Kerala High Court
Dr Ciza Thomas vs State Of Kerala on 30 May, 2025
Author: A.Muhamed Mustaque
Bench: A. Muhamed Mustaque
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. MUHAMED MUSTAQUE
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE JOHNSON JOHN
FRIDAY, THE 30TH DAY OF MAY 2025 / 9TH JYAISHTA, 1947
OP(KAT) NO. 186 OF 2025
PETITIONER/S:
DR CIZA THOMAS,
AGED 57 YEARS
W/O DR T. JOHN THARAKAN, RESIDING AT K.P-7/240A, EASWARAN
THAMPI NAGAR, KALLAYAM P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN -
695043
BY ADVS.
NISHA GEORGE
GEORGE POONTHOTTAM (SR.)
A.L.NAVANEETH KRISHNAN
KAVYA VARMA M. M.
SILPA SREEKUMAR
RESPONDENT/S:
1 STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY, HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 682031
2 THE DIRECTOR OF TECHNICAL EDUCATION,
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF TECHNICAL EDUCATION, PADMAVILASAM
ROAD, FORT P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695002
3 THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL, KERALA,
AG'S OFFICE COMPLEX, CANTONMENT STATION RD, STATUE, PALAYAM,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
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4 MR. AJAYAN C,
ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, HIGHER EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT (G/J), GOVERNMENT OF KERALA, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
PIN - 695001
SENIOR GOVERNMENT PLEADER SHRI A.J.VARGHESE
THIS OP KERALA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
26.05.2025, THE COURT ON 30.05.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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A. MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & JOHNSON JOHN, JJ.
--------------------------------------------------
O.P. (KAT). No. 186/2025
--------------------------------------------------
Dated this the 30th day of May 2025
JUDGMENT
A.Muhamed Mustaque, J.
The petitioner, Dr. Ciza Thomas, retired from the Government
Engineering College as a Principal on 31/03/2023. This appears to be
a third round of litigation for her, solely because she had assumed
the office of Vice Chancellor of A.P.J. Abdul Kalam Technological
University, as per an order of the Chancellor, the then Governor of
Kerala, dated 03/11/2022. That was a temporary appointment made
by the Chancellor, invoking Section 13(7) of the A.P.J. Abdul Kalam
Technological University Act, 2015, pending a regular appointment.
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The statutory provision above permits the appointment of the Vice
Chancellor for a period not exceeding six months in aggregate until
the next person assumes the office of the Vice Chancellor. The State
challenged the action of the Chancellor in W.P.(C) No. 35656/2022.
A learned Single Judge of this Court upheld the appointment. In
appeal, the matter came before a Division Bench comprising one
among us (Justice A. Muhamed Mustaque). The Division Bench, vide
judgment dated 16/02/2023, upheld the State Government's
authority to recommend names of candidates to the Chancellor for
making temporary appointments. However, the Division Bench did
not interfere with the appointment of Dr. Ciza Thomas for the reason
that it was an appointment made to a fortuitous post, and the
Government has the authority to appoint anyone temporarily
replacing her. Thereafter, Dr. Ciza Thomas was appointed as the
Principal of the Government Engineering College,
Thiruvananthapuram, and subsequently retired on 31/03/2023.
2. Immediately on retirement, Dr. Ciza Thomas was
proceeded for disciplinary action alleging that she violated the
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Government Service Conduct contemplated under Rule 48 of the
Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1960, by assuming the office
of the Vice Chancellor as per the order of the Tribunal. Dr. Ciza
Thomas again approached the Tribunal in O.A. No. 435/2023. The
Tribunal, by an interim order dated 17/03/2023 in O.A. No.
435/2023, directed Dr. Ciza Thomas to respond to the show cause
notice dated 10/03/2023. The Tribunal, by its order dated
30/03/2023, disposed of the above Original Application without
interfering with the show cause notice. Dr. Ciza Thomas again
approached this Court by filing O.P. (KAT) No. 170/2023, challenging
the order of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 435/2023 dated 30/03/2023. A
Division Bench (comprising one among us - Justice A. Muhamed
Mustaque) by judgment dated 20/10/2023, set aside the show cause
notice holding that it is illegal and unsustainable. It is appropriate to
refer to paragraph 8 of the above judgment.
