Kerala High Court
M/S.Ajr Global Exports vs The Executive Officer on 11 March, 2025
Author: Anil K. Narendran
Bench: Anil K. Narendran
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE MURALEE KRISHNA S.
TUESDAY, THE 11TH DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 20TH PHALGUNA, 1946
WP(C) NO. 6820 OF 2025
PETITIONER:
M/S.AJR GLOBAL EXPORTS
PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION CENTRE 3/297 PERATHUMUKKU
JUNCTION KANDALLOOR, ALAPPUZHA , KERALA
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR JAYESH DEVARAJAN,
PIN - 690531
BY ADVS.
ADITYA UNNIKRISHNAN
NIVEDITA A.KAMATH
BINISHA BABY
HARIKRISHNAN K.U.
ARAVIND RAJAGOPALAN MENON
ANIL D. NAIR (SR.)
RESPONDENTS:
1 THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD, SABARIMALA ,
PATHANAMTHITTA KERALA, PIN - 689713
2 DEVASWOM ACCOUNTS OFFICER
TRANVANCORE DEVASWOM , NATHANCODE,
THIRUVANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695003
3 DEVASWOM COMMISSIONER
DEVASWOM HEAD QUARTERS, NANDANCODE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695003
W.P.(C)No.6820 of 2025 2
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4 TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY ,
DEVASWOM HEAD QUARTERS, NANDANCODE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695003
*5 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE SPECIAL SECRETARY TO
GOVERNMENT
REVENUE (DEVASWOM) DEPARTMENT,
GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THRIUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001
**6 THE SENIOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
KERALA STATE AUDIT DEPARTMENT,
TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD AUDIT,
NANTHANCODE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 003
(*ADDL.R5 & R6 ARE SUO MOTU IMPLEADED VIDE ORDER
DATED 11.03.2025)
OTHER PRESENT:
SRI. S. RAJMOHAN, SR. GP;
SRI. G. BIJU, SC, TDB
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
ON 11.03.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
W.P.(C)No.6820 of 2025 3
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JUDGMENT
Anil K. Narendran, J.
The petitioner, who was a successful bidder for the Kuthaka
right of sale of coconuts in Sabarimala Devaswom for the year
1199 ME, for the period from 11.11.2023 to 31.10.2024 covered
by an tender notification issued by the 1st respondent Executive
Officer, Sabarimala, subject to the terms and conditions stipulated
in Ext.P1, has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding
the respondents to dispose of Ext.P4 representation dated
04.11.2024 and Ext.P5 representation dated 31.01.2025, as
expeditiously as possible.
2. Going by the averments in the writ petition, in terms
of the terms and conditions contained in Ext.P1, the petitioner,
who was the successful bidder for the Kuthaka right of sale of
coconuts in Sabarimala Devaswom for the year 1199 ME, for the
period from 11.11.2023 to 31.10.2024 paid the Earnest Money
Deposit (EMD) and security deposit. He has also paid the bid
amount fully. On completion of the period of contract, the
petitioner made an application for refund of EMD and security
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deposit, vide Exts.P4 and P5 representations. However, there is
no response from the 4th respondent Travancore Devaswom
Board.
3. On 20.02.2025, when this writ petition came up for
admission, the learned Standing Counsel for Travancore
Devaswom Board sought time to get instructions.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the
learned Standing Counsel for Travancore Devaswom Board for
respondents 1 to 4 and also the learned Senior Government
Pleader for additional respondents 5 and 6.
5. The learned Standing Counsel for Travancore
Devaswom Board, on instructions from the 3rd respondent
Devaswom Commissioner, would submit that the petitioner is yet
to remit a sum of Rs.7,91,939/- towards GST.
6. The issue that requires consideration in this writ
petition is as to whether the petitioner can invoke the writ
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the constitution of
India to enforce the terms of the contract entered into with the
Travancore Devaswom Board, in respect of the Kuthaka right
covered by the e-tender notification issued by the Executive
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Officer, Sabarimala, subject to the terms and conditions contained
in Ext.P1 notification.
