Sepoy K. Sunder Raju vs Union Of India
2025 Latest Caselaw 3253 Ker

Kerala High Court

Sepoy K. Sunder Raju vs Union Of India on 8 August, 2025

​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025             1​              2025:KER:58943​
                                                    ​


            IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM​
            ​

                                 PRESENT​
                                 ​

  THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI​
  ​

                                    &​
                                    ​

           THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.​
           ​

               TH​
               ​
  FRIDAY, THE 8​
  ​                DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 17TH SRAVANA,​​
                   ​                                  1947​

                          WP(C) NO. 5243 OF 2025​
                          ​

PETITIONER:​
​

               ​EPOY K. SUNDER RAJU​
               S
               AGED 53 YEARS​
               ​
               S/O. LATE. KANNAPPAN, NO. 152, 1ST MAIN, IST BLOCK,​
               ​
               DODDA BOMMASANDRA VIDYARANYAPURA POST, BANGALORE,​
               ​
               KARNATAKA, PIN - 560097​
               ​


               ​Y ADVS.​
               B
               SHRI.RATHEESH B.​
               ​
               SHRI.GYOTHISH CHANDRAN​
               ​
               SHRI.SANUJU R.​
               ​



RESPONDENTS:​

​

1​ ​ ​NION OF INDIA​ U REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,​ ​ SOUTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI, PIN - 110011​ ​

2​ ​ ​HE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF​ T INTEGRATED HEAD QUARTERS OF MOD (ARMY),​ ​ SOUTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI, PIN - 110011​ ​

3​ ​ ​ IC RECORDS​ O CORPS OF MILITARY POLICE RECORDS,​ ​ C/O 56 APO, PIN - 900493​ ​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 2​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

4​ ​ ​RINCIPAL CONTROLLER OF DEFENCE ACCOUNTS (PENSIONS)​ P OFFICE OF THE PCDA (P), DRAUPATI GARH, ALLAHABAD,​ ​ PIN - 211014​ ​

BY ADV SHRI.T.C.KRISHNA, SENIOR PANEL COUNSEL​ ​

​HIS​ ​ T WRIT​ ​ PETITION​ ​ (CIVIL)​ ​ HAVING​ ​ BEEN​ ​ FINALLY​ ​ HEARD​ ​ ON​ 29.07.2025,​ ​ ​ THE​ ​ COURT​ ​ ON​ ​08.08.2025​ ​DELIVERED​ ​ THE​ FOLLOWING:​ ​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 3​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​JUDGMENT​

​Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J.​

​Heard finally with the consent of both the parties.​

​2.​ ​The​ ​present​ ​writ​ ​petition​ ​under​ ​Article​ ​226​ ​of​ ​the​

​Constitution​ ​of​ ​India​ ​has​ ​been​ ​filed​ ​challenging​ ​the​ ​Ext.P3​

​order​ ​dated​ ​29.06.2022​ ​passed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Armed​ ​Forces​ ​Tribunal​

​(AFT), Regional Bench, Kochi in​​O.A.No​​.344 of 2018.​

​3.​​The​​brief​​facts​​of​​the​​case​​are​​that​​the​​petitioner​​is​​an​

​Ex-Sepoy​​with​​No​​.7775292​​H,​​who​​was​​recruited​​in​​the​​Army​​on​

​11.03.1987.​ ​He​ ​was​ ​declared​ ​as​ ​a​ ​deserter​ ​with​ ​effect​ ​from​

​03.11.1990.​​As​​a​​consequence​​he​​was​​dismissed​​from​​the​​service​

​on​​09.04.1994​​under​​Section​​20(3)​​of​​Army​​Act.​​Being​​aggrieved,​

​the​ ​petitioner​ ​preferred​ ​a​ ​representation​ ​dated​ ​17.10.2017​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 4​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​which​​was​​rejected​​by​​a​​speaking​​order.​​The​​petitioner​​filed​​the​

