Kerala High Court
Saifuneesa vs State Of Kerala on 27 October, 2025
LA.App.No.112 of 2025 1 2025:KER:80860
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANU
MONDAY, THE 27TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 5TH KARTHIKA, 1947
LA.APP. NO. 112 OF 2025
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 07.11.2014 IN LAR NO.74 OF
2012 OF THE SUB COURT, ATTINGAL
APPELLANT/CLAIMANT:
SAIFUNEESA
AGED 65 YEARS
THEKKATHU VEEDU, EDAVILAKATHU MURI, VEILOOR VILLAGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695302
BY ADV SRI.M.R.SARIN
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA
THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, CIVIL
STATION, KUDAPPANAKUNNU,THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 682031
2 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
TECHNOPARK, KAZHAKKUTTAM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
PIN - 695581
BY ADVS.
SMT.K.V.RASHMI
SRI.ANIL THOMAS(T)
SMT.REKHA C.NAIR, SR. GP.
THIS LAND ACQUISITION APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
ON 27.10.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
LA.App.No.112 of 2025 2 2025:KER:80860
S.MANU, J.
==========================
LA.App.No.112 of 2025
==========================
Dated this the 27th Day of October, 2025
JUDGMENT
This application has been filed to condone the delay of 3698
days in filing the appeal.
2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the
applicant/appellant; the learned Senior Government Pleader for the 1 st
respondent and the learned Standing Counsel for the 2 nd respondent and
perused the affidavit of the applicant/appellant.
3. The appeal has been filed challenging the judgment and
decree in LAR No.74 of 2012 passed by the Sub Judge, Attingal, dated
07.11.2014. The applicant/applicant has stated in the affidavit that she
had contacted the lawyer on 07.01.2015 and came to know that the
Reference Court had passed judgment. The counsel was instructed to
file an appeal before this Court. It is further stated that the
LA.App.No.112 of 2025 3 2025:KER:80860
applicant/appellant was living away from home due to health issues and
had to spent huge amounts for treatment. She could not arrange funds
for meeting the expenses to file the appeal. There is no specific case as
to whether the delay was caused on account of inaction by the counsel
or inability of the applicant to raise funds. The affidavit is hence vague
and evasive.
4. Though the applicant/appellant cited financial stringency on
account of health issues and treatment undergoing, no documents has
been produced to show that the applicant had faced any serious health
issues. No specific statements are made in the affidavit regarding the
nature of illness and treatment undertaking and the period during which
the applicant was unwell. There is a delay of 3698 days in filing the
appeal. The reasons stated in the affidavit are totally insufficient to
explain the long delay.
5. In Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by Legal
Representatives and Others v. Special Deputy Collector (LA) [(2024)
12 SCC 336], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down and reiterated
the principles regarding the condonation of delay, in a case arising from
acquisition proceedings. It is apposite to refer to the following
LA.App.No.112 of 2025 4 2025:KER:80860
paragraphs:
7. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the legal
maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" i.e. it is for the general welfare
that a period of limitation be put to litigation. The object is to put an end to
every legal remedy and to have a fixed period of life for every litigation as it is
futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending indefinitely. Even public policy
requires that there should be an end to the litigation otherwise it would be a
dichotomy if the litigation is made immortal vis-à-vis the litigating parties i.e.
human beings, who are mortals.
8. The courts have always treated the statutes of limitation and prescription as
statutes of peace and repose. They envisage that a right not exercised or the
remedy not availed for a long time ceases to exist. This is one way of putting
to an end to a litigation by barring the remedy rather than the right with the
passage of time.
xxx xxx xxx
18. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji, this Court in advocating the liberal approach in
condoning the delay for "sufficient cause" held that ordinarily a litigant does
not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain
every day's delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone
delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the
interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail
upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be
condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted
in condoning the delay, existence of "sufficient cause" for not filing the appeal
in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to
condone the delay. The phrases "liberal approach", "justice-oriented
approach" and cause for the advancement of "substantial justice" cannot be
employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a
matter of fact dead matters to be revived and reopened by taking aid of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
xxx xxx xxx
20. This Court as far back in 1962 in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. has
emphasised that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not
filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of
delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the
court. The court, despite establishment of a "sufficient cause" for various
reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of
the party.
21. In Maqbul Ahmad v. Pratap Narain Singh, it had been held that the court
cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the
ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when
mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly,
satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on
sympathetic grounds alone.
LA.App.No.112 of 2025 5 2025:KER:80860
22. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar v. State of
Haryana wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if
some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately
when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of
the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of
parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
23. In Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of A.P., where the High Court, despite
unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the
applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed
to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. The High
Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed
manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay
should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court
observed that the concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice-oriented
approach" and "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the
substantial law of limitation.
xxx xxx xxx
25. In Basawaraj v. LAO, this Court held that the discretion to condone the
delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. The expression "sufficient cause" as occurring in Section 5 of
the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack
of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may
harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as
prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law
as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable
grounds.
xxx xxx xxx
28. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid,
and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
28.1. Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end
to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
28.2. A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long
time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
28.3. The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently,
such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has
to be construed liberally;
28.4. In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-
oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the
same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in
Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
28.5. Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if
sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is
established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay,
negligence and want of due diligence;
28.6. Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean
LA.App.No.112 of 2025 6 2025:KER:80860
that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with
the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
28.7. Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the
delay; and
28.8. Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid
down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the
conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory
provision."
6. The learned counsel for the applicant/appellant referred to
the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suresh Kumar v. State of
Haryana [2025 SCC Online SC 896] and contended that the Hon'ble
Apex Court condoned the delay of 4908 days in the said case and held
that a liberal approach shall be adopted in condoning the delay in land
acquisition matters. It is to be noted that in the said case, the applicant
had raised a specific contention that the delay in filing the appeal was
not on account of any fault from his part. Contention, as discernible from
paragraphs 6 and 13 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, was
that the appellant had entrusted someone to file the appeal, but the said
person failed to do so. Hence the Hon'ble Supreme Court was convinced
that the land loser was not at fault and on being satisfied that there was
sufficient reason, condoned the delay.
7. As it is trite law that the power to condone delay can be
exercised only on sufficient cause, this Court has to consider as to
LA.App.No.112 of 2025 7 2025:KER:80860
whether sufficient cause has been shown in the affidavit filed in support
of the application to condone the delay. As noted above, apart from a
very vague statement about the illness of the applicant, no specific
averments are available in the affidavit filed in support of the application
to condone the delay in the case at hand, though the delay is of 3698
days. In such circumstances, the decision cited by the learned counsel
for the applicant/appellant is of no help to the applicant to seek
condonation of delay, as the essential requirement to invoke Section 5 of
the Limitation Act is sufficient reason. It is also relevant to note that in the
case of Suresh Kumar (Supra) principles laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Supra) was also noticed.
In view of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Supra), the reasons stated in the
affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay are
totally inadequate. Inaction and lack of bonafides on the part of the
applicant are well evident. As the applicant has not offered sufficient
reasons to condone the delay, C.M. Application No.2 of 2025 is
dismissed.
LA.App.No.112 of 2025 8 2025:KER:80860
Since the application for condonation of delay; viz,
C.M.Appln.No.2 of 2025 has been dismissed, this appeal is also
dismissed.
Sd/-
S.MANU
JUDGE
MC/27.10