"8. The appointment of the petitioner by the Chancellor, who is the Governor of
Kerala, admittedly is by invoking the statutory provisions. Rule 48 of the UGC
Regulations does not contemplate any violation of Government servant's conduct
if such an appointment is made through the process of law. The rule only
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contemplates taking up employment by the Government servant by his own
volition. If proper interpretation of law is accorded as above, it can be seen that
show cause notice is misconceived and legally unsustainable. The Government
servant can only be proceeded for disciplinary action against violation of any
existing rules or law. If the appointment is made invoking statutory provisions
in another service, and not based on the individual application of the
Government servant, that will not amount to violation of Rule 48. Based on the
interpretation of Rule 48 as above, we are of the view that the show cause notice
is unsustainable. Further, we note that in a challenge made by the Government,
we had justified the appointment of the petitioner as the Vice Chancellor. The
legality of her appointment cannot be reopened as inter party judgment would
bind the Government as well. The learned Additional Advocate General Shri Asok
M.Cherian's argument is that it is not the legality of the appointment but the
conduct of the petitioner which is the subject matter of the disciplinary action.
We are afraid to accept this argument for the reason that the conduct of the
petitioner in taking up the post of Vice Chancellor temporarily as explained
earlier was not on her desire or application but made by the Chancellor invoking
statutory provisions.
Thus, the original petition is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and we
quash Annexure A8 before the Tribunal."
The State brought the matter before the Apex Court under SLP (Civil)
Diary No. 5101/2024. The Apex Court dismissed the above Special
Leave Petition on 05/03/2024, leaving open the question of law.
3. Even thereafter, Dr. Ciza Thomas was not paid her pensionary
benefits. This was for the reason that the State appears to have filed
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a review petition against the dismissed SLP (Civil) Dairy No.
5101/2024.
4. Thereafter, Dr. Ciza Thomas approached the Tribunal in
O.A. No. 323/2025. The Tribunal, by an interim order dated
11/02/2025, directed that the provisional pension be effected along
with arrears. It was submitted by the learned Government Pleader
before the Tribunal that the arrears of provisional pension had been
disbursed to Dr. Ciza Thomas on 05/03/2024. Thereafter, the Tribunal
adjourned the matter on 10/03/2025 for the Government Pleader to
file a reply statement.
5. Dr. Ciza Thomas approached this Court by filing the
present O.P. (KAT). No. 186/2025 on 11/04/2025, invoking Article
227 of the Constitution, seeking a direction to disburse her regular
pension, arrears, and all other terminal benefits.
6. Normally, this Court would be reluctant to entertain a
challenge under Article 227 in respect of matters which have not
been finally concluded by the Tribunal, unless the Tribunal commits
a jurisdictional error during its proceedings or while passing orders.
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We are also reluctant to invoke our powers under Article 227 as there
is no manifest error committed by the Tribunal in this matter.
Pursuant to our direction, a statement has been filed before this
Court by the first respondent. In the statement, it is stated as
follows:
"(2) It is respectfully submitted that the petitioner had worked in various colleges
in her tenure of service. The Director of Technical Education is examining
whether any liability has been incurred by the petitioner during her tenure of
service. If any liability is found, that has to be assessed and quantified by the
department within a period of 3 years. If no liability is found, the entire DCRG
amount will be disbursed to the petitioner.
(3) It is respectfully submitted that the Government have already approached
the Honourable Supreme Court by filing a Review Petition in SLP for reviewing
the judgment for the reason that the question of law raised by the State was left
open. Therefore, the State and its officials are awaiting an order in the Review
Petition with respect of the question of law raised by the petitioners in the above
SLP. The Registry of the Honourable Supreme Court has already allotted Diary
Number No. 27777/2024. Awaiting the outcome of the Review Petition is also is
one of the reason for disbursing the pensionary benefits. If there is any delay
occurred in disposing of the Review Petition filed by the State before the
Honourable Supreme Court, the Department will disburse the remaining
pensionary benefits to the petitioner in view of Note 3 Rule 3 of Part III KSR."
