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Ibs Software Services Private Limited vs Union Of India
2025 Latest Caselaw 6724 Ker

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 6724 Ker
Judgement Date : 16 June, 2025

Kerala High Court

Ibs Software Services Private Limited vs Union Of India on 16 June, 2025

                                                    2025:KER:42465
W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014
                                      1


           IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                  PRESENT

                THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANU

  MONDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF JUNE 2025 / 26TH JYAISHTA, 1947

                       WP(C) NO. 9520 OF 2014

PETITIONER:


            IBS SOFTWARE SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED
            521 - 524, NILA, TECHNOPARK CAMPUS,
            TRIVANDRUM-695 581,
            REPRESENTED BY ITS COMPANY SECRETARY
            MR.RAMESH BABU.M

            BY ADVS.
            SHRI.M.GOPIKRISHNAN NAMBIAR
            SHRI.BENNY P. THOMAS (SR.)
            SHRI.K.JOHN MATHAI
            SRI RAJA KANNAN


RESPONDENTS:


     1      THE UNION OF INDIA
            REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY,
            MINISTRY OF FINANCE(DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE),
            NORTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI -110 001.

     2      THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
            THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, AAYAKAR BHAVAN,
            KOWDIAR, TRIVANDRUM - 695 003.
                                                   2025:KER:42465
W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014
                                  2


     3      JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,
            RANGE - I,
            THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, AAYAKAR BHAVAN,
            KOWDIAR, TRIVANDRUM - 695 003.

            BY ADVS.
            SHRI.JOSE JOSEPH, SC, INCOME TAX DEPARTMENT,
            KERALA
            SRI.P.G.JAYASHANKAR
            SRI.G.KEERTHIVAS

      THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY
HEARD ON 16.06.2025, ALONG WITH WP(C).9521/2014, THE
COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
                                                     2025:KER:42465
W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014
                                      3



           IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                  PRESENT

                THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANU

  MONDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF JUNE 2025 / 26TH JYAISHTA, 1947

                       WP(C) NO. 9521 OF 2014

PETITIONER:


            SUNTEC BUSINESS SOLUTIONS PRIVATE LIMITED,
            321, NILA, TECHNOPARK CAMPUS, TRIVANDRUM-695 581,
            REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER,
            MR.SURESH RAO V.R.


            BY ADVS.
            SHRI.M.GOPIKRISHNAN NAMBIAR
            SHRI.BENNY P. THOMAS (SR.)
            SHRI.K.JOHN MATHAI
            SHRI.RAJA KANNAN
RESPONDENTS:


     1      THE UNION OF INDIA
            REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY,
            MINISTRY OF FINANCE (DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE),
            NORTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI - 110 001.

     2      THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
            THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, AAYAKAR BHAVAN,
            KOWDIAR, TRIVANDRUM - 695 003.
                                                  2025:KER:42465
W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014
                                  4


     3      ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,
            RANGE-1, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, AAYAKAR BHAVAN,
            KOWDIAR, TRIVANDRUM - 695 003.

     4      JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
            RANGE-1, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, AAYAKAR BHAVAN,
            KOWDIAR, TRIVANDRUM - 695 003.

            BY ADVS.
            SRI.P.K.R.MENON,SENIOR COUNSEL, GOI(TAXES)
            SRI.P.G.JAYASHANKAR
            SHRI.JOSE JOSEPH, SC, INCOME TAX DEPARTMENT,
            KERALA
            SRI.G.KEERTHIVAS

     THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY
HEARD ON 16.06.2025, ALONG WITH WP(C).9520/2014, THE
COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
                                                           2025:KER:42465
W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014
                                     5


                                                                       [CR]
                              S.MANU, J.
            --------------------------------------------------
                   W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014
             -------------------------------------------------
                 Dated this the 16th day of June, 2025

                              JUDGMENT

In these writ petitions assessment orders issued by the

competent authority of the Income Tax Department are under

challenge mainly on the ground that they were issued beyond

the time limit under sub-section (13) of Section 144C of the Act.

