Kerala High Court
K.Sunil Kumar vs Food Corporation Of India(Fci) on 22 January, 2025
Author: D. K. Singh
Bench: D. K. Singh
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"C.R."
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE D. K. SINGH
WEDNESDAY, THE 22ND DAY OF JANUARY 2025 / 2ND MAGHA, 1946
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PETITIONER/S:
K.SUNIL KUMAR, AGED 53 YEARS
MANAGER (GENERAL), FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA, DIVISIONAL OFFICE,
MULAMKUNNATHUKAVU, THRISSUR, PIN - 680581
BY ADVS.
S.P.ARAVINDAKSHAN PILLAY
N.SANTHA
V.VARGHESE
PETER JOSE CHRISTO
S.A.ANAND
K.N.REMYA
L.ANNAPOORNA
RESPONDENT/S:
1 FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA(FCI)
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, HEADQUARTERS, 16-20, BARAKHAMBA
LANE, NEW DELHI,, PIN - 110001
2 MANAGING DIRECTOR
FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA (FCI), FCI HEADQUARTERS, 16-20, BARAKHAMBA LANE,
NEW DELHI,, PIN - 110001
3 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (SOUTH)
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FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA, ZONAL OFFICE (SOUTH), HADDOWS ROAD, CHENNAI,,
PIN - 600006
4 GENERAL MANAGER(KERALA),
FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA, REGIONAL OFFICE, KESAVADASAPURAM,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695004
BY ADV Jose Kuriakose (Vilangattil)
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING RESERVED ON 08.01.2025, THE COURT ON 22.01.2025
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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JUDGMENT
"C.R."
Heard Mr S P Aravindakshan Pillay learned Counsel for the
petitioner, and Mr Jose Kuriakose learned Standing Counsel for the Food
Corporation of India (FCI).
Facts:
2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, who
is employed as Manager (General) in the service of the Food Corporation
of India ('FCI' for short), aggrieved by the non-regularization of his
period of suspension with effect from 16.08.2015 to 15.02.2016 as a duty
for all purposes.
2.1 The facts of the case, as stated in the writ petition, disclose
that the petitioner was implicated in an Abkari case while working as
Assistant Grade-1 (General) at the Food Corporation of India's District
office, Kannur. He was in judicial custody from 16.08.2015 until he got
bail on 09.09.2015.
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2.2 As per the final report submitted by the Excise Department
vide charge sheet no.31/2016 dated 29.02.2016 under Section 173 of
Cr.P.C, the petitioner was apprehended transporting 14.25 litres of
foreign liquor, which was seized by the Excise Officers and Crime
No.129/2015 under Section 58 of the Abkari Act was registered against
him. The petitioner was sent to judicial custody on 16.08.2015. The
petitioner was placed under suspension in terms of sub-regulation 2(a)
of Regulation 66 of the FCI (staff) Regulation 1971, with a change in
headquarters to District Office Kozhikode. The suspension was extended
for a period of 90 days vide the order dated 14.12.2015, and thereafter,
the suspension was revoked with effect from 15.02.2016 vide the order
dated 17.02.2016.
3. The Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the
petitioner under Regulation 58 of the FCI (Staff) Regulations 1971 vide
Memorandum dated 07.03.2017, for the following charges:-
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"ARTICLE-1
Shri K Sunil Kumar, Asst. Grade-I (Genl.), while working at FCI, District
Office, Kannur has behaved in a manner very much unbecoming of an
employee of the Corporation. As per the final report submitted by the
Excise Department charge sheet No. 31/16, dtd: 29.02.2016 under section
173 Cr.PC, the Official on 16.08.2015 at 06.45 AM on the road Edathodi to
Vatakara Railway station in front of Rinsha Hotel while the CO (Charged
Official) transporting 14.25 Litrs foreign Liquor of Mahi, Excise Inspector
Shri R-N-Byju and party who were the Officers of Vatakara Excise Circle
detected the crime and registered case as Crime No.129/2015 under
Section 58 of Abkari Act 1077. Also the case is in Assistant Sessions Court,
Vatakara vide Case number SC No.866/16. Accused and the seized articles
were produced before the JFCM Vatakara and the accused was remanded
by the Honble Court. Thus, Shri K Sunil Kumar, Asst. Grade- 1(Genl) has
contravened Regulation 31, 32,45 & 32.A (5), (17), (19), (24), (30) and (38)
of FCI(Staff) Regulations, 1971."
