Kerala High Court
Visweswara Pillai vs State Of Kerala on 6 October, 2025
2025:KER:73324
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN
MONDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 14TH ASWINA, 1947
CRL.A NO. 2139 OF 2010
CC NO.31 OF 2007 OF ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER & SPECIAL JUDGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, DATED 15.10.2010.
APPELLANT/ACCUSED NO.1:
VISWESWARA PILLAI, FORMERLY SPECIAL VILLAGE OFFICER,
MUNDAKKAL VILLAGE, KOLLAM.
BY ADVS.
SRI.P.VIJAYA BHANU (SR.)
SMT.P.MAYA
SRI.VIPIN NARAYAN
RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.
BY SRI.A.RAJESH, SPL.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, VACB
SMT.REKHA S., SR.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, VACB
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 17.09.2025
ALONG WITH CRL.A.2162/2010, THE COURT ON 06.10.2025, DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 2 2025:KER:73324
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN
MONDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 14TH ASWINA, 1947
CRL.A NO. 2162 OF 2010
CC NO.31 OF 2007 OF ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER & SPECIAL
JUDGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, DATED 15.10.2010
APPELLANT/ACCUSED NO.2:
PAUL FERNANDEZ,
FORMERLY VILLAGE OFFICER,
MUNDAKKAL VILLAGE OFFICE, KOLLAM.
BY ADVS.
SMT.RESHMA E.
SMT.ATHEENA ANTONY
SMT.ANJU JOSEPH
SMT.ANJITHA SANTHOSH
RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
STATE - REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.
BY SRI.A.RAJESH, SPL.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, VACB
SMT.REKHA S., SR.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, VACB
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
17.09.2025 ALONG WITH CRL.A.2139/2010, THE COURT ON
06.10.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 3 2025:KER:73324
CR
COMMON JUDGMENT
Dated this the 06th day of October, 2025
These are appeals filed by accused Nos.1 and 2, respectively,
in C.C.No.31/2007 on the files of the Enquiry Commissioner and
Special Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, challenging conviction and
sentence imposed against them as on 15.10.2010. The
respondent herein is the State of Kerala, represented by the
Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, through the Special Public
Prosecutor.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the
learned Special Public Prosecutor, in detail. Perused the verdict
under challenge and the decisions placed by both sides.
3. The prosecution allegation is that the 1 st accused, while
working as Special Village Officer and the 2 nd accused, while
working as Village Officer, respectively, in Mundakkal Village,
being public servants, demanded Rs.100/- each from PW1 for
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 4 2025:KER:73324
issuing possession certificate, sketch and plan of the landed
property belonged to PW3, initially on 29.10.2004 and thereafter,
on 01.11.2004 at about 10.05 a.m. Thereafter, both the accused
accepted the same as illegal gratification. In this backdrop, the
prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, 'the PC Act, 1988' hereinafter)
and under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (for short, 'the
IPC' hereinafter), by the accused.
4. The learned senior counsel appearing for the 1 st
accused argued that in the instant case, the evidence adduced by
the prosecution is insufficient to find demand of illegal
gratification by the 1st accused. It is also pointed out that even
though there is a change in the name of the 1 st accused as per the
FIR and the final report, there was no proper identification of the
accused at the dock, at the instance of the witnesses. According to
the learned senior Counsel, initially, in the prosecution records,
the name of the 1st accused was stated as 'Viswanadhan', and
subsequently, his original name, Visweswaran Pillai, came into
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 5 2025:KER:73324
the picture. In such a case, specific identification of the 1 st
accused would be necessary and lack of the said identification is
fatal to the prosecution. The learned senior counsel further
pointed out that, in the present case, the bribe amount alleged to
have been demanded and accepted by the 1 st accused is only a
trivial sum of Rs.100/-, and, in such view of the matter, sub-
section (3) of Section 20 of the PC Act, 1988, would have
application. The said provision provides that, notwithstanding
anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), the court may
decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said
sub-sections if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its
opinion, so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be
drawn. The learned senior counsel for the 1st accused placed
decision of the Apex Court in A.Subair v. State of Kerala
reported in [(2009) 8 SCC 587], wherein, in paragraph Nos.22
and 23, the Apex Court considered a case involving Rs.25/- and
held that the High Court went wrong in drawing presumption
under Section 20 ignoring the trivial nature of the amount.
5. The learned counsel for the 2 nd accused also zealously
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 6 2025:KER:73324
shared the arguments advanced by the learned senior counsel for
the 1st accused, while pointing out that the evidence of PW1 does
not disclose any material to prove the initial demand, as alleged
by the prosecution. That apart, the learned counsel for the 2 nd
accused also found shelter under Section 20(3) of the PC Act,
1988, by placing a decision of the Bombay High Court in
Hanmantappa Murtyappa Vijapure v. State of
Maharashtra reported in [2004 Crl.LJ 3001] to assert the
point that in the said case, the Bombay High Court held that a
sum of Rs.150/- in 1994 was a trivial amount for the purpose of
Section 20(3), and Rs.50/- in 1990 also was trivial in nature.