2. Section 144C of the Income Tax Act is extracted

hereunder:-

"144C. (1) The Assessing Officer shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, in the first instance, forward a draft of the proposed order of assessment (hereafter in this section referred to as the draft order) to the eligible assessee if he proposes to make, on or after the 1st day of October, 2009, any variation which is prejudicial to the interest of such assessee.

2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

(2) On receipt of the draft order, the eligible assessee shall, within thirty days of the receipt by him of the draft order,-

(a) file his acceptance of the variations to the Assessing Officer; or

(b) file his objections, if any, to such variation with,-

(i) the Dispute Resolution Panel; and

(ii) the Assessing Officer.

(3) The Assessing Officer shall complete the assessment on the basis of the draft order, if -

(a) the assessee intimates to the Assessing Officer the acceptance of the variation; or

(b) no objections are received within the period specified in sub-section (2).

(4) The Assessing Officer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in section 153 [or section 153B], pass the assessment order under sub-section (3) within one month from the end of the month in which,-

(a) the acceptance is received; or

(b) the period of filing of objections under sub- section (2) expires.

(5) The Dispute Resolution Panel shall, in a case where any objection is received under sub-section (2), issue such directions, as it thinks fit, for the guidance of the 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

Assessing Officer to enable him to complete the assessment.

(6) The Dispute Resolution Panel shall issue the directions referred to in sub-section (5), after considering the following, namely:-

(a) draft order;

(b) objections filed by the assessee;

(c) evidence furnished by the assessee;

(d) report, if any, of the Assessing Officer, Valuation Officer or Transfer Pricing Officer or any other authority;

(e) records relating to the draft order,

(f) evidence collected by, or caused to be collected by, it; and

(g) result of any enquiry made by, or caused to be made by, it.

(7) The Dispute Resolution Panel may, before issuing any directions referred to in sub-section (5),-

(a) make such further enquiry, as it thinks fit; or

(b) cause any further enquiry to be made by any income-tax authority and report the result of the same to it.

(8) The Dispute Resolution Panel may confirm, reduce or enhance the variations proposed in the draft order so, however, that it shall not set aside any proposed 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

variation or issue any direction under sub-section (5) for further enquiry and passing of the assessment order.

"[Explanation.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the power of the Dispute Resolution Panel to enhance the variation shall include and shall be deemed always to have included the power to consider any matter arising out of the assessment proceedings relating to the draft order, notwithstanding that such matter was raised or not by the eligible assessee.] (9) If the members of the Dispute Resolution Panel differ in opinion on any point, the point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the members.

(10) Every direction issued by the Dispute Resolution Panel shall be binding on the Assessing Officer. (11) No direction under sub-section (5) shall be issued unless an opportunity of being heard is given to the assessee and the Assessing Officer on such directions which are prejudicial to the interest of the assessee or the interest of the revenue, respectively. (12) No direction under sub-section (5) shall be issued after nine months from the end of the month in which the draft order is forwarded to the eligible assessee.

2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

(13) Upon receipt of the directions issued under sub- section (5), the Assessing Officer shall, in conformity with the directions, complete, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 153 [or section 153B], the assessment without providing any further opportunity of being heard to the assessee, within one month from the end of the month in which such direction is received.

(14) The Board may make rules for the purposes of the efficient functioning of the Dispute Resolution Panel and expeditious disposal of the objections filed under sub- section (2) by the eligible assessee.

"[(14A) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any assessment or reassessment order passed by the Assessing Officer with the prior approval of the "[Principal Commissioner or] Commissioner as provided in sub-section (12) of section 144BA.] "[(14B) The Central Government may make a scheme, by notification in the Official Gazette, for the purposes of issuance of directions by the dispute resolution panel, so as to impart greater efficiency, transparency and accountability by-

(a) eliminating the interface between the dispute resolution panel and the eligible assessee or any other person to the extent technologically feasible;

2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

(b) optimising utilisation of the resources through economies of scale and functional specialisation;

(c) introducing a mechanism with dynamic jurisdiction for issuance of directions by dispute resolution panel.

(14C) The Central Government may, for the purpose of giving effect to the scheme made under sub-section (14B), by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that any of the provisions of this Act shall not apply or shall apply with such exceptions, modifications and adaptations as may be specified in the notification:

Provided that no direction shall be issued after the 31 st day of March, 2024.