3.1 The Enquiry Officer concluded that the charge against the
petitioner was proved, and the Disciplinary Authority, vide the
punishment order dated 07.08.2018 [Ext P4], imposed the penalty of
"reduction to two-stage lower in the time scale of pay for three years with
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cumulative effect but same shall not have the effect of postponing his future
increment of pay after penalty period".
3.2 The Assistant Session Judge Vatakara, in Sessions Case
No.866/2016, acquitted the petitioner in the Abkari case. The judgment
of the Assistant Session Judge, Vatakara, dated 30.03.2021 in Sessions
case No.866/2016, has been placed on record. Paragraphs 25 and 26 of
the said judgment would read as under:-
"After analysing the entire evidence, this Court find that there are
suspicious circumstances behind the apprehension of the accused as
alleged by the prosecution. Since the liquor bottles produced before
the Court do not show that there are hologram of the State of
Puducherry, prosecution case cannot be accepted because PW5, the
detecting Officer deposed that there was hologram of Puducherry
State on those bottles. Inventory prepared by the Deputy Excise
Commissioner is Incomplete, and it does not give correct details of
the bottles alleged to have been seized from the possession of the
accused. To conclude, this court hold that prosecution has not
succeeded in establishing the offence against accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Points found against the prosecution.
26. Point No.(III):- In view of the finding on Point Nos.(i) and (ii), the
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accused is not found guilty of offfence punishable under Section 55(a)
and 58 of the Abkari Act and he is acquitted u/s.235 Cr.P.C. Bail bond
executed by the accused stands cancelled and he is set at liberty
forthwith."
3.3 After the petitioner was acquitted by the Court of Sessions in
Sessions Case No.866/2016 vide judgment dated 30.03.2021. The
petitioner filed an appeal before the Executive Director (South)/
Appellate Authority against the punishment order passed by the
Disciplinary Authority in Ext.P4. The Appellate Authority, after taking
note of the judgment dated 30.03.2021 of the Assistant Sessions Court,
Vatakara, and hearing the petitioner at length was of the view that the
charges framed in the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner
were based on the charge sheet filed against him by the Excise
Department and the charge memo issued to the petitioner was similar to
the criminal case filed against the petitioner. Therefore, the judgment
passed by the Sessions Court was required to be taken into cognizance.
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The petitioner was exonerated from the charges framed against him by
the Disciplinary Authority. Thus, the petitioner was exonerated from
the penalty of a "reduction of two-stage lower in the time scale of pay for three
years with the cumulative effect, but the same shall not have the effect of
postponing his future increment of pay after the penalty period".
4. After exoneration by the Appellate Authority vide order dated
04.08.2021 in Ext.P6, the petitioner moved further representation dated
24.08.2021 requesting the Disciplinary Authority to treat the suspension
period as the period spent on duty as per the Sub-Regulation 8(a) of
Regulation 66 of FCI (Staff) Regulations 1971 and requested for payment
of full pay and allowances.
4.1 The Disciplinary Authority vide impugned order dated
22.11.2021, on Ext.P7 representation of the petitioner dated 24.08.2021,
held that the petitioner's acquittal was not 'honourable' from the charges
levelled against him. The petitioner was suspended vide order dated
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19.08.2015 on his arrest on 16.08.2015 in the Excise case. He was granted
bail only on 09.09.2015. The petitioner, however, reported at District
Office Calicut only on 12.11.2015 and left the Headquarters on the same
day without obtaining prior permission, and he did not give any
explanation for his absence from 09.09.2015 to 11.11.2015.
4.2 The petitioner, again, remained unauthorizedly absent from
13.11.2015 to 15.01.2016, 17.01.2016 to 14.02.2016 and 15.02.2016 to
10.03.2016. Therefore, the Disciplinary Authority was of the view that
the period of suspension from 16.08.2015 to 15.02.2016 cannot be treated
as the period spent on duty.
4.3 Aggrieved by the Disciplinary Authority's decision, the
petitioner preferred an appeal to the Executive Director (South)/ the
Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority vide impugned order
dated 12.09.2022 in Ext.P10 did not find substance in the appeal and
dismissed the appeal. Against the said decision of the Appellate
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Authority, the petitioner filed a Review before the Managing Director/
the Reviewing Authority of the Food Corporation of India. However, the
said Review Petition was dismissed vide order dated 14.11.2023 in
Ext.P12.
