Kerala High Court
Rahul M R vs State Of Kerala on 17 September, 2025
2025:KER:70098
CRL.A Nos.1685 & 1690/2025 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
WEDNESDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2025 / 26TH BHADRA, 1947
CRL.A NO. 1685 OF 2025
CRIME NO.482/2025 OF MARADU POLICE STATION, Ernakulam
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 27.08.2025 IN CRL MP NO.1602 OF
2025 OF SPECIAL JUDGE FOR THE TRIAL OF OFFENCES UNDER SC/ST
(POA) ACT,1989, ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/S:
RAHUL M R
AGED 29 YEARS
S/O RAVEENDRAN A K MOOKKATH HOUSE, LANE 2 COL.
VISWANATHAN ROAD, EROOR WEST P O, TRIPUNITHURA,
NADAMA, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682306
BY ADVS.
SRI.S.RAJEEV
SRI.V.VINAY
SRI.M.S.ANEER
SHRI.SARATH K.P.
SHRI.ANILKUMAR C.R.
SHRI.K.S.KIRAN KRISHNAN
SHRI.AZAD SUNIL
SMT.DIPA V.
SHRI.AKASH CHERIAN THOMAS
RESPONDENT/S:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
KERALA, ERNAKULAM (CRIME NO 482/2025 OF MARADU
POLICE STATION, ERNAKULAM), PIN - 682031
2 XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
2025:KER:70098
CRL.A Nos.1685 & 1690/2025 2
BY ADVS.
SHRI.GEORGE SEBASTIAN
SRI.DHANESH MATHEW MANJOORAN
OTHER PRESENT:
SRI. RENJIT GEORGE (SR .PP)
SRI. GEORGE SEBASTIAN - FOR R2
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
03.09.2025,AND HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 17.09.2025 ALONG
WITH CRL.A.1690/2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:70098
CRL.A Nos.1685 & 1690/2025 3
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE GOPINATH P.
WEDNESDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2025 / 26TH BHADRA, 1947
CRL.A NO. 1690 OF 2025
CRIME NO.482/2025 OF MARADU POLICE STATION, Ernakulam
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT DATED 27.08.2025 IN CRL MP NO.1602
OF 2025 OF SPECIAL COURT- OFFENCES UNDER SC/ST (POA)
ACT,1989, ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/S:
RENJITH M R
AGED 37 YEARS
S/O RAVEENDRAN A K MOOKKATH HOUSE, LANE 2 COL.
VISWANATHAN ROAD, EROOR WEST P O, TRIPUNITHURA,
NADAMA, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682306
BY ADVS.
SRI.K.K.DHEERENDRAKRISHNAN
SMT.N.P.ASHA
RESPONDENT/S:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
KERALA, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682031
2 XXXXX
XXXXXX, PIN - 682038
BY ADVS.
SHRI.GEORGE SEBASTIAN
SRI.DHANESH MATHEW MANJOORAN
OTHER PRESENT:
SMT. SEENA C (PP)
SRI. GEORGE SEBASTIAN - FOR R2
2025:KER:70098
CRL.A Nos.1685 & 1690/2025 4
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
03.09.2025 AND HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 17.09.2025 ALONG
WITH CRL.A.1685/2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:70098
CRL.A Nos.1685 & 1690/2025 5
'C.R'
JUDGMENT
[CRL.A Nos.1685/2025, 1690/2025]
These appeals have been filed under Section 14A of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the SC/ST Act'). Crl.A. No.1685/2025
is filed by the 1st accused in Crime No.482/2025 of Maradu Police
Station, Ernakulam District, and Crl.A. No.1690/2025 is filed by the 2 nd
accused in the same crime. Crime No.482/2025 of Maradu Police
Station has been registered alleging commission of offences under
Sections 376(2)(n) & 506 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter
referred to as 'the IPC') and S.3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. By an order
dated 27.08.2025 in Crl.M.P 1602/2025 on the file of the Special Judge
for Trial of Offences under the SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989, Ernakulam, an
application filed by both the accused jointly for anticipatory bail was
dismissed by that court. The appellant in Crl.A.No.1685/2025 is
hereinafter referred to as the 1st accused, and the appellant in
Crl.A. No.1690/2025 is hereinafter referred to as the 2nd accused.