(14D) Every notification issued under sub-section (14B) and sub-section (14C) shall, as soon as may be after the notification is issued, be laid before each House of Parliament.] (15) For the purposes of this section,-

(a) "Dispute Resolution Panel" means a collegium comprising of three "[Principal Commissioners or] Commissioners of Income-tax constituted by the Board for this purpose;

(b) "eligible assessee" means,-

(i) any person in whose case the variation referred to in sub-section (1) arises as a consequence 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

of the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer passed under sub-section (3) of section 92CA; and

(ii) any non-resident not being a company, or any foreign company."

[Emphasis supplied]

3. Many specific time limits are stipulated under the

provisions of Section 144C. Under sub-section (2), on receipt of

draft order issued by the Assessing Officer, an eligible assessee

shall file acceptance of the variations or objections within 30

days of the receipt of the draft order. If no objections are

received within the said period, Assessing Officer can complete

the assessment on the basis of the draft order. Under sub-

section (4), time limit of one month from the end of the month

is stipulated for the Assessing Officer to complete the

assessment if acceptance was received from the assessee or the

period for filing of objections under sub-section (2) expired. If

objection is filed before the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) as

provided under Section 144C(2)(b), the DRP shall complete its 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

proceedings within a period of 9 months from the end of the

month in which the draft order is forwarded to the eligible

assessee. Under sub-section (13), time limit is stipulated for

the Assessing Officer to complete the assessment on receipt of

the direction from the DRP. The Assessing Officer shall complete

the assessment within one month from the end of the month in

which such direction is received. The prime ground of challenge

in these writ petitions is regarding non-adherence to the time

limit fixed under sub-section (13).

4. The relevant dates to be noted in both cases are

given below:-

              Events              W.P.(C)No.   W.P.(C)No.

    Date of issuance of    27.03.2013          20.03.2013
    draft assessment order
    Date of filing of             26.04.2013   24.04.2013
    objections before the
    DRP
    Date of issuance of           13.12.2013   11.12.2013
    directions by DRP
    Date of issuance of           25.03.2014   12.03.2014
    assessment order
                                                   2025:KER:42465
W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014





Therefore in both cases, indisputably the assessment

orders were issued beyond the time limit under S.144C

(13). Hence the only issue arising for consideration is the

consequence of the failure to adhere to the time limit under

sub-section 13.

5. Sri.Raja Kannan, learned counsel for the petitioner

pointed out that Section 144C was incorporated in the Income

Tax Act by Finance Act, 2009 with effect from 1.4.2009. He

referred to the budget speech of the Hon'ble Minister of Finance

in which objective of incorporating the provision was explained.

An alternative dispute resolution mechanism was proposed to be

introduced within the Income Tax Department, for the resolution

of transfer pricing disputes in order to facilitate speedy

resolution of tax disputes, taking into account the necessity to

improve the investment climate in the country. Learned counsel

also made reference to the notes on clauses. Regarding Section 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

144C, it was mentioned in the notes on clauses as under:-

"Clause 55 of the Bill seeks to insert a new section 144C in the Income Tax Act relating to Dispute Resolution Panel.

The subjects of transfer pricing audit and the taxation of foreign company are at nascent stage in India. Often the Assessing Officers and Transfer Pricing Officers tend to take a conservative view. The correction of such view take very long time with the existing appellate structure.

With a view to provide speedy disposal, it is proposed to amend the Income Tax Act so as to create an alternative dispute resolution mechanism within the Income Tax Department and accordingly, section 144C has been proposed to be inserted so as to provide inter alia the Dispute Resolution Panel as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.

This amendment will take effect from 1st October, 2009."

6. Further, the learned counsel made reference to the

memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance Bill,

2009. The relevant extract reads as under:-

2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

"Provision for constitution of alternate dispute resolution mechanism The dispute resolution mechanism presently in place is time consuming and finality in high demand cases is attained only after a long drawn litigation till Supreme Court. Flow of foreign investment is extremely sensitive to prolonged uncertainty in tax related matter. Therefore, it is proposed to amend the Income Tax Act to provide for an alternate dispute resolution mechanism which will facilitate expeditious resolution of disputes in a fast track basis."