Petitioners' submission:
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the
findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in the impugned order
in Ext.P8 that the petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case was not
'honourable', is not correct. The petitioner was honourably acquitted.
On that basis, the petitioner was exonerated from the punishment of
reduction of two-stage lower in the time scale of pay for three years with
cumulative effect.
5.1 The learned Counsel further submits that after the
examination of the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, the
Sessions Court did not find the charges proved against the petitioner,
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and therefore, he was acquitted by the Sessions Court in the Criminal
Case. The findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, which has
been upheld by the Appellate Authority and the Reviewing Authority,
are against several judgments including the judgments in the case of
State of West Bengal v. Sankar Ghosh1; Deputy Inspector General of Police
v. S Samuthiram2; and Imtiyaz Ahmad Malla v. The State of Jammu and
Kashmir3.
Respondent's submission:
6. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel for the
respondent Corporation has submitted that the question involved in this
writ petition is the regularisation of his period of suspension and
unauthorized absence in service. The Disciplinary Authority has noted
the petitioner's conduct in remaining unauthorizedly absent from duty.
2014 (3) SCC 610
2013 (1) SCC 598
2023 SCC OnLine SC 205
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The petitioner was not honourably acquitted, and, in fact, the
Management has been gracious and magnanimous enough to exonerate
him from the punishment of reduction of two-stage lower in the time
scale of pay for three years with cumulative effect. When the petitioner
remained in jail and, after he was granted bail, did not join the duties
and remained unauthorizedly absent, the petitioner is not entitled to get
his unauthorized absence in service treated as time spent on duty. The
claim for payment of salary for the said period is wholly unjustified.
Discussion and Analysis:
7. The question whether a person has been acquitted
honourably or he has been acquitted, giving the benefit of the doubt, has
come for consideration in several judgments before the Supreme Court.
8. Though the phrase 'honourable acquittal' is not defined
anywhere in the Criminal Procedure Code, this has been the consistent
view in the judicial pronouncements that the expression 'honourable
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acquittal' could be when the accused is acquitted after full consideration
of the prosecution case and the Prosecution miserably fails to prove the
charges levelled against the accused [Commissioner of Police, New Delhi
v. Mehar Singh4 paragraph 25].
8.1 It is also well-settled that mere acquittal in a criminal case
does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service. The acquittal
has to be 'honourable' [Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi
v. Bhopal Singh Panchal5 and R P Kapoor v. Union of India6]
8.2 In Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration v. Pradeep
Kumar7 it has been held that if a person is acquitted or discharged in a
criminal case, the same cannot be inferred that he was falsely involved
or he had no criminal antecedents. Paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the
said judgment, which have been taken note of in the subsequent
2013 (7) SCC 685
1994 (1) SCC 541
AIR 1964 SC 787
(2018) 1 SCC 797
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judgment in Imtiyaz Ahmad Malla (supra), are extracted hereunder:
"10. The acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of the suitability of
the candidates in the concerned post. If a person is acquitted or
discharged, it cannot always be inferred that he was falsely involved or
he had no criminal antecedents. Unless it is an honourable acquittal, the
candidate cannot claim the benefit of the case. What is honourable
acquittal, was considered by this Court in Deputy Inspector General of
Police v. S Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598, in which this Court held as
under:-
"24. The meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal" came up for consideration
before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541. In that case, this
Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal
by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held
that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the
acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions "honourable acquittal",
"acquitted of blame", "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Code of Criminal
Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is
difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression "honourably acquitted".
When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that
the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused,
it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted."
11. Entering into the police service required a candidate to be of good
character, integrity and clean antecedents. In Commissioner of Police,
New Delhi v. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685, the respondent was acquitted
based on the compromise. This Court held that even though acquittal was
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based on compromise, it is still open to the Screening Committee to
examine the suitability of the candidate and take a decision. Emphasizing
upon the importance of character and integrity required for joining
police force/discipline force, in Mehar Singh case, this Court held as
under:-
"23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that the Screening Committee
would be entitled to keep persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the
police force even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal or
discharge is on technical grounds or not honourable. The Screening Committee will be
within its rights to cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is
based on some serious flaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the result of
material witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officers of the Screening
Committee who will be able to judge whether the acquitted or discharged candidate is
likely to revert to similar activities in future with more strength and vigour, if
appointed, to the post in a police force. The Screening Committee will have to consider
the nature and extent of such person's involvement in the crime and his propensity of
becoming a cause for worsening the law and order situation rather than maintaining
it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not merit any interference
from this Court as its object appears to be to ensure that only persons with impeccable
character enter the police force.