Thus, Rs.100/- in 2004 is trivial to apply under Section 20(3) of
the PC Act, 1988. She also challenged Ext.P23 sanction
contending that the same is not proper. In this connection, she
has placed decision of the Apex Court in Mohd.Iqbal Ahmed v.
State of A.P. reported in [1979 KHC 667 : AIR 1979 SC
677]. In fact, this decision has no application in the present case,
since the same was rendered when considering Section 6 of the
PC Act, 1947, wherein there is no pari materia provisions akin to
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 7 2025:KER:73324
Sections 19(3) and 19(4) of the PC Act, 1988 were in the statute,
viz., the PC Act, 1947.
6. The learned Special Public Prosecutor zealously
opposed the contentions and pointed out that in the evidence of
PW1, there is categorical assertion as to demand made by accused
Nos.1 and 2 on 29.10.2004 and subsequent demand and
acceptance on 01.11.2004. It is also submitted that the accused
were persons known to each other and witnesses who had close
contact with them during the trap proceedings when identified at
the dock, the same alone is sufficient to prove the identification.
Therefore, any other mode of identification of the accused at the
dock is unnecessary, as the evidence taken as a whole clearly
establishes that it was accused Nos.1 and 2 who demanded and
accepted the bribe. Accordingly, the learned Special Public
Prosecutor opposed interference in the verdict impugned. The
learned Special Public Prosecutor placed decision of the Apex
Court in Narendra Champaklal Trivedi and Another v.
State of Gujarat reported in [2012 KHC 4330] and submitted
that in the said decision, the Apex Court held that even if the
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 8 2025:KER:73324
amount accepted is small, minimum sentence has to be awarded,
if the offence is proved, since corruption at any level does not
deserve either sympathy or leniency. In response to the
contention raised by the learned senior counsel for the 1 st accused
regarding the trivial nature of the amount, the learned Special
Public Prosecutor, with reference to Section 20(3) of the PC Act,
1988, placed reliance on a three bench decision of the Apex Court
in State of Karnataka v. Chandrasha reported in [2024
KHC 6658], wherein the Apex Court considered A.Subair's
case (supra) and the Apex Court held that when the fact of receipt
of payment or an agreement to receive the gratification stood
proved, there is a clear case of nexus or corroboration and the
presumption itself is irrelevant. Thus, it is specifically submitted
by the learned Special Public Prosecutor that, in cases of such
nature, even without the aid of Section 20 of the PC Act, 1988, the
accused can be penalised.
7. On appraisal of the contentions on and off the issue,
the points to be considered are;
(i) Is it correct to say that the Special Court rightly entered
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 9 2025:KER:73324
into conviction for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the
PC Act, 1988?
(ii) Is it correct to say that the Special Court rightly
entered into conviction for the offence punishable under Section
13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988?
(iii) Is it correct to say that the Special Court rightly
entered into conviction for the offence punishable under Section
120B of the IPC?
(iv) Whether the verdict would require interference?
(v) The order to be passed?
8. Point Nos.(i) to (v)
In this case, prosecution examined PW1, supported by the
evidence of PW3 to prove demand and acceptance of bribe by the
accused for issuance of possession certificate, sketch and plan in
respect of the property owned by PW3. PW1 deposed that he had
given Ext.P1 statement before the Vigilance team on 30.10.2004
and he deposed that he was working in a cashew factory run by
PW3 and he was authorized to submit an application for getting
possession certificate, sketch and plan of the property owned by
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 10 2025:KER:73324
PW3, which in turn, submitted before UCO Bank for applying a
loan. He deposed that PW3 handed over an application to be
submitted to the Village Officer and on 11.10.2007, he had
reached Mundakkal Village Office, Kollam and the application so
filed was identified as Ext.P2. According to him, Ext.P2
application was handed over to the 2 nd accused and he instructed
to come after two days. Thereby, he reached the office on
13.11.2004, but the 2nd accused was not present. On 14.11.2004,
between 11 and 12 hours, he reached the Village Office and met
the 2nd accused. Then, the entrustment of the papers signed by
the 1st accused occurred when the 1st accused had instructed him
to reach by 3.00 p.m. PW1 further deposed that when the 1 st
accused was asked whether money had been given to the Village
Officer, he replied that he had not given any money and that he
would come back after discussing the matter with PW3.
Accordingly, he discussed the matter with PW3, and PW3
informed him that there must be an attempt to obtain the
documents without paying any bribe. Later, he informed the 1st
accused that when the documents would be signed, he would
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 11 2025:KER:73324
carry out the necessary formalities. The 1 st accused then informed
him that if money was not given, the documents would not be
issued, and directed him to come with Rs.100/- each for accused
Nos.1 and 2. Further, he instructed him to provide a copy of the
title document of the property. Again, on 29.10.2004, he reached
the Village Office and met the 2 nd accused, but he did not meet the
1st accused, as he was on leave, Later, Ext.P1 was lodged and two
100/- rupee notes were entrusted to the Dy.S.P., two Gazetted
Officers were present therein and he identified the said notes
before the court as MO1 series two in numbers. About the
demonstration of phenolphthalein test and subsequent colour
change, he deposed that thereafter, he along with official
witnesses and Vigilance team including the Dy.S.P., started
towards the Village Office and he entered into the Village Office.