7. The learned counsel submitted in view of the above

that the incorporation of Section 144C of Income Tax Act was

with the laudable goal of speedy resolution/mitigation of

disputes. He therefore submitted that the time limits ingrained

in the provisions of Section 144C are so consciously

incorporated by the law makers with the aim of introducing a

fast-track mechanism. He hence contended that any breach of

the time limits would consequently vitiate the proceedings and 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

the provisions of Section 144C are not merely procedural in

nature. The learned counsel made reference to various reported

judgments. He placed heavy reliance on the judgment of a

Division Bench of Bombay High Court reported in Vodafone Idea

Limited v. Central Processing Centre and Others [2023 SCC

OnLine Bom 2464]. The Division Bench of the Bombay High

Court considered the provisions of Section 144C and held that it

is a self-contained provision, which carves out a separate class

of assessees, i.e. eligible assessees. Further, it was held that if

the provisions of Section 144C are not strictly adhered to, the

entire object of providing an alternate redressal mechanism in

the form of DRP would stand defeated. The Bombay High Court,

considered challenge against an assessment order passed by

the Assessing Authority two years after the DRP issued its

direction and held that it was time barred and cannot be

sustained. Relevant discussions in the judgment of the Bombay

High Court are extracted hereunder:-

2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

"21. Section 144C of the Act is a self contained provision which carves out a separate class of assessees, i.e., 'eligible assessee'. Section 144C of the Act was inserted in the Finance Act of 2009 and came into effect from 1st October 2009. In the notes on clauses to the Finance Bill, 2009 (Budget 2009-

2010), the reason for insertion of Section 144C is given as under :

"The subjects of transfer pricing audit and the taxation of foreign company are at nascent stage in India. Often the Assessing Officers and Transfer Pricing Officers tend to take a conservative view. The correction of such view take very long time with the existing appellate structure.

With a view to provide speedy disposal, it is proposed to amend the Income Tax Act so as to create an alternative dispute resolution mechanism within the income-tax department and accordingly, Section 144C has been proposed to be inserted so as to provide inter alia the Dispute Resolution Panel as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism."

22. Thus, if the provisions of Section 144C as mandated by the Statute are not strictly adhered the 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

entire object of providing for an alternate redressal mechanism in the form of DRP stand defeated. That is not the intention of the legislature when the provision was introduced in the Act. Section 144C (10) of the Act provide that the directions of DRP are binding on the AO. By failing to pass any order in terms of the provision, the AO cannot be permitted to defeat the entire exercise and render the same futile. When a Statute prescribes the power to do a certain thing in a certain way, then the thing must be done in that way and other methods of performance are forbidden. Once the statute has prescribed a limitation period for passing the final order, it is expected that the internal procedure of the department should mould itself to give meaning to and act in aid of the provision. Any procedural defect (there is none in this case) in the internal mechanism of the working of E-assessment Scheme, cannot operate against the interest of assessee. Hence, the FAO cannot be believed that the DRP direction was received by him only on 23 rd August 2023 despite being uploaded on the ITBA portal on 25th March 2021. The failure on the part of department to follow the procedure under Section 144C of the Act is not merely a procedural 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

irregularity, but is an illegality and vitiates the entire proceeding.

23. In a decision in the matter of Turner International India Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-25(2), New Delhi, the Delhi High Court has held that the question "whether the final assessment order stands vitiated for failure to adhere to the mandatory requirements of Section 144C of the Act?", is no longer res integra and any order passed contrary to Section 144C of the Act cannot be sustained.

24. In a decision cited by Mr. Mistri in the matter of Shell India Markets (P.) Ltd. (supra), this Court has also held as follows :

"10. Sub-section (13) of Section 144C, therefore, is very clear inasmuch as the Assessing Officer shall, upon receipt of the directions issued under Sub-section (5), in conformity with the directions, complete the assessment within one month from the end of the month in which such direction is received.

              Sub-section   (13)      also    provides   that    the
              Assessing     Officer      can     complete        the

assessment without providing any further opportunity of being heard to the assessee.

