Nitin Jamdar, C. J.
Through this Public Interest Litigation, the Kerala High Court
Advocates' Association challenges the amendment to the Kerala Court
Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, introduced by Section 2 of the
Kerala Finance Act, 2025. The Mavelikara Bar Association and the
Trivandrum Bar Association have joined as intervenors supporting this
challenge.
2. Earlier, the levy of court fees and the valuation of suits in the region
were governed by the Madras Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955,
the Travancore-Cochin Court-Fees Act, 1125, and the Travancore-
Cochin Suits Valuation Act, 1125. To ensure uniformity across the entire
State, it was considered necessary to enact a common law, and
accordingly, the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1959') came into force on 1
February 1962.
3. The Act of 1959 comprises nine chapters. Chapter I sets out the
definitions and the applicability of the Act. Chapter II relates to the
liability to pay court fees, while Chapter III provides for the
determination of court fees under various sections. Chapter IV concerns
the computation of fees, and Chapter V addresses the valuation of suits.
Chapters VI and VII contain provisions relating to probates, letters of
administration, refunds, and remissions. Under Section 85 of the Act of
1959, the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Rules, 1962 were
framed. Schedule I appended to the Act deals with ad valorem fees, and
Schedule II prescribes the court fees, which form the main subject matter
of the present challenge.
4. The Act of 1959 has undergone several amendments over the years.
Act 8 of 1966, enacted to raise additional resources for the Fourth Five
Year Plan, enhanced the rates of court fees. This was followed by Act 8 of
1968, which introduced amendments necessitated by the period when
the State of Kerala was under President's Rule. By Act 12 of 1969, a
further amendment was made to provide for the levy of court fees on
election petitions, as no specific provision existed earlier. Subsequently,
Act 7 of 1972 amended the Act of 1959 to grant certain concessions to
Co-operative Societies and Trade Unions formed by members of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Acting on the recommendations
of the Taxation Enquiry Committee, the Act was further amended to
prescribe a uniform fee rate for miscellaneous petitions. Thereafter, Act
38 of 1976 introduced provisions relating to court fees payable before
Tribunals, and Act 39 of 1976 brought in procedural changes. Following
a challenge to the validity of certain clauses in the Schedule, on the
ground that the court fee levied was excessive and amounted to taxation,
the State undertook a study, leading to further amendments through Act
6 of 1991. Subsequent amendments were also made from time to time,
based on financial proposals of the Government of Kerala concerning
various legislations.
5. The subject matter of challenge is the Kerala Finance Act, 2025
(hereinafter referred to as 'the impugned Amending Act'), by which the
Act of 1959 was amended. For the sake of convenience, the impugned
Amending Act is reproduced hereunder:
a) clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 4 shall be
deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of July,
2017;
(b) section 6 shall come into force on such date as the
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
appoint:
CHAPTER II
REVISION OF TAXES
2. Amendment of Act 10 of 1960.- In the Kerala
Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 (10 of 1960),-
(1) in section 7, in sub-section (2), after the figure
and symbol "38," the figures, bracket, letter and symbol
"40(1a)," shall be inserted;
(2) in section 25, for the words "rupees one
thousand", wherever it occurs the words "rupees five
thousand" shall be substituted;
(3) in section 27, for the words "rupees five
hundred", wherever it occurs the words "rupees two
thousand and five hundred" shall be substituted;
(4) in section 28,-
(i) for the words "rupees two hundred", the words
"rupees five thousand" and for the words "rupees one
thousand", the words "rupees ten thousand" shall be
substituted;
(ii) in the Explanation, after the words "charitable
endowment", the words, symbols, brackets and figures
"and any institution registered under the Travancore-
Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies
Registration Act, 1955 (12 of 1955) and the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 (Central Act 21 of 1860)" shall be
inserted;
(5) for section 29, the following section shall be
substituted, namely:-
(i) in item (i), for the words "Rupees fifty", the words
"Rupees five hundred" shall be substituted;
(ii) in item (ii), for the words "Rupees three
hundred", the words "Rupees two thousand" shall be
substituted;
(10) in section 40, after sub-section (1), the following
sub-section shall be inserted, namely:-
section (1), for setting aside a gift deed, settlement deed
and release deed, if filed by the settlor, donor or any
person who can claim under him in present or future, the
fee shall be computed on the market value of the
property.";
(i) for the words, figures and symbols "section 14
of the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923, section
13 of the Travancore Survey and Boundaries Act of 1094
or section 14 of the Cochin Survey Act, II of 1074", the
words, symbols, bracket and figures "section 13 of the
Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act, 1961 (37 of 1961)"
(14) in section 50, for the words "Rupees twenty
five", "Rupees fifty", "Rupees two hundred", "Rupees four
hundred", the words "Rupees one hundred and twenty
five", "Rupees two hundred and fifty", "Rupees one
thousand" and "Rupees two thousand" shall respectively
be substituted;
(15) in section 52A, for the words, figure, letters
and brackets "sub-items (C) and (D) of item (iii) of article
3 of Schedule II", the words, figure, letters and brackets
"sub-items (C) and (D) of item (ii) of article 1 of schedule
II" shall be substituted;
(16) in section 68, for the words, figure, letters and
brackets "article 11(g) and (t) of Schedule II", the words,
figure, letters and brackets "article 9(g) and (s) of schedule
II" shall be substituted;
(17) in section 74, in sub-section (1), in item (ii),
for the words "rupees twelve thousand", the words "rupees
three lakh" and for the words "rupees fifteen thousand",
the words "rupees ten lakh" shall be substituted;
(18) in section 74A, in sub-section (1), in item (b),
for the words "one hundred rupees", the words "twenty
five thousand rupees" and for the words "one thousand
rupees", the words "ten lakh rupees" shall be substituted;
(19) in section 76,-
(i) in sub-section (1), after the words "amount
involved in the dispute", the words, symbols, brackets and
figures ",on petitions under section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Central Act 26 of 1996) at
the rate of 0.5% of the award amount and on original
petitions filed before the High Court and petition filed
under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
(Central Act 54 of 2002) at the rate of rupees one
hundred per petition" shall be inserted;
(ii) in sub-section (2), in item (ii), for the words
and figures "article 16 of schedule II", the words and
figures "article 12 of schedule II" shall be substituted;
(a) in the first schedule, after article 1 and the
entries against it in columns (2) and (3), the following
article and entries shall respectively be inserted, namely:-
compensation for bodily injury One percentum on
or death caused by any criminal the amount of
act, grievous hurt, malicious compensation";
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prosecution, defamation - libel
or slander
(b) for the second schedule, the following schedule
shall be substituted, namely:-
SCHEDULE II
Article Particulars Proper fee
(1) (2) (3)
1. Memorandum of appeal from an order
inclusive of an order determining any
question under section 47 or section 144 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central
Act 5 of 1908), and not otherwise provided
for when presented--
(i) to any Court other than the High Fifty rupees
Court or to the Land Revenue Commissioner
or the Chief Executive Authority or to any
Executive Officer
(ii) to the High Court--
(A) From an order other than an order
under the Kerala Farmers' Debt Relief
Commission Act, 2006 (1 of 2007)
(1) Where the order was passed by a
Subordinate Court or other authority--
(a) If the order relates to a suit or One hundred and twenty
proceeding, the value of which exceeds one five rupees
thousand rupees
(b) In any other case Fifty rupees
(2) Where the appeal is under section 5 of
the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 (5 of 1959)-
(a) From an order passed in exercise of One hundred and twenty
appellate jurisdiction five rupees
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(b) From an order passed in exercise of One hundred and
original jurisdiction, which would be twenty five rupees
appealable under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), had
it been passed by a Subordinate Court
(c) In any other case One thousand rupees
per appellant
(3) Where the appeal is under section 45-B One thousand two
of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (Central hundred and fifty rupees
Act 10 of 1949)
(4) Where the appeal is under section 415 Fifty rupees
of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhitha,
2023 (Central Act 46 of 2023)
(B) From an order under the Kerala Twenty five rupees
Farmers' Debt Relief Commission Act, 2006
(1 of 2007)
(C) From an order of the Appellate
Tribunal under the Income Tax Act, 1961
(Central Act 43 of 1961),--
(a) Where the total income of the assessee Two thousand and five
as computed by the Assessing Officer, in the hundred rupees
case to which the appeal relates is one lakh
rupees or less
(b) Where such income exceeds one lakh Seven thousand and five
rupees but does not exceed two lakh rupees hundred rupees
(c) Where such income exceeds two lakh
rupees--
(i) in the case of appeal by the Government Two percent of the
of India relief sought for,
subject to a maximum
of rupees one lakh
(ii) in all other cases Five percent of the
relief sought for,
subject to a maximum
of rupees ten lakhs
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(d) Where the subject matter of an appeal Ten percent of relief
relates to any matter, other than those sought for, subject to a
specified in sub-clauses (a) to (c) above minimum of two
thousand five hundred
rupees
(D) From an order of the Appellate
Tribunal under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957
(Central Act 27 of 1957)--
(a) Where the total net wealth of the Ten thousand and five
assessee as computed by the Assessing hundred rupees
Officer, in the case to which the appeal relates
is one lakh rupees or less
(b) Where such net wealth exceeds one Seven thousand and
lakh rupees but does not exceed two lakh five hundred rupees
rupees
(c) Where such net wealth exceeds two Five percent of the
lakh rupees relief sought for
(d) Where the subject matter of an appeal Ten percent of the
relates to any matter, other than those relief sought for, subject
specified in clauses (a) to (c) above. to a minimum of two
thousand and five
hundred rupees
(iii) to the Government in pursuance of a One hundred and
statutory right to appeal for which no court twenty five rupees
fee is leviable under any other enactment
2. Memorandum of appeal under the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(Central Act 26 of 1996)--
(i) memorandum of appeal against an order One percentum on
under section 34 of the Arbitration and amount of award
Conciliation Act, 1996 (Central Act 26 of
1996), setting aside or refusing to set aside an
award
(ii) appeals against orders passed under
sections 8, 9, 16 (2), 16 (3) and 17, covered
by section 37(1)(a) and (b), section 37(2)(a)
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and (b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (Central Act 26 of 1996) fee shall
be chargeable as follows:--
(a) if the value of the claim extends upto Five hundred rupees
rupees ten lakh
(b) if the value of the claim exceeds rupees Two thousand rupees
ten lakh and upto rupees fifty lakh
(c) if the value of the claim exceeds rupees Five thousand rupees
fifty lakh
3. Copy or translation of a judgment or order Twenty five rupees
not being or having the force of a decree
passed by the High Court, or by any Civil
Court or by the Presiding Officer of any
Revenue Court or office or by any other
Court or Judicial or executive authority
4. Copy or translation of a judgment or order of a Twenty five rupees
Criminal Court
5. Copy of a decree or order, having the force of a Twenty five rupees
decree, made by the High Court or any other
Court
6. Copy of any document liable to stamp duty
under the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959 (17 of
1959) when left by any party to a suit or
proceeding in place of the original
withdrawn-
(a) When the stamp duty chargeable on The amount of the
the original does not exceed two rupees fifty duty chargeable on
paise the original
(b) in any other case Ten rupees
7. Copy of any revenue or judicial proceeding or
order not otherwise provided for by this Act or
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copy of any account, statement, report or the
like taken out of any Court or office of any
public officer--
For every document Ten rupees
8. (a) Application or petition presented to any Ten rupees
officer of land revenue by any person holding
temporarily settled land under direct
engagement with Government and when the
subject matter of the application or petition
relates exclusively to such engagement
(b) Application or petition presented to any Ten rupees
officer of land revenue relating to the grant of
land on darkhast or assignment of land
(c) Application to a Collector for lease of Twenty five rupees
land for agricultural or non-agricultural
purposes
(d) Application or petition presented to any Twenty five rupees
executive officer under any Act for the time
being in force for the conservancy or
improvement of any place if the application
or petition relates solely to such conservancy
or improvement
(e) Application or petition presented to any Twenty five rupees
board or executive officer for a copy or
translation of any order passed by such board
or officer or of any other document on record
in such office
(f) Application to a Forest Officer by a forest
contractor for extension of the period of
lease-
(i) if the value of the subject matter of the Five hundred rupees
lease is rupees one lakh twenty five thousand
or less
(ii) if such value exceeds rupees one lakh One hundred rupees
twenty five thousand for every rupees five
thousand or part thereof, in excess of rupees
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one lakh twenty five thousand
(g) Application for attestation of private
documents intended to be used outside India-
(i) which involves verification of Five hundred rupees
genuineness of the document
(ii) which requires counter signature after Two hundred and fifty
attestation by a Notary rupees
(h) Application or petition presented to the
Government and not otherwise provided for-
(i) which involves the exercise or non- Ten rupees
exercise of power conferred by law or rule
having the force of law
(ii) in other cases Five rupees
(i) Application or petition presented to the
Land Revenue Commissioner or Chief
Executive Authority and not otherwise
provided for--
(i) which involves the exercise or non- Fifty rupees
exercise of power conferred by law or rule
having the force of law
(ii) in other cases Twenty rupees
(j) (i) Application under section 8 (1) of the One hundred and
Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and twenty five rupees
Assignment) Act, 1971 (26 of 1971), to the
Tribunal constituted under that Act
(ii) Application to such Tribunal for an Thirty rupees
interlocutory order
(k) Application or petition not falling Twenty five rupees
under clause (h) or (i) and presented to a
public officer or in a public office and not
otherwise provided for
9. (a) Application or petition presented to any Twenty five rupees
Court for a copy or translation of any
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judgment, decree or any proceeding of or
order passed by such Court or of any other
document on record in such Court
(b) Application or petition presented to any Twenty five rupees
Civil Court other than a Principal Civil Court
of original jurisdiction or to any Court of Small
Causes constituted under the Kerala Small
Cause Courts Act, 1957 (8 of 1957), or to a
Collector or other officer of revenue in relation
to any suit or case in which the amount or
value of the subject matter is less than Rs. 250
(c) Application to any Court that records Twenty five rupees in
may be called from another Court, when the addition to the fee
Court grants the application, and is of opinion leviable on the
that the transmission of such records involves application
the use of the post
(d) Application for permission to deposit Twenty five rupees
revenue or rent either in the office of the
Collector or in the Court
(e) Application or petition presented to a Twenty five rupees
Court for determination of the amount of
compensation to be paid by a landlord to his
tenant.