2. The allegations leading to registration of Crime
No.482/2025 of Maradu Police Station (in brief) are that the 1 st accused
in Crl.A.1685/2025 had established a relationship with the de facto
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complainant/victim after promising to marry her. It is alleged that the
1st accused had initially forced the de facto complainant to enter into
sexual relationships with him, despite the objection of the de facto
complainant, and thereafter, continued to maintain his relationship
with her. After living with her for some time in a rented house, he
withdrew from the promise of marriage and thereby committed the
offences alleged against him. The 2 nd accused is the brother of the 1 st
accused. The allegation against him is that he had threatened the
de facto complainant and had warned her against maintaining a
relationship with the 1st accused. It is alleged that the 2nd accused had
threatened the de facto complainant by stating that he was not causing
any harm to her, only because she is the mother of a minor child.
3. Sri. S. Rajeev, the learned counsel appearing for the
1st accused, has taken me through the First Information Statement
given by the de facto complainant/victim. He submits that even if all
the allegations in the First Information Statement are accepted as true,
no offence has been committed by the 1st accused. He refers to the
recent judgment of this Court in Hiran Das Murali v. State of
Kerala, 2025 KHC OnLine 943, to contend that where a
relationship which lasted for a long time subsequently breaks down on
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account of one reason or the other, the same cannot be a ground to
raise an allegation of rape on the false promise of marriage. The
learned counsel also submits that the Supreme Court in Mahesh
Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra and another, (2024) 11
SCC 398 (which has been relied on by this Court in Hiran Das
Murali), observed that it is a worrying trend that consensual
relationships that lasted over a period of time are subsequently
characterised as rape. The learned counsel also placed reliance on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Jothiragawan v. State, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 628 to contend that where the alleged victim had
willingly engaged in sexual relationships on more than one occasion
even if it is alleged that the first instance of sexual intercourse was
against her will, the allegation of the accused having committed rape
cannot be sustained.
4. Sri. K. K. Dheerendrakrishnan, the learned counsel
appearing for the 2nd accused, reiterates the contentions taken by the
learned counsel appearing for the 1st accused. He also submits that,
insofar as the 2nd accused is concerned, the allegation against him is
that he had threatened the de facto complainant over the telephone. It
is submitted that to force both the accused in this case into some sort of
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settlement, the 2nd accused has also been roped in as an accused in this
case, and all the allegations against the 2nd accused are false and
without any basis. It is submitted that the 2nd accused had no occasion
whatsoever to threaten the de facto complainant as alleged in the First
Information Statement. It is further submitted that the investigation
into the case has revealed that the de facto complainant had
purposefully suppressed the fact that she was earlier married to one
Rajesh of Maradu during 2009, and thereafter she married one Sarath,
whose name is mentioned as her husband in the First Information
Statement. It is submitted that, in the facts and circumstances of this
case, the bar against the grant of anticipatory bail under Section 18 of
the SC/ST Act will not apply and the appellants are entitled to
anticipatory bail.
5. Sri. Renjith George, the learned Senior Public
Prosecutor, and Sri. George Sebastian, the learned counsel appearing
for the de facto complainant, vehemently opposed the prayer for
anticipatory bail. It is submitted that, unless this Court were to
conclude that, prima facie, none of the offences under the SC/ST Act
have been committed, the bar against the grant of anticipatory bail in
Section 18 of the SC/ST Act will apply, and the appellants are not
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entitled to anticipatory bail. It is submitted that a reading of the First
Information Statement of the de facto complainant will indicate that,
though the de facto complainant and the 1st accused had lived together
for some time, the initial relationship was not consensual and the
de facto complainant was forced to succumb to the demand for sexual
intercourse by the 1st accused in the case. It is submitted that the
investigation is only progressing, and if anticipatory bail is granted to
the appellants at this stage, the same may not be conducive to the
completion of the investigation in a proper manner. It is pointed out
that as far as the 2nd accused is concerned, he is also the accused of
having committed the offence of criminal intimidation punishable
under Section 506 of the IPC. It is submitted that Section 506 of the
IPC is also a scheduled offence under the provisions of the SC/ST Act.
It is submitted that it was revealed during the course of investigation
that the 2nd accused had contacted the de facto complainant over the
phone on 16.08.2024 and also on 19.08.2024, and that this lends
credence to the allegation that the 2nd accused had threatened the
de facto complainant over the telephone. Sri. George Sebastian, the
learned counsel for the de facto complainant, refers to the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain, 2025 KHC
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OnLine 6765, to contend that where a prima facie case has been
made out, the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act will apply, and the
appellants are not entitled to anticipatory bail.
