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● The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laxman Singh v. Union of
India and others [(2021) 8 SCC 479] had taking note of the
departmental inquiry initiated against the appellant in the said
case which was for his alleged failure in preventing theft of
railway property, wherein the appellant was found guilty of
gross negligence in discharge of duties, reduced the penalty of
reduction of time scale of Rs.200/- for a period of two years
with cumulative effect terming it as unjustified and had held
that the appellant would be entitled to all retirement benefits in
accordance with the rules. The same dictum applies to the
factual situation of the petitioner's case also.
● Reliance is placed on the dictum laid down by the High Court
of Calcutta in Brahma Pandey alias B. Pandey v. Union of
India [(2006)SCC OnLine Cal703] wherein the High Court had
taken note of the dictum laid down in V.K.Khanna v. State of
Punjab [AIR 2001 SC 343] wherein it was observed that,
when the inquiry officer in his inquiry report gave a finding, but
did not disclose reasons and this constitutes bias. It is settled
position of law that when a quasi judicial authority passes an
2025:KER:33736
order it must be backed by reasons and in case the inquiry
finding is not based on reasons, such finding does not get any
leg to stand on. No valid and tenable reason had been stated
in the impugned orders and hence the same is hit by the
dictum mentioned above.
6. Contentions of the respondents in brief:
● Exts.P6, P12, and P14 are valid, rendered in accordance with
law and do not call for any interference.
● Ext.P6 Penalty Advice had been issued by the Disciplinary
Authority after carefully scrutinising the DAR proceedings.
● During the course of the inquiry, the lady employee, who was
a commercial clerk subjected to misbehaviour by the
petitioner, had been examined as PW2. She had specifically
deposed that the petitioner had on the relevant day come to
the parcel office and had misbehaved and threatened her. It
was also deposed that when another commercial clerk tried to
intervene, the petitioner had manhandled him. The lady clerk
had reported the matter to the station-master on duty and the
chief parcel supervisor. The evidence of the said witness
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remains uncontroverted.
● The punishment of compulsory retirement which was issued
on 14.01.2008 was modified by the Revisional Authority and
the petitioner had been reinstated in service by reducing the
rank from head constable to constable for a period of two
years with recurring effect. The period of modified punishment
was exhausted on 05.07.2012.
● Petition was issued with a major penalty charge sheet under
Rule 153 in which the disciplinary authority can nominate any
inspector as inquiry officer even without waiting for
delinquent's reply. The procedure adopted is in accordance
with the provisions contained in Rule 153.2 (a) of the RPF
Rules 1987 and there has been no violation of the mandates
of the Rules.
● The petitioner had in the course of the inquiry stated that he
has no objection to the person appointed as enquiry officer
viz., Sri.K.P.James in conducting the inquiry and the same had
been duly recorded. He had also expressed satisfaction over
the inquiry and hence the allegation that the inquiry was
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conducted in a most arbitrary and illegal manner and that the
enquiry officer is biased are incorrect, unfounded and
baseless.
● The inquiry officer had conducted the inquiry in compliance
with all the procedural requirements and natural justice
principles. The charges against the petitioner were found
proved. The Disciplinary Authority had, after complying with
the due formalities, agreed with the findings of the inquiry
officer and awarded the penalty of compulsory retirement,
which was subsequently modified to one of very less rigour.
There is no basis, cause or legally sustainable reason to
challenge the same.
● The appeal as well as the revision preferred by the petitioner
had been rejected after a detailed and meaningful
consideration, and the petitioner had been paid his due
pensionary benefits. The Writ Petition that has been filed after
this huge delay is only a chance litigation initiated by the
petitioner without any bona fides.
● The revisional authority had viewed the case of the petitioner
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sympathetically and had reinstated the petitioner in service
modifying the penalty of compulsory retirement to reversion
from Head constable to constable, i.e., from grade pay of
Rs.2,800/- to Rs.2,000/- for a period of two years recurring
and the period spent out of service was treated as dies-non.
The revisional authority had thus taken into account all the
aspects of the case and it is thereafter that the penalty had
been modified. The petitioner cannot have any legally
sustainable grievance after the same.