(f) A written complaint or charge of any Fifty rupees
offence other than an offence for which a
Police Officer may, under the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhitha, 2023 (Central Act
46 of 2023) arrest without warrant and
presented to any Criminal Court and an oral
complaint of any such offence reduced to
writing under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhitha, 2023 (Central Act 46 of 2023)
(g) (i) Application or petition presented to Twenty rupees per
any Court, except Sub-Court or District Court, petitioner
or to any Magistrate Court in his executive
capacity and not otherwise provided in this Act
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(ii) Application or petition presented to Sub Thirty rupees per
Court or District Court petitioner
(h) Petition for taking possession of any One thousand rupees
secured assets under section 14 of the per petition
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest
Act, 2002 (Central Act 54 of 2002)
(i) Application for arrest or attachment
before judgment or for temporary injunction-
(i) when presented to a Civil Court or
Revenue Court other than the High Court in
relation to any suit or proceeding
(a) if the value of the subject matter of Fifty rupees
which is less than Rs. 250;
(b) if the value is Rs. 250 and above One hundred and
twenty five rupees
(ii) when presented to the High Court Two hundred and fifty
rupees
(j) Application or petition under section 47,
Order XXI rules 58 and 90 and Order
XXXVIII rule 8 of Civil Procedure, 1908
(Central Act 5 of 1908)--
(i) when filed in a Revenue Court or a Fifty rupees
Munsiff's Court;
(ii) when filed in a Sub-Court or a District One hundred and
Court; twenty five rupees
(iii) when filed in the High Court District Two hundred and fifty
rupees
(k) Application or petition under sections Two hundred and fifty
34, 72, 73 and 74 of the Indian Trusts Act, rupees
1882 (Central Act 2 of 1882)
(l) (i) Application for probate or letters of Two hundred and fifty
administration to have effect throughout India rupees
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(ii) Application for probate or letters of
administration not falling under clause (i)--
(a) if the value of the estate does not exceed Five rupees
Rs. 1000;
(b) if the value exceeds Rs. 1000: Twenty five rupees
Provided that if a caveat is entered and the
application is registered as a suit, one half the
scale of fee prescribed in article 1 of schedule I
on the market value of the estate less the fee
already paid on the application shall be levied.
(m) Original petitions not otherwise provided
for when filed in--
(i) a Munsiff's Court--
(a) under the Kerala Small Cause Courts Fifty rupees
Act, 1957 (8 of 1957)
(b) in other cases One hundred and
twenty five rupees
(ii) a Sub-Court or a District Court Two hundred and fifty
rupees
(iii) the High Court Five hundred rupees
per petitioner
(iv) for Contempt of Court Cases in the Five hundred rupees
High Court
(v) arbitration application before the High One thousand rupees
Court:
Provided that no fee shall be leviable for
Habeas Corpus and Writ Petitions preferred as
Public Interest Litigation as long as the same is
entertained and disposed as Public Interest
Litigation before the High Court
(n) Application to set aside an award under
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(Central Act 26 of 1996),―
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the principal amount of the award covered One percentum on the
by section 34 of the Arbitration and principal amount of
Conciliation Act, 1996 (Central Act 26 of award
1996)
(o) Application for enforcing awards
including foreign awards―
(i) if the value of the subject matter of the One percentum on the
award does not exceed ₹ 1,00,000/-; value of the subject matter
(ii) if the value exceeds ₹ 1,00,000/-, for 0.75 percentum on the
every one hundred rupees or part thereof in value of the subject
excess of one lakh rupees upto ₹ 10,00,000/-; matter
(iii) if the value exceeds ₹ 10,00,000/-, for 0.50 percentum on the
every one hundred rupees or part thereof in value of the subject
excess of ten lakh rupees upto ₹ 1,00,00,000/-; matter
(iv) if the value exceeds ₹ 1,00,00,000/-, for 0.25 percentum on the
every one hundred rupees or part thereof in value of the subject
excess of ₹ 1,00,00,000/-; matter
(subject to a maximum
of fifty thousand
rupees)
(p) Revision petition presented to the High
Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908) or
under section 22 of the Kerala Small Cause
Courts Act, 1957 (8 of 1957) or under the
provisions of any other Act, arising out of a
suit or proceeding--
(i) if the value of the suit or proceeding to One hundred and
which the order sought to be revised relates twenty five rupees
does not exceed Rs. 1000;
(ii) if such value exceeds ₹1000 Two hundred and fifty
rupees
(q) Petition under sections 230 and 272 of One thousand two
the Companies Act, 2013 (Central Act 18 of hundred and fifty rupees
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2013), in connection with the winding up of a
company
(r) Application under section 39 of the One thousand rupees
Specific Relief Act, 1963 (Central Act 47 of
1963)
(s) Application or petition presented to the Fifty rupees
High Court and not otherwise specifically
provided for
(t) Election petition questioning the election
of a person in respect of--
(i) the office of member of a Panchayat; Two hundred and fifty
rupees
(ii) the office of President or Vice President Five hundred rupees
of a Panchayat;
(iii) the office of member of a Block One thousand rupees
Panchayat;
(iv) the office of President or Vice President Two thousand rupees
of a Block Panchayat;
(v) the office of member of a District One thousand and five
Panchayat; hundred rupees
(vi) the office of President or Vice President Two thousand and five
of a District Panchayat; hundred rupees
(vii) the office of member of a Municipal One thousand and five
Council or Municipal Corporation; hundred rupees
(viii) the office of Mayor or Deputy Mayor Three thousand rupees
of Municipal Corporation or Chairman or Vice
Chairman of Municipal Council;
(ix) Election petition presented to the High One thousand two
Court under section 80A of the hundred and fifty
Representation of the People Act, 1951 rupees
(Central Act 43 of 1951) of a Member of
Legislative Assembly;
(x) Election petition presented to the High One thousand two
Court under section 80A of the Representation hundred and fifty
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of the People Act, 1951 (Central Act 43 of rupees
1951) of a Member of Parliament
(u) When the difference of the amount
awarded by Land Acquisition Officer/
Competent Authority and reference Court,
when the enhanced amount--
(i) does not exceeds rupees twenty five Nil
thousand;
(ii) exceeds rupees twenty five thousand but Five hundred rupees
does not exceeds one lakh;
(iii) exceeds rupees one lakh for every one Four rupees
hundred rupees or part thereof, in excess of
one lakh rupees up to five lakh;
(iv) exceeds rupees five lakh for every one One rupee
hundred rupees, or part thereof in excess of
five lakh rupees up to ten lakh;
(v) exceeds rupees ten lakh for every one 0.75 rupee
hundred rupees or part thereof, in excess of ten
lakh rupees up to twenty lakh;
(vi) exceeds rupees twenty lakh for every 0.50 rupee
one hundred rupees or part thereof, in excess
of twenty lakh rupees up to fifty lakh;
(vii) exceeds rupees fifty lakh for every one 0.25 rupee
hundred rupees or part thereof, in excess of
fifty lakh rupees up to seventy five lakh;
(viii) exceeds rupees seventy five lakh for 0.10 rupee
every one hundred rupees or part thereof, in
excess of seventy five lakh rupees up to one
crore;
(ix) exceeds rupees one crore for every one 0.01 rupee
hundred rupees or part thereof, in excess of
rupees one crore
(v) original petition preferred claiming
compensation under--
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the Telecommunications Act, 2023 (Central Two percentum of
Act 44 of 2023); Petroleum and Minerals additional compensation
Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in awarded
Land) Act, 1962 (Central Act 50 of 1962); the
Electricity Act, 2003 (Central Act 36 of 2003)
(w) An application under Order XXI rule
97 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (Central
Act 5 of 1908)--
(i) (a) before a Munsiff's Court; Five hundred rupees
(b) before a Sub- Court or a District Court One thousand rupees
(ii) for appeal/revision One thousand rupees
10. (i) Bail bond or other instrument of Ten rupees
obligation when filed in village Courts
(ii) Bail bond or other instrument of Twenty five rupees
obligation given in pursuance of an order
made by a Court or Magistrate under any
section of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhitha, 2023 (Central Act 46 of 2023) or
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central
Act 5 of 1908) and not otherwise provided for
in this Act.