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7. From the statement, it is discernible that no contestable case
is made by the State before the Tribunal on the reliefs sought by Dr.
Ciza Thomas before the Tribunal. The only justification made by the
first respondent for the delay in disbursal of pensionary benefits is
on the fact that a review petition has been filed by the State before
the Apex Court to review the dismissed SLP. It is also further
contended that the State has a time period of three years to quantify
any liability. Under Rule 3 of Part III KSR, the authority of the
Government to withhold the pension is only in the circumstances
enumerated therein. Rule 3 of Part III KSR specifically states that a
pension can be withheld to enable the Government to recover losses
incurred, pending departmental or judicial proceedings. It is
impermissible to withhold a pension by the Government in any other
circumstances. No departmental or judicial proceedings are pending
against Dr. Ciza Thomas. We are astonished to see how the State is
using its authority arbitrarily to deny legitimate dues of a retired
government servant. When the authority of the Government
becomes a wield to harass government servants, can the
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constitutional court gloss over such arbitrary action to frustrate the
legitimate entitlements?
8. We need to examine the power of this Court under Article
226 in proceedings initiated under Article 227. Is the constitutional
court entitled to exercise power under Article 226 in a challenge
made under Article 227? We shall advert to the law in this regard at
the first instance.
9. Part XIV-A of the Constitution was inserted in the
Constitution by the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976. Article 323A of Part
XIV-A of the Constitution states that the Parliament may by law
establish Administrative Tribunals to adjudicate disputes with respect
to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to
public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union
and the State. The Parliament enacted the Administrative Tribunal
Act, 1985, in tune with Article 323A of Part XIV-A of the Constitution.
The statement of objectives of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985
clearly enunciates that the enactment aims to provide adjudication
of disputes related to public service. Section 14 of the Administrative
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Tribunal Act, 1985 refers to the jurisdiction and power of the Central
Administrative Tribunal. Similar jurisdiction and power are conferred
on the State Administrative Tribunals under Section 15 of the Act.
Section 28 of the Act refers to exclusion of jurisdiction of the courts,
except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, from
exercising jurisdiction and powers over the Tribunal. The Apex Court
in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, [(1987) 1 SCC 124]
held that an Administrative Tribunal serves as an alternative
institutional mechanism, but the Supreme Court would continue to
retain its power of judicial review over the decisions of such
Tribunals. The right to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136
against Tribunal decisions was also preserved. However, regarding
the jurisdiction of High Courts, the Supreme Court adopted a
restrictive approach, ruling that High Courts do not have the
authority to exercise judicial review in these cases.
10. Thereafter, a Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in L.
Chandrakumar v. Union of India, [(1997) 3 SCC 261] examined
the law laid down in Sampath Kumar's case (supra) and held that
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the power of judicial review is an essential and basic feature of the
Constitution. Further, held that the power of the High Court under
Article 226/227 is a basic feature of the Constitution and exclusion
of the jurisdiction of High Court and Supreme Court under Articles
226/227 and 32 of the Constitution are unconstitutional, and all
decisions of the Tribunal will be subject to the scrutiny of the Division
Bench of the High Court, and the Tribunal will act as a Court of first
instance in respect of area of law for which it has been constituted.
11. As we noted earlier, we are not looking into this matter
from the perspective of the power conferred on the Administrative
Tribunal. If we were to look at the matter of secondary judicial
review, we would have refrained from entertaining this matter and
deciding this issue, as the matter is still pending before the Tribunal.
From the facts that loom large in this case, we absolutely find that it
is not worth a contest for the State to deny Dr. Ciza Thomas her
pension and all other benefits. On the face of the records of the
Court, if the constitutional court is able to form an opinion that the
State is wielding its power and authority to oppress and harass a
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government servant, the Court shall not refrain from using its power
under Article 226 of the Constitution even though the challenge is
made under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is apposite to refer the
judgment of the Apex Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib
Sehravardi, [(1981) 1 SCC 722] wherein it was held as follows:
"16 ... Wherever therefore there is arbitrariness in State action whether it
be of the legislature or of the executive or of an "authority" under Article 12,
Article 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action.