7. In State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals
Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 216] the Apex Court reiterated that a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the
proper procedure for adjudicating disputes relating to the
enforcement of contractual obligations. Under the law, it was open
to the respondent to approach the court of competent jurisdiction
for appropriate relief for breach of contract. It is settled law that
when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the
litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not
invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the
existence of an alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction
of the court to issue a writ, but ordinarily, that would be a good
ground for refusing to exercise the discretion under Article 226. It
is true that many matters could be decided after referring to the
contentions raised in the affidavits and counter-affidavits, but that
would hardly be a ground for the exercise of extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of an
alleged breach of contract. Whether the alleged non-supply of
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road permits by the appellants would justify a breach of contract
by the respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is
not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Such
seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with
regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and
determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the
parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather than by a court
exercising the prerogative of issuing writs.
8. In National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga
Enterprises [(2003) 7 SCC 410] the Apex Court was dealing
with a case in which the respondent had filed a writ petition before
the High Court for refund of the amount. The High Court posed
two questions, namely, (a) whether the forfeiture of the security
deposit is without the authority of law and without any binding
contract between the parties and also contrary to Section 5 of the
Contract Act; and (b) whether the writ petition is maintainable in
a claim arising out of breach of contract. While dealing with the
said issue the Apex Court opined that it is settled law that disputes
relating to contracts cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. It has been so held in Kerala State
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Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Kalathil [(2000) 6 SCC 293],
State of U.P. v. Bridge and Roof Company (India) Ltd.
[(1996) 6 SCC 22] and Bareilly Development Authority v.
Ajai Pal Singh [(1989) 2 SCC 116]. This is settled law. The
dispute in the case before the Apex Court was regarding the terms
of an offer. They were thus contractual disputes in respect of
which a writ court was not the proper forum. The Senior Counsel
for the respondent relied upon the decisions in Verigamto
Naveen v. State of A.P. [(2001) 8 SCC 344] and Harminder
Singh Arora v. Union of India [(1986) 3 SCC 247]. The Apex
Court noticed that those are cases where the writ court was
enforcing a statutory right or duty. These cases do not lay down
that a writ court can interfere in a matter of contract only. Thus,
on the ground of maintainability, the writ petition should have
been dismissed.
9. In Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee,
Bhatinda [(1969) 3 SCC 769] the Apex Court opined that the
High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India merely because in
considering the petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may
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fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226, the High
Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. It is true
that exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary, but the discretion
must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition
raises questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their
determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that
account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not
appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may
decline to try a petition. Rejection of a petition in limine will
normally be justified, where the High Court is of the view that the
petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made
dispute sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the
party against whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or that
the dispute raised thereby is such that it would be inappropriate
to try it in the writ jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons.
10. In ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit
Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 553] the
Apex Court, after referring to various judgments as well as the
pronouncement in Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee,
Bhatinda [(1969) 3 SCC 769] and Century Spinning and
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Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal
Council [(1970) 1 SCC 582], held that, merely because one of
the parties to the litigation raises a dispute in regard to the facts
of the case, the Court entertaining such a petition under Article
226 of the Constitution is not always bound to relegate the parties
to a suit. In Gunwant Kaur [(1969) 3 SCC 769] the Court even
went to the extent of holding that in a writ petition, if the facts
require, even oral evidence can be taken. This clearly shows that
in an appropriate case, the writ court has the jurisdiction to
entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions of fact and
there is no absolute bar for entertaining a writ petition even if the
same arises out of a contractual obligation and/or involves some
disputed questions of fact.
11. In ABL International Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 553] the
Apex Court laid down the following legal principles;
(a) in an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a
State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of
a contractual obligation is maintainable.
(b) merely because some disputed questions of fact
arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to
refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a
matter of rule.
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(c) a writ petition involving a consequential relief of
monetary claim is also maintainable.
While laying down the principle, the Apex Court sounded a word
of caution as under in paragraph 28, which reads thus;
"28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the
maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the Court should bear in mind the fact
that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226
of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by
any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court
having regard to the facts of the case, has the discretion to
entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has
imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of
this power. See: Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade
Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1]. And this plenary right of the
High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be
exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available
remedies unless such action of the State or its
instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to
violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other
valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it
necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction."