Then, the Village Officer Paul sir (the 2 nd accused) asked whether
the amount was brought. According to PW1, the said question
was repeated by the 1st accused Visweswaran Pillai also. PW1
replied in the affirmative and he entrusted Rs.100/- to the 2 nd
accused and he accepted the money by using his right hand and
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 12 2025:KER:73324
kept the same inside the left pocket of his shirt. Similarly, the 1st
accused also accepted the money using the right hand and placed
the same in the left pocket of his shirt. Later, they signed the
certificate and given to PW1 and he came outside and given the signal
by folding his dhoti, as directed by the Dy.S.P.
9. PW2 examined in this case is the decoy witness who
accompanied the trap team. He deposed about the pre and post-
trap proceedings. According to him, he reached the Vigilance
Office on 30.10.2004. When the Dy.S.P. introduced PW1 and
informed him about the complaint lodged by PW1, PW2 deposed
that PW1 entrusted two notes of Rs.100/- each, which the Dy.S.P.
received and marked with 'V' on the watermark using a ball pen.
He identified the above notes as MO1 series. He deposed that,
during the demonstration of the phenolphthalein test using a ten-
rupee note in sodium carbonate solution, the solution turned
pink. MO3 bottle was identified as the liquid used for the
demonstration. He deposed that Ext.P3 mahazar was prepared
for the purpose and thereafter, the Vigilance party including CW3
moved towards the Village Office and stopped the vehicle 100
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 13 2025:KER:73324
meters away from them. He deposed further that Dy.S.P.
instructed PW1 to give signal by lifting his documents on receipt
of bribe by the accused persons.
10. PW10 is the Dy.S.P. and he supported the pre and post
proceedings. PW2 and PW10 stated that on seeing the signal,
they along with other officials rushed to the Village Office. PW6,
who was the Inspector, who accompanied PW10 for trap also
stated that on seeing the signal, he also went inside the Village
Office. They found PW1 at the verandah of the Village Office. All
these witnesses stated that PW10 asked PW1 whether the accused
had received the bribe money. PW1 replied that they had received
the bribe money and that accused Nos. 1 and 2 were inside the
staff room. These witnesses, along with PW1, then went inside the
staff room. They deposed that accused Nos.1 and 2 were found
sitting on two chairs, the 2nd accused on the front chair and the 1 st
accused on the back chair. On seeing the accused, PW1 informed
the witnesses that they had received Rs.100/- each from him, and
that the money was kept in the left pocket of their shirts. PW10,
the Dy.S.P. disclosed the identity of all to the accused. He also
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 14 2025:KER:73324
questioned the accused who disclosed their identity - the name
and designation.
11. It is true that the name of the 1st accused was
mentioned in the FIR as 'Viswanadhan', whereas his original
name is Visweswaran Pillai, as disclosed by the 1 st accused to
PW10. However, PW1 specifically identified the 1st accused as
Visweswaran Pillai while giving evidence after naming him
correctly. PW2 and PW6 stated that PW10 asked the 2 nd accused
as to where he kept the bribe money. Though he did not reply at
first, when the question was repeated, he stated that the money
was kept in the left pocket of his shirt. The same question was
repeated by PW10 to the 1st accused. He also stated that the
money was kept inside his left pocket of his shirt. The said fact is
deposed by PW2, PW6 and PW10. These witnesses further stated
that a mutual body search was conducted and the hands of PW2,
CW3 and PW10 were dipped in sodium carbonate solution and no
colour change was noted. The said solution was taken in a bottle,
which was sealed, and a label containing the signatures of the
witnesses was affixed thereon. The same was identified as MO6.
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 15 2025:KER:73324
PW2 and PW6 as well as PW10 testified further that the right
hand fingers of the 1st accused was dipped in sodium carbonate
solution and the right hand fingers and the solution turned pink
in colour. The same was taken in a bottle sealed the same, marked
with letter 'F' and it was identified as MO7. Sodium carbonate
solution was taken in another glass and right hand fingers of the
2nd accused was dipped in the same, both fingers and the sodium
carbonate solution showed pink colour change. The same was
taken in a bottle sealed the same affixed with label containing the
signature of PW2, PW10 and CW3, and marked with letter 'G'.