In fact, the concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire
constitutional scheme and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of
the fabric of the Constitution."
12. The constitutional courts are the protectors of fundamental
rights, and the constitutional courts alone have the exclusive
authority and power to enforce the fundamental rights. The power of
the Tribunal, being the nature of a review of the actions impugned,
has its own limitations while deciding a matter of this nature where
no substantial service dispute is involved. The Tribunal is an authority
to decide on service disputes by a mechanism of judicial review,
including the violation of fundamental rights. Therefore, it can also
decide on disputes related to the validity of statutory provisions and
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rules of service, and also on questions of violation of the fundamental
rights of the government servant. However, under the Constitution,
the enforcement of fundamental rights stands on a different
perspective. Unlike other Courts and Tribunals, which are competent
to decide on a dispute concerning the violation of fundamental rights,
they have no power or authority to enforce the fundamental rights.
The enforcement of fundamental rights refers to the process by which
constitutional courts, such as the High Courts and the Supreme
Court, ensure that the rights guaranteed to individuals under the
Constitution are upheld and protected. When a fundamental right is
infringed or violated, whether by the State or any of its agencies, the
aggrieved individual has the right to approach these courts for
enforcement. In such cases, the courts exercise their constitutional
powers, particularly under Article 32 (Supreme Court) and Article
226 (High Courts) of the Constitution, to issue appropriate writs or
directions compelling the State to comply with the constitutional
mandates. This judicial mechanism acts as a vital check on arbitrary
or unlawful actions by public authorities, thereby safeguarding the
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values embedded in the Constitution. The Government, as well as
government servants, are bound by the rule of law. The jurisdiction
and authority of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal under Rule 15 of
the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2010, is to
decide a subject touching upon service or matters concerning service
in the State. In a matter where arbitrariness is manifest and service
rules are taken as a shield by the Government, constitutional courts
are not restrained from invoking their power under Article 226, as
they are protectors of fundamental rights. The enforcement of a
fundamental right is not akin to the exercise of judicial power to
adjudicate a dispute (lis) through the conventional mechanism of
review. Rather, it is a distinct constitutional function wherein the
court examines whether there has been a violation of a guaranteed
right, and if so, provides appropriate remedial measures. This
process is not centred on resolving disputes in the traditional
adversarial sense, but is primarily concerned with ensuring that the
actions of the State conform to the constitutional norms.
13. This Court in Indian Broadcasting And Digital
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Foundation v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, [2024
KLT OnLine 2626] held as follows:
"14. We cannot agree with Mr. Sibal's arguments that TDSAT is incompetent to
address challenges based on the violation of fundamental rights. There is a
fundamental distinction between enforcing fundamental rights and
exercising judicial review concerning those rights. In the former case,
only constitutional courts have the authority to enforce fundamental
rights. However, regarding judicial review based on fundamental rights
parameters, any authority with review power can determine whether a
decision or order aligns with fundamental rights or applicable law.
Therefore, we conclude that the challenge to the regulation must fail in light of
the binding judgment. We grant the appellants the liberty to challenge the Tariff
Order before TDSAT. The learned Senior Counsel, Shri Santhosh Mathew,
representing appellants 4 and 5, requested that the interim order issued by this
Court be maintained to allow the appellants to approach TDSAT should any
adverse orders arise from this Court. Taking note of the request as above, we
order that coercive steps shall be deferred for a period of two weeks to enable
the appellants to invoke alternate remedy." (emphasis supplied)
14. In matters like this arising under Article 227, the
constitutional courts will not hold any enquiry on the entitlement of
government servants under the service law, but rather focus on the
action of the State violating fundamental rights. We draw our
reasoning on exercising power under Article 226 on the following
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precedents in a matter arising out of a challenge under Article 227.
14(1). The Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander
Rai, [(2003) 6 SCC 675] held as follows:
"39. Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working rules, the
fact remains that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226
or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a straight-jacket formula or
rigid rules. Not less than often, the High Court would be faced with a dilemma.
