Kerala High Court
Kerala State Co-Operative Bank Ltd., ... vs Kerala Co-Operative Tribunal, ... on 2 May, 2025
WP(C)Nos.3655/2015 & 1
3684/2015
2025:KER:33412
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
FRIDAY, THE 2ND DAY OF MAY 2025 / 12TH VAISAKHA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 3655 OF 2015
PETITIONER:
THE KERALA STATE CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD.
COBANK TOWERS, PALAYAM,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695033,
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
BY ADV SRI.GILBERT GEORGE CORREYA, SC
RESPONDENTS:
1 THE KERALA CO-OPERATIVE TRIBUNAL
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM- 695 001,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY.
2 THE CO-OPERATIVE ARBITRATION COURT (NORTH)
KOZHIKODE, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
3 K.VIJAYAKRISHNAN
LAKSHMI SADAN, KANHIKULAM POST,
KALLADIKKODE - 678 596.
BY ADVS.
SHAJI THOMAS, R3
N.RAGHURAJ
A.V.RAVI
P.P.BIJU(K/668/2005)
JEN JAISON(K/000208/2017)
THOMASKUTTY SEBASTIAN(K/623/1987)
WP(C)Nos.3655/2015 & 2
3684/2015
2025:KER:33412
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON 02.05.2025, ALONG WITH WP(C)NO.3684/2015, THE COURT ON
THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WP(C)Nos.3655/2015 & 3
3684/2015
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
FRIDAY, THE 2ND DAY OF MAY 2025 / 12TH VAISAKHA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 3684 OF 2015
PETITIONER:
THE KERALA STATE CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD.,
COBANK TOWERS, PALAYAM,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM 695033
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
BY ADV SRI.GILBERT GEORGE CORREYA, SC
RESPONDENTS:
1 THE KERALA CO-OPERATIVE TRIBUNAL,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM 695001,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
2 THE CO-OPERATIVE ARBITRATION COURT (NORTH)
KOZHIKODE, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
3 K. VIJAYAKRISHNAN
LAKSHMI SADAN, KANHIKULAM POST,
KALLADIKKODE-678596
BY ADVS.
SHAJI THOMAS, R3
SMT.K.AMMINIKUTTY
SRI.N.RAGHURAJ
SRI.A.V.RAVI
P.P.BIJU(K/668/2005)
WP(C)Nos.3655/2015 & 4
3684/2015
2025:KER:33412
JEN JAISON(K/000208/2017)
THOMASKUTTY SEBASTIAN(K/623/1987)
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON 02.05.2025, ALONG WITH WP(C) No.3655/2015, THE COURT ON
THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WP(C)Nos.3655/2015 & 5
3684/2015
2025:KER:33412
JUDGMENT
Dated this the 2nd day of May, 2025
[WP(C) Nos.3655/2015, 3684/2015]
Since the parties to these Writ Petitions and the subject
matter involved are the same, they are considered and disposed of
together.