11. Every copy of power of attorney when filed Fifty rupees
in any suit or proceeding
12. Mukhtarnama, Vakalatnama or any paper
signed by an advocate signifying or intimating
that he is retained for a party--
When presented--
(i) to any Court other than the High Court Twenty five rupees
or to any Collector or Magistrate or other
executive officer;
(ii) to the Land Revenue Commissioner or a Twenty five rupees
Chief Executive Authority
(iii) to the High Court Fifty rupees
(iv) to the Government Fifty rupees
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13. Agreement in writing stating a question for
the opinion of the court under the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of
1908)-
(i) When presented to in a case where the Five hundred rupees
value of the subject matter does not exceed
₹ 5000
(ii) in any other case One thousand rupees
14. Caveat Two hundred and fifty
rupees
15. Application to arbitrator for adjudication Five percentum on the
of dispute under the Chit Funds Act, 1982 arbitration amount
(Central Act 40 of 1982)
16. (a) Petition or counter claim presented to
family court under explanation (c) of sub-
section (1) of section 7 of the Family Courts
Act, 1984 (Central Act 66 of 1984)--
When the total claim amount in the
petitions/counter claim amount valued, after
deduction of the amount valued for the
dwelling house―
(i) upto rupees five lakhs Two hundred rupees
(ii) above rupees five lakhs and upto rupees Five hundred rupees
twenty lakhs
(iii) above rupees twenty lakhs and upto One thousand rupees
rupees fifty lakhs
(iv) above rupees fifty lakhs and upto rupees Two thousand rupees
one crore
(v) above rupees one crore Five thousand rupees
(b) Appeals filed before the High Court
under section 19 of the Family Courts Act,
1984 (Central Act 66 of 1984)―
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When the total claim amount in the petitions
/ counter claim amount valued, after deduction
of the amount valued for the dwelling house-
(i) upto rupees five lakhs One hundred rupees
(ii) above rupees five lakhs and upto rupees Two hundred and fifty
twenty lakhs rupees
(iii) above rupees twenty lakhs and upto Five hundred rupees
rupees fifty lakhs
(iv) above rupees fifty lakhs and upto rupees One thousand rupees
one crore
Two thousand and five
(v) above rupees one crore
hundred rupees
17. (a) Complaints filed under section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Central
Act 26 of 1881)--
When the amount of dishonoured cheque
involved in the complaint--
(i) upto rupees fifty thousand Two hundred and fifty
rupees
(ii) above rupees fifty thousand and upto Five hundred rupees
rupees two lakhs
(iii) above rupees two lakhs and upto rupees Seven hundred and fifty
five lakhs rupees
(iv) above rupees five lakhs and upto rupees One thousand rupees
ten lakhs
(v) above rupees ten lakhs and upto rupees Two thousand rupees
twenty lakhs
(vi) above rupees twenty lakhs and upto Five thousand rupees
rupees fifty lakhs
(vii) above rupees fifty lakhs Ten thousand rupees
(b) Appeal filed against judgment in section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881
2025:KER:82119
(Central Act 26 of 1881)―
(i) When an appeal filed, on getting leave Five hundred rupees for
under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section cheque upto rupees two
419 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha lakhs and one thousand
Sanhitha, 2023 (Central Act 46 of 2023) rupees for cheques above
before the High Court at the instance of the rupees two lakhs
complainant against the order of acquittal
(ii) When filed at the instance of accused Five hundred rupees for
against conviction before the Sessions Court cheque upto rupees two
lakhs and one thousand
rupees for cheques above
rupees two lakhs
(c) Revision filed against judgment in
section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 (Central Act 26 of 1881)―
(i) At the instance of the complainant Five hundred rupees for
challenging insufficiency of sentence before cheque upto rupees two
the High Court lakhs and one thousand
rupees for cheques above
rupees two lakhs
(ii) When filed at the instance of accused Five hundred rupees for
against conviction before the Sessions Court cheque upto rupees two
lakhs and one thousand
rupees for cheques above
rupees two lakhs
18. (a) Anticipatory bail applications filed
under section 482 of Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Central Act 46 of
2023)―
(i) application for anticipatory bail before Five hundred rupees per
High Court; petitioner and for each
subsequent petition half of
the same
(ii) application for anticipatory bail before Two hundred and fifty
Court of Sessions rupees per petitioner and
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for subsequent each
petition half of the same
(b) Application for bail under section 483
of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
(Central Act 46 of 2023)―
(i) application for bail filed before High Two hundred rupees per
Court, otherwise than in custody; petitioner subject to a
maximum of one
thousand rupees
(ii) application for bail filed before Court of One hundred rupees per
Sessions, otherwise than in custody. petitioner subject to a
maximum of five hundred
rupees
(c) application for bail filed when a person Fifty rupees per petitioner
appears before a court other than High Court subject to a maximum of
or Court of Sessions under section 480 of two hundred and rupees."
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
(Central Act 46 of 2023)
xx xxx xxxxx
***
6. Challenging the Amendment Act, the present petition is filed with
the following prayers:
(i) To issue a Writ of Mandamus, Writ, Order or
Direction, declaring that the amendment to Kerala
Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 by Kerala
Finance Act, 2025 is unconstitutional as it imposes
unreasonable restrictions on the Fundamental Right of
citizens to access the justice delivery system;
(ii) To issue a Writ of Mandamus, or any other Writ,
Order or Direction, declaring that provisions relating
to Ad Valorem Court fees without an upper limit in the
Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, and
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the subsequent amendment made in 2025 is
unconstitutional;
(iii) To issue a Writ of Mandamus, Writ Order or
Direction, declaring that Section 73-A of Kerala Court
Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959, is
unconstitutional, arbitrary, and illegal;
***
7. For the sake of readability, the discussion on the prayers is divided
into three parts, with further subdivisions.
A. Challenge to Section 73A of the Act of Kerala Court Fees and
Suits Valuation Act, 1959.
B. Challenge to the provisions relating to ad valorem court fees in
the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 and the
amendment of 2025.
C. Challenge to the amendment made to the Kerala Court Fees
and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 by the Act of 2025.
This topic is divided into three components as under:
(i) Legislative competence of the State to enact the Act of 2025.
(ii) Challenge on the ground of arbitrariness infringing Article 14 of
the Constitution of India.
(iii) Challenge to the constitutionality on the ground that it infringes
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, placing unreasonable
restrictions on access to justice.
***
2025:KER:82119
8. We have heard Mr. Yeshwanth Shenoy, the learned counsel for the
Petitioner, Mr. K. Gopalakrishna Kurup, the learned Advocate General
along with Mr. Mohammed Rafiq, the learned Special Government
Pleader for the State, and Mr. Harikrishnan and Mr. R. Sunil Kumar, the
learned counsel for Respondent Nos.4 and 5. We now take up the
challenge as per the above categorisation.
9. First, the Petitioner has challenged the validity of Section 73A of
the Act of 1959. Section 73A reads as follows:
"73A. Special provision regarding suits, appeals,
revision etc. filed by or on behalf of the Government
before the Court.- Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other provisions of this Act, where
a suit, appeal, revision, review or other pleadings or
documents are filed or presented by or on behalf of
the Government or its officers in their official
capacity before any Court, no Court fee shall be
chargeable in respect of such suit, appeal, revision,
review or other pleadings or documents under the
provisions of this Act."
***
This provision exempts the State Government from the payment of court
fees. It is also to be noted that this provision has been in the statute book
since the enactment of the Act of 1959.
10. The Petitioner contends that Section 73A of the Act of 1959 grants
a blanket exemption to the Government and its functionaries from the
payment of court fees, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings,
whether appeals, revisions, or reviews, filed by the State. In such
2025:KER:82119
proceedings, members of the general public are, in most cases, arrayed as
respondents. It is argued that the Government and its functionaries are
the largest litigants in Kerala, and this exemption results in a substantial
loss of revenue to the State. According to the Petitioner, in judicial
proceedings, the Government must be treated as a litigant at par with
other parties. Hence, a blanket exemption from payment of court fees to
the State and its functionaries is unconstitutional, as it creates a
classification without any intelligible differentia, and is discriminatory
and arbitrary. The Petitioner further submits that imposing a steep
increase in court fees on the general public alone, while exempting the
State, amounts to a system of cross-subsidy, which is contrary to the basic
principles of justice.
11. As stated earlier, Section 73A of the Act of 1959 was introduced in
2002. Its validity was challenged in 2003 before this very Court on the
ground that it violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The
Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Human Rights Protection
Forum v. State of Kerala1, rejected that challenge. Notably, the present
Petitioner has made no reference to this decision in the petition. In that
case, the petitioner, the Human Rights Protection Forum, questioned the
action of the State Government in increasing the court fees as arbitrary
and contended that Section 73A, which exempts the State Government
from paying court fees, was discriminatory. The Division Bench, speaking
1 2003 (3) KLT 436
2025:KER:82119
through Chief Justice Jawahar Lal Gupta, rejected the contention for the
following reasons:
"5. Mr. Thomas submits that the provision in the
statute which exempts the State Government suffers
from the vice of discrimination.
6. It is undoubtedly true that Section 73(a) of the
Court Fees Act provides that "where a suit, appeal,
revision, review or other pleadings or documents is
filed or presented by or on behalf of the Government
or its officers in their official capacity before any court,
no court fee shall be chargeable....." However, it is not
disputed that the court fee goes to the State exchequer.
If the State is called upon to pay the court fee, it shall
be virtually paying itself. It appears that the provision
has been made with the sole object of reducing the
work load. In economic terms, it shall not be of any
substantial consequence. In fact, it results in saving of
time and expense.
7. Mr. Thomas, relies upon the decision of their
Lordships of the Supreme Court in Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji and Others (AIR
1987 SC 1353), to contend that the State has to be
treated as par with any other litigant. It is undoubtedly
so. When the Court is examining the validity of any
claim filed by the State, it has to be treated like any
other litigant. However, the observations made by
their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the context of
the condonation of delay cannot be read to mean that
any provision exempting the State from payment of
court fee or tax would be violative of Article 14. In
fact, since the State itself collects the court fee, its
position is totally distinct from that of an ordinary
citizen. This classification has a reasonable nexus with
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the ultimate object of the exemption which is saving of
time and expense. Thus, even the second contention
cannot be sustained."
***
The learned counsel for the Petitioner sought to distinguish the present
case by contending that, in the earlier decision, the petitioner therein had
failed to produce any factual basis or supporting material, and therefore,
the challenge was rejected. However, this is not a correct reading of the
judgment. The challenge in that case was twofold - firstly, that the
revision of court fees was arbitrary, and secondly, that Section 73A of the
Act of 1959 was unconstitutional. The challenge to Section 73A was
rejected on merits, not on account of any failure to produce data, which
was the reason for rejecting the first ground of challenge. Section 73A was
inserted by Act 2 of 2003, and the challenge was dismissed in the same
year. We find no reason to take a different view, as we are in respectful
agreement with the reasoning adopted by the Hon'ble Division Bench in
the said decision.
12. Since we are analysing this judgment, it is relevant to note one
more issue, namely, the challenge to the requirement of paying court fees
in contempt petitions. This very issue had been raised before a Division
Bench of this Court as early as 2003 in Human Rights Protection Forum,
and the challenge was rejected. This position has remained settled for
more than twenty-two years, and we find no reason to depart from this
long-standing view of the law laid down by this Court.