6. The learned counsel appearing for the 1st accused
would submit, in reply, that on 25.07.2025, the mother of the accused
in this case had issued a legal notice to the de facto complainant, and it
is immediately after receiving the said notice that the de facto
complainant had set criminal law in motion by filing the complaint
leading to the registration of Crime No. 482/2025 of Maradu Police
Station. The learned counsel appearing for the 2 nd accused submits, in
reply, that the Investigating Officer had filed a report before the Special
Court at the time when the bail application filed by accused Nos. 1 and
2 was pending before the Special Court, and this report indicates that,
since there were frequent contacts between the 1st accused and the de
facto complainant at the relevant time, it could not be ascertained as to
whether the 2nd accused had contacted the de facto complainant and
had threatened her. It is pointed out that the telephone of the 2 nd
accused was being used by the 1st accused frequently. It is pointed out
that the call made on 19.08.2024 allegedly lasted for about 37 minutes,
and it is unbelievable that the 2nd accused had talked to the de facto
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complainant for 37 minutes to threaten her. It is submitted that, even
going by the First Information Statement, the said call was at a time
when the relationship between the 1st accused and the de facto
complainant was subsisting, and the call lasting 37 minutes can only be
a call made by the 1st accused to the de facto complainant at a time
when their relationship was subsisting.
7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the
accused, the learned Public Prosecutor, and the learned counsel
appearing for the de facto complainant, I am of the view that the
appellants have made out a case for the grant of anticipatory bail. The
decision of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Damu Khare (supra)
and the decision of this Court in Hiran Das Murali (supra) indicate
that where a relationship between two individuals lasts for a
considerably long period and there is a break-up in the relationship
after some time, the same cannot be a ground to allege rape on the false
promise of marriage. In the facts of the present case, going by the First
Information Statement of the de facto complainant, the relationship
between the de facto complainant and the 1st accused started in the
year 2023 and lasted till July 2025. It is also evident from a reading of
the First Information Statement that, though the de facto complainant
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is married to one Sarath and has a child in her relationship with said
Sarath, she started living with the 1st accused at a rented house from
April 2024. It is the specific statement of the de facto complainant that
the de facto complainant and the 1st accused were living together as
husband and wife, though the marriage between the de facto
complainant and the said Sarath had not yet been dissolved in
accordance with the law. It is clear from the First Information
Statement that the application for divorce to dissolve the marriage
between the de facto complainant and the said Sarath is still pending
before the Family Court, Ernakulam. This Court in Anil Kumar v.
State of Kerala, 2021 (2) KLT 83, had considered the question as
to whether an allegation of rape on the false promise of marriage could
be raised when one of the parties to a relationship was in a subsisting
marriage. It was held:-
"10. So from the admitted allegations discernible from
the prosecution materials, it can be seen that the 3rd
respondent then aged 31 years was already married to
another person since May, 2008 and she had a minor
son aged 8½ years. Initially she did not know that the
petitioner has married and based on his promise that he
would marry her, both of them entered into sexual
relationship. Later, even after coming to know that the
petitioner has married, which information was conveyed
to her by none other than the wife of the petitioner, still
the petitioner and the 3rd respondent continued to have
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sexual relationship. Later, the 3rd respondent moved
away from the locality to another place and even
thereafter, also both the 3rd respondent and the
petitioner have entered into sexual relationship which
lasted for a long time and she became pregnant, etc.
