Thrissur in Crl.M.P.No.5403 of 2025 in S.C.No.725/2011. The
petitioner is accused No.11. He faces charges under Sections
2. The prosecution case as narrated in the impugned order
3. The petitioner filed an application seeking discharge
under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. The learned Sessions Judge dismissed
prima facie case against the petitioner and the other accused.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and
the learned Public Prosecutor.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
the petitioner based on the theory of conspiracy. The learned
6. The learned counsel submitted that accused No.12 with
7. The learned Public Prosecutor, per contra, submitted
the petitioner based on the theory of conspiracy. He further
petitioner with the offences alleged, and to establish his
participation in the conspiracy. The prosecution materials show
that accused No.1 obtained a mobile connection with
8. According to the prosecution, the petitioner / accused
with him. On 07.03.2010, she asked the victim-Maneesh, to
come to Cherupadam near Elavallypara padam centre. It is the
9. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
accused No.11 with the aid of conspiracy will not sustain.
10. Sections 239 and 240 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure deal with discharge and framing of charge.
11. The obligation to discharge the accused under Section
239 Cr.P.C. arises when the Magistrate considers the charge
12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing
charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case. The
14. In State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa
15. In State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [(2000) 6 SCC
"7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of
framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider
whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the Accused. The court is not required to
appreciate evidence to conclude whether the
materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting
the Accused."
6 2026:KER:14549
16. In Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and others v. State of
Uttar Pradesh and another [(2013) 11 SCC 476], the Apex
Court observed that while framing charges the Court is required to
evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether
the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would
disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. It
was further held that the Court cannot speculate into the
truthfulness or falsity of the allegations, contradictions and
inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses at the stage of
discharge.
17. Section 239 envisages a careful and objective
consideration of the question whether the charge against the
Accused is groundless or whether there is ground for presuming
that he has committed an offence. What Section 239 prescribes is
not, therefore, an empty or routine formality. It is a valuable
provision to the advantage of the accused, and its breach is not
permissible under the law. But if the Judge, upon considering the
record, including the examination, if any, and the hearing, is of the
opinion that there is "ground for presuming" that the accused has
committed the offence triable under the chapter, he is required by
Section 240 to frame in writing a charge against the Accused. The
order for the framing of the charge is also not an empty or routine
7 2026:KER:14549
formality. It is of a far-reaching nature, and it amounts to a
decision that the accused is not entitled to discharge under Section
239, that there is, on the other hand, ground for presuming that he
has committed an offence triable under Chapter XIX and that he
should be called upon to plead guilty to it and be convicted and
sentenced on that plea, or face the trial. (See: V.C. Shukla v.
State through CBI (AIR 1980 SC 962)."
18. In Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal
Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [(AIR 1980 SC
52)] the Apex Court stated thus:-
"At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded
upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him
to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of
the factual ingredients constituting the offence
alleged, may justify the framing of charge against the
accused in respect of the commission of that offence."
19. In State by Karnataka Lokayukta, Police Station,
Bengaluru v. M.R.Hiremath (2019) 7 SCC 515 the Apex Court
held thus:-
"25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of
the fact that the trial court was dealing with an
application for discharge under the provisions of
Section 239 Cr.P.C. The parameters which govern the
exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in
several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle
of law that at the stage of considering an application for
discharge the court must proceed on the assumption
that the material which has been brought on the record
by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in
order to determine whether the facts emerging from
8 2026:KER:14549
the material, taken on its face value, disclose the
existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the
offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan (2014) 11
SCC 709), adverting to the earlier decisions on the
subject, this Court held: (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29)
29. ... At this stage, probative value of the materials has
to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep
into the matter and hold that the materials would not
warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be
considered is whether there is a ground for presuming
that the offence has been committed and not whether a
ground for convicting the Accused has been made out.
To put it differently, if the court thinks that the Accused
might have committed the offence on the basis of the
materials on record on its probative value, it can frame
the charge; though for conviction, the court has to
come to the conclusion that the Accused has committed
the law does not permit a mini trial at this stage."
20. In State through Deputy Superintendent of Police
v. R. Soundirarasu and Ors. (AIR 2022 SC 4218) the Apex
Court while dealing with the scope of Section 239 Cr.P.C. held
thus:-
"61. Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
lays down that if the Magistrate considers the
charge against the Accused to be groundless, he
shall discharge the Accused. The word 'groundless',
in our opinion, means that there must be no ground
for presuming that the Accused has committed the
offence. The word 'groundless' used in Section 239
of the Code of Criminal Procedure means that the
materials placed before the Court do not make out
or are not sufficient to make out a prima facie case
against the Accused. ......................... 73. This would
not be the stage for weighing the pros and cons of
all the implications of the materials, nor for sifting
the materials placed by the prosecution- the
exercise at this stage is to be confined to
considering the police report and the documents to
decide whether the allegations against the Accused
can be said to be "groundless". 74. The word
9 2026:KER:14549
"ground" according to the Black's Law Dictionary
connotes foundation or basis, and in the context of
prosecution in a criminal case, it would be held to
mean the basis for charging the Accused or
foundation for the admissibility of evidence. Seen in
the context, the word "groundless" would connote
no basis or foundation in evidence. The test which
may, therefore, be applied for determining whether
the charge should be considered groundless is that
where the materials are such that even if
unrebutted, would make out no case whatsoever."
21. Therefore, the obligation to discharge the accused
under Section 239 Cr.P.C. arises when the Magistrate/Special
Judge considers the charge against the accused to be groundless
that is, there is no legal evidence or when the facts are such that
no offence is made out at all and no detailed evaluation of the
materials or meticulous consideration of the possible defences
need be undertaken at this stage nor any exercise of weighing
materials in golden scales is to be undertaken.
22. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that
the prosecution failed to connect Accused No.11 with the crime.
The learned counsel highlighted that, even according to the
prosecution, the mobile phone allegedly used by accused No.1
belongs to a stranger, CW36.
23. The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the
prosecution has no case that Mobile No.9526541731 was in
the name of accused No.11 rather the prosecution alleged that
10 2026:KER:14549
accused No.1 procured SIM card with the aid of CW36 and the
same was used by accused No.11. The learned Public
Prosecutor submitted that the specific case of the prosecution
is that accused No.11 intentionally used that mobile and
pretended love with victim and procured his presence at
Cherupadam where he was attacked by the assailants. The
learned Public Prosecutor submitted that at the time of
search, as pointed out by accused No.11, the mobile phone
used by her and the broken SIM card were recovered.
24. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that
even if the whole prosecution case is admitted for the purpose
of argument, the case put forward by the prosecution only
gives rise to a mere suspicion as distinguished from a grave
suspicion.
25. The learned Public Prosecutor countered and
submitted that the fact that the mobile phone containing the
SIM card used for contacting the victim was recovered as
pointed out by accused No.11 gives rise to a grave suspicion.
The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that there are
credible materials to establish the involvement of accused
No.11 in the criminal conspiracy.
11 2026:KER:14549
26. This Court is of the view that the prosecution
could bring forth grave suspicion against accused No.11 as
highlighted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sajjan Kumar v.
Central Bureau of Investigation [(2010) 9 SCC 368].
27. Essentially, the prosecution case is that the petitioner
aided accused No.1 to procure his presence at the place of
occurrence. The prosecution has placed the call data records and
the statements of other relevant witnesses to prima facie establish
that the petitioner / accused No.11 was involved in the conspiracy
alleged by the prosecution.
28. It is profitable to extract the relevant portion of the
impugned order, which reads thus:-
"8. As against this particular accused, the
indictment is that there was a conspiracy between the
accused No.1 to 12 and for that purpose the accused
No.1 obtained from CW36 a connection number
9526541731 and made the A11 contact Maneesh in
9744971780. The accused No.11 following the
instructions of accused No.1, deliberately call that
number, faked love with the deceased Maneesh and
on 07.03.2010 asked the deceased Maneesh to come
to Cherupadam near Elavallypara padam centre, after
going through the sketch prepared by accused No.1
with the help of accused No.12. At that spot the
accused No.1, 4, 9 and 10 kidnapped him, brought to
the entry portion of paddy. The overt acts have been
from accused Nos.1 to 10.
9. In other words, the involvement of the
accused No.11 is confined to criminal
conspiracy alone.
10. In order to prove the same, the
prosecution has produced call data records
12 2026:KER:14549
between the accused No.11 and deceased
Maneesh, even corresponding to the time when
Maneesh was brought to the paddy. There are
entries, according to the prosecution,
corresponding to such long contact between
accused No.11 and the deceased.
xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx
15. Analysing the evidence that is tendered
against the accused No.11, the situation cannot
be equivalent with the accused No.12 who got
a discharge. Accused No.11 had been
inexplicably maintaining a relationship with the
deceased Maneesh. The call data records show
the frequency of calls between these two
numbers."
29. Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse
or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is
non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable
misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in
setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible.
The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The
whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the
power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles
of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under
Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C is not to be equated with that of an
appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to
be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is
grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision
is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly
13 2026:KER:14549
ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise
of their revisional jurisdiction. {Vide: Sanjaysinh Ramrao
Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [(2015) 3 SCC 123],
Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan & Anr [(2001) 9 SCC 631)]
and Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. Central
Bureau of Investigation [(2018) 16 SCC 299)]}.
30. In Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v.
Central Bureau of Investigation [(2018) 16 SCC 299)] the
Apex Court held that interference in the order framing charges or
refusing to discharge is called for in the rarest of rare cases only to
correct a patent error of jurisdiction.
31. On an analysis of the materials placed before the
Court, this Court is of the view that the conclusion of the Sessions
Court, that there are prima facie grounds to suspect the complicity
of the petitioner, requires no interference.
32. This Court is of the view that the order impugned is
not affected with any patent error of jurisdiction. All the challenges
in this revision petition therefore fail. It is made clear that I have
not made any observation on the merits of the prosecution case.
The observations made in this order are only for ascertaining
whether the charges levelled are groundless or not. The petitioner
14 2026:KER:14549
is at liberty to raise all the contentions during trial.
The revision petition stands dismissed.
Sd/-
K. BABU
JUDGE
SJ
15 2026:KER:14549
APPENDIX OF CRL.REV.PET NO. 155 OF 2026
PETITIONER ANNEXURES
Annexure A1 TRUE COPY OF THE FIS DATED 07/03/2010 INCRIME
NO 138/2010 OF THE PAVARATTY POLICE STATION,
THRISSUR
Annexure A2 TRUE COPY OF THE FINAL REPORT DATED
05/08/2010 FILED BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER
Annexure A3 TRUE COPY OF THE SEIZURE MAHASAR DATED
29/03/2010
Annexure A4 TRUE COPY OF THE DISCHARGE PETITION CRL M.P
5403/2025 DATED 16/09/2025 BEFORE HON'BLE I
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE, THRISSUR
Annexure A5 FREE COPY OF THE ORDER ISSUED TO ACCUSED IN
DISCHARGE PETITION CRL M.P 5403/2025 DATED
01.01.2026 BY HON'BLE I ADDITIONAL SESSIONS
JUDGE, THRISSUR