● During the entire service the petitioner in force was punished
seven times which included Censure (five times), reduction of
pay (one time), withholding of annual increment (one time). He
was also punished for misbehaving with the superior officers in
an intoxicated condition on 07.03.1993. Petitioner had on
09.06.1997, abused the Sub Inspector/RPF/Trichur by using
vulgar words and also challenged the sub-inspector when
refused to give him a sick memo.
● There cannot be a re-appreciation of the evidence tendered
before the inquiry officer and this is not the appellate authority
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in disciplinary proceedings. Reliance is placed on the dictum
laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. P
Gunasekaran [AIR 2015 SC 545]
● The contention that the charge sheet was vague insofar as the
obscene language as used by the petitioner had not been
elaborated therein is devoid of merits and unsustainable. The
qualifying words 'obscene', 'vulgar', 'unparliamentary' etc.
which are used preceding the word language are all used to
denote unrefined and indecent language which was used by
the petitioner against the women employee.
● Petitioner had not raised any contention regarding vagueness
of charge regarding obscene language in the course of the
inquiry. He cannot thus raise the same for the first time in the
Writ Petition.
● The deposition of the lady employee with whom the petitioner
had misbehaved has not been assailed. She had very
categorically and unequivocally deposed in the inquiry that the
petitioner had misbehaved with her. The totality of the
evidence adduced in the inquiry was sufficient to hold the
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petitioner guilty and there is no reason to interfere with the
penalty imposed on the petitioner.
● The penalty imposed is not open for review by the High Court
under Article 226. Reliance is placed on the dictum laid down
by the Supreme Court in B.C.Chaturvedi and others v.
Union of India, [AIR 1996 SC 484]. The disciplinary authority
and on appeal the appellate authority being fact-finding
authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with
a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with their
discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view
the magnitude and gravity of the misconduct. The High Court
while exercising the power of judicial review cannot normally
substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some
other penalty.
● If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the
appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court, it
could appropriately mould the relief either directing the
disciplinary public appellate authority to reconsider the penalty
imposed or to shorten the litigation itself in exceptional and
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rare cases impose appropriate punishment with cogent
reasons in support thereof.
● The contention of the petitioner that double jeopardy is
attracted is not maintainable since, all that was done was to
take note of the past conduct of the delinquent employee
which relevance and bearing to the enquiry. Reliance is placed
on the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme court in
Central Industrial Security Force and others v. Abrar Ali
[(2017) 4 SCC 507] wherein it was held that double jeopardy
will not be attributed when the desirability of continuance of
the respondent was considered on the basis of his past
contact.
● The Hon'ble Supreme Court had in Union of India v.
Bishamber Das Dogra [(2009) 13 SCC 102] considered the
question whether the past conduct of the delinquent employee
could be taken into consideration for the purpose of deciding
the punishment. After a survey of the precedents on the point,
it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it is desirable
that the delinquent employee may be informed by the
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disciplinary authority that his past conduct would be taken into
consideration while imposing the punishment. But in case of
misconduct of grave nature or indiscipline, even in absence of
statutory rules, the authority may take into consideration the
indisputable past conduct/ service record of the employee for
adding weight to the decision of imposing punishment if facts
of the case so require. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had also
termed as settled, legal proposition that habitual absenteeism
constitutes gross violation of all discipline.
● The contention of the petitioner that the evidence was not
properly appreciated by the inquiry officer and that the
deposition of the evidence tendered by the witness from the
side of the petitioner was not properly appreciated is
unsustainable. DW1 and DW2 examined from the side of the
petitioner are none other than the Mother in law and wife of
the petitioner. Nevertheless, their deposition had been duly
considered and was given due credit that it was worthy of.
● The contention that the name of the witness PW3 was
included without notice and not listed in the charge memo is
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not correct. In the charge memo, it has been clearly mentioned
in the list of witnesses, serial number 4, that any other witness
as desired by the EEO could be examined, provided the
person could positively contribute to the proceedings. The
same was done in accordance with the provisions contained in
Rule 153.17. The petitioner had not raised any objection to the
inclusion and examination of PW3 during the course of the
inquiry.