2025:KER:82119
13. The second ground of challenge relates to prayer clause (ii),
concerning the provision for ad valorem court fees under the Act of 1959
and its subsequent amendments, which, according to the Petitioner,
operate without any upper limit. The pleadings in the petition rest on the
alleged increase in ad valorem fees. The learned Advocate General,
however, submitted that there has been no change in the ad valorem fees
themselves and demonstrated this by referring to Schedule I. He
explained that only the basis for computation has been modified, not the
rate of the fee. The Kerala Finance Act, 2025, he clarified, does not
introduce any revision of the ad valorem fees prescribed under Schedule I
of the Act of 1959. As per the substitution carried out by Sections 2(3)
and 20(b), only the fixed court fees under Schedule II have been revised.
It was pointed out that the percentage rate applied remains unchanged;
the only variation lies in the base figure on which that percentage is
calculated. By way of illustration, he submitted that if the fee was earlier
computed at 4% on a base value of ₹1,000/-, it is now computed at 4% on
a revised base value of ₹5,000/-. In certain instances, this revision
operates to the benefit of litigants. To substantiate this, the learned
Advocate General produced a comparative chart showing ad valorem fees
payable under Articles 1 and 1A of Schedule I to the Act of 1959 for
claims ranging from ₹100/- to ₹50 lakhs, pointing out that there is no
change that could be regarded as detrimental to litigants.
2025:KER:82119
14. The learned counsel for the Petitioner had initially advanced
arguments on the premise that the ad valorem fees had been altered to the
detriment of litigants. However, after the learned Advocate General
demonstrated that no such change had occurred, the learned counsel for
the Petitioner accepted this position and did not press the issue further.
He thereafter confined his submissions to the main contention
concerning the revision of Schedule II to the Act of 1959.
15. Now, this takes us to the main challenge, namely, the impugned
Amending Act in so far as it relates to the changes in the Schedule. The
State has traced its power to levy court fees to Entry 3 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Entry 3 reads as follows:
"Officers and servants of the High Court; procedure in
rent and revenue Courts; fees taken in all Courts except
the Supreme Court."
***
Though the learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the
Petitioner is not questioning the competence of the State Legislature in
enacting the impugned Amending Act, a reference needs to be made to
the settled principles so as to put a challenge to a legislation enacted by a
competent Legislature in its proper perspective.
16. The challenge in this petition to the exercise of legislative power by
a competent Legislature on the ground of arbitrariness falls within a
narrow scope. A heavy burden lies on the challenger to demonstrate that
2025:KER:82119
the legislative action of a competent Legislature is arbitrary. In support of
the challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner
has referred to two facets. One, the decision of the Division Bench of the
Delhi High Court in the case of Delhi High Court Bar Association and
Another v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others2, and second,
Report on the Revision of Court Fees and Suits Valuation in Kerala dated
16 January 2025 submitted by the former Justice V.K. Mohanan
Committee constituted by the State Government, and the Speech of the
Finance Minister in the Assembly to demonstrate arbitrariness and lack
of correlation.
17. The Petitioner has placed strong reliance upon the decision of the
Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Delhi High Court
Bar Association. The learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the
present issue is squarely covered by that decision, which comprehensively
reviewed the entire body of case law on the subject, including various
decisions of Indian and international courts and other relevant materials.
The learned counsel also took us through the said decision in detail.
18. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, in the case of Delhi
High Court Bar Association, dealt with a group of petitions challenging
the constitutionality and validity of the Court Fees (Delhi Amendment)
Act, 2012. The petitions were filed by certain bar associations and
individual advocates. The primary contention raised before the Division
2 2013 SCC OnLine Del 4091
2025:KER:82119
Bench concerned the legislative competence of the Delhi Legislative
Assembly to amend the Court Fees Act, 1870. In the alternative, it was
argued that even if such competence were assumed, the impugned
legislation would nevertheless be violative of the fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Constitution of India, as well as of human rights
principles. The Division Bench framed specific issues for consideration,
the first of which was whether the assent of the President was justiciable
in the context of the legislative competence of the Delhi Legislative
Assembly. After an elaborate discussion extending over 221 paragraphs,
the Court held that Article 239AA of the Constitution of India does not
empower the Delhi Legislative Assembly to amend the Court Fees Act,
1870, which is a Central legislation. The Bench further observed that
even if it were to be assumed that the Delhi Legislative Assembly had the
requisite legislative competence, it failed to follow the constitutionally
mandated procedure, as it neither complied with the essential
preconditions for obtaining the President's assent nor drew the
President's attention to the repugnancy between the Central enactment
and the proposed amendment. Consequently, the Division Bench struck
down the impugned enactment on the ground that it was enacted without
legislative competence. In view of this finding, no further inquiry was
strictly necessary as to whether the Act violated fundamental or human
rights. Nevertheless, the Division Bench proceeded to examine those
aspects in detail, referring extensively to international and Indian judicial
decisions and Law Commission reports, and concluded that the
2025:KER:82119
impugned legislation also infringed Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of India.
19. The decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the
case of Delhi High Court Bar Association undoubtedly has persuasive
value. However, it is a settled principle of law that a judgment has to be
understood in the context in which it was delivered and in light of the
specific issues the court was required to decide. In that decision, the Delhi
High Court had already held that the Delhi Legislative Assembly lacked
legislative competence, rendering any further declaration unnecessary. In
the present case, there is no dispute regarding the competence of the
Kerala State Legislature. Regarding the legal principles governing the
challenge to the revision of court fees, the decision of the Delhi High
Court cannot be construed to mean that any revision of court fees is
impermissible, even when such revision is lawful and justified. As
discussed later, it is open to the State to consider factors such as the
devaluation of the rupee and the expenditure incurred on judicial
infrastructure when revising the court fees. The impact of such levies on
the State's finances and their correlation with revenue generation will
necessarily vary from State to State.
20. The next limb of the Petitioner's challenge concerns the Report of
the Justice V.K. Mohanan Committee. It is contended that this report was
the sole material relied upon by the State and that it was self-
contradictory, arbitrary, and could not have formed a valid basis for
2025:KER:82119
revising the court fees. The Justice V.K. Mohanan Committee (the
Committee) was constituted pursuant to the budget proposal dated 10
January 2024. The Committee comprised a retired Judge of this Court,
the Secretary of the Law Department, an advocate member, and the
Secretary of the Taxes Department. It examined the existing court fee
structure, reviewed relevant Law Commission reports, and studied the
statutory framework governing court fees. The Committee also engaged
with stakeholders, including advocates and their associations, invited
representations, and received inputs from judicial officers. In addition, it
conducted physical hearings to gather views from various quarters.
21. The learned counsel for the Petitioner took us through the entire
Report, offering detailed comments on almost every paragraph. He
submitted that all relevant stakeholders were not consulted and that the
Committee was given only limited time to complete its work. It was
further contended that the stakeholders who were consulted by the
Justice V.K. Mohanan Committee were under the impression that the
proposed increase in court fees related only to family courts and
proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
The learned counsel argued that the entire exercise was arbitrary and that
the Report was perfunctory, thereby rendering the action of the State
Government violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He also
criticised the schedule of public hearings, contending that minimal time
was spent on each sitting, that the representations submitted were not
2025:KER:82119
genuinely considered, and that both the hearings and the constitution of
the Committee amounted to a mere formality.
22. The learned counsel for the Petitioner further criticised the Report,
contending that although the Committee had noted the average inflation
rate of the Indian rupee between 2003 and 2023 as 6.7%, it nevertheless
recommended an increase in court fees which was nearly five times that
figure. The Petitioner, in the writ petition, has furnished several instances
illustrating the steep rise. For example, in a suit for declaration, the court
fee has been increased from ₹1,000/- to ₹5,000/-, representing an
increase of 400%; in a suit for injunction, from ₹500/- to ₹2,500/-, an
increase of 400%; in a suit relating to trust property, from ₹1,000/- to
₹10,000/-, an increase of 900%; in a suit for possession of immovable
property, from ₹1,000/- to ₹20,000/-, an increase of 1900%; in a suit for
accounts, from ₹1,000/- to ₹5,000/-, an increase of 400%; and in a suit
under the Survey and Boundaries Act, from ₹1,000/- to ₹5,000/-, an
increase of 400%. In respect of suits relating to public matters, the fee has
been enhanced from ₹10/- to ₹500/- before the Munsiff Court and from
₹100/- to ₹1,000/- before the Sub Court or District Court -- an increase
of 4900% and 900% respectively. Similarly, in the High Court, court fees
in certain categories of proceedings have been raised from ₹10/- to
₹500/-, from ₹100/- to ₹500/-, and from ₹200/- to ₹1,000/-, which,
according to the learned counsel, reflects a uniform rise of approximately
400%. On that basis, it was contended that if the average rate of inflation
2025:KER:82119
was only 6.7%, the Committee could not have recommended an increase
in court fees exceeding 400%. The learned counsel also criticised the
Committee's reference to the exchange rate of the Indian rupee vis-à-vis
the US dollar, submitting that it is an irrelevant factor for determining
domestic court fee revisions. It was argued that although the Committee
cited inflation as the rationale for the enhancement, no empirical study or
analysis was undertaken before the enactment of the impugned
Amending Act. The learned counsel further pointed out that, from the
speech of the Finance Minister, it is evident that the impugned Kerala
Finance Act, 2025, was introduced primarily as a revenue-generating
measure with an estimated target of ₹1,500 Crores.
23. Broadly, the two principal heads of criticism advanced by the
Petitioner against the Report of the Justice V.K. Mohanan Committee are
as follows. First, it is contended that the consultation process with
stakeholders and the overall procedure adopted by the Committee were
perfunctory. According to the Petitioner, such a flawed process vitiates
the validity of the Report, and any revision of court fees based upon it,
being arbitrary and disproportionate, would fall foul of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. Secondly, the Petitioner, relying upon the
Committee's own observation that the average inflation rate over the last
two decades was 6.7%, contended that the Committee could not have, on
that basis, recommended an increase in court fees as high as 1,500%. It
was argued that the Report discloses no empirical study, comparative
2025:KER:82119
data, or specific material to justify such enhancement, and that the
conclusions are based on broad and generalised assumptions rather than a
reasoned economic or legal analysis.
24. Originally, the State had filed a counter affidavit supporting the
validity of the impugned enactment. The Petitioner had sought a
direction for the Report of the Committee to be placed on record, and
accordingly, the Report was produced. There was, however, no
amendment to the petition after the Report was filed, and all submissions
were made orally with reference to it. We have to be conscious of the
circumstances in which the Report has been placed before us. This Court
is not sitting in appeal over the findings of the Committee, nor is this a
challenge to any administrative action of the State arising out of the
Report. The constitution of the Committee was part of a preparatory
exercise undertaken by the State before enacting legislation under Section
2 of the Kerala Finance Act, 2025, to understand the views of the
stakeholders. It is in this background that the Report has been brought to
our notice. Therefore, we must bear in mind the scope of a challenge to a
legislative measure enacted by a competent Legislature. The Petitioner's
attempt to correlate the Committee's reference to the 6.7% inflation rate
with the extent of increase in court fees, and to rest the entire challenge
on that basis, is too simplistic to invalidate an otherwise valid exercise of
legislative power. What is relevant to be seen is whether the material
placed on record supports or negates the challenge to the impugned
2025:KER:82119
Amending Act.