2. Petitioner is an apex Co-operative Society as defined under
Section 2(a) of the Co-operative Societies Act. The 3 rd respondent
while working as Manager of the Bank at its office at Thrissur was
charged of serious financial improprieties and other lapses. Since
the reply submitted by him was not found satisfactory, a domestic
enquiry was conducted. On the basis of the report submitted therein,
the 3rd respondent was dismissed from service by the order dated
17.09.2008. He preferred an appeal before the Board of Directors,
which was dismissed by an order dated 19.01.2009. The 3 rd
respondent then filed ARC No.84 of 2011 (Old No.55 of 2009)
before the Co-operative Arbitration Court (Northern), Kozhikode
(Ext.P1) inter alia seeking to set aside the domestic enquiry report
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and to reinstate him in service with full back wages. The Bank filed
Ext.P2 written statement in the ARC. The Arbitration Court vide
Ext.P3 order dated 06.02.2014 set aside the suspension as well as
dismissal of the 3rd respondent and directed him to be reinstated in
service if not already superannuated. However, the prayer for back
wages was rejected. The 3rd respondent challenged Ext.P3 order to
the extent it declined him back wages before the Kerala Co-
operative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (hereinafter referred to as
'the Tribunal') by filing Appeal No.37 of 2014. The Tribunal vide
Ext.P4 judgment dated 28.10.2014 allowed the appeal and
confirmed the order of the Arbitration Court setting aside the
domestic enquiry report and order of suspension and dismissal. As
regards the question of entitlement of the 3 rd respondent to back
wages, the Tribunal remanded back the said question to the
Arbitration Court for fresh consideration. In the meanwhile, the Bank
had preferred a Revision Petition numbered as R.P.No.59 of 2014
before the Tribunal challenging Ext.P3 order dated 06.02.2014 of
the Arbitration Court. The said R.P. was dismissed by the Tribunal
vide its order on 13.11.2014 terming the same as time barred. The
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petitioner Bank has preferred both the above Writ Petitions seeking
to set aside the above mentioned two orders of the Co-operative
Tribunal. While W.P.(C) No.3655 of 2015 is filed by the Bank
seeking to quash Ext.P4 judgment dated 28.10.2014 of the Tribunal
remanding the question of entitlement to back wages for fresh
consideration to the Arbitration Court, the other Writ Petition viz.,
W.P.(C) No.3684 of 2015 is filed by the Bank seeking to quash
Ext.P4 order dated 13.11.2014 of the Tribunal dismissing the
Revision Petition filed by the Bank.
3. Heard Sri.Gilbert George Correya, Advocate for the
petitioner Bank and Sri.Shaji Thomas, Advocate, for the 3 rd
respondent.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Bank
contended that the Tribunal erred in rendering Ext.P4 judgment
dated 28.10.2014 in the appeal filed by the 3 rd respondent on the
erroneous assumption that the petitioner Bank had not challenged
Ext.P3 order dated 06.02.2014 rendered by the Arbitration Court by
filing an appeal or revision. He contended that the petitioner Bank
had indeed challenged Ext.P3 order of the Arbitration Court by filing
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a revision, namely Revision Petition No.59 of 2014, before the very
same Tribunal. It is contended by the learned counsel that on
28.10.2014, when Ext.P4 judgment was rendered by the Tribunal in
the appeal preferred by the 3 rd respondent, the above said Revision
Petition had already been heard by the Tribunal. The Tribunal was
aware of the fact that both the appeal and revision were pending
before it. Hence both the matters ought to have been heard
together. The learned counsel proceed to substantiate this
contention by pointing to the order in Revision Petition No.59 of
2014, which has been produced as Ext.P4 in W.P.(C) No.3684 of
2015 which states that the revision petition was heard on
04.08.2014 though the order dismissing in the same was rendered
only on 13.11.2014. Thus according to the learned counsel for the
petitioner, it is after hearing the Revision Petition on 04.08.2014 that
the Tribunal disposed of the appeal of the 3 rd respondent on
28.10.2014 holding that no revision had been filed by the petitioner
Bank. This according to the learned counsel is an error apparent on
the face of the record and hence Ext.P4 judgment allowing the
appeal of the 3rd respondent is fit to be set aside on the said ground
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alone. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Bank further
contended that Ext.P4 judgment of the Tribunal allowing the appeal
preferred by the 3rd respondent is erroneous also for the reason that
the Tribunal had remanded the matter back to the Arbitration Court
after expressing in the judgment its opinion that the 3 rd respondent
was entitled to back wages. Hence, according to the learned
counsel, the decision that the Arbitration Court would take in the
light of such an express opinion is a 'foregone conclusion'. As
regards Ext.P4 order dated 13.11.2014 impugned in W.P.(C)
No.3684 of 2015, dismissing the revision petition filed by the Bank,
the learned counsel vehemently submitted that such dismissal is
unsustainable in law. The learned counsel for the petitioner Bank
contended that the Tribunal erred in dismissing the revision petition,
holding that the same was time barred. Reliance is placed on the
dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in North Eastern
Chemicals Industries (P) Ltd. and another v. Ashok Paper Mill
(Assam) Ltd. and another [(2023) SCC OnLine SC 1649] where