2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

This means that the moment the Assessing Officer receives the directions under Sub- section (5), he has to straight away complete the assessment and he does not even have to hear the assessee. The Assessing Officer shall simply comply with the directions received from the DRP within one month from the end of the month in which such directions is received."

25. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we have no hesitation in holding that the assessment order dated 31st August 2023 passed by FAO two years after the DRP directions, is time barred and cannot be sustained. Consequently, the ROI as filed has to be accepted. Petitioner is entitled to receive the refund together with interest, in accordance with law. The procedure to be completed within 30 days of this order being unloaded. This would, however, not preclude revenue, should the need arise, from reopening the assessment by following due process and in accordance with law."

8. He also placed reliance over a judgment of a learned

Single Judge of this Court in Allianz Cornhill Information 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

Services Private Limited, Rep. by its Chief Financial Officer v.

Union of India rep. by Secretary, Ministry of Finance

(Department of Revenue) and Others [2023 SCC OnLine Ker.

11076]. This Court in the said judgment considered a case in

which the assessment order was issued beyond the period

stipulated under Section 144C(13). There was a delay of about

two months in passing the assessment order. Following

observations made by this Court in the said judgment are

germane:-

"14. On a perusal of Section 144C of the Act, it is found that, time is the essence of the proceedings. The specific time frame given under various sub-sections would clearly reflect the essentiality of the time factor, in which proceedings contemplated under Section 144C are to be completed by the respective authorities. A dilution of the time limits envisaged under the statutory frame work of Section 144C would, therefore, defeat the very purpose and object behind the insertion of the said provision. Section 153 of the Act deals with the time limit contemplated for the completion of assessments and re-assessments under the Act. It is relevant to note that in addition to the non-obstante clause under Section 144C(1) with respect to other provisions of the Act, there is a specific exclusion of the application of Section 153 from 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

the frame work of Section 144C. This specific exclusion of Section 153 from the proceedings under Section 144C, exemplifies the rigour of the specific time limits provided under Section 144C. Under Section 153 of the Act, longer time limit is prescribed, whereas, specific time limit is prescribed under Section 144C of the Act. The specific exclusion of Section 153 from the ambit of Section 144C is a conscious action of the law- maker. If the legislature does not have any intention to stick on with the time limit prescribed in Section 144C, there was no necessity of insertion of Section 144C, since there was already a provision under Section 153 contemplating time limit for completion of assessments or re-assessments. Hence, it cannot be said that Section 144C is procedural, but, on the other hand, it is a substantive provision specifying time limit for completing proceedings by the assessee, the assessing officer and the DRP.

...................................................................

16. By inserting Section 144C, the legislature had a specific intention that the time limit prescribed in the provision has to be strictly complied with and notwithstanding anything contained in Section 153, the assessing officer has to pass the assessment order. Hence, it is clear that the intention of the legislature was to comply with the time limit prescribed in the said section in order to avail the benefit of fast track assessment. The assessing officer cannot, at their whims and fancies, pass any order under Section 144C, but, they have to strictly comply with the statutory provisions envisaged under Section 144C.

2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

.....................................................................

19. Section 144C is inserted in the Finance Act, 2009 with a view to provide a speedy disposal to create an alternative dispute resolution mechanism within the Income Tax Department. If the provisions of Section 144C as mandated by the statute are not strictly adhered to, the entire object of providing an alternative dispute resolution mechanism in the form of DRP would stand defeated. The legislature had clear intention while the said provision was inserted in 2009 to facilitate an expeditious resolution of disputes on a fast track basis. If the assessing officer fails to pass any order in accordance with the statutory provisions, as mandated under Section 144C, it will defeat the entire exercise and render the same futile. The directions in Ext.P3 given by the DRP are binding on the assessing officer, who has to finalize the assessment order even without affording the assessee an opportunity of being heard. There was nothing more to do by the assessing officer than to pass an assessment order on receipt of Ext.P3. Once the statute has prescribed limitation period for passing a final order, the officers of the Department should act accordingly in order to provide the assessee an expeditious resolution of the disputes. The impugned orders were passed by the assessing authority beyond the time prescribed under Section 144C(13). Therefore, I am of the opinion that the impugned order passed by the assessing officer cannot be sustained."

This Court set aside the impugned assessment order issued 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

beyond the time limit prescribed under Section 144C(13).