​Original​​Application​​before​​the​​AFT​​challenging​​the​​rejection​​of​

​the​ ​representation​ ​dated​ ​17.10.2017.​ ​The​ ​AFT​ ​dismissed​ ​the​

​Original​​Application​​on​​merits​​as​​well​​as​​on​​the​​ground​​of​​delay​

​of more than 17 years in approaching the Tribunal.​

​4.​ ​The​ ​learned​ ​counsel​ ​for​​the​​petitioner​​contended​​that​

​the​ ​learned​ ​Tribunal​ ​erred​ ​in​ ​rejecting​ ​the​ ​prayer​ ​for​

​conversion​​of​​dismissal​​into​​discharge​​in​​low​​medical​​category​

​or​​medical​​invalidation,​​so​​as​​to​​enable​​the​​petitioner​​to​​get​​the​

​injury​ ​pension/disability​ ​pension/invalid​ ​pension​ ​with​ ​effect​

​from​​his​​discharge/invalidation​​with​​all​​consequential​​benefits.​

​The​ ​learned​ ​counsel​ ​for​ ​the​ ​petitioner​​further​​submitted​​that​

​the​​petitioner​​was​​disabled​​both​​physically​​and​​psychologically.​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 5​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​The​ ​petitioner​ ​was​ ​deputed​ ​to​ ​Indian​ ​Peace​ ​Keeping​ ​Force​

​(IPKF)​​in​​Srilanka​​on​​29.08.1989​​during​​part​​of​​IPKF​​operations​

​in​ ​Srilanka.​ ​During​ ​part​ ​of​ ​IPKF​ ​operations​ ​the​ ​petitioner​

​sustained​​gunshot​​injury​​on​​his​​chest​​and​​upper​​arm.​​He​​had​​a​

​traumatic​ ​experience​ ​as​ ​he​ ​had​ ​to​​spend​​all​​night​​in​​the​​field​

​along​​with​​injured​​and​​mutilated​​dead​​bodies​​in​​order​​to​​avoid​

​detection​​by​​the​​enemies.​​The​​bullet​​injury​​was​​so​​deep​​that​​it​

​permanently​​damaged​​the​​vital​​body​​parts.​​The​​petitioner​​was​

​under​​severe​​depression​​and​​psychologically​​disturbed.​​During​

​this​​period​​the​​petitioner​​was​​detained​​to​​undergo​​upgradation​

​Cadre​ ​Class​ ​III​ ​to​ ​II​ ​at​ ​Madhya​ ​Bharat​ ​Area​ ​Provost​ ​Unit,​

​Jabalpur.​​Unfortunately​​he​​could​​not​​reach​​the​​destination​​due​

​to​ ​an​ ​imbalanced​ ​state​ ​of​ ​mind.​ ​The​ ​petitioner​ ​kept​ ​on​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 6​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​wandering​ ​around​ ​aimlessly.​ ​After​ ​some​ ​days​ ​he​ ​was​ ​able​ ​to​

​trace​ ​his​ ​family​ ​and​ ​relatives.​ ​Thereafter​ ​the​ ​respondents​

​dismissed​ ​him​ ​from​ ​service​ ​by​ ​treating​ ​him​ ​as​ ​deserter.​ ​The​

​dismissal​​of​​the​​petitioner​​is​​without​​following​​due​​procedures​

​of​ ​law;​ ​therefore,​ ​the​ ​learned​​counsel​​for​​the​​petitioner​​prays​

​that this writ petition be allowed.​

​5.​ ​Per​ ​contra​ ​the​ ​learned​ ​Senior​ ​Central​ ​Government​

​Counsel​ ​appearing​ ​for​ ​the​ ​respondents​ ​vehemently​ ​opposed​

​the​​afore​​prayer​​and​​submitted​​that​​the​​learned​​Tribunal​​ought​

​not​ ​to​ ​have​ ​gone​ ​into​ ​the​ ​merits​ ​of​ ​the​ ​case,​ ​since​ ​the​

​petitioner​ ​was​ ​dismissed​ ​from​ ​service​ ​on​ ​09.04.1994.​

​Thereafter​ ​he​ ​did​ ​not​ ​choose​ ​to​ ​file​ ​a​ ​representation​ ​or​

​approach​ ​the​ ​learned​ ​Tribunal​ ​for​ ​the​ ​last​ ​17​ ​years.​ ​For​ ​the​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 7​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​very​ ​first​ ​time,​ ​on​ ​17.10.2017,​ ​he​ ​had​ ​preferred​ ​a​