the question whether Article 116 of the Limitation Act 1963 applies
to the proceedings under the Jogighopha (Assam) Unit of Ashok
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Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990
was considered. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that,
when a court is seized of a situation where no limitation stands
provided either by specific applicability of the Limitation Act or the
special statute governing the dispute, the court must undertake a
holistic assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case to
examine the possibility of delay causing prejudice to a party. The
learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the dictum
laid down by this Court in B.Preethakumari v. Joint Registrar of
Co-operative Societies (General) Thiruvananthapuram and
others [(2022) SCC OnLine KER 4727], wherein it had been held
after referring to the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain [(1976) 2 SCC 58]
that the Co-operative Arbitration Court should exercise its discretion
in a judicial and judicious manner and if it is found that there are rare
and exceptional circumstances which warrant not to grant the relief
of reinstatement then such discretion should also be exercised, so
as to consider the grant of compensation in view of reinstatement. It
had also been held by this Court therein that in the ordinary
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perspective in such cases, especially involving dismissal, causes
stigma for misconduct and if it is in violation of the statutory
mandate, reinstatement would be the appropriate relief. However,
such discretion to grant reinstatement should be used only for
compelling and good reasons. No such reason has been stated in
the case at hand by the Arbitration Court for ordering reinstatement
of the 3rd respondent. The Tribunal never got an opportunity to look
into the same as the revision was dismissed at the threshold
wrongly holding that it is barred by limitation. The learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner on placing reliance on the dictum laid
down by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat and another v.
Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association and another
[(2012)10 SCC 353], and contended that revisional or supervisory
power as vested in a Tribunal is to be distinguished from the
Appellate jurisdiction. Such supervisory or revisional jurisdiction is a
power vested in the Superior Court or Tribunal enabling it to satisfy
itself as regards the correctness of the orders of the Inferior
Tribunal. The said powers ought to have been exercised by the
Tribunal in accordance with law. Ext.P4 order dated 13.11.2014
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dismissing the Revision Petition clearly reveals that the Tribunal
had erred in exercising such revisional powers.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the 3 rd
respondent submitted that both the orders issued by the Tribunal
which have been impugned in these Writ Petitions do not call for any
interference. The same have been rendered in accordance with law.
As regards the scope for interference with Ext.P4 orders rendered
by the Tribunal in both these Writ Petitions, the learned counsel for
the 3rd respondent placed reliance on the dictum laid down by the
Supreme Court in Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic
Sciences v. Bikartan Das [2023 KHC 6774] wherein the scope and
ambit of for exercise of issuance of Certiorari was charted and laid
down inter alia holding that the High Court does not exercise the
powers of Appellate Tribunal and it does not review or reweigh the
evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal
purports to be based. Reliance is also placed on the dictum laid
down by this Court in President, Anickad Regional Farmers
Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. and another v. Benny Thomas
and another [2022 (6) KHC 298] wherein this Court had
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affirmatively placed reliance on the dictum laid down in David T.K.
v. Kuruppumpady Service Co Operative Bank and others [2015
(2) KHC 301], wherein it had been held as follows:
"4. The proposition that can be deduced from the law
laid and settled by the apex court is that the scope
and extent of interference with the factual findings of
the tribunal are exceptionally limited. the jurisdiction
of the high court in a red petition filed under Article
226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India
challenging the findings of a tribunal is supervisory
and not appellate. Unless the High Court finds that
there are manifest errors or that the findings are
patently unreasonable or tainted with perversity, the
writ jurisdiction would not be invoked to unsettle such
factual findings. Were the tribunal exercises a
discretion giving valid reason, no interference is
called for. Even if another view is possible,
interference under the writ jurisdiction is not justified,
unless the decision impugned is palpably perverse or
patently unreasonable, as wholly unavailable on
record or in direct conflict with settled principle of
law. If the High Court comes to a conclusion that the
tribunal has committed manifest error by
misconstruing certain documents or the materials on
record to such an extent to which a reasonably
prudent person could not have come to the
conclusions reached by the tribunal, or that the
tribunal has ignored the relevant materials or had
taken into consideration any inadmissible material,
the High Court would be justified in interfering with
the findings of the tribunal."