If it intervenes in pending proceedings there is bound to be delay in termination
of proceedings. If it does not intervene, the error of the moment may earn
immunity from correction. The facts and circumstances of a given case may
make it more appropriate for the High Court to exercise self-restraint and not to
intervene because the error of jurisdiction though committed is yet capable of
being taken care of and corrected at a later stage and the wrong done, if any,
would be set right and rights and equities adjusted in appeal or revision preferred
at the conclusion of the proceedings. But there may be cases where "a stitch in
time would save nine". At the end, we may sum up by saying that the power is
there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the
dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical
wisdom of the judge."
(emphasis supplied)
14(2). The Apex Court in MMTC Ltd. v. CCT, [(2009) 1
SCC 8] held as follows:
"14. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675 : AIR 2003 SC
3044] after referring to the decisions in Custodian v. Khan Saheb Abdul Shukoor
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[AIR 1961 SC 1087 : (1961) 3 SCR 855] , Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of
Hills Division [AIR 1958 SC 398] , T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa [AIR 1954 SC 440]
and Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra [(2002) 4 SCC 388 : AIR 2002 SC 1771],
this Court held at paras 17 [Ed. : Para 17 below is from Jaidev Siddha (Dr.) v.
Jai Prakash Siddha, (2007) 3 MPLJ 595, while paras 19 and 25 are from Surya
Dev Rai case, (2003) 6 SCC 675.] , 19 and 25 as follows:
"17. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is quite vivid and luminescent
that the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the
learned Single Judge, character and the contour of the order, directions
issued, nomenclature given, the jurisdictional
prospective (sic perspective) in the constitutional context are to be perceived.
It cannot be said in a hypertechnical manner that an order passed in a writ
petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or
subordinate courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Phraseology used in exercise of
original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in Section 2 of the
Act cannot be given a restricted and constricted meaning because an order
passed in a writ petition can tantamount to an order under Article 226 or 227
of the Constitution of India and it would depend upon the real nature of the
order passed by the learned Single Judge. To elaborate; whether the learned
Single Judge has exercised his jurisdiction under Article 226 or under Article
227 or both would depend upon various aspects and many a facet as has
been emphasised in the aforequoted decisions of the Apex Court. The
pleadings, as has been indicated hereinabove, also assume immense
significance. As has been held in Surya Dev Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675 : AIR 2003
SC 3044] a writ of certiorari can be issued under Article 226 of the
Constitution against an order of a tribunal or an order passed by the
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subordinate court. In quintessentiality, it cannot be put in a straitjacket
formula that any order of the learned Single Judge that deals with an order
arising from an inferior tribunal or the subordinate court is an order under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not an order under Article 226 of
the Constitution. It would not be an overemphasis to state that an order in a
writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution in a composite manner and they can coincide, coexist, overlap,
imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the
learned Single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full
and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the
Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on
equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of the case."
(MPLJ p. 606) .."
(emphasis supplied)
14(3). In Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji v. State of
Gujarat, [(2015) 9 SCC 1] the Apex Court held as follows:
"3. At the outset, we may state that though eight questions have been drawn up
by the special Bench yet we are disposed to think that they can really be put
into three basic compartments, namely:
(i) In what context the phrase 'original jurisdiction' appearing in Clause 15 of
the Letters Patents should be construed, that is, by taking into consideration the
plain meaning of the same as the Court's power to hear and decide the matter
before any other court and review the same; or should it be construed in the
context with the power of the Court to issue a writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, which is always original.
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(ii) Assuming the words "to issue to any person or authority" as contained in
Article 226 of the Constitution are interpreted so as to include the tribunal or the
Court, then in such circumstances, would it be the correct proposition of law to
say that appellate tribunal is not amenable to a writ of certiorari and the only
remedy available to the litigant to challenge the order passed by an appellate
tribunal is under Article 227 of the Constitution and, ancillary one, when a
petition assails an order of the tribunal, be it a tribunal of first instance or an
appellate tribunal, should it be necessarily treated as a petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India in every case or it would depend upon facts of each
case, more particularly the grounds of challenge and the nature of order passed.