​representation​ ​which​ ​was​ ​dismissed.​ ​Thereafter​ ​he​ ​had​

​approached​​the​​Tribunal​​in​​the​​year​​2018​​by​​filing​​an​​Original​

​Application.​ ​On​ ​perusal​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Original​ ​Application​ ​in​

​Paragraph​​No.3(Limitation)​​no​​reasons​​have​​been​​shown​​for​​the​

​inordinate​ ​delay​ ​of​ ​17​ ​years​​in​​approaching​​the​​Tribunal.​​The​

​learned​​Tribunal​​apart​​from​​considering​​the​​merits​​of​​the​​case,​

​dismissed​​the​​Original​​Application​​on​​the​​ground​​of​​inordinate​

​delay​​of​​17​​years.​​The​​Hon'ble​​Apex​​Court​​has​​clearly​​held​​that​

​preferring​ ​representation​ ​after​ ​a​ ​long​ ​gap​ ​of​ ​time​ ​and​ ​that​

​having​​been​​considered​​by​​the​​authorities,​​would​​not​​bring​​the​

​case​ ​within​ ​limitation.​ ​Therefore,​​no​​interference​​is​​called​​for​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 8​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​in​ ​the​ ​order​ ​passed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​learned​ ​Tribunal.​ ​He,​ ​therefore,​

​prayed that this writ petition be dismissed.​

​6.​ ​Heard​ ​the​​learned​​counsel​​for​​the​​parties​​and​​perused​

​the records.​

​7.​​In​​the​​present​​case,​​the​​petitioner​​had​​approached​​the​

​learned​ ​Tribunal​ ​after​ ​a​ ​period​ ​of​ ​17​ ​years​ ​for​ ​which​ ​no​

​plausible​​explanation​​has​​been​​put​​forth​​for​​such​​a​​huge​​delay.​

​Therefore,​​the​ ​Original​​Application​​as​​well​​as​​this​​writ​​petition​

​suffers​​from​​inordinate​​delay​​and​​laches.​​The​​learned​​Tribunal​

​has​​rightly​​dismissed​​the​​Original​​Application​​on​​the​​ground​​of​

​delay.​

​8.​​We​​would​​not​​like​​to​​dwell​​upon​​the​​merits​​of​​the​​case​

​as​​done​​by​​the​​learned​​Tribunal;​​however,​​we​​would​​like​​to​​deal​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 9​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​with​ ​the​ ​preliminary​ ​objections​ ​with​ ​regard​ ​to​ ​delay​ ​and​

​laches.​ ​The​ ​crux​ ​of​ ​the​ ​matter​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​service​ ​of​ ​the​

​petitioner​ ​was​ ​terminated​ ​in​ ​the​​year​​1994​​and​​the​​petitioner​

​had​​approached​​the​​Tribunal​​as​​well​​as​​this​​Court​​after​​17​​long​

​years.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​well​ ​established​​principle​​of​​law​​that​​delay​​defeats​

​equity.​

​9.​ ​The​ ​learned​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​Karnataka​

​Power​ ​Corpon.​ ​Ltd.​ ​Vs.​ ​K.​ ​Thangappan​ ​reported​ ​in​ ​(2006)​ ​4​​SCC​

​322​​has held as under :​

6​ .​​Delay​​or​​laches​​is​​one​​of​​the​​factors​​which​​is​​to​​be​​borne​​in​ ​mind​ ​by​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​when​ ​they​ ​exercise​ ​their​ ​discretionary​ ​powers​ ​under​ ​Article​ ​226​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Constitution.​ ​In​ ​an​ ​appropriate​ ​case​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​may​ ​refuse​ ​to​​invoke​ ​its​ ​extraordinary​ ​powers​ ​if​ ​there​ ​is​ ​such​ ​negligence​ ​or​ ​omission​ ​on​ ​the​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​applicant​ ​to​ ​assert​ ​his​ ​right​ ​as​ ​taken​ ​in​ ​conjunction​ ​with​ ​the​ ​lapse​ ​of​ ​time​ ​and​ ​other​ ​circumstances,​ ​causes​ ​prejudice​ ​to​ ​the​ ​opposite​ ​party.​ ​Even​ ​where​​fundamental​​right​​is​​involved​​the​​matter​​is​​still​​within​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 10​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