6. Reliance is also placed in the same respect on the dictum
laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Garment Craft v.
Prakash Chand Goyel [(2022) 4 SCC 181], wherein it was laid
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down that the High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not
act as a court of first appeal to re-appreciate, re-weigh the evidence
or facts upon which determination under challenge is based. The
Supreme Court had in the said decision also placed reliance on its
earlier decision in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate Pvt. Ltd. [(2001)
8 SCC 97], wherein it had been held that the scope and ambit of
exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227
of the Constitution of India was considered. It was held that the
exercise of power under the said Article involves a duty on the high
court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their
authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of
them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any
unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardships or wrong
decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Subordinate
Courts or Tribunals. Reliance is also placed on the dictum laid down
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and
another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329], wherein it
had been reiterated that reserve and exceptional power of judicial
intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual
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cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in
the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas
Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievances. As
regards the challenge put forth by the petitioner Bank against the
order of the Tribunal affirming the reinstatement of the 3 rd
respondent and directing of payment of back wages to the 3 rd
respondent thus setting aside the remand on the question of back
wages as found by the Arbitration Court, it is submitted by the
learned counsel appearing for the 3 rd respondent placing reliance on
the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Deepali Gundu
Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and
others [2013 KHC 4982] and in Ravindran K.S. v. Branch
Manager, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2015 KHC 4356] that the
order of the Tribunal fully meets the mandates of law and settled by
the said precedents is thus valid and legal. No interference is called
for with the finding in Ext.P4 order of the Tribunal in the appeal filed
by the 3rd respondent and it was valid and legal on the part of the
Tribunal to hold that the 3 rd respondent is entitled to full back wages.
The learned counsel contended that the principle of merger applies
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and placed reliance on the dictum laid dowon by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [2000 KHC
636], wherein it had been held that where an appeal or revision is
provided against an order passed by a Court, Tribunal or any other
authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies,
reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by
the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum
and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable
of enforcement in the eye of law.
7. The contentions put forth and precedents relied by both
parties have also been considered. Petitioner has in both the Writ
Petitions sought for issuance of writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P4
orders issued by the Tribunal. The two cardinal principles of law
governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution when it comes to the issue of writ of certiorari has
been lucidly laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central
Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das
(supra). It reads as follows:
"50. The first cardinal principle of law that
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governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution, more
particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of
certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High
Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate
Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence
upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal
purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it
considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably
erroneous but does not substitute its own views for
those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can
be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of
the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high
prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere
asking.
51. The second cardinal principle of exercise
of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution is that in a given case, even if some
action or order challenged in the writ petition is found
to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while
exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder
can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial
justice between the parties. Article 226 of the
Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which
is essentially discretionary, although founded on
legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court,
exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as
public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal
formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the
realities of the fact situation of the case. While
administering law, it is to be tempered with equity
and if the equitable situation demands after setting
right the legal formulations, not to take it to the
logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty
if it does not notice equitable consideration and
mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the
High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not."
It is trite thus that supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error
of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can
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be supported. This Court cannot substitute its own decision on facts
and conclusions for that of the inferior court or Tribunal. It is well
settled that exercise of issuance of certiorari and interfering with the
orders of the courts or the Tribunal is restricted to cases of serious
dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of
law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave
injustice remains uncorrected.
8. Having thus reminded myself of the contours of the
jurisdiction while considering the orders rendered by Tribunals in
disciplinary proceedings, I proceed to consider the contentions
made regarding Ext.P4 orders rendered by the Tribunal sought to be
quashed in both the Writ Petitions.
9. As regards judgment dated 28.10.2014 in Appeal No.37 of
2014 produced as Ext.P4 and impugned in W.P.(C) No.3655 of
2015 is concerned, I note that the Tribunal had vide the said order
set aside that portion of the award of the the Arbitration Court which
concluded that the 3rd respondent is not entitled to get back wages
and had relegated the question to be decided by the petitioner Bank.