This bottle was identified by these witnesses as MO8. A mahazar
was prepared, showing all these details and the same was signed
by PW2 and CW3. It was again stated by these witnesses that, as
directed by PW10, the money from the left pocket of the 1 st
accused was taken by the witness Gopalakrishnan. They found
MO1 series 100/- rupee note in the said pocket. The same was
identified by the witness as MO1(a). PW2 stated that he verified
MO1(a) with the number he noted day before. The same was also
verified with Ext. P6 entrustment mahazar. This was found to be
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 16 2025:KER:73324
the same. These witnesses further stated that the said currency
note was dipped in sodium carbonate solution by CW3. The
currency note and the solution showed pink colour change. This
liquid was taken in a bottle, which was sealed, affixed with a label
containing the signatures of the witnesses and PW10, and marked
with the letter 'H'. The same was identified by these witnesses as
MO9. PW2 and PW10 stated that with the assistance of CW3, the
other 100/- rupee note was taken from the pocket of the 2 nd
accused. This was verified with entrustment mahazar and
identified as MO1(b), the note entrusted by PW1 to PW10. The
said note was again dipped in lime water and the lime water and
the note turned pink in colour. These witnesses added that the
same lime water was taken in a bottle sealed the same affixed the
label containing the signatures of these witnesses and PW10 and
the same was MO10. PW2 and PW10 added that the shirt worn by
the 1st accused which was MO13 was taken and PW2 dipped the
left pocket portion of the shirt in lime water. The lime water and
that portion of the shirt turned pink in colour. This was taken in a
bottle sealed affixed the label containing the signature of the
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 17 2025:KER:73324
witnesses and the same was identified as MO11. Again, MO14, the
shirt worn by the 2nd accused was taken by PW2 and the left
pocket of the shirt was dipped in lime water. This lime water and
the shirt portion also turned pink in colour. The said solution was
taken in a bottle sealed the same and affixed the label containing
signature of the witnesses and PW10. This was identified as
MO12. The body search of the 1 st accused was conducted through
the witness Gopalakrishnan and body search of the 2 nd accused
was conducted through PW2. PW10 then arrested accused Nos.1
and 2. He prepared Ext.P5 mahazar. By this time, PW4 came to
that office, as directed by the Tahsildar to take additional charge
of the said office. PW6 - the Inspector seized the records from the
said office, as per Ext.P9 mahazar. PW10 filed Ext.P25 report
showing the correct name and address of accused Nos.1 and 2.
MO1 series to MO14 were produced before court. PW10
questioned the witnesses and recorded their statements.
12. The learned senior counsel for the 1 st accused as well as
the learned counsel for the 2nd accused vehemently canvassed that
no evidence available in this case to prove the demand, as
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 18 2025:KER:73324
contended by the prosecution and in this connection, the learned
senior counsel read out the legible copy of the deposition of PW1
available with him. On reading the legible copy, it could be
gathered that there was no demand by the 1st accused. On reading
the original deposition of PW1 before the Special Court, it
emerges that PW1's evidence was that the Village Officer, Paul sir,
enquired whether the money requested had been brought. The
same question was subsequently repeated by the 1 st accused also.
Thereafter, PW1 handed over the money to accused Nos.1 and 2,
who accepted the same with their right hands and placed the
same in their left pocket. On reading the evidence of PW1 as
regards to demand, nothing extracted to disbelieve his version
during cross-examination. It is pointed out by the learned senior
counsel for the 1st accused that the reluctance in the matter of
issuance of possession certificate was due to issuance of a
possession certificate in the name of wife of PW3. PW3
supported the version of PW1 without much ambiguity.
According to the learned senior counsel, because of issuance of a
possession certificate in the name of the wife of PW3, possession
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 19 2025:KER:73324
certificate could not be issued without transferring the property
in the name of PW3 and thereby, the accused persons demanded
production of original documents.
13. Countering this argument, the learned Special Public
Prosecutor would submit that, as per Ext.P20, page No.31, as on
8.10.2004 itself, mutation was effected in the name of PW3 also
after execution of document, whereby the wife of PW3 shared her
individual ownership to her husband. Therefore, this argument
could not be appreciated. On perusal of Ext.P20, the contention
raised by the learned Special Public Prosecutor could be gathered.
Thus, it appears that even prior to the filing of Ext.P2 application
by PW1 for obtaining the possession certificate, sketch, and plan,
mutation had already been effected in the name of PW3.
Therefore, even though the Village Officer already issued a
possession certificate in the name of PW3, upon production of the
title deed in 2003, the accused persons could very well issue the
documents asked for by PW3 through PW1 and there is no
justification for them to deny the documents asked for by PW1
and PW3, on the basis of issuance of possession certificate in the
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 20 2025:KER:73324
name of the wife of PW3. Thus, this contention is of no avail to
the accused.
14. Now, it is necessary to address the ingredients
required to attract the offences under Section 7 and Section 13(1)
(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988. The same are extracted
as under:-
Section 7:- Public servant taking gratification
other than legal remuneration in respect of
an official act. - Whoever, being, or expecting to be
a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to
accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for
himself or for any other person, any gratification
whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive
or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official
act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the
exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour
to any person or for rendering or attempting to
render any service or disservice to any person, with
the Central Government or any State Government or
Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with
any local authority, corporation or Government
Company referred to in clause (C) of section 2, or
with any public servant, whether named or
otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 21 2025:KER:73324
which shall be not less than three years but which
may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to
fine.
Section 13:- Criminal misconduct by a public
servant. - (1) A public servant is said to commit the
offence of criminal misconduct,-
a) xxxxx
(b) xxxxx
(c) xxxxxx
(d) If he,- (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for
himself or for any other person any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position
as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any
other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public
servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage without any public interest.
xxxxx
(2) Any public servant who commits criminal
misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment
for a term which shall be not less than four years but
which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable
to fine.
15. In this connection, it is relevant to refer a 5 Bench decision
of the Apex Court in [AIR 2023 SC 330], Neeraj Dutta v. State,
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 22 2025:KER:73324
where the Apex Court considered when the demand and acceptance
under Section 7 of the P.C.Act to be said to be proved along with
ingredients for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of
the PC Act, 1988 and in paragraph No.68, it has been held as under :
"68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
summarised as under:
(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by
the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish
the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections
7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act.