t​ he​ ​discretion​ ​of​​the​​Court​​as​​pointed​​out​​in​​Durga​​Prashad​​v.​ ​Chief​​Controller​​of​​Imports​​and​​Exports​​.​​Of​​course,​​the​​discretion​ ​has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.​ ​7.​ ​What​ ​was​ ​stated​ ​in​ ​this​ ​regard​ ​by​ ​Sir​ ​Barnes​ ​Peacock​ ​in​ ​Lindsay​​Petroleum​​Co.​​v.​​Prosper​​Armstrong​​Hurd​​(PC​​at​​p.​​239)​​was​ ​approved​ ​by​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​Moon​ ​Mills​ ​Ltd.​ ​v.​ ​M.R.​ ​Meher​ ​and​ ​Maharashtra​ ​SRTC​ ​v.​ ​Shri​ ​Balwant​ ​Regular​ ​Motor​ ​Service​​.​ ​Sir​ ​Barnes​​had stated:​ ​"Now,​ ​the​ ​doctrine​ ​of​ ​laches​ ​in​ ​courts​ ​of​ ​equity​ ​is​ ​not​ ​an​ ​arbitrary​ ​or​ ​a​ ​technical​ ​doctrine.​ ​Where​ ​it​ ​would​ ​be​ ​practically​ ​unjust​ ​to​ ​give​ ​a​ ​remedy​ ​either​​because​​the​​party​ ​has,​​by​​his​​conduct​​done​​that​​which​​might​​fairly​​be​​regarded​ ​as​ ​equivalent​ ​to​ ​a​ ​waiver​ ​of​ ​it,​ ​or​ ​where​ ​by​​his​​conduct​​and​ ​neglect​ ​he​ ​has​ ​though​​perhaps​​not​​waiving​​that​​remedy,​​yet​ ​put​ ​the​ ​other​ ​party​ ​in​ ​a​ ​situation​ ​in​ ​which​ ​it​ ​would​ ​not​ ​be​ ​reasonable​ ​to​ ​place​​him​​if​​the​​remedy​​were​​afterwards​​to​​be​ ​asserted,​​in​​either​​of​​these​​cases,​​lapse​​of​​time​​and​​delay​​are​ ​most​ ​material.​ ​But​ ​in​ ​every​ ​case,​ ​if​ ​an​ ​argument​ ​against​ ​relief,​ ​which​ ​otherwise​ ​would​ ​be​ ​just,​​is​​founded​​upon​​mere​ ​delay,​ ​that​ ​delay​ ​of​ ​course​ ​not​ ​amounting​ ​to​ ​a​ ​bar​ ​by​ ​any​ ​statute​ ​of​ ​limitation,​ ​the​ ​validity​ ​of​ ​that​ ​defence​ ​must​ ​be​ ​tried​ ​upon​ ​principles​ ​substantially​ ​equitable.​ ​Two​ ​circumstances​​always​​important​​in​​such​​cases​​are,​​the​​length​ ​of​ ​the​ ​delay​ ​and​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​the​ ​acts​ ​done​ ​during​ ​the​ ​interval​ ​which​​might​​affect​​either​​party​​and​​cause​​a​​balance​ ​of​​justice​​or​​injustice​​in​​taking​​the​​one​​course​​or​​the​​other,​​so​ ​far as it relates to the remedy."​ ​8​ ​.​ ​It​ ​would​ ​be​ ​appropriate​ ​to​ ​note​ ​certain​ ​decisions​ ​of​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​which​ ​this​​aspect​​has​​been​​dealt​​with​​in​​relation​​to​ ​Article​ ​32​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Constitution.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​apparent​ ​that​ ​what​ ​has​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 11​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​ een​ ​stated​ ​as​ ​regards​​that​​article​​would​​apply,​​a​​fortiori,​​to​ b ​Article​ ​226.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​observed​ ​in​ ​Rabindranath​ ​Bose​ ​v.​ ​Union​ ​of​ ​India​ ​that​ ​no​ ​relief​ ​can​ ​be​ ​given​ ​to​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​who​ ​without​ ​any​ ​reasonable​ ​explanation​ ​approaches​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​under​ ​Article​ ​32​ ​after​ ​inordinate​ ​delay.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​stated​ ​that​ ​though​ ​Article​ ​32​ ​is​ ​itself​ ​a​ ​guaranteed​ ​right,​ ​it​ ​does​ ​not​ ​follow​ ​from​ ​this​ ​that​ ​it​ ​was​ ​the​ ​intention​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Constitution-makers​ ​that​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​should​ ​disregard​ ​all​ ​principles​ ​and​ ​grant​ ​relief​ ​in​ ​petitions​​filed​​after​​inordinate​ ​delay.​ ​9.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​stated​​in​​State​​of​​M.P.​​v.​​Nandlal​​Jaiswal​​that​​the​​High​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​exercise​ ​of​ ​its​ ​discretion​ ​does​ ​not​ ​ordinarily​ ​assist​ ​the​ ​tardy​ ​and​ ​the​ ​indolent​ ​or​ ​the​ ​acquiescent​ ​and​ ​the​ ​lethargic.​ ​If​ ​there​ ​is​ ​inordinate​ ​delay​ ​on​ ​the​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​and​ ​such​ ​delay​ ​is​​not​​satisfactorily​​explained,​​the​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​may​ ​decline​ ​to​ ​intervene​ ​and​ ​grant​ ​relief​ ​in​ ​exercise​​of​​its​​writ​​jurisdiction.​​It​​was​​stated​​that​​this​​rule​​is​ ​premised​ ​on​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​factors.​ ​The​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​does​ ​not​ ​ordinarily​ ​permit​ ​a​ ​belated​ ​resort​ ​to​ ​the​ ​extraordinary​ ​remedy​ ​because​ ​it​ ​is​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​cause​ ​confusion​ ​and​ ​public​ ​inconvenience​ ​and​ ​bring,​ ​in​ ​its​ ​train​ ​new​ ​injustices,​ ​and​ ​if​ ​writ​​jurisdiction​​is​​exercised​​after​​unreasonable​​delay,​​it​​may​ ​have​ ​the​ ​effect​ ​of​ ​inflicting​ ​not​ ​only​ ​hardship​ ​and​ ​inconvenience​ ​but​ ​also​ ​injustice​ ​on​ ​third​ ​parties.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​pointed​ ​out​ ​that​ ​when​ ​writ​ ​jurisdiction​ ​is​ ​invoked,​ ​unexplained​ ​delay​ ​coupled​ ​with​ ​the​ ​creation​ ​of​ ​third-party​ ​rights​ ​in​ ​the​ ​meantime​ ​is​ ​an​ ​important​ ​factor​ ​which​ ​also​ ​weighs​ ​with​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​deciding​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​to​ ​exercise such jurisdiction.​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 12​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​The​​Supreme​​Court​​in​​the​​case​​of​​M.P.​​Ram​​Mohan​​Raja​​Vs.​