Learned Counsel submitted, relying on the said decision, that it

was rendered on almost identical set of facts and hence these

writ petitions may also be allowed.

9. Sri.P.G.Jayashankar, the learned Standing Counsel for

the Income Tax Department, submitted that the charging

provisions of the Act and the provisions providing for machinery

are to be understood and interpreted differently. He contended

that Section 144C is essentially a machinery provision which

provides for a swift procedure. He submitted that a breach of

the time limit prescribed under sub-section (13) cannot be

considered as a vitiating factor affecting the very validity of the

assessment order. He submitted that the Assessing Authority is

not vested with any discretion under Section 144C when the

DRP issues directions. Once the DRP issues directions, the

Assessing Authority has to issue an assessment order following

the directions as such. The Assessing Authority in such a 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

situation exercises only an administrative power. He therefore

contended that even if the Assessing Authority takes time more

than that is provided under sub-section (13) of Section 144C, no

prejudice is caused and the assessment need not be considered

as vitiated. He referred to various provisions of Section 144C

and contended that accepting the interpretation canvassed by

the learned counsel for the petitioner would result in the

machinery provisions defeating the charging provisions.

10. The learned Standing Counsel made reference to

various reported judgments. He made reference to the

judgment reported in Panchamahal Steel Ltd. v. U.A.Joshi, ITO

and another [(1997) 225 ITR 458]. The Hon'ble Supreme Court

in the said judgment examined the provisions of Section 144B

and observed that once a draft order is made and the matter is

referred to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner on receiving

the objections of the assesssee, the function of the Income Tax

Officer practically comes to an end and the remaining thing to 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

do by him is to pass a final order of assessment in accordance

with the directions given by the Inspecting Assistant

Commissioner. The learned Standing Counsel submitted that the

Assessing Officer is in a comparable situation when he receives

the directions from the DRP. The learned Standing Counsel

made reference to the judgment of a Division Bench of this

Court reported in Joseph Kuruvila v. Commissioner of Income

Tax [(1989) 179 ITR 139]. This Court held in the said case that

failure to confirm to Section 144B is only an irregularity. The

learned Standing Counsel pointed out a recent judgment of this

Court in Parameswara Krishna Kaimal v. Union of India and

others [(2024) 462 ITR 154 (Ker)]. A learned Single Judge of

this Court observed in the said judgment that Section 144C is

not a substantive provision. Further it was held that it is a

machinery provision which has been incorporated for the benefit

of assessees. The learned Standing Counsel made further

reference to the judgment of a Constitution Bench of the 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in J.K.Synthetics Limited and

Birla Cement Works and Ors. v. Commercial Taxes Officer and

State of Rajasthan and Ors [(1994) 4 SCC 276]. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the said judgment held that ordinarily the

charging section which fixes the liability is strictly construed but

that rule of strict construction is not extended to the machinery

provisions which are construed like any other statute. Further,

the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the machinery provisions

must no doubt be so construed as would effectuate the object

and purpose of the statute and not defeat the same. The

learned Standing Counsel contended relying on the above said

judgment that the provisions of Section 144C being machinery

provisions, strict interpretation of the same in such a manner as

argued by the petitioners would be erroneous. Such an

interpretation would lead to defeating the provisions of the Act.

He further submitted that the judgment of the Bombay High

Court, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner was 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

rendered in a case in which the assessment order was issued

more than 2 years after the DRP issued directions. Hence,

according to the learned Standing Counsel the same is

distinguishable on facts. He also pointed out that the judgment

of the learned Single Judge of this Court relied on by the

learned counsel for the petitioner is under challenge before the

Division Bench of this Court. He hence submitted that the writ

petitions are liable to be dismissed, upholding the assessment.

11. Though the judgment of the learned Single Judge

in Allianz Cornhill Information Services Private Limited, Rep.

by its Chief Financial Officer v. Union of India rep. by

Secretary, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) and

Others [2023 SCC OnLine Ker 11076] is under challenge in writ

appeal, no orders have been passed by the Division Bench

touching its operation and precedential value. However, as the

learned Standing Counsel for Income Tax Department

strenuously argued that the interpretation adopted in the said

judgment of this Court and also by the Bombay High Court in 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

Vodafone Idea Limited v. Central Processing Centre and

Others [2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2464] is against the accepted

principles of interpretation, to be fair to him, I find it

appropriate to address his contentions.