(iii) Whether in a petition for issue of a writ of Certiorari under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, the tribunal/Court whose order is impugned in a petition
must be a party to the petition so that the writ sought from the Court can be
issued against the tribunal/Court, but if the petition is for the relief under Article
227 only, then the tribunal/Court whose order is under assail need not be a
party-respondent on the reasoning that by entertaining a petition under Article
227 of the Constitution, the High Court exercises its power of superintendence
which is analogous to the revisional jurisdiction.
4. The special bench, as is evincible from the judgment impugned, has delved
into the questions framed by it, if we permit ourselves to say so, at great length
and recorded its conclusions in seriatum. It is necessary to reproduce the
relevant conclusions, which are as follows:-
"(iii) When a writ is issued under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is issued in
exercise of its original jurisdiction whether against the Tribunal or inferior Court
or administrative authority.
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(iv) The power exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution is in exercise of
original jurisdiction and not supervisory jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
(vii) A writ of certiorari lies in appropriate cases against the order of Tribunal or
Court subordinate to the High Court where such a Court, or Tribunal acts not
only as an authority of first instance but even if such a Court or Tribunal acts as
an appellate or revisional authority provided a case for a writ of certiorari is
made out to the satisfaction of the Court concerned. Thus, if an appellate or
revisional order of the Court or Tribunal, subordinate to a High Court, suffers
from a patent error of law or jurisdiction, the same could be challenged before
the High Court with the aid of Article 226 of the Constitution and it could not be
said that such an appellate or revisional order of the Court or Tribunal could be
challenged with the aid of Article 227 alone.
(emphasis supplied)
15. Article 14 of the Constitution safeguards citizens from
discrimination and embodies the principle of the rule of law, which
ensures equal legal protection for all. Determining arbitrariness
involves applying the legal standards set by the Supreme Court, from
the case of E.P. Royappa (supra) onwards. These judgments
emphasise that equality must be observed in both positive and
negative aspects to avoid arbitrariness. In every instance, the law
mandates fairness and equal treatment. The State wields significant
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power that can deeply affect the lives of its citizens. This power gives
rise to a jural relationship between the State and its subjects, where
the exercise of power must be fair and constitutionally compliant,
creating corresponding responsibilities or liabilities for individuals.
When State action is guided by extraneous considerations that are
nevertheless deemed legitimate under the law, such actions must
still align with Article 14. The context in which the State exercises its
authority becomes crucial, especially when courts evaluate violations
or the enforcement of fundamental rights. In the specific context of
a government servant, statutory rules play a vital role in defining the
power-liability relationship between the Government and the
employee. If the Government exercises power beyond the scope of
this established legal relationship, that is, if the action cannot be
traced to any valid authority under the applicable rules, then such
action is arbitrary and violates Article 14. In cases involving pension
entitlements, the court must first examine the relevant rules
governing pensions. These rules clearly state that pension is not a
matter of right, but is subject to procedures, such as those outlined
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in Part III of the Kerala Service Rules (KSR). If the State exercises
power outside of these procedures and without legal backing, it
would amount to unequal treatment, thereby violating the guarantee
of equality under Article 14.
16. In the above background, we are exercising our power
under Article 226 of the Constitution for the following reasons,
holding that the Government has violated the fundamental rights of
Dr. Ciza Thomas, who retired on 31/03/2023:
No disciplinary action is pending against her. The Disciplinary
proceedings against her have been quashed and set aside by this
Court. No judicial proceedings are pending against her. No one has
a case against her that the liability is quantified and a liability
certificate has been issued. Rule 3 of Part III, KSR enables the
Government to withhold pension only when departmental
proceedings or judicial proceedings are pending. In the absence of
any pending departmental or judicial proceedings, the Government
cannot withhold pensionary benefits of Dr. Ciza Thomas. We note that
the Government exercised its authority and power in flagrant
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violation of her fundamental rights and to harass her for taking up
the office of the Vice Chancellor at the instance of the Chancellor, the
then Governor. This Court cannot ignore the gross injustice meted
out to such a distinguished government servant; we will have to
protect her pensionary right, which is a property right under the
Constitution, and it cannot be denied as such unless by a procedure
established by law.