​State of T.N. Reported in (2007) 9 SCC 78​​has held​​as under :​

1​ 1.​ ​So​ ​far​ ​as​ ​the​ ​question​ ​of​ ​delay​ ​is​ ​concerned,​ ​no​ ​hard-andfast​​rule​​can​​be​​laid​​down​​and​​it​​will​​depend​​on​​the​ ​facts​ ​of​ ​each​ ​case.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​present​ ​case,​ ​the​ ​facts​​stare​​at​​the​ ​face​ ​of​ ​it​ ​that​ ​on​ ​8-10-1996​ ​an​ ​order​ ​was​ ​passed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Collector​​in​​pursuance​​of​​the​​order​​passed​​by​​the​​High​​Court,​ ​rejecting​ ​the​ ​application​ ​of​ ​the​ ​writ​ ​petitioner​ ​for​ ​consideration​ ​of​ ​the​ ​grant​ ​of​ ​mining​ ​lease.​ ​The​ ​writ​ ​petitioner​​sat​​tight​​over​​the​​matter​​and​​did​​not​​challenge​​the​ ​same​ ​up​ ​to​ ​2003.​ ​This​ ​on​ ​the​ ​face​ ​of​ ​it​ ​appears​ ​to​ ​be​ ​very​ ​serious.​​A​​person​​who​​can​​sit​​tight​​for​​such​​a​​long​​time​​for​​no​ ​justifiable reason, cannot be given any benefit.​