12. In State of Kerala v. M.K. Jose [(2015) 9 SCC
433] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the
respondent had earlier challenged the order of termination of the
contract before the High Court by filing in W.P. (C)No.22541 of
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2013. That writ petition ended in dismissal. He filed W.A.No. 1912
of 2013. The Division Bench, by the judgment dated 24.02.2014,
allowed that writ appeal. The Division Bench, on the basis of the
report of the Advocate Commission, came to the conclusion that
the order of termination was founded on erroneous facts,
inasmuch as the competent authority had opined that more than
50% of the work remained to be done. The Division Bench opined
that, as there was a factual defect, which was evident from the
report of the Advocate Commission, the order of termination of
the contract is liable to be quashed. After quashing the said order,
the Division Bench directed the Superintending Engineer, Public
Works Department (Roads and Bridges) to consider and dispose
of the matter afresh after affording the contractor an opportunity
of being heard. It also directed that the Commission's report and
the Engineer's report and the accounts shall be produced by the
Contractor before the competent authority, who shall take the
same into account before taking a final decision in the matter. The
State and the official respondents took up the matter before the
Apex Court. The Apex Court, after referring to the law laid down
in Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 216] and
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Ganga Enterprises [(2003) 7 SCC 410], reiterated that a writ
court should ordinarily not entertain a writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India if there is a breach of contract
involving disputed questions of fact. The High Court appointed a
Commission to collect the evidence, accepted the same without
calling for objections from the respondent, and quashed the order
of termination of the contract. The Apex Court observed that the
procedure adopted by the High Court is quite unknown to the
exercise of powers under Article 226 in a contractual matter.
13. In M.K. Jose [(2015) 9 SCC 433] the Apex Court
noticed that in ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit
Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 553] a
Two-Judge Bench after referring to various judgments as well as
the pronouncement in Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee,
Bhatinda [(1969) 3 SCC 769] and Century Spinning and
Manufacturing Company Ltd. V. Ulhasnagar Municipal
Council [(1970) 1 SCC 582] granted the relief as the facts were
absolutely clear from the documentary evidence brought which
pertain to interpretation of certain clauses of contract of
insurance. The issue that had arisen in ABL International was
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that an instrumentality of a State was placing a different
construction on the clauses of the contract of insurance and the
insured was interpreting the contract differently. The Court
thought it apt, merely because something is disputed by the
insurer, it should not enter into the realm of disputed questions of
fact. In fact, there was no disputed question of fact, but it required
interpretation of the terms of the contract of insurance. Similarly,
if the materials that come on record from which it is clearly
evincible, the writ court may exercise the power of judicial review.
14. It is well settled that, where the rights which are
sought to be agitated are purely of a private character no
mandamus can be claimed. Even if the relief is sought against the
State or its instrumentality, the precondition for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus is a public duty. In a dispute based on a purely
contractual relationship, there being no public duty element, a
writ of mandamus would not lie.
15. In Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajay Pal
Singh [(1989) 2 SCC 116] the Apex Court noticed that, even
conceding that Bareilly Development Authority has the trappings
of a State or would be comprehended in 'other authority' for the
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purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, while
determining price of the houses/flats constructed by it and the
rate of monthly instalments to be paid, the 'authority' or its agent
after entering into the field of ordinary contract acts purely in its
executive capacity. Thereafter, the relations are no longer
governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid
contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties
inter se. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon
them by the contract in the absence of any statutory obligations
on the part of Bareilly Development Authority in the said
contractual field.
16. The law laid down by the Apex Court in
Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar [(1977) 3 SCC
457], Premji Bhai Parmar v. Delhi Development Authority
[(1980) 2 SCC 129] and Divisional Forest Officer v.
Bishwanath Tea Company Ltd. [(1981) 3 SCC 238] is that,
where the contract entered into between the State and the
persons aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the
rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or
order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
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so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract
pure and simple.
17. In Bishwanath Tea Company Ltd. [(1981) 3 SCC
238] the Apex Court considered the question of maintainability
of a writ petition in respect of a claim arising out of the contractual
rights and obligations flowing from the terms of a lease. The Apex
Court held that, it is undoubtedly true that High Court can
entertain in its extraordinary jurisdiction a petition to issue any of
the prerogative writs for any other purpose. But such writ can be
issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even
in respect of a corporation there is a denial of equality before law
or equal protection of law. The Corporation can also file a writ
petition for enforcement of a right under a statute. On the facts
of the case on hand, the Apex Court noticed that Bishwanath Tea
Company Ltd., the respondent company, was merely trying to
enforce a contractual obligation. The obligation to pay royalty for
timber cut and felled and removed is prescribed by the relevant
regulations. The validity of regulations is not challenged.