(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused,
the prosecution has to first prove the demand of
illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as
a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved
either by direct evidence which can be in the nature
of oral evidence or documentary evidence.
(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can
also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the
absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.
(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the
public servant, the following aspects have to be borne
in mind:
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 23 2025:KER:73324
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe
giver without there being any demand
from the public servant and the latter
simply accepts the offer and receives the
illegal gratification, it is a case of
acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In
such a case, there need not be a prior
demand by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant
makes a demand and the bribe giver
accepts the demand and tenders the
demanded gratification which in turn is
received by the public servant, it is a case
of obtainment. In the case of obtainment,
the prior demand for illegal gratification
emanates from the public servant. This is
an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and
(ii) of the Act
iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the
offer by the bribe giver and the demand by
the public servant respectively have to be
proved by the prosecution as a fact in
issue. In other words, mere acceptance or
receipt of an illegal gratification without
anything more would not make it an
offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d),
(i) and (ii) respectively of the Act.
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 24 2025:KER:73324
Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in
order to bring home the offence, there must
be an offer which emanates from the bribe
giver which is accepted by the public
servant which would make it an offence.
Similarly, a prior demand by the public
servant when accepted by the bribe giver
and in turn there is a payment made which
is received by the public servant, would be
an offence of obtainment under Section 13
(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act
(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the
demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal
gratification may be made by a court of law by way
of an inference only when the foundational facts have
been proved by relevant oral and documentary
evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis
of the material on record, the Court has the discretion
to raise a presumption of fact while considering
whether the fact of demand has been proved by the
prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact
is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the
absence of rebuttal presumption stands.
(f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or
has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during
trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by
letting in the evidence of any other witness who can
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 25 2025:KER:73324
again let in evidence, either orally or by
documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove
the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does
not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of
the accused public servant.
(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on
the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates
the court to raise a presumption that the illegal
gratification was for the purpose of a motive or
reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said
presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal
presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the
said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section
20 does not apply to Section 13(1) (d) and (ii) of the
Act.
(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under
Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of
fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a
mandatory presumption while the latter is
discretionary in nature."
16. Thus, the legal position as regards to the essentials
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act, 1988, is
extracted above. Regarding the mode of proof of demand of bribe,
if there is an offer to pay bribe by the bribe giver without there
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 26 2025:KER:73324
being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply
accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case
of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there
need not be a prior demand by the public servant. The
presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or
obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of
law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have
been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not
in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the
Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while
considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the
prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to
rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal
presumption stands. The mode of proof of demand and
acceptance is either orally or by documentary evidence or the
prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The
trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of
the accused public servant. Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is
concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 27 2025:KER:73324
the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was
for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said
Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a
legal presumption or a presumption in law.
17. In this context, it is relevant to refer the decision of
this Court in Sunil Kumar K. v. State of Kerala reported in
[2025 KHC OnLine 983], in Crl.Appeal No.323/2020, dated
12.9.2025, wherein in paragraph No. 12, it was held as under:
"12. Indubitably in Neeraj Dutta's case (supra)
the Apex Court held in paragraph No.69 that there is
no conflict in the three judge Bench decisions of this
Court in B.Jayaraj and P.Satyanarayana Murthy
with the three judge Bench decision in M.Narasinga
Rao, with regard to the nature and quality of proof
necessary to sustain a conviction for offences under
Section 7 or 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, when the
direct evidence of the complainant or "primary
evidence" of the complainant is unavailable owing to
his death or any other reason. The position of law
when a complainant or prosecution witness turns
"hostile" is also discussed and the observations made
above would accordingly apply in light of Section 154
of the Evidence Act. In view of the aforesaid discussion
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 28 2025:KER:73324
there is no conflict between the judgments in the
aforesaid three cases. Further in Paragraph No.70 the
Apex Court held that in the absence of evidence of the
complainant (direct/primary,oral/documentary
evidence) it is permissible to draw an inferential
deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant
under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the
Act based on other evidence adduced by the
prosecution. In paragraph No.68 the Apex Court
summarized the discussion. That apart, in State by
Lokayuktha Police's case (supra) placed by the
learned counsel for the accused also the Apex Court
considered the ingredients for the offences punishable
under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC
Act,1988 and held that demand and acceptance of
bribe are necessary to constitute the said offences.
Similarly as pointed out by the learned counsel for the
petitioner in Aman Bhatia's case (supra) the Apex
court reiterated the same principles. Thus the legal
position as regards to the essentials to be established
to fasten criminal culpability on an accused are
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the
accused. To put it otherwise, proof of demand is sine
qua non for the offences to be established under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988
and dehors the proof of demand the offences under the
two Sections could not be established. Therefore mere
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 29 2025:KER:73324
acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of bribe
or as undue pecuniary advantage or illegal
gratification or the recovery of the same would not be
sufficient to prove the offences under the two Sections
in the absence of evidence to prove the demand."