● Having participated in the inquiry, including the inclusion and
examination of PW3 without any demur, the petitioner is not
entitled to challenge the same. The said contention put forth is
hit by estoppel and acquiescence as the same had not been
raised by the petitioner in the written submission given to the
inquiry officer or in the defense statement submitted before the
disciplinary authority.
● It is settled that in an inquiry, strict and sophisticated rules of
evidence under the Indian Evidence Act do not apply.
Reliance is placed on the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Dilip Paul
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[2023 SCC OnLine SC 1423] that it is open to the adjudicating
authority to accept, rely and evaluate any evidence having
probative value and come to its own conclusion, keeping in
mind judicial approach and objectivity, exclusion of extraneous
material and observance of the rules of natural justice and fair
play.
● The strict and technical rules of evidence and procedure does
not apply to departmental inquiry, the connotation 'evidence'
cannot be understood in a narrow technical sense as to
include only that evidence adduced in a regular court of law
when a person is examined as a witness by administering
oath. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dilip
Paul's case (supra) that there should not be any allergy to
hearsay evidence provided it has a reasonable nexus and
credibility.
● Petitioner was a member of a disciplined police force and was
governed by the rules in force. Rule 146.1 stipulates that all
members of the Force irrespective of their ranks shall submit
themselves to the requirement of code of behaviour prescribed
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both on duty and off duty. Petitioner's complicity has been
proved in the course of the inquiry and he has been charged
for discreditable conduct, acting in a manner prejudicial to the
discipline and conducting himself in a manner which brought
discredit to the reputation of the force and also for repeated
minor misconducts. Both charges levelled against the
petitioner were proved convincingly and beyond doubt. The
penalty was imposed for the charges alleged and proved
against the petitioner. The disciplinary, appellate and judicial
authorities have duly considered the contentions raised by the
petitioner against the inquiry report. This Writ Petition filed
long thereafter is hence devoid of any merits and is only to be
dismissed.
Discussion and Analysis:
7. The scope of interference by a High Court in exercise of
jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary proceedings is no longer res
integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan and
others v. Heem Singh [(2021) 12 SCC 569] summed up the law in
the following words:
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"In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there
are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of
restraint. The second defines when interference is
permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of
judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination
of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily
within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge
does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority.
Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer.
Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is
a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is
responsible for the efficient conduct of their service.
Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural
justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of
evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard
of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a
criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil
standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities.
Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying
approaches based on context and subject. The first end of
the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy -
deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a
fact finding authority and autonomy of the employer in
maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the
other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has
the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry
are based on no evidence or when they suffer from
perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident
of what the law regards as a perverse determination of
fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our
jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognized it for
long years in allowing for the authority of the court to
interfere when the finding or the penalty are
disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or
misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail
between the banks of these two shores which have been
termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not
rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when
they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the
finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence
an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is
to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some
evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard
against perversity. But this does not allow the court to re-
appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or
to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more
appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which
has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the
exercise of robust common sense without which the
judges' craft is in vain." (Emphasis added)
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8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has in Director General
of Police, Railway Protection Force (supra), has also laid down
the aspects that would open for the High Court to look into as
follows:
"(a) The inquiry is held by the competent authority;
(b) The inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf;
(c) There is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting
the proceedings;
(d) The authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair
conclusion by some considerations which are extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant and extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at
such conclusions
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the
admissible and material evidence;
(h) The disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) The finding of fact is based on no evidence."
Thus it is trite and settled that in exercise of its powers under Article
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court shall not venture
into re-appreciation of the evidence. Having thus reminded myself of
the scope and extent of jurisdiction, I now proceed to consider the
contentions put forth by the parties.
9. The primary objection put forth by the petitioner is that
Ext.P1 charge sheet is 'vague' and 'imprecise' since the term
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'obscene language' used therein had not been explained or clarified
enough, so as to enable the petitioner to defend the same
effectively. It is relevant to note that such an objection had not been
raised by him hereto before at any stage of the proceedings and is
being raised for the first time in this Writ Petition. I note that the
charge sheet had very specifically and clearly elaborated on the
charge by stating as the first charge the incident of petitioner
misbehaving with the lady Commercial Clerk, Parcel Office, Thrissur
on 12.04.2007 whose name had been specified in the Charge sheet.
