 24, which show what the meaning of the word 'person' in the definitions
is. I would like to point out in passing that Section 22(1) says that no person
employed in a public utility service shall go on strike except on certain conditions
and there is nothing in the Act to show that the word "person" in Section 22(1)
means only a workman. Proceeding however with the point we are concerned
with, the question is, is there any provision in the Act which would show that the
words "any person" in Section 2(k) were meant only to refer to persons of the
workman class. I have not been able to find any and none has been pointed out.
Therefore, the fact that in Section 2 sub-sections (1) and (q) the word "persons"
means workmen is no reason for concluding that the same word must be given
the same restricted meaning in Section 2(k). The position with regard to Section
33-A, in which the word employee has to be read as meaning a workman because
of Section 33, is the same and does not require to be dealt with specially. I may
add that if it has to be said that because in certain other sections the word
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"person" has to be understood as referring to a workman only, in Section 2(k)
also the same word must have the same meaning, then we have to read the words
"any person" in Section 2(k) as meaning only a workman as defined in the Act.
This however is not the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. I
may further say that it was not contended that the word "person" in Section 2
sub-sections (1) and (q) and the word employee in Section 33-A has to be read as
including not only a workman in employment but also a discharged workman
and a person who in future becomes a workman, and it seems to me that such a
contention would not have been possible.
39. I proceed now to deal with the second group of reasons based on the object
and scheme of the Act. It is said that the Act makes a distinction between
employees who are workmen and all other employees, and that the focus of the
Act is on workmen and it was intended mainly for them. This was the view taken
in United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Kedar Nath Gupta15. I will assume all this. It
may also be true that the Act is not much concerned with employees other than
workmen. But I am unable to see that all this is any reason for holding that the
words "any person" must mean a person of the workman class. The definition in
Section 2(k) would be fully concerned with workmen however, the words "any
person" in it may be understood because the dispute will be one to which a
workman is a party. Is it to be said that the Act would cease to be intended for
workmen or the focus of it displaced from workmen or that the distinction
between workmen and other employees would vanish if a dispute relating to the
dismissal of one who is not a workman is held to be an industrial dispute, even
though the dispute is one to which workmen are parties? I am unable to subscribe
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to such an argument. But it is said that in such a case the workmen would not be
interested in the dispute, the dispute would not really be with them and they
would not be in any real sense of the word parties to it. So put the argument
comes under the last of the three reasons earlier stated, namely, that in order
that there may be an industrial dispute the workmen must be interested in that
dispute. This contention I will consider later. It is also said in United Commercial
Bank case that the main purpose of the Act is to adjust the relations between
employers and workmen by securing for the latter the benefit provided by the
Act. It is really another way of saying that the workmen must be interested in the
dispute, for if they are not interested no benefit can accrue to them from an
adjustment of it. This, as I have said, I will discuss later.
40. It is also said that the Act is for the benefit of workmen and therefore if a
dispute concerning a person who is not a workman, is an industrial dispute
capable of being resolved by adjudication under the Act, then, if the award goes
in favour of the workmen raising it, a benefit would result to a person whom the
Act did not intend to benefit.
........"
(emphasis supplied)
25. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge, therefore, is
clearly erroneous, as it proceeds on an incomplete and improper
understanding of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate (supra). The judgment, in fact,
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reaffirms the contention of the appellant herein that Sec. 22(1) of the ID
Act deals with a much broader spectrum, including all categories of
employees (both workmen and non-workmen) employed in any
industrial establishment. Consequently, the finding of the learned Single
Judge on this count is liable to be set aside.
26. In view of the above analysis, we unhesitatingly hold that the
rigors of Sec. 22(1) of the ID Act and the statutory prohibition contained
therein shall apply squarely to the RWP association. Acceptance of the
association's contention would effectively amount to interpreting the
judgment of this Court as legalizing the draconian actions of strikes and
lockouts by trade unions, something the Indian Constitution does not
envisage. There is no basis for the inference that managerial or
supervisory employees of higher ranks or cadres are excluded from the
provisions of the ID Act. While it may be argued in an appropriate case
that managerial and supervisory employees do not fall within the
definition of 'workman', it is entirely different to contend that they
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cannot be covered by the statute itself, particularly Sec. 22(1) of the ID
Act. The learned Single Judge clearly glossed over this crucial aspect,
rendering the reasoning suspect.
27. Further, the restrictions imposed under Section 22 of the ID
Act are designed to protect the interests of the public and ensure the
smooth operation of a PUS. A PUS provides services of immense public
importance, and permitting strikes or lockouts in such services would
have unforeseeable repercussions on the public and the citizenry at
large. The very definition of 'strike' under Sec. 2(q) of the ID Act
contemplates that officers and non-workmen employees are included
within the expression "body of persons employed in any industry". Had
Parliament intended a limited scope, it could have used the term
'workman' instead of 'body of persons'. A conjoint reading of Sec. 2(q) with
Sec. 22(1) of the ID Act clearly demonstrates that the learned Single
Judge erred by overlooking the essential submission of the appellants -
that Section 22, not Sections 12 or 23 of the ID Act, is applicable.