12. The submission of the learned Standing Counsel that

the function of the Assessment Officer after receiving directions

from the DRP is comparable to the position of the Income Tax

Officer after obtaining directions from the Inspecting Assistant

Commissioner, with reference to Section 144B and relying on

judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Panchamahal

Steel Ltd.'s case and Joseph Kuruvila's case, does not

appear to be perfectly sound. It may be correct that no

discretion is vested with the Income Tax Officer in the

mentioned circumstances and the Assessing Officer acting

pursuant to the directions from the DRP. However, for that

reason alone it cannot be concluded that as in the case of

Section 144B, breach of the provisions of Section 144C should 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

be treated as a mere irregularity.

13. It is true that a learned Single Judge of this Court in

Parameswara Krishna Kaimal's case observed that Section

144C is not a substantive provision. However, the observations

and findings, virtually to the contrary, made in an earlier

decision by a co-ordinate bench in Allianz Cornhill Information

Services Private Limited, Rep. by its Chief Financial Officer v.

Union of India rep. by Secretary, Ministry of Finance

(Department of Revenue) and Others [2023 SCC OnLine Ker.

11076] were not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. The

argument of the learned Standing Counsel that the judgment of

the Bombay High Court in Vodafone Idea Limited v. Central

Processing Centre and Others [2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2464] is

distinguishable on facts, as the Court was considering a case

involving delay of more than 2 years, also cannot be accepted,

as the question considered by the Court was the consequence of

not following strictly, the time limit stipulated under Section

144C(13). Extent of delay in passing the assessment order was 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

immaterial.

14. Section 144C was incorporated to the Act by an

amendment. Amendments are thoughtful, purpose-driven

changes made to an existing legislation by the legislature. When

an amendment is made, it must be assumed that the legislature

felt it was appropriate to alter the law as it existed prior to the

amendment. The legislature, well aware of the scheme and

provisions of the statute as it existed, proceeds to amend the

statute when the need of a change is felt. Amendments are

hence impelled by the conviction of the legislature regarding

changes required to be made for various considerations and

reasons.

15. An amended provision becomes an integral part of

the statute and it cannot be considered and interpreted in

isolation, detached from the other provisions of the statute.

However, apart from keeping in mind the object of the statute,

it is essential to keep the legislative purpose of effecting the 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

amendment also in mind while attempting to interpret an

amended provision. Otherwise, the interpretation may defeat

the purpose of the amendment.

16. In Rameshwar Prasad and Ors v. State of UP

and Ors [(1983) 2 SCC 195 ] the Hon'ble Supreme Court held

thus:

"Whenever a court is called upon to interpret an amended provision, it has to bear in mind the history of the provision, the mischief which the legislature attempted to remedy, the remedy provided by the amendment and the reason for providing such remedy."

17. Normally when the legislative intention is clear from

the plain language of the provision, the Court need not look into

any other aspects. Nevertheless, since the provision was

incorporated by an amendment, following the observations of

the Hon'ble Apex Court referred above, it is apposite in the 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

case at hand to take note of the objectives of incorporating the

provision pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner

noted in the opening paragraphs of this judgment. As explained

by the law makers, Section 144C was incorporated with the

objective of providing a speedy mechanism for assessments

involving transfer pricing, to reduce possibility of disputes and to

avoid time consuming litigations. The said provision was

incorporated in the Act to further improve the investment

climate in the country. Object of incorporating such a provision

will be defeated if it is interpreted in such a manner, so that the

same would become watered down and futile.

18. Even in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court

relied on by the learned Standing Counsel for Income Tax

Department, reported in J.K.Synthetics Limited and Birla

Cement Works and Ors. v. Commercial Taxes Officer and State

of Rajasthan and Ors. [1994 (4) SCC 276], the Hon'ble

Supreme Court held in clear terms that the machinery 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

provisions must no doubt be so construed as would effectuate

the object and purpose of the statute and not defeat the same.