Therefore, it is admitted case of the prosecution that the
3rd respondent has already married. Hence, it can be
seen that the promise alleged to have been made by the
accused to a married woman that he would marry her,
etc., is a promise, which is not enforceable in law and is
seen by public policy and morals and hence,
unenforceable in view of the mandatory provisions
contained in S.23 of the Indian Contract Act. Such an
unenforceable and illegal promise cannot be the basis for
the prosecution to contend that the consent of the
woman, who has sexual relationship with the accused,
was obtained on the basis of misconception of fact, as
understood in Explanation No.2 of S.376 of the IPC and
S.90 of the IPC. That apart, a reading of the abovesaid
materials would make it clear that with wide and open
eyes and even after coming to know that the petitioner
has already married, the 3rd respondent and the
petitioner have entered into a long-standing sexual
relationship, even though both of them are married. In
the light of all these aspects, it is only to be held that even
if it is assumed that the sexual incidents alleged in the
prosecution materials are assumed to be broadly true,
then it has to be held that such incidents could have
happened only on the basis of consent of two full grown
adults. As observed hereinabove, in such cases it can be
only said that the sexual relationship entered into by two
full grown adults, can be only on the basis of promiscuity
and passions to have their mutual companionship, which
also is inclusive of sexual relationship. Such a scenario
cannot be the basis to contend that the vital ingredients
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of rape as per S.375 of the IPC are fulfilled and that the
accused is to be prosecuted for the said offence. Hence, it
is only to be held that the vital ingredients of the offence
of rape as per S.375 of the IPC, which is punishable under
S.376 of the IPC are conspicuously absent in this case
and hence, the continuance of the impugned criminal
proceedings is nothing, but a mere wastage of time and
precious resources of the judicial organs, the prosecution
machinery and the police agency and it amounts to an
abuse of the process of the Court. Moreover, the 3rd
respondent has now stated that the petitioner has agreed
to maintain her and the child born to her in the
abovesaid sexual relationship with the petitioner, etc."
It is clear from the judgment of this Court in Anil Kumar (supra) that
where one of the parties to a relationship is in a subsisting marriage,
there cannot be an allegation of rape on the false promise of marriage.
Considering all the aforesaid facts, I am prima facie convinced that the
1st accused has made out a case that he cannot be accused of having
committed an offence punishable under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC.
8. Coming to the allegations against the 2 nd accused, it is seen
from a reading of the First Information Statement that the allegation
against him is that he had threatened the de facto complainant by
stating that bodily harm would be caused but for the fact that she was
having a child and had called upon her to refrain from having any
relationship with the 1st accused in the case. The phone calls on
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16.08.2024 and 19.08.2024 lasted for 111 seconds and 2198 seconds
(37 minutes) respectively. Therefore, there is some merit in the
contention of the learned counsel for the 2nd accused that these calls
could not have been made for the purposes of threatening the de facto
complainant, especially when, even going by the First Information
Statement, these calls relate to a period when there was a healthy
relationship between the 1st accused and de facto complainant. In such
circumstances, it is quite possible that the 1 st accused was using the
telephone of the 2nd accused to talk to the de facto complainant. If this
is the situation, it is at least doubtful as to whether the alleged offence
under Section 506 IPC has been committed by the appellants.
9. Coming to the offences under the provisions of the SC/ST Act,
it is to be noted that the offence alleged is under Section 3(2)(v) of the
SC/ST Act. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act (to it the extent relevant)
reads thus:-
" (2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe,--
(i) xxxxxxx
(ii)xxxxxxx
(iii)xxxxxx
(iv)xxxxxx
(v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45
of 1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten
years or more against a person or property knowing
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that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such
member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life
and with fine;"
I have already held that prima facie, the offence under Section
376(2)(n) of the IPC, cannot be said to have been committed by the
1st accused. The maximum term of punishment for the offence under
Section 506 IPC is seven years. Therefore, the provisions of Section
3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act are not attracted. Though Section 506 IPC is a
scheduled offence for the purposes of Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST
Act, the said provision has not been invoked. At any rate, I have also
held that prima facie no offence under Section 506 is made out. A
division bench of this Court has in Rajachandrasekharan @ Babu
v. State of Kerala, 2024 (2) KLT 656, taken the view that Section
3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act is by itself not a substantive offence 1. In
Shahul Ameer v. State, 2025 KHC 292, this Court has taken the
view that where the court reaches a finding that there was no false
promise of marriage, the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST
Act may not be attracted. As already indicated, the provisions of
Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act are attracted only when an offence
1. Also see Narain Trivedi v. State of U.P 2008 Cri.L.J 1686
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punishable with imprisonment for a term of 10 years or more under the
IPC has been committed. In other words, in cases where the allegation
is that an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act has been
committed and when this Court prima facie concludes that the
substantive offence punishable with a term of imprisonment for a
period of 10 years or more has not been committed, the said prima
facie conclusion is sufficient to hold that the bar under Section 18 of
the SC/ST Act against the grant of anticipatory bail will not apply. In
other words, in the facts of this case, the prima facie conclusion that
the appellants have not committed any offence under Section 376(2)(n)
and Section 506 IPC automatically leads to a conclusion that the
appellants have not committed an offence punishable under Section
3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.