25. While considering the issue of revision of court fees, the settled
legal position is that factors such as the devaluation of the rupee and the
increasing financial obligations of the State to maintain and expand
judicial infrastructure are relevant considerations. The court fees collected
may be utilised towards the administration of justice, though not with
mathematical precision. At the same time, as observed by the Law
Commission (referred to later), any enhancement in court fees must be
reasonable and should not be of such magnitude as to impede or infringe
upon the right of access to justice guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
26. Certain basic facts stated in the Report of the Committee are not
disputed, nor has any contrary material been placed before us. For
instance, it is recorded that in 1998, the average wage of a non-
agricultural worker in Kerala was ₹437/-, which increased to ₹1,002/- in
2024. It is also noted that while the national average daily wage (covering
both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors) is ₹470/-, the average daily
wage in Kerala is ₹893/-. The Report further records that the average
price of gold rose from ₹5,600/- per 10 grams in 2003 to ₹71,510/- per
10 grams in 2024, showing an increase of more than twelve-fold during
this period. It is also undisputed that there was no revision of court fees
between 2003 and 2023, while during the same period, the value of the
rupee declined significantly. The exchange rate of the Indian rupee
2025:KER:82119
against the US dollar stood at ₹85.10 in December 2024, marking a
depreciation of 2.14% during that year. The Committee observed that in
2000, the exchange rate was ₹47.19 per US dollar; in 2002, ₹44.94;
in 2010, ₹45.73; and by 2020, it had risen sharply to ₹76.38. Though
the Petitioner has criticised this reference, it is evident that the
Committee has cited these figures only to illustrate the overall weakening
of the Indian currency. The depreciation of the rupee, both domestically
and internationally, over the last few decades, is a matter of record and
not in dispute.
27. It is also an undisputed fact that the last revision of court fees in the
State of Kerala was carried out in 2003, and no comprehensive revision
has been undertaken during the past twenty years. The learned Advocate
General has pointed out that the cumulative inflation over the last two
decades has reached 265.78%, with an average annual inflation rate of
6.7% during this period. The State has also placed on record that the
average per capita income in Kerala has increased more than sevenfold
between 2003 and 2023. In this backdrop, and despite the inflation rate
being 6.7%, the Committee recommended a revision of court fees up to
five times the existing rates.
28. In the counter affidavit, the State has reproduced a table which
shows the time gaps for revision of court fees, such as in Suits for
Declaratory relief, the fee has been increased from ₹1,000/- to ₹5,000/-
2025:KER:82119
after 34 years, and in Suits for Injunction, the fee has been increased from
₹500/- to ₹2,500/- after 34 years. In Suits relating to trust property, the
fee computed was one-fifth of the market value subject to a maximum fee
of ₹200/- or where the property has no market value, on ₹1,000/-. The
capping so prescribed remained the same from 1962 and now the
maximum fee is capped at ₹5,000/-, and in cases where the property has
no market value, the fee has to be computed on ₹10,000/-. This revision
has taken place after 63 years. Similarly, in Suits under the Specific Relief
Act, 1963, the revision of court fee is after 63 years. The table supplied by
the State further shows that in Suits for Possession, the fee has been
increased from ₹1,000/- to ₹20,000/- after 34 years; in Suits relating to
Easements, from ₹1,000/- to ₹5,000/- after 34 years; in Suits for
Accounts, from ₹1,000/- to ₹5,000/- after 34 years; in Partition Suits,
from ₹50/- to ₹500/- in cases filed before the Munsiff Court, and from
₹300/- to ₹2,000/- in cases filed before the Sub Court, after 34 years; in
Suits under the Survey and Boundaries Act, from ₹1,000/- to ₹5,000/-
after 34 years; in Suits for altering or cancelling entries in a register, from
₹15/- to ₹75/- after 63 years; in Suits relating to public matters, from
₹10/- to ₹500/- in cases filed before the Munsiff Court and to ₹1,000/-
before the Sub Court/District Court, after 63 years; and in Suits not
otherwise provided for, from ₹25/- to ₹125/- before the Revenue Court,
from ₹50/- to ₹250/- before the Munsiff Court, from ₹200/- to ₹1,000/-
where the value of the subject matter is ₹25,000/- or less, and from
₹400/- to ₹2,000/- where the value of the subject matter exceeds
2025:KER:82119
₹25,000/- before the Sub Court/District Court, after 34 years. Thus, all
the entries in respect of which revision of court fees is sought to be
undertaken under the impugned Amending Act, are included in Schedule
II of the Act of 1960.
29. The table placed on record by the State Government in its counter
affidavit also indicates the long periods during which court fees have
remained unchanged. For instance, in respect of Suits relating to trust
property, Suits under the Specific Relief Act, 1963, Suits to alter or cancel
entries in a register, and Suits concerning public matters, the court fees
have remained unaltered for the past 63 years. As regards most other
categories, such as Suits for declaratory relief, Suits for injunction, Suits
for possession, Suits relating to easements, Suits for accounts, Partition
Suits, Suits under the Survey and Boundaries Act, and Suits not otherwise
provided for, the table shows that the court fees have remained
unchanged for 34 years.
30. The contention of the Petitioner that the 10% thumb rule, as laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance
Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and Others3, should be applied, according
to us, is not applicable to the case at hand, where the revision has taken
place over a period ranging from 15 to 22 years.
31. The learned Advocate General has further submitted that the
challenge, based on arguments advanced orally in respect of individual
3 (2017) 16 SCC 680
2025:KER:82119
entries, proceeds on a misconception. He has taken us through the
schedule of the impugned Amending Act and demonstrated, by way of
comparison, how the fee revision has occurred -- for instance, where the
court fee has increased from ₹2/- to ₹10/-. It must also be borne in mind
that these revisions have been undertaken after more than two decades.
Therefore, even though figures such as 400% are projected to suggest a
steep hike affecting fundamental rights, the actual increase at the ground
level ranges only from ₹2/- to ₹10/-, or from ₹5/- to ₹25/-, and that too
over a period of twenty years. Once these facts are placed on record, even
if the Report of the Committee is kept aside, it cannot be said that there
has been no devaluation of the rupee or that the legislative exercise
undertaken by a competent Legislature is arbitrary or requires
invalidation. Having regard to the devaluation of the rupee and the
passage of time, we find no arbitrariness in the legislative exercise.
32. The second aspect relates to the growing financial obligation of the
State to provide and maintain adequate judicial infrastructure. On this
issue, reference may be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in All India Judges' Association v. Union of India4, relied upon by
the learned Advocate General. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
was dealing with a petition seeking the constitution of an All India
Judicial Service and the establishment of uniform conditions of service
and hierarchy across the subordinate judiciary in the country. The Court
referred to the recommendations contained in the Fourteenth Report of
4 (1992) 1 SCC 119
2025:KER:82119
the Law Commission insofar as they related to the scales of pay of judicial
officers and other matters having monetary implications. While observing
that the dispensation of justice is an essential feature of governance, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised that the collection of court fees
should be utilised for the administration of justice and the development
of judicial infrastructure, and not treated as a source of general revenue.
The following observations from the said decision are relevant to the
issue at hand:
"53. We would like to point out that dispensation of
justice is an inevitable feature in any civilised society.
Maintenance of law and order require the presence of
an efficient system of administration of criminal
justice. Under the Civil Code, Court fee is realised
under the Court Fee Act. For some time demand to
abolish it has been made but the States have
abandoned the idea on account of the demand by the
States of compensation from the Centre in case of
abolition of Court fee. Court fee is not a tax and is a
fee as has been held by a Constitution Bench of this
Court in Secretary, Government of Madras, Home
Department and another v. Zenith Lamps and
Electrical Ltd. AIR 1973 SC 724. In paragraph 29 of
this judgment Sikri. C.J. speaking for this Court
pointed out:
"It seems to us that the separate mention
of 'fees taken in court' in the Entries referred to
above has no other significance than that they
logically come under Entries dealing with
administration of Justice and courts. The
draftsman has followed the scheme designed in
the Court Fees Act, 1870 of dealing with fees
2025:KER:82119
taken in court at one place. If it was the
intention to distinguish them from fees in List
II Entry 66, surely some indication would have
been given by the language employed. If these
words had not been separately mentioned in
List I, Entry 77 and List II................
It seems plain that 'fees taken in court' are
not taxes, for if it were so, the words 'taxes'
would have been used or some other indication
given. It seems to us that this conclusion is
strengthened by two considerations. First, taxes
that can be levied by the Union are mentioned
in List I from Entry 82; in List II taxes that can
be imposed start from Entry 45. Secondly, the
very use of the words 'not including fees taken
in any court' in Entry % List I, and Entry 66
List II, shows that they would otherwise have
fallen within these Entries. It follows that 'fees
taken in court' cannot be equated to "Taxes". If
this is so, is there any essential difference
between fees taken in court and other fees? We
are unable to appreciate why the word 'fees,
bears a different meaning in Entry 77, List I
and Entry 96 List I or Entry 3 List Hand Entry
66 List II. All these relevant cases on the nature
of 'fees' were reviewed in Indian Mica and
Micanite Industries Ltd. v. The State of Bihar,
AIR 1971 SC 1182 at page 1186, by Hegde, J.
and he observed:
"From the above discussion, it is clear that
before any levy can be upheld as a fee, it must
be shown that the levy has reasonable
correlationship with the services rendered by
the Government. In other words, the levy must
2025:KER:82119
be proved to be a quid pro quo for the services
rendered. But in these matters it will be
impossible to have an exact correlationship.
The correlationship expected is one of a general
character and not as of arithmetical exactitude".
***
54. It is not our intention to raise a dispute on this
aspect. We adverted to these authorities and the views
of this Court to bring support for the view that what is
collected as Court fee at least be spent on the
administration of Justice instead of being utilisted as a
source of general revenue of the States. Undoubtedly
the income from Court fees is more than the
expenditure on the administration of Justice. This is
conspicuously noticeable from the figures available in
the publication in the Ministry of Law and Justice.
55. What we have said above should be adequate
justification for making provision with a view to
making judicial functioning viable."
***
The collection of court fees and their utilisation for the administration of
justice are part of a single, integrated scheme and cannot be treated as
separate or independent of each other. In the case of Secretary,
Government of Madras, Home Department and Another v. Zenith
Lamps and Electrical Ltd.5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that court
fees must bear a reasonable relationship to the cost of administering civil
justice. The Court observed that, in determining such fees, relevant
considerations include the expenses involved in maintaining courts and
5 (1973) 1 SCC 162
2025:KER:82119
the officers who administer justice. It was further emphasised that the
court fees are intended to support the administration of justice and
should not be treated merely as a means of augmenting the general
revenue of the State.
33. The correlation between the levy of court fees and their utilisation
for the administration of justice was examined in depth by a three-judge
Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary to
Government of Madras and Another v. P.R. Sriramulu and Another6. In
that case, a certificate had been granted by the Madras High Court
following its judgment declaring certain provisions of the Tamil Nadu
Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act and the High Court Court Fees Rules
to be invalid. Although the primary challenge concerned the levy of ad
valorem court fees, the broader issue, whether the collection of court fees
must bear a rational nexus to the cost of administering justice, was also
comprehensively debated before the Court. On this issue, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed as under:
"18. While considering the reasonableness of the levy
the High Court also took into account the vast difference
in the rates of fee between the years 1922 to 1955. In
this connection it may be pointed out that having regard
to the changing social and economic conditions of the
country and the threats of frequent inflationary trends
hovering around, the levy of court fees cannot remain
static and has to be amended according to the
requirements of the times. The increase in the court fees
6 (1996) 1 SCC 345
2025:KER:82119
has to be appreciated having regard to the increased
need of the revenue by reason of the increased cost of
the administration of justice. That being so, it would be a
futile exercise to compare the rates of court fee under the
Court Fee Act, 1922 with those of 1955. There is bound
to be a world of difference in the rates due to large span
of time having elapsed between 1922 and 1955.