The Tribunal vide the impugned order after setting aside that portion
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of the award of the Arbitration Court directed the Arbitration Court to
dispose of the question regarding payment of back wages to the 3 rd
respondent expeditiously, at any rate, within two weeks from the
date of receipt of the lower court records and copy of judgment of
the Tribunal. Contrary to the contention that was put forth by the
counsel for the petitioner Bank, I note that this finding was arrived at
by the Tribunal not solely based on the reason that the petitioner
Bank had not filed an appeal or revision against the award of the
Arbitration Court. The Tribunal, I note, had in detail considered the
question of entitlement of back wages both on facts and law. The
Tribunal found that the Arbitration Court had not stated any reason
for finding that the 3rd respondent is not entitled to get back wages.
After finding that the petitioner Bank had not proved the allegations
against the 3rd respondent, the Arbitration Court without any reasons
found that the 3rd respondent had not performed his duties befitting
the manner as a Branch Manager of the petitioner Bank. It is on the
said basis that the Arbitration Court had concluded that the 3rd
respondent is not entitled to back wages. This according to the
Tribunal is erroneous and devoid of just reason. The Tribunal held
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that the Arbitration Court had not answered the question of 3rd
respondent's entitlement to back wages in accordance with law. The
conclusion arrived at by the Arbitration Court was termed by the
Tribunal as 'an observation made without any justifiable reason'.
Thus the Tribunal concluded that the direction of the Arbitration
Court to the petitioner Bank to decide the issue of back wages was
incorrect and unsustainable. It was also concluded that the
Arbitration Court ought not have given such a direction to the
petitioner Bank after finding the entire disciplinary proceedings
initiated against the 3rd respondent by the Bank to be vitiated and
after setting aside the enquiry report, order of suspension and
dismissal from service. Thus, the said finding of the Arbitration Court
was found to be legally and factually incorrect and unsustainable by
the Tribunal for valid reason. The above discussion and finding
arrived at by the Tribunal unequivocally reveals that the Tribunal had
arrived at the same after a due appreciation of all relevant aspects
and not simply because the petitioner Bank had not filed an appeal
or revision that the said decision was arrived at. It was a conclusion
arrived at by the Tribunal on merits. I note that the said finding of the
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Tribunal adheres to the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), which reads as follows:
"The very idea of restoring an employee to the
position which he held before dismissal or removal or
termination of service implies that the employee will
be put in the same position in which he would have
been but for the illegal action taken by the employer.
The injury suffered by a person who is dismissed or
removed or is otherwise terminated from service
cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With
the passing of an order which has the effect of
severing the employer-employee relationship, the
latter source of income gets dried up. Not only the
concerned employee but his entire family suffers
grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of
sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious
food and all opportunities of education and
advancement in life. At times, the family has to
borrow from the relatives and other acquaintances to
avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the
competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality
of the action taken by the employer. The
reinstatement of such an employee, which is
preceded by a finding of the competent judicial
quasi-judicial body or court that the action taken by
the employer is ultra-virus, the relevant statutory
provisions or the principles of natural justice,, ,
entitles the employee to claim full back wages,. . If
the employer wants to deny back wages to the
employee or contest his entitlement to get
consequential benefits,, , then it is for him, oblique
her, to specifically plead and prove. that during the
intervening period the employee was gainfully
employed and was getting the same emoluments.
denial of back wages to an employee who has
suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would
amount to indirectly punishing the concerned
employee and rewarding the employer by relieving
him of the obligation to pay back wages including the
emoluments."
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No other anomaly has been pointed out with respect to the judgment
dated 28.10.2014 of the Tribunal. The same cannot hence be lightly
interfered with as is trite by the precedents discussed above. The
decision of the Tribunal thus deserves to be retained undisturbed.
Consequently, I do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment
dated 28.10.2014 in Appeal No.37 of 2014 issued by the Tribunal.
10. Now I proceed to consider the contentions put forth
concerning the legal sustainability of the order in R.P.No.59 of 2014
produced as Ext.P4 and impugned in W.P.(C) No.3684 of 2015.