18. First of all, I shall address the question as to whether
there was failure in identifying the 1 st accused, whose name
initially, as per the prosecution records, is 'Viswanadhan' instead
of Visweswaran Pillai. In this connection, it is relevant to refer
the evidence of PW1. In the evidence of PW1, it is stated that the
1st accused, Visweswaran Pillai, and the 2 nd accused, Paul Sir,
separately demanded the money previously asked for and
thereafter accepted the same on the date of trap. PW1 identified
accused Nos.1 and 2 at the dock. It is true that, in the evidence,
there is no separate identification of accused Nos.1 and 2.
However, as pointed out by the learned Special Public Prosecutor,
it is discernible from the facts of the case that this was a trap case,
wherein PW1 lodged a complaint before the Vigilance
Department after having established familiarity with the accused.
Thereafter, the accused demanded and accepted the bribe money,
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 30 2025:KER:73324
following which they were arrested. Thereafter, at the dock, they
were identified by naming them specifically. In such a case, the
contention raised by the learned senior counsel, disputing the
identity of the accused, would not stand and for the said reason,
the said challenge is found to be unsustainable.
19. Regarding the argument advanced by the learned
senior counsel for the 1st accused, alleging lack of evidence of
demand, as against the 1st accused, the same cannot be
countenanced as already discussed. In fact, the evidence of PW1,
corroborated by the evidence of PW3, categorically established
that accused Nos.1 and 2 demanded and accepted the bribe as
alleged by the prosecution on 01.11.2004 in continuation of the
demand earlier made on on 29.10.2004, thereby satisfying the
ingredients of the offences in question. Therefore, the said
contention also could not be considered.
20. Coming to the application of Section 20(3) of the PC
Act, 1988, where it has been provided that the court may decline
to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-
sections if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, is
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 31 2025:KER:73324
so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn. On
reading the section itself, it is discernible that when the amount
of bribe is negligible, the court has the discretion to decline
drawing of presumption under Section 20(1) of the PC Act, 1988.
On reading Section 20(1) of the PC Act, 1988, the presumption
would be operative once it is proved that an accused person has
accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to
obtain for himself or for any other person any gratification other
than legal remuneration. In Chandrasha's case (supra), in
paragraph No.23, the Apex Court held that in view of the
aforesaid analysis, we find that the trial Court based on the oral
and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, rightly found
the respondent guilty of the offences punishable under S.7 and
S.13(1)(d) r/w S.13(2) of the Act and sentenced him for the same.
However, the High Court by placing reliance on the decision of
this Court in A. Subair's case (supra), held that since no work
was pending with the respondent as on the date of trap, the
ingredient to attract and complete the offences punishable under
S.7, S.13(1)(d) read with S.13(2) of the Act was not met. The view
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 32 2025:KER:73324
so taken by the High Court is unsustainable as the decision of
this Court in A.Subair's case (supra) did not support the view. It
was a case where the complainant was not even examined and
there were discrepancies in the evidence of the other witnesses.
In the present case, we do not find such infirmities. Insofar as
the reference to sub-section (3) to S.20 regarding the triviality of
the gratification, the act sought or performed, and the amount
demanded cannot be considered in isolation to each other. The
value of gratification is to be considered in proportion to the act
to be done or not done, to forbear or to not forebear, favour or
disfavour sought, so as to be trivial to convince the Court, not to
draw any presumption of corrupt practice. It is also not
necessary that only if substantial amount is demanded, the
presumption can be drawn. The overall circumstances and the
evidence will also have to be looked into. S.20 would come into
operation only when there is no nexus between the demand and
the action performed or sought to be performed. But, when the
fact of receipt of payment or an agreement to receive the
gratification stands proved, there is a clear case of nexus or
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 33 2025:KER:73324
corroboration and the presumption itself is irrelevant. S.20 gets
attracted when it is proved that the public servant has accepted
or agreed to accept any gratification other than legal
remuneration and in that case, presumption is that it is the
motive or reward for any of the acts covered under S.7, S.11 or
S.13(1)(b) of the Act. The presumption under S.20 is similar to
S.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where the onus is
on the accused to prove that he is not guilty of the offences
charged. The first two limbs under sub-sections (1) and (2) of S.
20 make it clear that adequacy of consideration is irrelevant to
draw the presumption. That apart, sub-section (3) only grants a
discretion to Court to decline from drawing any presumption if
the amount is so trivial so that such inference of corruption is
not fairly possible in the facts of the case. Therefore, it is not a
rule but an exception available to the Court to exercise its
discretionary power in the facts and circumstances of the case.
In the present facts of the case, we are not inclined to exercise
such discretion. As such, the judgment of acquittal passed by the
High Court is illegal, erroneous and contrary to the materials on
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 34 2025:KER:73324
record.
The above decision would lead to the conclusion that Section
20(3) of the PC Act, 1988, is an exception available to the court to
exercise its discretionary power in the facts and circumstances of
a particular case and in Chandrasha's case (supra), the Apex
Court was not inclined to exercise such discretion. Thus, the law
is settled that once the fact in issue as to receipt of payment or an
agreement to receive the gratification stands proved, beyond
reasonable doubt, further corroboration and presumption of
Section 20(1) of the PC Act, 1988, is irrelevant, though the court
can presume so. That is to say, once the demand and acceptance
of illegal gratification by a public servant are established beyond
reasonable doubt, the court need not go in aid of the presumption
under Sections 20(1) and (2) of the PC Act, 1988. Having noticed
the legal position, I am not inclined to apply the discretion
provided under Section 20(3) of the PC Act, 1988 in the instant
case. Therefore, this contention also must fail.
