Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 9757 Ker
Judgement Date : 16 October, 2025
Crl.Appeal No.283 of 2010 1
2025:KER:76887
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE JOHNSON JOHN
THURSDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 24TH ASWINA, 1947
CRL.A NO. 283 OF 2010
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 05.02.2010 IN Crl.L.P. NO.116
OF 2010 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA ARISING OUT OF THE JUDGMENT
DATED 02.12.2009 IN ST NO.68 OF 2009 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE
OF FIRST CLASS -II, THODUPUZHA.
APPELLANT:
NOBLE FINANCE COMPANY, REPRESENTED BY ITS
PARTNER, P.R.SUDHEER KUMAR, PULICKAL HOUSE,
KARIKODE VILLAGE, THODUPUZHA TALUK.
BY ADVS. SRI.R.BINDU (SASTHAMANGALAM)
& SRI.PRASANTH M.P
RESPONDENT:
1 MANI P, S/O PERUMAL,
CHERUMATTATHIL HOUSE, KOTTAMALA P.O.,
ULUPPUNNI, IDUKKI DISTRICT.
2 STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
ERNAKULAM.
R1 BY ADV.PRASOON SUNNY
R2 BY SENIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI.ALEX M.THOMBRA.
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
15.10.2025, THE COURT ON 16-10-2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.283 of 2010 2
2025:KER:76887
JOHNSON JOHN, J.
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Crl.Appeal No.283 of 2010
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Dated this the 16th day of October, 2025.
J U D G M E N T
This appeal by the complainant is against the
acquittal of the accused for the offence under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
('N.I Act' for short).
2. As per the complaint, the accused executed a
hire purchase agreement in favour of the complainant
finance company on 18-01-2006 and received
Rs.1,01,250/- agreeing to repay the said loan amount
in 30 equal monthly installments of Rs.3,375/- each
starting from 18-02-2006 onwards. But subsequently,
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the accused committed default in payment of the
installments and thereafter towards the amount due to
the complainant company, the accused issued a cheque
dated 22-09-2007 for Rs.1,00,000/-. When the
complainant presented the cheque for collection, the
same was dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds in
the account of the accused and in spite of issuance
of statutory notice, the accused failed to pay the
cheque amount to the complainant. It is also stated
that the complainant finance company is a registered
partnership firm and the partner, who signed the
complaint is authorized to file the complaint as per
resolution dated 22-03-2003.
3. Before the trial court, from the side of the
complainant, PW1 examined and Exhibits P1 to P8 were
marked and from the side of the accused, DW1 examined
and Exts.D1 and D2 were marked.
4. After considering the oral and documentary
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evidence on record and hearing both sides, the trial
court found that PW1 is not authorized to file a
complaint in the name of the firm in the absence of a
provision analogous to Order XXX of C.P.C in the
Cr.P.C and therefore, the accused is found not guilty
and acquitted under Section 255(1) Cr.P.C.
5. Heard Adv.R.Bindu Sasthamangalam, the
learned counsel for the appellant, Adv.Prasoon Sunny,
the learned State Brief representing the first
respondent/accused and Sri.Alex M.Thombra, the
learned Senior Public Prosecutor for the second
respondent.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant argued
that any partner including the Managing Partner who
is an agent of the firm is entitled to file a
complaint on behalf of the firm. But the learned
counsel for the accused/first respondent argued that
no document is produced to show that the person who
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signed the complaint representing the firm is a
partner of the firm or that he is an agent of the
firm.
7. In Nazar v. State of Kerala [2007(4) KHC
882], this Court held that in the absence of any
enabling provision in the Cr.P.C the Managing Partner
is not entitled to file a complaint in the name of
the firm. However, any partner including the Managing
Partner who is an agent of the firm is entitled to
file a complaint on behalf of the firm. In the
absence of any document to show that the person who
signed the complaint is a partner or an agent of the
firm, I find no reason to disagree with the finding
of the trial court in this regard.
8. The specific case of the complainant
finance company is that the accused executed a hire
purchase agreement on 18-01-2006 and availed a loan
of Rs.1,01,250/-. A perusal of Ext.P1 hire purchase
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agreement dated 18-01-2006 shows that the complainant
finance company is the owner of the vehicle bearing
registration No. KL6 3184 and the said vehicle was
supplied to the accused who is the hirer and Clause
II in Ext.P1 would show that the total hire amount is
Rs.1,01,250/-. Further, Clause III of Ext.P1 shows
that on execution of the said agreement, the hirer
shall pay the owner a sum of Rupee ONE in
consideration of the option to purchase given to the
Hirer by Clause IV.
9. It cannot be disputed that in a hire
purchase agreement normally the hirer has to pay the
hire amount in equal monthly installments. There is
nothing in Ext.P1 agreement to show that the
complainant company advanced a loan of Rs.1,01,250/-
to the accused. In cross examination PW1 admitted
that the registration certificate and other documents
of the vehicle are in the possession of the
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complainant firm. According to PW1, the accused paid
two installments. He denied the suggestion that the
total hire amount was only Rs.75,000/-. PW1 also
denied the suggestion that he has no authority to
represent the complainant firm. The Secretary of
Service Co-operative Bank, Thodupuzha is examined as
DW1. Ext.D1 is the copy of the account opening form
of PW1 and Ext.D2 is the copy of the ledger relating
to Ext.D1 account.
10. It is well settled that the standard of
proof which is required from the accused to rebut
the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and
139 of the N.I Act is preponderance of
probabilities and that the accused is not required
to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt.
11. In Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa ((2019) 5 SCC
418), the Hon'ble Supreme Court summarised the
principles of law governing the presumptions under
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Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act in the following
manner:
"(i) Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability.
(ii) The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.
(iii) To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.
(iv) That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. "
12. In ANSS Rajashekar v. Augustus Jeba
Ananth [2019 (2) KHC 155= 2019 (1) KLD 492], it
was held that when evidence elicited from
complainant during cross examination creates
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serious doubt about the existence of debt and
about the transaction and the complainant fails to
establish the source of funds, the presumption
under Section 139 is rebutted and the defence case
stands probabilised.
13. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.Borcar [2025(6) KHC
250(SC)] shows that ultimately it becomes the duty
of the courts to consider carefully and appreciate
the totality of the evidence and then come to a
conclusion whether in the given case the accused
has shown that the case of the complainant is in
peril for the reason that the accused has
established a probable defence. In the present
case, the evidence of PW1 in cross examination and
Ext.P1 hire purchase agreement are sufficient to
establish a probable defence to rebut the
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statutory presumptions in favour of the
complainant. As noticed earlier in this case,
there is no evidence to show that the person who
signed the complaint on behalf of the complainant
finance company is a partner of the said firm or
an agent duly authorized to file a complaint on
behalf of the firm. On a careful re-appreciation of
the entire evidence, I find no reason to interfere
with the findings in the impugned judgment and
therefore, I find that this appeal is liable to be
dismissed.
In the result, this appeal is dismissed.
Sd/-JOHNSON JOHN, JUDGE.
amk
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