19. The High Court also took the view that the
expenditure incurred by the Government in payment to
their Law Officers cannot be debited to the cost of
administration of justice which the litigant can be
required to compensate for. In our opinion this view of
the High Court also cannot be accepted for the simple
reason that these Law Officers are also part of the
machinery of the administration of justice. Apart from
what has been stated above in the aforegoing paragraphs
it may be noticed that the view expressed by the High
Court cannot be sustained in view of the subsequent
judgment of this Court in the case of All India Judges'
Assn. v. Union of India [(1992) 1 SCC 119: 1992 SCC
(L&S) 9: (1992) 19 ATC 42] whereby this Court had
given various directions to the Government involving
considerable amount of funds most of which will fall
under the head of administration of civil justice. The
Government is, therefore, bound to raise funds through
the medium of fee."
(emphasis supplied)
***
34. In the case of Zenith Lamp and Electrical Ltd., in a matter arising
from the levy of court fees, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that
whenever the State Legislature generally increases the court fees, it has to
be established that such an increase is necessary to meet the cost of
2025:KER:82119
administration of justice. When there is no broad correlation between the
cost of administration of civil justice and the levy of court fees, the
imposition ceases to be a fee and becomes a tax. In the absence of such a
correlation, the levy would exceed the competence of the State. That
would mean, there has to be a correlation between the court fees collected
and the administration of justice.
35. In the case of Sanjeev Kumar Jain v. Raghubir Saran Charitable
Trust and Others7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reviewed the regime of
imposition of costs, and made the following observations regarding the
court fees:
"30. Though there is a general impression that the
court fee regarding litigation is high, in fact, it is not so.
Except in the case of few categories of suits (that is
money suits, specific performance suits etc., and
appeals therefrom), where court fee is ad valorem, in
majority of the suits / petitions and appeals arising
therefrom, the court fee is a fixed nominal fee. The
fixed fees that are payable, prescribed decades ago have
not undergone a change and in many cases, the fixed
fee is not worth the cost of collection thereof. There is
therefore a need for a periodical revision of fixed court
fees, that is payable in regard to suits / petitions /
appeals filed in Civil Courts, High Court, Tribunals
and Supreme Court. For example, in Supreme Court,
the maximum court fee payable is only Rs.250/-,
whether it is a suit or special leave petition or appeal.
31. A time has come when at least in certain type of
litigations, like commercial litigations, the costs should
7 (2012) 1 SCC 455
2025:KER:82119
be commensurate with the time spent by the courts.
Arbitration matters, company matters, tax matters, for
example, may involve huge amounts. There is no
reason why a nominal fixed fee should be collected in
regard to such cases. While we are not advocating an ad
valorem fee with reference to value in such matters, at
least the fixed fee should be sufficiently high to have
some kind of quid - pro quo to the cost involved. Be
that as it may."
***
The learned counsel for the Petitioner sought to contend that these
observations are made in the context of commercial matters, and they
indicate the need for revision of court fees.
36. The learned Advocate General has also relied upon the decision of
the Division Bench of this Court in the case of The Cardamom
Marketing Corporation and Another v. The State of Kerala and Others8,
which was affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The view of the
Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chackolas Spinning &
Weaving Mills Ltd. v. State of Kerala and Another9 was affirmed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Cardamom Marketing
Corporation and Another v. State of Kerala and Others 10, wherein while
confirming that providing social security to legal profession is an essential
part of legal system, the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the validity of
imposition of additional court fees for the said purpose. The learned
8 2007 SCC OnLine Ker 646
9 (2006) 1 KLT 989
10 (2017) 5 SCC 255
2025:KER:82119
Advocate General relied upon the above decision to point out that the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has expanded the scope of the State's obligation
by stating that all stakeholders of the legal system have to be taken care of
and, therefore, the court fee may also be utilised for this purpose.
37. In the case of P. M. Ashwathanarayana Setty and Others v. State of
Karnataka and Others11, various issues arose before the three-judge Bench
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a group of appeals regarding the policy
and legality of the levy of court fees. One issue raised was the broad
correlation between the totality of expenses in the administration of civil
justice and the court fees collected. The Hon'ble Supreme Court referred
to its earlier decision in the case of Zenith Lamp and Electrical Ltd. and,
in paragraph 67, made the following observations:
"67. We have given our careful and anxious
consideration to this vexed problem which is a subject
matter of considerable debate both in and outside
Courts. The anomalies that the policy behind the
impugned provisions can produce in conceivable cases
could, indeed, be inequitable or even quite startling.
But, the argument, in the last analysis, becomes
indistinguishable from the contention that the
correlation of the services to the fee would have to be
decided on the basis of how the correlation operates in
each individual case. It would be an insistence on
testing the conceptual nature of the fee on the basis of
the degree of the quid pro quo in the case of each
individual payer of the fee., That is the peccant part of
the argument. Once a broad correlation between the
totality of the expenses on the services, conceived as a
11 1989 Supp (1) SCC 696
2025:KER:82119
whole, on the one hand and the totality of funds
raised by way of the fee, on the other established, it
would be no part of the legitimate exercise in the
examination of constitutionality of the concept of the
impost to embark upon its effect in individual cases.
Such a grievance would be one of disproportionate
nature of the distribution of the fees amongst those
liable to contribute and not one touching the
conceptual nature of the fee. Indeed this position was
clearly recognised by the Madras High Court in
Zenith Lamp's case (ILR (1968) 1 Mad 247) itself in
the following passage of the, judgment:
"If, in substance, the levy is not to raise revenues
also for the general purpose of the State the mere
absence of uniformity of the fact that it has no
direct relation to the actual services rendered by
the authority to each individual who obtains the
benefit of the service, or that some of the
contributories do not obtain the same degree of
service as other may, will not change the essential
character of the levy."
***
68. There might, conceivably, be cases where a
particular individual contributor may not derive any
benefit at all, though as a member of the class he has
no option but to make the contribution. The principle
underlying the contention that beyond a point the
impost ceases to have the quality of a fee, if valid, can
be visualised and applied even to cases where, despite
the uniformity in the distribution of the burden, a
particular individual does not obtain any service at all.
This cannot be a legitimate and permissible ground of
invalidation."
(emphasis supplied)
***
2025:KER:82119
Therefore, the collection of court fees and the expenditure on the
administration of justice need not be with mathematical exactitude.
38. The challenge in this petition is to an economic legislation. In the
decision in the case of P. M. Ashwathanarayana Setty and Others,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised the judicial restraint required
in examining the challenges to fiscal statutes and made the following
observations:
"79. The problem is, indeed, a complex one not free
from its own peculiar difficulties. Though other
legislative measures dealing with economic regulation
are not outside Article 14, it is well recognised that the
State enjoys the widest latitude where measures of
economic regulation are concerned. These measures
for fiscal and economic regulation involve an
evaluation of diverse and quite often conflicting
economic criteria and adjustment and balancing of
various conflicting social and economic values and
interests. It is for the State to decide what economic
and social policy it should pursue and what
discriminations advance those social and economic
policies. In view of the inherent complexity of these
fiscal adjustments, courts give a larger discretion to the
legislature in the matter of its preferences of economic
and social policies and effectuate the chosen system in
all possible and reasonable ways. If two or more
methods of adjustments of an economic measure are
available, the legislative preference in favour of one of
them cannot be questioned on the ground of lack of
legislative wisdom or that the method adopted is not
the best or that there were better ways of adjusting the
competing interests and claims. The legislature
2025:KER:82119
possesses the greatest freedom in such areas. The
analogy of principles of the burden of tax may not also
be inapposite in dealing with the validity of the
distribution of the burden of a "fee" as well.
80. xx xxxx xxxxx
81. The legislature has to reckon with the practical
difficulties of adjusting conflicting interests. It has to
bring to bear a pragmatic approach to resolving these
conflicts and evolve a fiscal policy it considers best
suited to the felt needs. The complexity of economic
matters and the pragmatic solutions to be found for
them defy and go beyond conceptual mental models.
Social and economic problems of a policy do not
accord with preconceived stereotypes so as to be
amenable to predetermined solutions. In State of
Gujarat v. Ambica Mills Ltd. [(1974) 4 SCC 656:
1974 SCC (L&S) 381: (1974) 3 SCR 760] this Court
observed: (SCC pp. 679, 680, 677, 678--paras 71,
72, 65, 67 and 64 respectively)
"...The court must be aware of its own remoteness and
lack of familiarity with the local problems.
Classification is dependent on the particular needs and
specific difficulties of the community... which are
beyond the easy ken of the court,... and which the
legislature alone was competent to make.
Consequently, lacking the capacity to inform itself
fully about the peculiarities of a particular local
situation, a court should hesitate to dub the legislative
classification as irrational....
...The question whether, under Article 14, a
classification is reasonable or unreasonable must, in
the ultimate analysis depend upon the judicial
approach to the problem.... The more complicated
2025:KER:82119
society becomes, the greater the diversity of its
problems and the more does legislation direct itself to
the diversities.... In the utilities, tax and economic
regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial
self-restraint if not official deference to legislative
judgment. The courts have only the power to destroy
but not to reconstruct. When these are added to the
complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty,
the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the
experts, and the number of times the judges have been
overruled by events, self-limitation can be seen to be
the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige
and stability.
Laws regulating economic activity should be viewed
differently from laws which touch and concern
freedom of speech and religion, voting, procreation,
rights with respect to criminal procedure, etc... judicial
deference to legislative judgment in instances of
economic regulation is explained by the argument that
rationality of a classification depends upon local
conditions about which local legislative or
administrative bodies would be better informed than a
court."
***
82. The lack of perfection in a legislative measure
does not necessarily imply its unconstitutionality. It is
rightly said that no economic measure has yet been
devised which is free from all discriminatory impact
and that in such a complex arena in which no perfect
alternatives exist, the court does well not to impose
too rigorous a standard of criticism, under the equal
protection clause, reviewing fiscal services....
83. The observations of this Court in ITO v. K.N.
Takim Roy Rymbai [(1976) 1 SCC 916: 1976 SCC
2025:KER:82119
(Tax) 143: (1976) 3 SCR 413] made in the context of
taxation laws are worth recalling: (SCC p. 923)
"(T)he mere fact that a tax falls more heavily on some
in the same category. is not by itself a ground to
render the law invalid. It is only when within the
range of its selection, the law operates unequally and
cannot be justified on the basis of a valid classification,
that there would be a violation of Article 14."
(emphasis supplied)
***
84. The question whether the measure of a tax or a
"fee" should be ad valorem or ad quantum is again a
matter of fiscal policy.
85. In the Zenith Lamp case [(1973) 1 SCC 162:
1973 SCC (Tax) 203: (1973) 2 SCR 973 at 981-82]
this Court observed: (SCC p. 170, para 31)
"The fees must have relation to the administration of
civil justice. While levying fees the appropriate
legislature is competent to take into account all
relevant factors, the value of the subject-matter of the
dispute, the various steps necessary in the prosecution
of a suit or matter, the entire cost of the upkeep of
courts and officers administering civil justice, the
vexatious nature of a certain type of litigation and
other relevant matters. It is free to levy a small fee in
some cases, a large fee in others, subject of course to
the provisions of Article 14."