21. As regards the contention raised by the learned
counsel for the 2nd accused, appellant in Crl.A.No.2162/2010,
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 35 2025:KER:73324
contending that Ext.P23 sanction is not proper, it could be
gathered that Ext.P23 sanction was proved through PW9.
Ext.P23 would show that PW9 issued sanction on scrutiny of the
zprosecution materials and on applying the minds specifically. It
is true that as per the decision in Mohd.Iqbal Ahmed's case
(supra), the Apex Court held as argued by the learned counsel for
the 2nd accused while considering Section 6 of the PC Act, 1947
that it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that valid
sanction has been granted by the Sanctioning Authority after it
was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out
constituting the offence. It is noticeable that, on going through
Section 6 of the PC Act, 1947, no pari materia provisions
equivalent to Sections 19(3) and 19(4) of the PC Act, 1988 were
available in the PC Act, 1947. In fact, Sections 19(3) and 19(4)
were introduced to the statute by the subsequent amendment.
The impact of sanction after a finding is entered or a sentence
already passed by a Special Judge being considered by this Court
shall be adhering to Sections 19(3) and 19(4) of the PC Act, 1988.
22. It is pertinent to note the principle laid down by the
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 36 2025:KER:73324
Apex Court in Paul Varghese v. State of Kerala reported in
[2007 (2) KHC 400 : JT 2007 (5) SC 525 : 2007 (2) KLT
529] and State by Police Inspector v. T. Venkatesh
Murthy reported in [(2004) 7 SCC 763], is that the validity of
sanction does not, by itself, affect the validity of the proceedings.
A defect, omission, or irregularity in the sanction would warrant
interference only if the court is satisfied that such defect has
resulted in a failure of justice.
23. In State of Goa v. Babu Thomas reported in [2005
KHC 1803 : 2005 (4) KLT SN 87 : 2005 (8) SCC 130 : AIR
2005 SC 3606], the Apex Court distinguished the decision in
State by Police Inspector v. T.Venkatesh Murthy's case
(supra) and held in paragraph 11 as under:
11. Referring to the aforesaid provisions, it is
contended by learned counsel for the appellant
that the Court should not, in appeal, reverse or
alter any finding, sentence or order passed by a
special Judge on the ground of the absence of any
error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction
required under sub-section (1), unless the Court
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 37 2025:KER:73324
finds a failure of justice has in fact been
occasioned thereby. In this connection, a reference
was made to the decision of this Court rendered in
the case of State v. T. Venkatesh Murthy (2004) 7
SCC 763 : (2004) SCC (Cri) 2140). Reference was
also made to the decision of this Court in the case
of Durga Dass v. State of H.P. (1973) 2 SCC 213 :
(1973) SCC (Cri) 762) where this Court has taken
the view that the Court should not interfere in the
finding or sentence or order passed by a special
Judge and reverse or alter the same on the ground
of the absence of, or any error, omission or
irregularity in the sanction required under sub-
section (1), unless the Court finds that a failure of
justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.
According to the counsel for the appellant no
failure of justice has occasioned merely because
there was an error, omission or irregularity in the
sanction required because evidence is yet to start
and in that view the High Court has not
considered this aspect of the matter and it is a fit
case to intervene by this Court. We are unable to
accept this contention of the counsel. The present is
not the case where there has been mere
irregularity, error or omission in the order of
sanction as required under sub-section (1) of
Section 19 of the Act. It goes to the root of the
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 38 2025:KER:73324
prosecution case. Sub-section (1) of Section 19
clearly prohibits that the Court shall not take
cognizance of an offence punishable under sections
7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed
by a public servant, except with the previous
sanction as stated in clauses (a), (b) and (c).
24. Reference may also be made to the decision of the
Apex Court in Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka reported in
[(2015) 14 SCC 186]. In paragraph 22 of the said judgment, the
Apex Court held as under:
22. The legal position regarding the importance of
sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act is thus much too clear to admit equivocation. The
statute forbids taking of cognizance by the court against a
public servant except with the previous sanction of an
authority competent to grant such sanction in terms of
clauses (a), (b) and (c) to Section 19(1). The question
regarding validity of such sanction can be raised at any
stage of the proceedings. The competence of the court
trying the accused so much depends upon the existence of
a valid sanction. In case the sanction is found to be
invalid, the court can discharge the accused relegating the
parties to a stage where the competent authority may
grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in accordance
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 39 2025:KER:73324
with law. If the trial court proceeds, despite the invalidity
attached to the sanction order, the same shall be deemed
to be non est in the eyes of law and shall not forbid a
second trial for the same offences, upon grant of a valid
sanction for such prosecution.
25. Going by the decisions extracted hereinabove, majority
of the decisions would emphasize the point that, failure of justice
if not occasioned, by way of the absence of, or any error, omission
or irregularity in sanction, the same by itself is not a ground to
interfere the finding, sentence or order passed by the Special
Judge. It is the fundamental principle of interpretation of statute
that, when provisions of a statute are interpreted, the
interpretation should be by giving effect to all the provisions,
without making any of the provisions redundant or inoperative.