Therefore, the demand for royalty is unsupported by law. What
the respondent claimed was an exception that in view of a certain
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term in the indenture of lease, i.e., clause 2, the appellant is not
entitled to demand and collect royalty from the respondent. This
is nothing but enforcement of a term of a contract of lease. Hence,
the question was whether such contractual obligation can be
enforced by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. Ordinarily,
where a breach of contract is complained of, a party complaining
of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract,
if the contract is capable of being specifically performed, or the
party may sue for damages. Such a suit would ordinarily be
cognisable by the civil court. The High Court in its extraordinary
jurisdiction would not entertain a petition either for specific
performance of a contract or for recovering damages. A right to
relief flowing from a contract has to be claimed in a civil court
where a suit for specific performance of a contract or for damages
could be filed.
18. The legal principles that can be culled out from the
decisions referred to supra are that, in a case where the contract
entered into between the State and the person aggrieved is of a
non-statutory character and the relationship is governed purely in
terms of a contract between the parties, the contractual
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obligations are matters of private law and a writ would not lie to
enforce a civil liability arising purely out of a contract. The proper
remedy in such cases would be to file a civil suit for claiming
damages, injunctions or specific performance or such appropriate
reliefs in a competent civil court. Pure contractual obligation in the
absence of any statutory complexion would not be enforceable
through a writ.
19. In Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union
of India [(2015) 7 SCC 728] the Apex Court held that there is
no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in
contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact
or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time,
discretion lies with the High Court which under certain
circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. In paragraph 69 of the
decision, the Apex Court summarised the circumstances in which
the Court would not normally exercise such discretion. In
paragraph 70 the Apex Court summarised different situations/
aspects relating to contracts entered into by the State/public
authority with private parties. Paragraphs 69 and 70 of the said
decision read thus;
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"69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid
principles has to be understood in the context of the
discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above.
As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the
maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual
matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or
even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time,
discretion lies with the High Court which under certain
circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that
under the following circumstances, "normally", the Court
would not exercise such a discretion:
69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action
has some public law character attached to it.
69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute
is provided in the contract, the High Court would
refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of
the Constitution and relegate the party to the said
mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of
disputes is to be resorted to through the means of
arbitration.
69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact
which are of complex nature and require oral
evidence for their determination.
69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of
contractual obligations are normally not to be
entertained except in exceptional circumstances.
70. Further, the legal position which emerges from
various judgments of this Court dealing with different
situations/aspects relating to contracts entered into by
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the State/public authority with private parties, can be
summarised as under:
70.1. At the stage of entering into a contract, the State
acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound
by the obligations of fairness.
70.2. State in its executive capacity, even in the
contractual field, is under obligation to act fairly
and cannot practise some discriminations.
70.3. Even in cases where question is of choice or
consideration of competing claims before entering
into the field of contract, facts have to be
investigated and found before the question of a
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution could
arise. If those facts are disputed and require
assessment of evidence the correctness of which
can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed
evidence, involving examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, the case could not be
conveniently or satisfactorily decided in
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved
party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit,
etc.
70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate
avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred.
70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid
contractual obligation. Occurrence of commercial
difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in
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performance of the conditions agreed to in the
contract can provide no justification in not
complying with the terms of contract which the
parties had accepted with open eyes. It cannot
ever be that a licensee can work out the licence if
he finds it profitable to do so and he can challenge
the conditions under which he agreed to take the
licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to
conduct his business.
70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained
of, the party complaining of such breach may sue
for specific performance of the contract, if contract
is capable of being specifically performed.
Otherwise, the party may sue for damages.
70.7. Writ can be issued where there is executive action
unsupported by law or even in respect of a
corporation there is denial of equality before law
or equal protection of law or if it can be shown that
action of the public authorities was without giving
any hearing and violation of principles of natural
justice after holding that action could not have
been taken without observing principles of natural
justice.
70.8. If the contract between private party and the
State/instrumentality and/or agency of the State
is under the realm of a private law and there is no
element of public law, the normal course for the
aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies
provided under ordinary civil law rather than
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approaching the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India and invoking its
extraordinary jurisdiction.