10. In Kiran (supra), after referring to Prathvi Raj Chauhan
v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 727, it was held:-
"6. In light of the parameters in relation to the
applicability of Section 18 of the Act emanating from
afore-discussed various decisions of this Court, the
proposition could be summarised that as the provision of
Section 18 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes
Act, 1989 with express language excludes the
applicability of Section 438, Cr. P.C., it creates a bar
against grant of anticipatory bail in absolute terms in
relations to the arrest of a person who faces specific
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accusations of having committed the offence under the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Act. The benefit of
anticipatory bail for such an accused is taken off.
6.1. The absolute nature of bar, however, could be read
and has to be applied with a rider. In a given case where
on the face of it the offence under Section 3 of the Act is
found to have not been made out and that the
accusations relating to the commission of such offence
are devoid of prima facie merits, the Court has a room to
exercise the discretion to grant anticipatory bail to the
accused under Section 438 of the Code.
6.2. Non-making of prima facie case about the
commission of offence is perceived to be such a situation
where the Court can arrive at such a conclusion in the
first blush itself or by way of the first impression upon
very reading of the averments in the FIR. The contents
and the allegations in the FIR would be decisive in this
regard. Furthermore, in reaching a conclusion as to
whether a prima facie offence is made out or not, it
would not be permissible for the Court to travel into the
evidentiary realm or to consider other materials, nor the
Court could advert to conduct a mini trial."
Taking into consideration the law laid down by the Supreme Court in
Prathvi Raj Chauhan (supra), as reiterated in Kiran (supra), I am
convinced that the appellants are entitled to anticipatory bail, as for
reasons already indicated, they have made out a prima facie that they
have committed no offence under the provisions of the SC/ST Act.
11. In the light of the above findings, I am inclined to
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allow these appeals. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed. The order
dated 27.08.2025 in Crl.M.P 1602/2025 on the file of the Special Judge
for Trial of Offences under the SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989, Ernakulam will
stand set aside. It is directed that the appellants shall be released on
bail in the event of their arrest in connection with Crime No.482 of
2025 of Maradu Police Station, subject to the following conditions:-
(i) The appellants shall execute bonds for sums of
Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) each with two solvent
sureties each for the like sum to the satisfaction of the Arresting
Officer;
(ii) The appellants shall appear before the Investigating
Officer in Crime No.482 of 2025 of Maradu Police Station at 11.00 A.M
on 25.9.2025 and 26.9.2025 and thereafter whenever called upon to do
so;
(iii) The appellants shall not attempt to interfere with the
investigation, influence or intimidate the de facto complainant or any
witness in Crime No.482 of 2025 of Maradu Police Station;
(iv) The appellants shall not be involved in any other crime
while on bail;
(v) The appellants shall not directly or indirectly make any
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inducement, threat, or promise to any person acquainted with the facts
of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court
or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence;
12. If any of the aforesaid conditions are violated, the
Investigating Officer in Crime No.482 of 2025 of Maradu Police
Station, Ernakulam, may apply to the jurisdictional Court for
cancellation of bail. It is clarified that the appellants will be deemed to
be in custody for the purposes of recovery, etc., even if they are released
on anticipatory bail as held by the Supreme Court in Sushila
Aggarwal and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another,
(2020) 5 SCC 1).
No observation in this order shall be deemed a finding by this
Court on any issue. The observations contained in this order are solely
for the purpose of evaluating the appellants' entitlement to anticipatory
bail.
Sd/-
GOPINATH P.
JUDGE
acd/DK
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APPENDIX OF CRL NO.1685 OF 2025 & CRL.A 1690/2025
APPELLANTS ANNEXURES
Annexure-I TRUE COPY OF THE FIR AND FIS IN CRIME
NO.482/2025 OF MARADU POLICE
STATION,ERNAKULAM.
Annexure-II A TRUE COPY OF THE MEDICAL CERTIFICATE OF THE
1ST ACCUSED DATED 22.07.2025
Annexure-III THE DISCHARGE SUMMARY OF THE 1ST ACCUSED
DATED 26.07.2025
Annexure-IV TRUE COPY OF THE LAWYER NOTICE DATED
25.07.2025
Annexure-V TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY TO LEGAL NOTICE DATED
04.08.2025.