Thereafter, the charge sheet was further proceeded to explain in the
statement of imputation part, the specifics of the incident by
mentioning that the petitioner who was under sick list had on
12.04.2007 come to the parcel office at Thrissur at about 23:30
hours without any valid reason and had unnecessarily interfered with
the duties of the lady commercial clerk deputed to perform the
outward parcel office and had misbehaved with her using obscene
language. With so much of details specifically provided and
explained in the charge sheet, the petitioner cannot now take up the
contention that the word obscene language had not been explained
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in the chart sheet and hence the charge sheet in its entirety is
'vague' thereby disabling the petitioner from effectively contesting/
challenging the same. In the course of the inquiry, the lady
employee who was examined as PW2 had specifically deposed that
the petitioner had on the relevant day come to the parcel office and
had misbehaved and threatened her. It was also deposed that, when
another commercial clerk who tried to intervene was manhandled by
the petitioner. The lady clerk had also reported the matter to the
station-master on duty and the chief parcel supervisor. The
petitioner who has not been able to controvert the evidence of the
said witness cannot be now heard to content that the charge sheet
was vague and imprecise.
10. The reliance placed on the dictionary meaning and
definition of the terms 'misbehave' and 'obscene' and the attempt to
explain that the same could have meanings of various hues and
colors thus leading to a confusion and vagueness as what was
intended in the context in which those words were used in the
charge sheet does not assist the case of the petitioner since such
such nuances in semantics have no place in construing the validity
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of disciplinary proceedings. In this context, I find merit in the reliance
placed in this respect by the respondents on the dictum in Dilip
Paul's case (supra) that the connotation 'evidence' cannot be
understood in a narrow technical sense as to include only that
evidence adduced in a regular court of law and the kind of
elaborateness and precision in such regular court proceedings need
not be insisted on in disciplinary proceedings.
11. Petitioner has alleged bias and prejudice as against
the enquiry officer on account of previous enmity and have
contended that the same vitiated the proceedings. Though it is
alleged that the enquiry officer had earlier made a false complaint
against the petitioner in the year 1997, alleging that the petitioner
had misbehaved with him and based on the complaint the petitioner
had been punished at that point of time, and thus the enquiry officer
was a biased judge and ought not have sat as an inquiry officer,
none of these contentions have apparently been raised by the
petitioner at any stage of the proceedings, either before the enquiry
officer nor before the appellate and revisional authorities. Nothing to
the said effect has been produced before me. On the other hand, it
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is the specific case of the respondents that the petitioner had, in
writing, expressed his satisfaction with the manner in which the
inquiry proceedings had been conducted and no objection or
reservation whatsoever had been raised by the petitioner in the said
respect hereto before. Hence I find no merit in the contention that
the enquiry officer was biased or prejudiced against the petitioner.
12. The next contention of the petitioner, is that the
person examined as PW3 was included by the enquiry officer
without notice to the petitioner and such a witness was not listed in
the charge memo. Thus according to the petitioner irrelevant
considerations and extraneous considerations had crept in and this
aspect was overlooked by the Appellate authority and the revisional
authority. However, the contention of the enquiry officer having
illegally relied on the deposition of PW3 is also devoid of
sustainability. It is settled as laid down in Dilip Paul's case (supra)
that it is open to the adjudicating authority to accept, rely and
evaluate any evidence having probative value and come to its own
conclusion, the rules of natural justice and fair play are observed. I
find merit in the contention put forth by the respondent that in the
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charge memo, it had been clearly mentioned in the list of witnesses,
serial number 4, that any other witness as desired by the enquiry
officer could be examined, provided the person could positively
contribute to the proceedings. The same was done in accordance
with the provisions contained in Rule 153.17. The petitioner had not
raised any objection to the inclusion and examination of PW3 during
the course of the inquiry. Having participated in the inquiry, and in
the examination of PW3 without any demur, the petitioner cannot be
heard to challenge the same upon realising that the final decision is
not in his favour. Thus the allegation that extraneous contentions
weighed with the enquiry officer is devoid of merits.