24. We find no substance in the contention that by cancelling the respondents'
candidature, the Screening Committee has overreached the judgments of the criminal
court. We are aware that the question of co-relation between a criminal case and a
departmental enquiry does not directly arise here, but, support can be drawn from the
principles laid down by this Court in connection with it because the issue involved is
somewhat identical, namely, whether to allow a person with doubtful integrity to work
in the department. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof beyond
all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of
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probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn
hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of
doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial,
where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of
India AIR 1964 SC 787 this Court has taken a view that departmental proceedings can
proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than
honourable.
25. The expression "honourable acquittal" was considered by this Court in S.
Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598. In that case this Court was concerned with a situation
where disciplinary proceedings were initiated against a police officer. Criminal case
was pending against him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve-Teasing
Act. He was acquitted in that case because of the non-examination of key witnesses.
There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case. Two material witnesses
turned hostile. Referring to the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal
(1994) 1 SCC 541, where in somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank's
action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the ground that in the
criminal case he was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not
an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High Court was not justified in setting
aside the punishment imposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court observed
that the expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame" and "fully
exonerated" are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are
coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the
expression "honourably acquitted". This Court expressed that when the accused is
acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution case and the prosecution
miserably fails to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said
that the accused was honourably acquitted.
................
33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned, his case appears to have been
compromised. It was urged that acquittal recorded pursuant to a compromise should
not be treated as a disqualification because that will frustrate the purpose of the Legal
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Services Authorities Act, 1987. We see no merit in this submission. Compromises or
settlements have to be encouraged to bring about peaceful and amiable atmosphere in
the society by according a quietus to disputes. They have to be encouraged also to
reduce arrears of cases and save the litigants from the agony of pending litigation. But
these considerations cannot be brought in here. In order to maintain integrity and high
standard of police force, the Screening Committee may decline to take cognizance of a
compromise, if it appears to it to be dubious. The Screening Committee cannot be
faulted for that.
...............
35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of
maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith
and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join
the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable
character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this
category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or
discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely
exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses
a threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order, therefore, has
entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee.
The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide.
In recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel
behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a
matter of concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating. In such a
situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like
the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are
likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. At the same time, the
Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed in it and
must treat all candidates with an even hand."
The same principle was reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh v.
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Parvez Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591.
12. While considering the question of suppression of relevant
information or false information in regard to criminal prosecution,
arrest or pendency of criminal case(s) against the candidate, in Avtar
Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 471, three-Judges Bench of this Court
summarized the conclusion in para (38). As per the said decision in para
(38.5), "In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of
a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider
antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate."
13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal case does not
automatically entitle him for appointment to the post. Still it is open to
the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether he is
suitable for appointment to the post. From the observations of this Court
in Mehar Singh and Parvez Khan cases, it is clear that a candidate to be
recruited to the police service must be of impeccable character and
integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this
category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed
that he was honourably acquitted/completely exonerated. The decision
of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is shown to
be mala fide. The Screening Committee also must be alive to the
importance of the trust repose in it and must examine the candidate with
utmost character."
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8.3 It is also relevant to take note of the legal position that even
if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal Court, no right is
conferred on the employee to claim any benefit, including reinstatement
after the trial Court acquits him.
8.4 The Supreme Court in Deputy Inspector General of Police
(supra), in paragraphs 22 and 23 has held as under:
"22. In R.P. Kapoor v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787, it was held even
in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the
acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam and another v.
Raghava Rajgopalachari reported in 1972 SLR 45, this Court quoted with
approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in (1934) 61 ILR Cal.
168 which is as follows:
"The expression "honourably acquitted" is one which is unknown to court of justice.
Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extra judicial
tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the
appellant believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by
the Government authorities and by the magistrate. Further, we decided that the
appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear
that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and
completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to
what Government authorities term 'honourably acquitted'".
23. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the
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service rule for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by
a Criminal Court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any
benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof
required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry
conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a
criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the
prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict
burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not
required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of
probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted
for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since
few of the other witnesses turned hostile etc. In the case on hand the
prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses
on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The
court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We
are not prepared to say in the instant case, the respondent was
honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not
entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not
provide so."