In the case at hand, object and purpose of the amendment are

to be kept in mind and an interpretation giving the provisions of

S.144C proper effect needs to be adopted even if it is assumed

that the same is a machinery provision. After the amendment

comes to force, the amended provision becomes integral part of

the statute and the analysis of the object and purpose of the

statute must be taking in to account the amendment also.

19. Viewed from the perspective as explained above

despite persuasive submissions of the learned Standing Counsel,

I do not find any reason to take a different view from that

adopted by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Allianz

Cornhill Information Services Private Limited, Rep. by its

Chief Financial Officer v. Union of India rep. by Secretary,

Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) and Others

[2023 SCC OnLine Ker 11076] and Division Bench of the 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

Bombay High Court in Vodafone Idea Limited v. Central

Processing Centre and Others [2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2464].

Assessing Officer is bound to adhere to the time limit stipulated

in S.144 C (13 ) of the Income Tax Act and assessment order

issued in breach of it shall be invalid.

20. In view of the foregoing discussion, I allow these writ

petitions. Impugned Ext.P4 assessment orders in both writ

petitions shall stand set aside.

Writ Petitions are disposed of as above.

Sd/-

S.MANU JUDGE

skj 2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

APPENDIX OF WP(C) 9520/2014

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS

EXT.P1: TRUE COPY OF THE DRAFT ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 27.3.2013 ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT EXT.P2: TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTIONS DATED 26.4.2013 FILED UNDER SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 144C OF THE ACT.

EXT.P3: TRUE COPY OF THE 'DIRECTIONS' DATED 13.12.2013 ISSUED BY THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PANEL SUB- SECTION (5) OF SECTION 144C OF THE ACT.

EXT.P4: TRUE COPY OF THE ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 25.3.2014, (WRONGLY TYPED AS 2013) WHICH WAS SERVED ON THE PETITIONER ON 27.3.2014 EXT.P5: TRUE COPY OF THE ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 9.3.2004 FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2001 - 02 IN RESPECT OF THE PETITIONER EXT.P6: TRUE COPY OF THE FINAL ORDER OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL IN I.T.A NOS 855 TO 857/COCH/2007 AND I.T.A. NO.847/COCH/2007 DATED 13.7.2010 EXT.P7: TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 18.1.2011

EXT.P8: TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 29.7.2011

EXT.P9: TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 13.1.2012

EXT.P10 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 27.3.2018 ISSUED BY THE NCLT,DIVISION BENCH,CHENNAI IN THE MATTER OF SCHEME OF AMALGAMATION WITH IBS SOFTWARE SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED WITH IBS SOFTWARE PRIVATE LIMITED,ALONG WITH THE SANCTIONED SCHEME OF AMALGAMATION AND ORDER DATED 27.3.2018 ISSUED BY THE REGISTRY OF THE NCLT, DIVISION BENCH CHENNAI.

2025:KER:42465 W.P.(C).Nos.9520 & 9521 of 2014

APPENDIX OF WP(C) 9521/2014

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS

EXT.P1: TRUE COPY OF THE DRAFT ASSESSMENT ORDER FOR THE YEAR 2009-10 DATED 20/03/2013 ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT.

EXT.P2: TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTIONS DATED 24/04/2013 (WITH COVERING LETTER) FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PANEL UNDER SUB- SECTION (2) OF SECTION 144 C OF THE ACT.

EXT.P3: TRUE COPY OF THE DIRECTIONS DATED 11/12/2013 ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER BY THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PANEL SUB-SECTION (5) OF SECTION 144C OF THE ACT.

EXT.P4: TRUE COPY OF THE ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 12/3/2014 ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER BY THE 4TH RESPONDENT. Ext.P5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 06.10.2021 ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL, DIVISION BENCH-II, CHENNAI, IN CP(CAA)/12 (CHE)/2021 IN CA/478/CAA/2020 Ext.P6 THE TRUE COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION PURSUANT TO CHANGE OF NAME DATED 06.12.2021 ISSUED BY THE REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES, CHENNAI-34 Ext.P7 THE TRUE COPY OF THE MASTER DATA DATED NIL OBTAINED FROM THE WEBSITE OF THE MINISTRY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (www.mca.gov.in)

 
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