13. Clubbing of Charge 1 and Charge 2 which are alleged
to be totally unrelated is the next serious objection raised by the
petitioner. While Charge No.1 concerned the misbehaviour of the
petitioner with a female commercial clerk using obscene language,
Charge No.2 was a list of penalties, mostly for unauthorised
absence, much of which had ended in a penalty of censure spread
over a period of 17 years of the petitioner's service. Hence it is
contended that Charge No. 2 cannot be termed as misconduct at all.
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Imposition of penalty based on the findings of Charge No.2 by the
disciplinary authority for an offence totally unrelated to the Charge
No.1 is termed as not in conformity with law and hence
unsustainable. On this point, in Ext.P6 it has been very specifically
stated that both the charges are independent and mutually exclusive
and that there is no hard and fast rule suggesting that all the
charges in a charge sheet should be interconnected. I find merit in
the explanation and further note that no prejudice whatsoever had
been caused to the petitioner on the said count.
14. The 'Principle of test of prejudice in Service
jurisprudence' referred to by the Supreme Court in Dilip Paul's case
(supra) affirmatively relying on the dictum laid down in State Bank
of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364] has held
that the test is to ascertain whether the violation of any procedure or
process resulted in a prejudice being caused or resulted in a loss of
fair hearing. The only question is whether any prejudice can be
stated to have been caused to the petitioner due the manner in
which the proceedings leading to Exts.P6, P12 and P14 were
conducted by the respondents. I have considered the question
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whether any serious prejudice has been caused to the petitioner due
the manner in which the disciplinary proceedings were undertaken
and the appellate and revisional orders were passed. It is not in
dispute that the petitioner was provided with the copies of the
proceedings and it is also not in dispute that the petitioner was
aware of the nature of the allegations leveled against him. It is also
not in dispute that ample opportunity was given to the petitioner to
meet the allegations levelled. It cannot be terms on the facts and
circumstances as revealed by records that the petitioner was taken
by surprise. It is also relevant to note that in Ext.P14 order issued by
the 2nd respondent dismissing the revision filed by the petitioner it
has been clearly stated that though the revisional authority fully
agreed with the orders of the appellate authority imposing
punishment, taking note of the fact that the petitioner had pleaded
for mercy, explaining his family circumstances, education of his two
daughters and financial crisis faced by him and his family due to his
employment etc., leniency was shown. Taking note of the fact that
the petitioner has about 13 years of service and the predicament of
his family, his case was sympathetically viewed by the revisional
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and he was given an opportunity to rectify himself by modifying the
punishment of compulsory retirement and reinstating him in service
by reducing his rank.
15. It is also relevant to note here that respondents have
stated that before the filing of this Writ Petition, the petitioner had
submitted a mercy appeal seeking to reduce the punishment
imposed by him, and had thereafter again submitted another mercy
appeal to the Director General RPF New Delhi, seeking again to
reduce the punishment. The said facts, which could probably have
been the reason for the delay in filing the Writ Petition, which was
done only after acquiescing to the Ext.P14 order was not revealed in
the Writ Petition. It is also submitted that the petitioner had opted for
VRS and thus himself opted out from service subsequent to his
reinstatement per Ext.P14.
16. As discussed above, no case has thus been made out
by the petitioner to quash Exts.P6, P12 and P14 by issuance of a
writ of certiorari. Petitioner is also not entitled to any other relief
sought in the Writ Petition. I find that the proceedings against the
petitioner had been conducted by the respondents in accordance
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with law and the decision thus arrived at is valid and legally
sustainable. The Writ Petition thus has to fail.
Conclusion
17. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any
reason to interfere with Exts.P6, P12 and P14 orders.
This Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.
Sd/-
SYAM KUMAR V.M.
JUDGE
csl
2025:KER:33736
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 14767/2014
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS
EXT.P1 A TRUE COPY OF MAJOR PENALTY MEMORANDUM OF
CHARGES BEARING NO.VXP/227/153/02/07 DATED
07-06-2007, ISSUED BY THE 5TH RESPONDENT.
EXT.P2 A TRUE COPY OF PROCEEDING OF DAR ENQUIRY
CONDUCTED ON DIFFERENT DATES.
EXT.P3 A TRUE COPY OF DETAILED BRIEF ADDRESSED TO
THE INQUIRY OFFICER AND THE INSPECTOR OF
PROTECTION FORCE, ERNAKULAM.