9. I have considered the judgment passed by the Sessions Court.
The petitioner was acquitted by the Sessions Court on technical grounds.
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Conclusion:
10. It cannot be said that the prosecution has failed miserably to
prove its case against the petitioner. However, for some technical
reasons, the petitioner was acquitted. Therefore, this Court is of the
view that the petitioner's acquittal was not the 'honourable acquittal'.
Further, the Disciplinary Authority has considered the circumstances
and addressed the petitioner's case for treating him in regular service
during the period of suspension and has declined the request for reasons
which are justified, reasonable and proper.
Result:
11. Therefore, this Court does not find that the views taken by
the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority, and the Reviewing
Authority require interference by this Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
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Thus, the writ petition fails, which is hereby dismissed.
All Interlocutory Applications regarding interim matters stand
closed.
Sd/-
D K SINGH
JUDGE
jjj
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APPENDIX OF WP(C) 23262/2024
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit -P1 TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT OF THE FCI(STAFF)
REGULATIONS, 1971.
Exhibit -P2 TRUE COPY OF ORDER NO.VIG.7(1)/2015 DATED 19.08.2015 OF THE
4TH RESPONDENT.
Exhibit -P3 TRUE COPY OF ORDER NO.VIG.7(1)/2015 DATED 17.02.2016 OF THE
4TH RESPONDENT.
Exhibit -P4 TRUE COPY OF ORDER NO.VIG.4(2)/2017 DATED 07.08.2018 OF THE
4TH RESPONDENT.
Exhibit -P5 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.03.2021 OF THE ASSISTANT
SESSIONS JUDGE, VATAKARA IN SESSIONS CASE NO.866/2016.
Exhibit -P6 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER
NO.CR.4(3)ADMN.CASE/KS/KER/CAT.III/2018 DATED 04.08.2021 OF
THE 3RD RESPONDENT.
Exhibit -P7 TRUE COPY OF THAT REPRESENTATION DATED 24.08.2021
SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE 4TH RESPONDENT.
Exhibit -P8 TRUE COPY THE ORDER NO.VIG.5(6)/2018 DATED 22.11.2021 OF THE
4TH RESPONDENT.
Exhibit -P9 TRUE COPY OF THE APPEAL DATED 05.01.2022 FILED BY THE
PETITIONER BEFORE THE 3RD RESPONDENT WITHOUT ITS
ENCLOSURES.
Exhibit -P10 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER
NO.CR.4(3)/ADMN.CASE/KS/KER/CAT.III/2018 DATED 12.09.2022 OF
THE 3RD RESPONDENT.
Exhibit -P11 TRUE COPY OF THE REVIEW PETITION DATED 31.10.2022 FILED BY
THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
Exhibit -P12 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.FCIHQ-ZE012(12)/1/2023-ZE DATED
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14.11.2023 OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT..
RESPONDENT EXHIBITS
Exhibit R1(a) The true copy of the Letter dated 15-03-2016 of Area Manager,
Kozhikode detailing the unauthorized absence of the petitioner
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P13 True copy of the memorandum No.VIG.4(1)/ 2015/KSK dated
28.03.2016 of the Area Manager of FCI, Kozhikode, issued to the
petitioner along with the appended detailed statement
Exhibit P14 True copy of the explanation dated 08.04.2016 submitted by the
petitioner before the Area Manager, FCI, Kozhikode.
Exhibit P15 True copy of the show cause notice No.VIG4(1)/2015/KSK dated
11.05.2016 of the Area Manager, FCI, issued to the petitioner.
Exhibit P16 True copy of the detailed reply dated 30.05.2016 submitted by the
petitioner to the Area Manager, FCI, along with the certificates of six
persons mentioned therein.
Exhibit P17 True copy of the order No.VIG.4(1)/2015/KSK dated 11.08.2016 of the
Area Manager, FCI.
Exhibit P18 True copy of the appeal dated 28.09.2016 submitted by the petitioner
before the 4th respondent without its enclosures.
Exhibit P19 True copy of the order No.Vig.5(1)/2017 dated 24.06.2017 of the 4th
respondent.
Exhibit P20 True copy of the letter No.Vig.7(1)/2015 dated 17.12.2015 issued by
Manager(VIG) to the Area Manager, FCI, Kozhikode.