Admittedly there had been delay on the part of the petitioner Bank in
filing the Revision Petition. It was sought to be explained out by the
petitioner Bank as follows: The 3 rd respondent had already crossed
the age of superannuation on 06.06.2014. Hence the counsel who
had been representing the petitioner Bank before the Arbitration
Court opined that the order of the reinstatement would not adversely
affect the interests of the Bank. The receipt of the said opinion along
with the records of the case took some time and it was received by
the Bank belatedly. Thereafter, the records of the case along with
the opinion of the counsel were forwarded to the standing counsel
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and after some delay, the Bank had thus preferred the Revision
Petition No.59 of 2014 against the order dated 06.02.2014 passed
by the Arbitration Court. It is relevant to reproduce the conclusion
arrived at by the Tribunal regarding delay. It reads as follows:
"No time is prescribed for filing revision. So the
reasonable time to file revision is to be taken as 90 days
(Tajudeen Shameer v. Secretary, Coastal Urban Co
Operative Bank Ltd., 2004 (1) KLT 909). It was held in
the decision of Sarojini Amma v. Trivandrum District
Co. Ltd., 2005, 3 KLT 655, that revisional jurisdiction
ought not to be permitted to be invoked after a fairly long
period until good reasons are shown to excuse such
delay, and it ought to have been filed at least within 5
months. This revision petition was filed after the expiry of 5
months period. No good reasons shown to excuse the
delay. Therefore the delay cannot be condoned. The
Revision Petition filed is time barred. Point answered
accordingly."
Thus the Tibunal had after considering the reasons stated by the
petitioner back for condoning the delay concluded that the revision
had been filed beyond a reasonable period of time and that no good
reasons had been shown to excuse the delay.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
reliance placed by the Tribunal on the dictum in Tajudeen Shameer
(supra) and Sarojini Amma (supra) are devoid of merits. In the
former, this Court had held that a revision petition under Section 84
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of the Act has to be filed within a reasonable period, (say 90 days)
and that if the revision petition was filed beyond the reasonable
period, the petitioner was required to explain the reasons for the
delay. In the latter, this Court had held that revisional jurisdiction
ought not to be permitted to be invoked after expiry of a fairly long
period until good reasons are shown to excuse such delay.
According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the said
precedents are not applicable to the facts of the cases at hand. He
contends that the finding therein that the revision must be exercised
at least within a period of five months is not conclusive. Nowhere
had it been prescribed that the revision petition filed beyond the
period of 150 days was mandatorily to be dismissed without looking
into the reasons advanced for the delay. Thus it is argued that the
Tribunal erred in dismissing the revision petition filed by the
petitioner alleging delay. This contention is sought to be buttressed
by placing reliance on the dictum in North Eastern Chemical
Industries, (P) Ltd. (supra), wherein it has been held that when no
limitation stands prescribed, it would be inappropriate for a court to
supplant the legislature's wisdom by its own and provide a limitation,
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more so in accordance with what it believed to be the appropriate
period. A court should in such a situation consider in the facts and
circumstances of the case at hand the conduct of the parties, the
nature of the proceedings, the length of the delay, the possibility of
prejudice being caused and the scheme of the statute in question.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court had also underscored that when a party
to a dispute raises a plea of delay despite no specific period being
prescribed in the statute such party also bears the burden of
demonstrating how the delay in itself would cause the party
additional prejudice or loss as opposed to the subject matter of
dispute being raised at an earlier point in time. It was also held
therein that in the absence of any particular period of time being
prescribed to file an appeal the same would be governed by the
principle of reasonable time for which by virtue of its very nature no
strait-jacket formula can be laid down and it is to be determined as
per the facts and circumstances of each case. In the said case, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, after taking note of the sequence of events,
held that the appellants cannot be said to have transgressed the
boundaries of reasonable time in filing the appeal before the
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concerned court.