(emphasis supplied)
***
88. Having regard to the nature and complexity of
this matter it is, perhaps, difficult to say that the ad
valorem principle which may not be an ideal basis for
distribution of a fee can at the same time be said to be
2025:KER:82119
so irrational as to incur any unconstitutional infirmity.
The presumption of constitutionality of laws requires
that any doubt as to the constitutionality of a law has
to be resolved in favour of constitutionality. Though
the scheme cannot be upheld, at the same time, it
cannot be struck down either."
***
Though the learned counsel for the Petitioner sought to contend that the
matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court arose in the context of ad
valorem fees, the fundamental principles laid down therein regarding
economic legislation are equally applicable. In that decision, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court clarified that where the scheme of distribution of the
burden is so arbitrary, unreasonable, or disproportionate as to offend
Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the levy would be liable to
challenge. However, this observation also sets a high threshold for
invalidation once a general correlation between the levy and the purpose
is established. In the present case, the State Government has placed on
record figures relating to expenditure, budgetary allocations, and revenue
generated from court fees, demonstrating a significant difference between
income and expenditure. It has also shown that there has been no
revision of fees in certain categories for nearly sixty years. These
factors collectively indicate a legitimate need for revising the court fees.
Once such a need is established and the competence of the State to
legislate on the subject is undisputed, the validity of the levy cannot be
casually assailed.
2025:KER:82119
39. As regards the correlation between the collection of court fees and
the expenditure on the administration of justice, the learned Advocate
General has placed on record a comparative chart indicating the amounts
allocated towards judicial administration. It shows that, as per the
budgetary provisions, ₹97.11 Crores were allocated in the year 2002-03,
which has increased to ₹1248.70 Crores in 2022-23. In contrast, the
revenue generated from court fees, excluding refunds, was only ₹40.89
Crores in 2002-03 and ₹126.85 Crores in 2022-23. According to the
learned Advocate General, a substantial portion of the expenditure is
accounted for by the salaries and emoluments of judicial officers and staff.
The learned Advocate General has relied upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of All India Judges' Association to
underline the financial obligations arising from the extension of various
monetary benefits to members of the judiciary. Further, in the case of
Chackolas Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., where the legislative
competence of the State to impose additional court fees under the Act of
1959 was questioned, the Division Bench of this Court reaffirmed that
the correlation between the amount collected as fees and the expenditure
incurred on providing services need not be established with mathematical
precision. It is sufficient if there exists a broad and reasonable correlation
between the two.
40. According to the Petitioner, the figures shown in the chart
represent only the budgetary allocations and do not indicate the actual
2025:KER:82119
expenditure incurred. A budgetary allocation, it is pointed out, merely
signifies the amount earmarked for the administration of justice. If such
allocated funds are not effectively utilised, resulting in deficiencies in
infrastructure or other related issues, appropriate directions can always be
issued to the State Government. Once a budgetary provision has been
made, the State cannot be heard to contend that there is no allocation for
the purpose. However, this aspect is distinct from the question of the
validity of the amendment to the Act of 1959. The Petitioner then
contended that no statistical data has been provided to correlate the
increase in court fees with the actual administrative costs, and therefore,
without this data being placed on record, the exercise would be arbitrary.
We are not called upon to perform an accounting exercise. The State's
rising obligation to provide for judicial infrastructure is not in dispute.
41. Thus, considering the scope of judicial review over the exercise of
powers by a competent Legislature, it has to be held that the impugned
Amending Act is neither beyond the legislative competence of the State
nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The revision of
court fees has been effected after a considerable lapse of time, ranging
from fifteen to twenty years in certain cases, during which period inflation
has substantially increased. The figures placed on record indicate that the
revenue generated from court fees falls considerably short of the
expenditure incurred by the State towards judicial administration. The
devaluation of the rupee and the escalating cost of maintaining judicial
2025:KER:82119
infrastructure are legitimate considerations for revising court fees. The
proportionality between the necessity for revision and the quantum of
enhancement cannot be determined by exact mathematical precision;
what is required is only a broad and reasonable correlation. Having regard
to the material produced by the State and the admitted circumstances,
such as the prolonged gap between revisions and the steady devaluation
of the rupee, it cannot be said that the revision of court fees is excessive or
disproportionate.
42. The second broad head of challenge is the violation of the
fundamental right of access to justice under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India. The Petitioner has relied upon the 189th Report of the Law
Commission of India on "Revision of Court Fees Structure", submitted in
February 2004, which has been referred to by the Delhi High Court in
the case of Delhi High Court Bar Association. It would be fruitful to
reproduce one of the main conclusions of the Law Commission in the
said Report as under:
"12) As regards ad valorem court fees, since the
levy is a percentage of the value of the claim, it may
not be necessary to enhance the percentages
consequent upon the devaluation of the rupee. This
is because the court fee paid will be proportionate
to the claim which in any event would be enhanced
to reflect the changed value of the rupee. However,
in the context of fixed court fees there may be a
need to revise the charges to reflect the present
2025:KER:82119
value of the rupee. At the same time, it requires to
be emphasised that any enhancement of Court fee
should not adversely affect the right of access to
justice. Further, the amount collected by way of
Court fee should not be more than the expenditure
incurred in administration of civil justice. Subject
to these limitations, the amount of fixed Court fee
prescribed under Schedule 2 of the Court Fees Act,
1870 may be enhanced in proportion to the extent
of devaluation of the rupee."
***
The Law Commission, in its Report, has observed that any enhancement
of court fees should not adversely affect the right of access to justice.
However, the extent to which a revision in court fees may operate as an
impediment would necessarily vary from person to person, depending
upon the nature of the case, the quantum involved, and the time span
over which the revision has taken place. While it is beyond dispute that
the right of access to justice, being part of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India, must be given primacy and cannot be compromised, that
principle alone cannot form the basis for invalidating a legislative exercise
in the absence of specific material demonstrating such impairment. A
challenge of this nature cannot rest upon generalised assertions. There has
to be clear pleadings to indicate which enhancement has affected which
class of litigants. The impact of the revision varies from entry to entry,
and even within the same entry, it may not affect all litigants in the same
manner - some may be prejudiced, while others may not.
2025:KER:82119
43. The Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Human Rights
Protection Forum, which dealt with the issue of a rise in court fees,
observed that the burden of proving that an enactment is invalid lies on
the person who challenges it, and that there was nothing on record in that
case to suggest that the imposition of court fees in various categories of
cases was arbitrary. The Division Bench also noted that no factual basis
had been provided for the contentions advanced in the petition. A similar
situation arises in the present case.
44. The prayers in the writ petition have already been reproduced
earlier. The challenge is directed against the entire enactment, namely,
the Kerala Finance Act, 2025. The Schedule to the impugned Amending
Act spans a wide range of entries, covering diverse categories of cases such
as orders passed by the Kerala Farm Debts Relief Commission,
applications under the Forest Acts, as well as commercial suits and
arbitration matters. The entire range of these provisions has been assailed
through a broad and undifferentiated contention that they infringe the
right of access to justice. However, it must be specifically demonstrated
how the increase in court fees in relation to commercial suits, arbitration
proceedings, or matters such as chit funds and debt relief, would, in fact,
impede access to justice. The litigants in these categories belong to
different economic and social strata, and it cannot be presumed that the
enhancement of court fees would have the same impact in every case.
There are no pleadings on record identifying the particular categories of
2025:KER:82119
cases or litigants said to be affected, nor has any attempt been made to
show how the revised rates create an impediment to access to justice in
any specific context. Reliance has been placed on an observation in the
Report of the Justice V.K. Mohanan Committee that 63% of the total
population lives below the level of extreme poverty and that 30% to 40%
of litigants belong to the low-income group. That observation, however,
only forms part of the introductory context to the Committee's
discussion, reflecting its awareness that a large number of litigants come
from economically weaker sections. It cannot, by itself, form the basis of a
constitutional challenge under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Once the legislative competence of the State is established and the
necessity for revision of court fees is duly demonstrated, the enactment
cannot be invalidated on the ground that it impedes access to justice
merely on the strength of such broad, generalised assertions unsupported
by concrete material.
45. There is no individual litigant before us, nor has any material been
produced to show that the right of access to justice of any particular
person has been affected. In this context, the learned Advocate General,
relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and Another v. C.K.
Rajan and Others12, submitted that the High Court should ordinarily
refrain from entertaining a writ petition in the nature of a public interest
litigation challenging the constitutionality or validity of a statute or
12 (2003) 7 SCC 546
2025:KER:82119
statutory rule. We do not propose to hold that a public interest petition
filed by an Advocates' Association questioning the revision of court fees is
not to be entertained at the threshold. However, the Association is
obliged to place tangible evidence before the Court demonstrating that a
particular enhancement of court fees infringes the constitutional
guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, whether in
respect of an individual or a specific class of litigants. A mere assertion
that any increase in court fees per se amounts to a constitutional
infraction cannot be accepted. In the present case, the challenge rests only
on general statements and hypothetical apprehensions, unsupported by
any material indicating that the revised court fees have, in fact, denied
access to justice to any identifiable category of litigants. The impugned
legislation, much less in its entirety, cannot, therefore, be struck down on
such broad and unsubstantiated grounds that it violates the right of access
to justice or the legislative policy underlying it.
46. Similarly, with respect to anticipatory bail, the facts of each case
may differ from person to person, and any challenge has to be
substantiated by proper pleadings. In the present case, the petitioner has
not questioned the levy of court fees on applications for anticipatory bail
as such but has contended that the increase from ₹10/- to ₹500/- is
excessive and disproportionate. It is relevant to note that from 1960 until
2024-25, the fee of ₹10/- remained unchanged. Before the impugned
Amending Act, the applicable fee was ₹10/- under the residuary Article
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11(t) of Schedule II, since no specific provision existed for anticipatory
bail applications. The amended rate is now ₹500/-, which the petitioner
argues amounts to an increase of 4900%. The State, however, maintains
that the residuary rate of ₹10/- cannot be used as a benchmark to
calculate such a percentage increase. Whether the prescription of a
separate court fee of ₹500/- for applications seeking anticipatory bail
infringes the right to personal liberty is an issue that may arise for
consideration in an appropriate case. It must also be recognised that
persons seeking anticipatory bail may be accused of different kinds of
offences, including economic and white-collar crimes.
47. It is to be noted that several States in India, in their Court Fees
legislations, have incorporated enabling provisions empowering the State
Government to reduce or exempt the payment of court fees for certain
classes of persons. As far as the State of Kerala is concerned, such
provisions are contained in the Act of 1959. Section 72 of the Act
exempts certain documents and provides for relaxation from the payment
of court fees. Section 73 prescribes a special procedure for suits by
societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, allowing
payment of only one-half of the fee chargeable on the plaint under the
Act, if the District Collector certifies that the society is not in a financially
sound position to pay the full amount. Section 74 provides for special
provisions regarding suits by registered trade unions, members of the
Scheduled Castes, and other categories. The relevant portion of Section
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74 reads as follows:
"74. Special provision regarding suits by registered
trade union, member of Scheduled Castes. etc.- (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing
provisions of this Act, the Court shall, subject to the
provisions of sub-section (2), admit the plaint in
respect of the following kinds of suit even though the
fee chargeable under this Act has not been paid and
after such admission calculate the amount of court-fee
chargeable in respect of the plaint under the provisions
of this Act, and require the Collector of the District to
pay the fee so chargeable--
(i) suits for money instituted by a registered trade
union wherein the claim does not exceed one
thousand rupees;
(ii) suits instituted by a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe whose annual income does not
exceed rupees twelve thousand and the amount of the
claim does not exceed rupees fifteen thousand.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this clause
Scheduled Caste and Schedule Tribe shall have the
same meaning as in the Constitution of India.