70.9. The distinction between public law and private law
element in the contract with the State is getting
blurred. However, it has not been totally
obliterated and where the matter falls purely in
private field of contract, this Court has maintained
the position that writ petition is not maintainable.
The dichotomy between public law and private law
rights and remedies would depend on the factual
matrix of each case and the distinction between
the public law remedies and private law field,
cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each
case has to be examined, on its facts whether the
contractual relations between the parties bear
insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a
particular case it is found that nature of the activity
or controversy involves public law element, then
the matter can be examined by the High Court in
writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India to see whether action of the State and/or
instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just
and equitable or that relevant factors are taken
into consideration and irrelevant factors have not
gone into the decision-making process or that the
decision is not arbitrary.
70.10. Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a
citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a
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distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider
and give due weight to it may render the decision
arbitrary, and this is how the requirements of due
consideration of a legitimate expectation forms
part of the principle of non-arbitrariness.
70.11. The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes
falling within the domain of contractual obligations
may be more limited and in doubtful cases the
parties may be relegated to adjudication of their
rights by resort to remedies provided for
adjudication of purely contractual disputes."
20. In SITCO Associates v. State of Kerala [2023 KHC
496], in the context of a contract awarded by the High Power
Committee for Implementation of Sabarimala Master Plan, a
Division Bench of this Court, in which one among us [Anil K.
Narendran, J.], was a party, held that the contract entered into
between the High Power Committee and the writ petitioner is of a
non statutory character and the relationship is governed purely in
terms of the contract between the parties, i.e., the agreement
dated 31.03.2018. In such situations, the contractual obligations
are matters of private law and a writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India would not lie to enforce a civil liability arising
purely out of that contract, since a pure contractual obligation in
the absence of any statutory complexion would not be enforceable
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through a writ. Seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the
parties with regard to breach of contract are to be investigated
and determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the
parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather than by a court
exercising the prerogative of issuing writs. In such cases, the
proper remedy of the person aggrieved would be to approach the
competent civil court seeking appropriate reliefs.
21. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions
referred to supra, the conclusion is irresistible that the petitioner
cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, seeking the aforesaid reliefs, in respect of
the contract entered into with the Travancore Devaswom Board,
in respect of the Kuthaka right covered by the e-tender
notification issued by the Executive Officer, Sabarimala, subject to
the terms and conditions contained in Ext.P1 notification.
In the result, this writ petition fails on the ground of
maintainability and the same is accordingly dismissed; however,
leaving open the rival contention on the disputes in relation to the
contract entered into with the Travancore Devaswom Board, in
respect of the Kuthaka right covered by the e-tender notification
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issued by the Executive Officer, Sabarimala.
Sd/-
ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE
Sd/-
MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE
MSA
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) 6820 OF 2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 TRUE COPY OF THE QUOTATION BEARING
REFERENCE NO. DB ROC 04/23 SAB (KUTTAKA)
DATED 07.08.2023 ALONG WITH THE GENERAL
TERMS OF CONTRACT ISSUED BY THE 1ST
RESPONDENT
Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE BID SUBMISSION
CONFIRMATION EVIDENCING THE PAYMENT
DETAILS OF EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT ALONG
WITH THE TENDER SECURITY DEPOSIT DATED
3.10.2023
Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF THE CHALLAN EVIDENCING THE
PAYMENT OF A PORTION OF THE BID AMOUNT
RELATING TO ITEM NO: 2 DATED 13.10.2023
Exhibit P3(A) TRUE COPY OF THE CHALLAN EVIDENCING THE
PAYMENT OF A PORTION OF THE BID AMOUNT
15.11.2023
Exhibit P3(B) TRUE COPY OF THE CHALLAN EVIDENCING THE
PAYMENT OF THE BALANCE PORTION OF THE
BID AMOUNT 19.12.2023
Exhibit P4 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER SUBMITTED BY THE
PETITIONER REQUESTING FOR REFUND OF THE
EMD AND SECURITY DEPOSIT BEFORE THE 2ND
RESPONDENT DATED 04.11.2024 ALONG WITH
THE ACKNOWLEDGMEN
Exhibit P5 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER SUBMITTED BY THE
PETITIONER TO THE 3RD RESPONDENT DATED
31.01.25 ALONG WITH THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Exhibit P6 TRUE COPY OF THE REGISTRATION
CERTIFICATE DATED 23.11.2022