​The​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​Shiv​ ​Dass​​Vs.​​Union​​of​

​India reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274​​has held as under​​:​

6​ .​​Normally,​​in​​the​​case​​of​​belated​​approach​​writ​​petition​​has​ ​to​ ​be​ ​dismissed.​ ​Delay​ ​or​ ​laches​ ​is​ ​one​ ​of​ ​the​ ​factors​ ​to​ ​be​ ​borne​ ​in​ ​mind​ ​by​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Courts​ ​when​ ​they​ ​exercise​ ​their​ ​discretionary​​powers​​under​​Article​​226​​of​​the​​Constitution​​of​ ​India.​ ​In​ ​an​ ​appropriate​ ​case​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​may​ ​refuse​ ​to​ ​invoke​​its​​extraordinary​​powers​​if​​there​​is​​such​​negligence​​or​ ​omission​ ​on​ ​the​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​applicant​ ​to​ ​assert​ ​his​ ​right​ ​as​ ​taken​ ​in​ ​conjunction​ ​with​ ​the​ ​lapse​ ​of​ ​time​ ​and​ ​other​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 13​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

c​ ircumstances,​ ​causes​ ​prejudice​ ​to​ ​the​ ​opposite​ ​party.​ ​Even​ ​where​​fundamental​​right​​is​​involved​​the​​matter​​is​​still​​within​ ​the​ ​discretion​ ​of​​the​​Court​​as​​pointed​​out​​in​​Durga​​Prashad​​v.​ ​Chief​​Controller​​of​​Imports​​and​​Exports​​.​​Of​​course,​​the​​discretion​ ​has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.​ ​7.​ ​What​ ​was​ ​stated​ ​in​ ​this​ ​regard​ ​by​ ​Sir​ ​Barnes​ ​Peacock​ ​in​ ​Lindsay​​Petroleum​​Co.​​v.​​Prosper​​Armstrong​​Hurd,​​PC​​at​​p.​​239​​was​ ​approved​ ​by​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​Moon​ ​Mills​ ​Ltd.​ ​v.​ ​M.R.​ ​Meher​ ​and​ ​Maharashtra​ ​SRTC​ ​v.​ ​Balwant​ ​Regular​ ​Motor​ ​Service​​.​ ​Sir​ ​Barnes​ ​had stated:​ ​"Now​ ​the​ ​doctrine​ ​of​ ​laches​ ​in​ ​courts​ ​of​ ​equity​ ​is​ ​not​ ​an​ ​arbitrary​​or​​technical​​doctrine.​​Where​​it​​would​​be​​practically​ ​unjust​ ​to​ ​give​ ​a​ ​remedy​ ​either​ ​because​​the​​party​​has,​​by​​his​ ​conduct​ ​done​ ​that​ ​which​ ​might​ ​fairly​ ​be​ ​regarded​ ​as​ ​equivalent​ ​to​ ​a​ ​waiver​ ​of​ ​it,​ ​or​ ​where​ ​by​ ​his​ ​conduct​ ​and​ ​neglect​ ​he​ ​has​ ​though​​perhaps​​not​​waiving​​that​​remedy,​​yet​ ​put​ ​the​ ​other​ ​party​ ​in​ ​a​ ​situation​ ​in​ ​which​ ​it​ ​would​ ​not​ ​be​ ​reasonable​ ​to​ ​place​​him​​if​​the​​remedy​​were​​afterwards​​to​​be​ ​asserted,​​in​​either​​of​​these​​cases,​​lapse​​of​​time​​and​​delay​​are​ ​most​ ​material.​ ​But​ ​in​ ​every​ ​case,​ ​if​ ​an​ ​argument​ ​against​ ​relief,​ ​which​ ​otherwise​ ​would​ ​be​ ​just,​ ​if​​founded​​upon​​mere​ ​delay,​ ​that​ ​delay​ ​of​ ​course​ ​not​ ​amounting​ ​to​ ​a​ ​bar​ ​by​ ​any​ ​statute​ ​of​ ​limitation,​ ​the​ ​validity​ ​of​ ​that​ ​defence​ ​must​ ​be​ ​tried​ ​upon​ ​principles​ ​substantially​ ​equitable.​ ​Two​ ​circumstances​​always​​important​​in​​such​​cases​​are,​​the​​length​ ​of​ ​the​ ​delay​ ​and​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​the​ ​acts​ ​done​ ​during​ ​the​ ​interval​ ​which​​might​​affect​​either​​party​​and​​cause​​a​​balance​ ​of​​justice​​or​​injustice​​in​​taking​​the​​one​​course​​or​​the​​other,​​so​ ​far as relates to the remedy."​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 14​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