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27.1 The fundamental question, therefore, is whether the call for a
strike by the RWP association could have been made at the outset. If the strike
itself was statutorily prescribed under Sec. 22(1) of the ID Act, there is
no question of the legality of appointing a conciliation officer or
referring the association to conciliation proceedings.
28. Therefore, the reasoning in the impugned judgment is based
on a misconstruction of the provisions of Chapter V of the ID Act,
particularly the definitions of 'strike' and 'PUS' read conjointly with
Section 22(1) of the Act. It is the 'call for strike' per se that may trigger the
initiation of conciliation proceedings, either at the behest of the RLC or
the employer establishment. 'Strike' is an expression entirely distinct
from 'industrial dispute' as defined under Section 2(k) of the ID Act, and
the moment the employer receives intimation, directly or indirectly,
that employees are proposing to go on strike against the establishment,
he is competent to register and initiate appropriate proceedings before
the RLC and trigger conciliation proceedings.
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29. Once conciliation proceedings have been triggered by virtue
of the call for strike, the call for strike cannot be carried forward or acted
upon by the employees during the continuance of such proceedings. By
holding that an 'industrial dispute' is a precondition for initiating
conciliation proceedings, the learned Single Judge overlooked both the
spirit and the substance of the provisions of Chapter V of the ID Act,
which deal with the broader menace of strikes and lockouts as
constitutionally incompatible modes of protest by employees of any
notified PUS. The findings that conciliation proceedings cannot be
initiated without an industrial dispute, and that an industrial dispute
can only arise at the behest of workmen, are based on an incomplete and
unsustainable reading of Chapter V of the ID Act.
30. We, therefore, hold unhesitatingly that even a call for strike,
if communicated to the employer, entitles him to trigger conciliation
proceedings. It is not necessary that such proceedings be preceded by
an 'industrial dispute' at the behest of workmen when the provisions of
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Section 22(1) of the ID Act are applicable. Acceptance of the opposite
argument would mean that strike or lockout could never serve as a
ground for initiating conciliation proceedings, thereby defeating the
Parliament's objective and intent in enacting these provisions.
31. It must be remembered that the root purpose of Section 22(1)
of the ID Act is to address the menace of strikes, not to regulate an
'industrial dispute,' which is the focus of Sections 10, 10A, and 10B under
Chapter III Section 22(1) of the ID Act is a self-contained, special
provision that applies to employees working in a notified PUS, an
establishment of immense public interest, whose activities cannot be
halted, suspended, or hindered by resorting to collective bargaining
through strikes.
32. This Court cannot ignore the practical realities of the present
day, where strikes by employees, workmen, or even officers of any sector
of public importance primarily harm the public at large, particularly
ordinary citizens. If bank officers go on strike, it is the common citizen,
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the lower-middle-class or poor citizens, who are most adversely
affected, not the wealthy. This is because the banking sector's interface
today is far more with ordinary citizens than with the affluent. Even for
basic services such as issuing a money order or demand draft, ordinary
citizens must wait in long queues, running from one counter to another.
33. Suspension of work through strikes or lockouts, therefore,
directly impacts the ordinary citizen. To address this menace, Section
22(1) of the ID Act has been enacted. If the interpretation given in the
impugned judgment is accepted, the provisions of Section 22(1) of the ID
Act would be rendered otiose. Conciliation proceedings before the
Conciliation Officer provide a level playing field for both the employer
and the employee to settle their grievances amicably in a structured
environment. There is no justification for the RWP association to oppose
conciliation proceedings while resorting to strikes and lockouts, which
often have the potential to escalate into violent agitations, resulting in
not only loss of public confidence but also damage to public property and
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assets.
34. The proceedings before the Conciliation Officer do not
undermine the employees' ability to raise grievances; rather, they
facilitate resolution by bringing the employer and employee to the same
negotiating table. They can appropriately be treated as a 'safety valve
mechanism,' whereby any person employed in a PUS must follow a
prescribed procedure before resorting to strike action or patiently
pursue conciliation proceedings. This crucial aspect appears to have
been overlooked by the learned Single Judge.
35. Although lengthy arguments and submissions were made
regarding the previous history and litigation between the parties
whenever strikes were called, with active interventions by various
Single Judges of this Court, we have refrained from delving into these
aspects, as the present judgment concerns a pure question of law. We
have also not addressed ancillary contentions regarding the premature
filing of the writ petition or the alleged absence of cause of action. Since
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the larger issue, the interpretation of Section 22(1) of the ID Act, has
been decided in favour of the appellant, other contentions are not being
considered. In a PUS, the law safeguards the public first - no strike or
lockout can trump the larger interest of the nation.
The Writ Appeal stands allowed. Accordingly, the impugned
judgment dated 28.03.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)
No.9196/2023, is set aside for the reasons stated above, and the writ
petition filed by the RWP is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/-
SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI
JUDGE
Sd/-
SYAM KUMAR V.M.
JUDGE
jjj