EXT.P4 A TRUE COPY OF LETTER BEARING NO.
VXP/227/153/02/07 DATED 18-12-2007 ISSUED BY
THE 4TH RESPONDENT.
EXT.P5 A TRUE COPY OF OBJECTIONS DATED 01-01-2008,
SUBMITTED TO THE 4TH RESPODNENT.
EXT.P6 A TRUE COPY OF PENALTY ADVICE BEARING NO.
VXP/227/153/01/06 DATED 14-01-2008, ISSUED
BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT.
EXT.P7 A TRUE COPY OF DETAILED APPEAL SUBMITTED
BEFORE THE 3RD RESPONDENT DEPUTY CHIEF
SECURITY COMMISSIONER.
EXT.P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE PROCEEDINGS NO. NIL DATED
26-03-2008, ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT.
EXT.P9 A TRUE COPY OF DETAILED REVISION PETITION
DATED 17 DEC 2008, ADDRESSED TO THE 2ND
RESPONDENT.
EXT.P10 A TRUE COPY OF JUDGMENT IN WPC NO.
35268/2008 DATED 18 JUN 2009 RENDERED BY
THIS HON'BLE COURT.
EXT.P11 A TRUE COPY OF SUBMISSION DATED 02-11-2009
TO THE 3RD RESPONDENT.
2025:KER:33736
EXT.P12 A TRUE COPY OF COMMUNICATION BEARING NO.
VXP/227/153/02/07 DATED 29-01-2010 ISSUED
FROM THE OFFICE OF THE 4TH RESPONDENT.
EXT.P13 A TRUE COPY OF REVISION PETITION IN THE FORM
AN AFFIDAVIT DATED 13-04-2010, SUBMITTED
ALONG WITH A COVERING LETTER ADDRESSED TO
THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXT.P14 A TRUE COPY OF THE REVISIONAL ORDER BEARING
NO.VXP/227/153/02/07 DATED 05-07-2010
COMMUNICATED BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT.
EXT.P15 A TRUE COPY OF THE DISCHARGE CERTIFICATE
ISSUED BY THE RAILWAY DOCTORS BEARING
NO.286378 DATED 13.10.2011 INDICATING THE
FACTUM OF TREATMENT FROM 31.03.2011 TO
12.10.2011.
EXT.P16 A TRUE COPY OF LETTER NO.V/MD.84/I/UF DATED
13.10.2011 ISSUED BY THE CHIEF MEDICAL
SUPERINTENDENT/SOUTHERN RAILWAY,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
EXT.P17 TRUE COPY OF RULE 1343 OF THE INDIAN RAILWAY
ESTABLISHMENT CODE VOL.II, 2005 EDITION
EXT.P15 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 3.9.2010 OF
SR.DIVISIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER, SOUTHERN
RAILWAY, THRISSUR ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN,
THRISSUR HEART HOSPITAL
EXT.P16 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 13.10.2011
ISSUED BY THE CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER/TVC OF
DIVISIONAL OFFICE, MEDICAL BRANCH OF
SOUTHERN RAILWAY TO THE PETITIONER
EXT.P17 TRUE COPY OF THE MERCY APPEAL DATED
17.12.2011 FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE
THE 2ND RESPONDENT
EXT.P18 True copy of the letter dated 23-1-2012 of
the Divisional Security Commissioner, RPF
Trivandrum addressed to the petitioner.
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EXT.P19 True copy of the letter dated 21-3-2014
issued by the Assistant Security
Commissioner, RPF to the petitioner.
EXT.P20 True copy of the intimation dated 8-7-2014
issued by the Assistant Security
Commissioner, RPF, Trivandrum to all IPF and
TVC division
EXT.P21 True copy of the letter dated 18-7-2017
submitted by the petitioner to the
Divisional Security Commissioner, RPF,
Trivandrum.
EXT.P22 True copy of the letter dated 25-7-2017
issued by the Divisional Security
Commissioner, RPF, Trivandrum to the
petitioner.
EXT.P23 True copy of the representation dated 19-7-
2023 submitted by the petitioner before the
Director General of RPF.