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has in North Eastern
Chemical Industries, (P) Ltd. (supra) held that in the absence of
any particular period of time being prescribed to file an appeal the
same would be governed by the principle of reasonable time which
has to be determined based on a case to case basis. This Court had
in Tajudeen Shameer (supra) and Sarojini Amma (supra) laid
down broad guidelines as to what could be deemed as reasonable
regarding condonation of delay in the filing of a revision petition
under Section 84 of the Act. When this Court thus specifies the time
period taking note of the absence of statutory prescription in the said
respect, the same has to be scrupulously complied with and
followed after due consideration of the facts and circumstances of
the case. Nothing has been produced so as to reveal that the
petitioner bank had any valid or legally tenable cause for seeking
condonation of the delay that had occasioned in filing the revision
petition, which admittedly was beyond the period of five months. The
purported reason stated for condonation of delay had been duly
considered by the Tribunal and found not valid enough to meet the
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mandates of law governing condonation. Apparently no substantial
cause has been made out for condonation of the delay occasioned
and the revision petition was dismissed by the Tribunal as time
barred. I find no reason to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal
in this respect. It follows that the conclusion arrived at by the
Tribunal to dismiss the Revision Petitioner filed by petitioner bank
was valid and proper and there is no reason to interfere with the
order dated 13.11.2014 in Revision Petition No. 59/2014 rendered
by the Tribunal.
13. It is also relevant to take note of the fact that even while
the matters were pending before the Arbitration Court and the
Tribunal, the 3rd respondent had passed the age of superannuation.
This had rendered his reinstatement in the petitioner bank
impossible. The Arbitration Court as well as the Tribunal had taken
due note of this aspect while considering the question of payment of
back wages. The direction to effect payment of back wages which
ought to have followed as a natural corollary to the order of
reinstatement, did not happen. The effect of quashing the impugned
orders by issuing a writ of certiorari will reopen the entire
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proceedings to revisit its correctness. In addition to the fact that the
prayer for issuance of certiorari is not legally sustainable, in the facts
and circumstances of the case, I note that substantial justice and
equity demands that the matter be brought to a quietus now rather
than a re-ignition of the challenge regarding the correctness of an
enquiry report submitted in the year 2008. The 3 rd respondent had
been deprived of his back wages which ought to have vested in him
in 2014 along with the order of reinstatement issued by the
Arbitration Court. Bearing in mind the travails that an reinstated
employee and his family may have had to endure, as elaborated in
Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), the prayer to quash Ext.P4 order
in appeal filed by the 3rd respondent cannot be allowed on the
ground of equity and substantial justice also. The similar prayer
seeking to quash Ext.P4 order which dismissed the revision petition
also has to fail on the same ground. Eleven years of deprivation of
back wages suffered by the 3 rd respondent and his family is enough.
Thus on the grounds of equity and substantial justice too, I find that
the prayer sought for issuance of certiorari in these Writ Petitions is
not fit to be granted.
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In view of the above discussion, I find no reason to interfere
with the order dated 28.10.2014 in Appeal No.37 of 2014 and order
dated 13.11.2014 in Revision Petition No.59 of 2014 rendered by
the Kerala Co-Operative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, and
impugned in these Writ Petitions. Both Writ Petitions are dismissed.
No costs.
Sd/-
SYAM KUMAR V.M.
JUDGE
csl
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) 3684/2015
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1: TRUE COPY OF THE PLAINT IN ARC NO.55 OF
2009 FILED BEFORE THE ARBITRATION COURT
EXHIBIT P2: TRUE COPY OF THE WRITTEN STATEMENT FILED BY
THE BANK IN ARC NO.55 OF 2009
EXHIBIT P3: TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER IN ARC NO 84/2011
(OLD NO.55/2009) DATED 06.02.2014
EXHIBIT P4: TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER IN REVISION PETITION
NO.59 OF 2014 DATED 13.11.2014
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) 3655/2015
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE PLAINT IN A.R.C NO.55 OF
2009 FILED BEFORE THE ARBITRATION COURT
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE WRITTEN STATEMENT FILED BY
THE BANK IN ARC NO. 55 OF 2009
EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER IN A.R.C NO. 84/2011
(OLD NO.55/2009) DATED 6.2.2014
EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN APPEAL NO.37
OF 2014 DATED 28.10.2014