26. In the latest decision of the Apex Court reported in
[2025 INSC 654] Dashrath v. The State of Maharashtra,
the Apex Court referred Neeraj Dutta's case (supra) and the
decision reported in [(2015) 2 SCC 33] Manzoor Ali Khan v.
Union of India, and held in paragraph Nos.12 and 13 that, it is
no longer res integra that requirement of sanction has a
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 40 2025:KER:73324
salutary object. Provisions requiring sanction to prosecute,
either under Section 19, PC Act or Section 197 of the (now
repealed) Cr. PC or under Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are intended to protect an innocent
public servant against unwarranted and mala fide prosecution.
Indubitably, there can be no tolerance to corruption which has
the effect of undermining core constitutional values of justice,
equality, liberty and fraternity; however, at the same time, the
need to prosecute and punish the corrupt is no ground to deny
protection to the honest. This is what was held by this Court in
its decision in Manzoor Ali Khan v. Union of India while
repelling a challenge raised in a Public Interest Litigation to the
constitutional validity of Section 19 of the PC Act. Even
otherwise, merely because there is any omission, error or
irregularity in the matter of granting sanction, that does not
affect the validity of the proceedings unless the court records its
own satisfaction that such error, omission or irregularity has
resulted in a failure of justice.
27. In another decision of the Apex Court reported in
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 41 2025:KER:73324
[2025 INSC 50], The State of Punjab v. Hari Kesh, after
referring the decision of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka
Lokayukta Police v. S.Subbegowda reported in [(2023) 17
Supreme Court Cases 699 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 911], the
Apex Court considered the combined effect of sub-sections (3)
and (4) of Section 19 and reiterated that, in view of sub-section
(3) clearly forbids the court in appeal, confirmation or revision,
the interference with the order passed by the Special Judge on
the ground that the sanction was bad, save and except in cases
where the failure of justice had occurred by such invalidity.
28. Thus, the law emerges is that, in order to take
cognizance for the offences under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of
the P.C. Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant,
sanction is necessary. After taking cognizance, during trial, when
considering the validity of sanction on the ground of any error or
omission or irregularity in the sanction, including the
incompetency of the authority to grant sanction, a court in
appeal, confirmation or revision, on those grounds, no finding,
sentence or order passed by the Special Judge shall not be
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 42 2025:KER:73324
interfered, unless the court finds that such error or omission or
irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice. Therefore, even
though sanction is necessary to take cognizance for offences
under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the P.C. Act alleged to be
committed by a public servant, unless there is a failure of justice,
the finding, sentence or order passed by the Special Judge shall
not be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or
revision.
29. In view of the above legal position, the mere error,
omission or irregularity in sanction, by itself, does not constitute
a ground for interference by an appellate or revisional court, or by
a court confirming the order, on the basis of any error, omission,
or irregularity in the sanction, unless the court is of the opinion
that such omission has, in fact, resulted in a failure of justice. In
the instant case, there is nothing to suggest that there is failure of
justice, in any manner and the sanction order found to be in
order. If any error, omission, or irregularity exists in the order of
sanction, the same cannot, by itself, serve as a ground to negate
the prosecution case in its entirety.
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 43 2025:KER:73324
30. Having gone through the prosecution case and on re-
appreciation of the evidence available, this Court is of the view
that the Special Court rightly found the ingredients to find
commission of offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section
13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 by accused Nos.1 and 2 herein/the
appellants. Therefore, conviction does not require any
interference.
31. In the instant case, the Special Court convicted the
accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one
year each and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each. In default of
payment of the fine, the accused were sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months each for the
offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988. Similarly,
for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the PC
Act, 1988, the Special Court imposed rigorous imprisonment for a
period of one year each and a fine of Rs.1,000/- each, with default
rigorous imprisonment of three months each. For the offence
under Section 120B of the IPC, the Special Court sentenced the
accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 44 2025:KER:73324
year each.
32. Considering the factual aspects discussed and the
arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the accused, I am
inclined to reduce the sentence to the minimum permissible
under law.
33. In the result, both these appeals stand allowed in part.
The conviction imposed against accused Nos.1 and 2 is
confirmed. The sentence stands modified as under:
34. The accused are sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of six months and also to pay a fine of
Rs.1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, both the
accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two
months for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act,
1988. The accused are sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of one year each and to pay a fine of
Rs.1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, the accused
shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months
each for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of
the PC Act, 1988. For the offence under Section 120B, the
CRL.A.NOS.2139 & 2162 OF 2010 45 2025:KER:73324
accused are sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period of two months each.
34. The substantive sentences shall run concurrently and
the default sentences shall run separately.
35. The orders suspending sentence and granting bail to
the accused stand cancelled and the bail bonds executed by the
accused also stand cancelled. The accused are directed to
surrender before the Special Court, forthwith to undergo the
modified sentence, failing which, the Special Court is directed to
execute the sentence, without fail.
Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment of
the Special Court, forthwith, without fail, for information and
compliance.
Sd/-
A. BADHARUDEEN
JUDGE
Bb