(iii) suits for money instituted by a prisoner whose
annual income does not exceed twelve thousand
rupees and wherein the claim does not exceed fifteen
thousand rupees.
(iv) suits for money filed by a co-operative society
registered under the Co-operative Societies Act for the
time being in force against any person other than a
member of the Society;
2025:KER:82119
(v) suits for recovery of compensation under the
Work men's Compensation Act, 1923 and for wages
or bonus by workmen under the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947; and
(vi) suits for arrears of maintenance or for maintenance
or for enhancement of maintenance or for recovery of
shares of their deceased husband or parents in the
family property, filed by women or minors, where the
annual income of such women or minors does not
exceed twelve thousand rupees.
[xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
(vii) suits by workmen against their employers in
matters arising from their employment;
(viii) suits for recovery of compensation arising out of
accidents, filed by the injured where the claim does not
exceed rupees fifty thousand and filed by the legal
heirs of the deceased in such accidents where the claim
does not exceed rupees one lakh;
(ix) suits by associations or societies registered under
the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and
Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955 (Act XII of
1955) or the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Central
Act 21 of 1860), with one of their objects as protection
of public interest in the matter of environment,
consumer protection, adulteration of food stuffs, or
other similar matters against the offenders, where the
subject matter of the suit relates to any of the above
matters and the court finds that there is prima facie
case of public interest;
(x) suits filed by 'Poor persons' as defined in the Rules
relating to legal aid to the poor applicable in the State
2025:KER:82119
from time to time, when the claim dos not exceed
rupees fifteen thousand;
(xi) suits by any person serving in the Armed Forces,
where the claim does not exceed rupees fifteen
thousand;
(xii) suits by ex-servicemen whose annual income does
not exceed rupees twelve thousand and the claim does
not exceed rupees fifteen thousand;
(xiii) suits by unemployed handicapped persons whose
annual income does not exceed rupees twelve
thousand and the claim does not exceed rupees fifteen
thousand."
Provided that the plaintiff in the suit has not
entered into any agreement with reference to the
subject-matter of the proposed suit under which any
other person has obtained an interest in such subject-
matter or has not acquired by transfer inter vivos an
interest in such subject-matter and in cases covered by
Clauses (ii), (iii) and (iv) of sub-section (1) above, the
claim originates in favour of the plaintiff.
***
Therefore, the concerned court, subject to the provisions of sub-section
(2) of Section 74, may admit the plaint in respect of the above-mentioned
kinds of suits even though the fee chargeable under the Act of 1959 has
not been paid, and may require the District Collector to pay the fee so
chargeable, following the procedure provided as above.
48. Section 74A of the Act of 1959 also provides special provisions
regarding certain appeals. It lays down that the Court shall admit the
2025:KER:82119
memorandum of appeal in respect of--(i) an appeal against the decree in
a suit referred to in clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 74, presented
by the plaintiff in such suit; or (ii) an appeal against the decree in a suit
for money instituted against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe whose monthly income does not exceed twenty-five thousand
rupees and wherein the claim does not exceed ten lakh rupees, presented
by such member, even though the fee chargeable under this Act has not
been paid. After such admission, the Court shall calculate the amount of
court fee chargeable in respect of such memorandum of appeal under the
provisions of this Act and require the Collector of the district to pay the
fee so chargeable. Further, under Section 75 of the Act of 1959, the State
Government has the power to reduce or remit fees. Section 75 reads thus:
"75. Power to reduce or remit fees.- The Government
may, by notification in the Gazette, reduce or remit, in
the whole or in any part of the territory of this State,
all or any of the fees chargeable under this Act, and
may, in like manner, cancel or vary such notification."
***
Therefore, the Act of 1959 contains provisions to address hardship,
ensuring that certain classes of persons are not prevented from
seeking recourse to a court of law due to their inability to pay the
prescribed court fees.
49. To summarise, the challenge to the revision of ad valorem court
fees, there being no increase in the ad valorem fees, does not survive and
2025:KER:82119
has, in fact, not been pressed by the petitioner. The challenge to Section
73A of the Act of 1959, which exempts the Government from payment
of court fees and was introduced in the year 2003, has already been
negatived by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Human Rights
Protection Forum v. State of Kerala. We find no reason to take a
different view. The main challenge to the impugned amending enactment
is based on the alleged breach of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India. The entire enactment is challenged, and not any specific provision
of the impugned Amending Act. The State Government has the
legislative competence to enact the impugned Amending Act. The
devaluation of the rupee, inflation, passage of time, and the expenditure
on the administration of justice are relevant factors to be taken into
account while considering the revision of court fees. The revision of court
fees has not taken place in the State of Kerala for more than two decades,
and the State has placed material on record to demonstrate the
devaluation of the rupee and the increased expenditure on the
administration of justice. A broad correlation between the collection of
court fees and the expenditure on the administration of justice is all that is
necessary; mathematical exactitude is not required. The Report of the
Committee constituted by the State Government forms only a part of the
exercise undertaken for enacting the impugned Amending Act. The
challenge to the legislative exercise of a competent Legislature, however,
must be examined within well-settled parameters. Once the basic
justification for revising court fees is established, the impugned
2025:KER:82119
Amending Act cannot be declared unconstitutional on the grounds of
violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As to the challenge
based on the alleged violation of the right to access justice, under Article
21 of the Constitution of India, it must again be noted that the entire
enactment is sought to be declared unconstitutional on this count. It is
not the position of law that any revision in court fees, however justified
and lawful, will ipso facto offend the right to access justice. Each entry in
the amended Schedule may have a different impact, and even a single
entry may affect different classes or persons differently. There are no such
specific pleadings or supporting material placed on record in the petition,
and the impugned amendment cannot be declared unconstitutional on
the basis of generalised assertions.
50. In these circumstances, prayer clause (i), seeking a declaration that
the amendment to the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959,
by the Kerala Finance Act, 2025, is unconstitutional, is rejected. Prayer
clause (ii), seeking a declaration that the provisions relating to ad valorem
court fees are unconstitutional, is also rejected. Prayer clause (iii),
challenging Section 73A of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation
Act, 1959, is rejected. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
51. Before parting, we observe that under the Act of 1959, the State
Government has the power to grant full or partial exemption from the
payment of court fees to a particular class of persons. Having carried out
the exercise of revising court fees, the State Government may consider
2025:KER:82119
whether any circumstances exist that warrant granting full or partial
exemption to a particular class or category based on social or financial
criteria. However, this decision is left to the discretion of the State
Government.
52. All pending interlocutory applications stand closed.
Sd/-
NITIN JAMDAR
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
BASANT BALAJI,
JUDGE
krj/-
2025:KER:82119
APPENDIX OF WP(PIL) NO.14/2025
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:-
EXHIBIT P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
KERALA FINANCE ACT, 2025, SHOWING THE
AMENDMENT TO THE KERALA COURT FEES AND SUIT
VALUATION ACT, 1959.
EXHIBIT P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE BUDGET SPEECH OF THE
HON'BLE MINISTER FOR FINANCE, STATE OF
KERALA.
EXHIBIT P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE DESCRIPTION OF THE KERALA
LAW REFORMS COMMISSION AS SHOWN IN THEIR
OFFICIAL WEBSITE.
EXHIBIT P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE DRAFT AMENDMENT BILL OF
THE KERALA COURT FEES & SUITS VALUATION ACT,
1959 AS PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF
KERALA LAW REFORMS COMMISSION.
RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS:-
EXHIBIT R2(A) A TRUE COPY OF GO(RT) NO. 46/2024/LAW DATED
DATED 10-01-2024 RELATING TO THE APPOINTMENT
OF THE COMMITTEE, ALONG WITH ITS TRANSLATION.
EXHIBIT R2(B) A TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT ON REVISION OF
COURT FEES AND SUIT VALUATION IN KERALA,
DATED 16-01-2025, SUBMITTED BY JUSTICE V.K.
MOHANAN (RTD) COMMITTEE.
ANNEXURE-1 G.O.(RT) NO.46/2024/LAW (OPINION G) DTD.
10/01/2024, ALONG WITH ITS TRANSLATION.
ANNEXURE-2 G.O.(RT) NO.63/2024/LAW (OPINION G) DATED
10/01/2024, ALONG WITH ITS TRANSLATION.
ANNEXURE-3 G.O.(RT) NO.1093/2024/LAW/THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
DTD. 16/10/2024, ALONG WITH ITS TRANSLATION.
2025:KER:82119
ANNEXURE-4 MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE MEETINGS, ALONG WITH
TRANSLATIONS.
ANNEXURE-5 LETTER NO.HCKL/329/2023-E6(A) DTD. 09/03/2024
OF THE REGISTRAR, DISTRICT JUDICIARY, HIGH
COURT OF KERALA.
ANNEXURE-6 U.O NOTE NO.EXP.A4/236/2024-FIN(E2749702) FIN
(EXPENDITURE-A) DEPARTMENT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DTD.19/04/2024.
ANNEXURE-7 GMAIL LETTER RECEIVED FROM
[email protected] OF THE ASSISTANT
ADVISOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS AND
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT, RESERVE BANK OF
INDIA, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, KERALA.
ANNEXURE-8 PAGE 1 TO 3 EXTRACTED FROM THE APPENDIX OF
ECONOMIC SURVEY REPORT OF THE YEAR 2023-24
PUBLISHED BY MINISTRY OF FINANCE, GOVT. OF
INDIA DATED 22/07/2024.
ANNEXURE-9 LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS APPROVED BY THE
COMMITTEE AS PER ITS MEETING DTD. 29/04/2024.
ANNEXURE-10 LETTER DTD.02/05/2024 APPROVED BY THE
COMMITTEE AS PER ITS MEETING DTD.29/04/2024.
ANNEXURE-11 COPY OF DESHABHIMANI DAILY DATED 01.06.2024.
ANNEXURE 12 COPY OF MALAYALA MANORAMA DAILY DATED
01.06.2024.
ANNEXURE-13 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AND OTHER DETAILS, WHO
ATTENDED THE PUBLIC HEARING, AT A GLANCE.
ANNEXURE-14 LETTER NO.HCKL/2529/2023-E1 DTD. 24/06/2024
OF THE REGISTRY OF THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF
KERALA.
ANNEXURE-15 THE LIST OF 9 STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR VIEWS,
OBJECTIONS AND STATEMENT SUBMITTED AND
RECEIVED BEFORE 31/05/2024, ALONG WITH THE
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTS IN VERNACULAR.
2025:KER:82119
ANNEXURE-16 THE LIST OF PERSONS AND THEIR WRITTEN VIEWS
AND DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED IN PERSON AT THE TIME
OF ZONAL HEARING AND RECEIVED THROUGH POST
AFTER 31/05/2024 AND BEFORE 19/06/2024, ALONG
WITH THE TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTS IN
VERNACULAR.
ANNEXURE-17 MINUTES OF THE ZONAL WISE PUBLIC HEARING,
ALONG WITH ITS TRANSLATION.
//TRUE COPY//
P.A. TO C.J.