In view of the above, we direct the official respondents to
release the entire terminal benefits due to her within two weeks from
today. On the question related to interest, the petitioner can be
relegated to the Tribunal and the Tribunal can decide.
The original petition is disposed of as above.
Sd/-
A. MUHAMED MUSTAQUE, JUDGE
Sd/-
JOHNSON JOHN, JUDGE
ms
OP(KAT) NO. 186 OF 2025
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APPENDIX OF OP(KAT) 186/2025
PETITIONER ANNEXURES
Annexure A1 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION NO. GS6-2838/2022
DATED 3.11.2022 ISSUED FROM THE GOVERNOR'S
SECRETARIAT WITH COVERING LETTER DATED 03.11.2022
Annexure A2 TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED 4.11.2022 SENT BY
THE DIRECTOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION TO THE APPLICANT
Annexure A3 TRUE COPY OF THE GOVERNMENT ORDER BEARING
G.O.(RT)NO.271/2023/H. EDN. DATED 28.02.2023
Annexure A4 TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 01.03.2023 IN
O.A. NO. 339/2023 OF THE HON'BLE TRIBUNAL
Annexure A5 TRUE COPY OF GOVERNMENT ORDER G.O. (RT) NO.
320/2023/H.EDN DATED 06.03.2023
Annexure A6 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 16.2.2023 IN W.A.
NO. 1847/2022 OF THE HONOURABLE HIGH COURT OF
KERALA
Annexure A7 TRUE COPY OF THE SHOW CAUSE NOTICE NO. HEDN-
G1/181/2022-HEDN DATED 10.3.2023 ISSUED BY THE 1ST
RESPONDENT
Annexure A8 TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 17.3.2023 IN
O.A. NO. 435/2023 OF THE HON'BLE TRIBUNAL
Annexure A9 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 30.03.2023 IN O.A.
NO. 435/2023 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE TRIBUNAL.
Annexure A10 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE NO. HEDN-G1/181/2022-HEDN
DATED 30.3.2023 ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT
Annexure A11 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. KTU/VCO/ 2023/1932
DATED 31.3.2023 ISSUED BY THE APPLICANT TO THE
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
Annexure A12 TRUE COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS NO.
E2/466/22/G.E.C.B.H DATED 31.3.2023 ISSUED FROM
THE GOVERNMENT ENGINEERING COLLEGE
Annexure A13 TRUE COPY OF THE CHARGE MEMO AND STATEMENT OF
ALLEGATIONS DATED NIL ISSUED FROM THE HIGHER
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
Annexure A14 TRUE COPY OF JUDGMENT IN O.P (KAT) NO. 170/2023
DATED 20.10.2023 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT
OF KERALA
Annexure A15 COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 05.03.2024 IN SLP (DIARY)
NO. 5101/2024 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA
Annexure A16 WAS SERVED WITH AN ORDER SANCTIONING PROVISIONAL
OP(KAT) NO. 186 OF 2025
2025:KER:37594
PENSION. TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.
P1/12380/23/DTE DATED 22.8.2023 ISSUED BY THE 2ND
RESPONDENT WITH ITS TYPED COPY
Annexure A17 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION NO. P1/12380/23/DTE
DATED 22.8.2023 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT
Annexure A18 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED 28.10.2023
SENT BY THE APPLICANT
Annexure A19 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. G1/105/2023/HEDN DATED
13.2.2024 ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT
Exhibit P1 TRUE COPY OF THE O.A NO. 323/2025 ALONG WITH
ANNEXURES FILED BEFORE THE KERALA ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNAL, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM ON 05.02.2025.
Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 11.02.2025 IN
O.A NO.323/2025 PASSED BY THE KERALA
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 10.03.2025 IN
O.A 323/2025 PASSED BY THE KERALA ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNAL, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