8​ .​ ​It​ ​was​ ​stated​ ​in​ ​State​ ​of​ ​M.P.​ ​v.​ ​Nandlal​ ​Jaiswal​ ​that​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​exercise​ ​of​ ​its​ ​discretion​ ​does​ ​not​ ​ordinarily​ ​assist​ ​the​ ​tardy​ ​and​ ​the​ ​indolent​​or​​the​​acquiescent​​and​​the​ ​lethargic.​ ​If​ ​there​ ​is​ ​inordinate​ ​delay​ ​on​ ​the​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​and​ ​such​ ​delay​ ​is​​not​​satisfactorily​​explained,​​the​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​may​ ​decline​ ​to​ ​intervene​ ​and​ ​grant​ ​relief​ ​in​ ​exercise​​of​​its​​writ​​jurisdiction.​​It​​was​​stated​​that​​this​​rule​​is​ ​premised​ ​on​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​factors.​ ​The​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​does​ ​not​ ​ordinarily​ ​permit​ ​a​ ​belated​ ​resort​ ​to​ ​the​ ​extraordinary​ ​remedy​ ​because​ ​it​ ​is​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​cause​ ​confusion​ ​and​ ​public​ ​inconvenience​ ​and​ ​bring​ ​in​ ​its​ ​train​ ​new​ ​injustices,​ ​and​ ​if​ ​writ​​jurisdiction​​is​​exercised​​after​​unreasonable​​delay,​​it​​may​ ​have​ ​the​ ​effect​ ​of​ ​inflicting​ ​not​ ​only​ ​hardship​ ​and​ ​inconvenience​ ​but​ ​also​ ​injustice​ ​on​ ​third​ ​parties.​ ​It​ ​was​ ​pointed​ ​out​ ​that​ ​when​ ​writ​ ​jurisdiction​ ​is​ ​invoked,​ ​unexplained​ ​delay​ ​coupled​ ​with​ ​the​ ​creation​ ​of​ ​third-party​ ​rights​ ​in​ ​the​ ​meantime​ ​is​ ​an​ ​important​ ​factor​ ​which​ ​also​ ​weighs​ ​with​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​deciding​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​to​ ​exercise such jurisdiction.​

​The​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​Nadia​ ​Distt.​ ​Primary​

​School​​Council​​Vs.​​Sristidhar​​Biswar​​reported​​in​​(2007)​​12​​SCC​​779​

​has held as under :​

1​ 1.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​present​ ​case,​ ​the​ ​panel​ ​was​ ​prepared​ ​in​ ​1980​ ​and​ ​the​ ​petitioners​ ​approached​ ​the​ ​court​ ​in​ ​1989​ ​after​ ​the​ ​decision​​in​​Dibakar​​Pal.​​Such​​persons​​should​​not​​be​​given​​any​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 15​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​ enefit​​by​​the​​court​​when​​they​​allowed​​more​​than​​nine​​years​ b ​to​ ​elapse.​ ​Delay​ ​is​ ​very​ ​significant​ ​in​ ​matters​ ​of​ ​granting​ ​relief​ ​and​ ​courts​ ​cannot​ ​come​ ​to​ ​the​ ​rescue​ ​of​ ​the​ ​persons​ ​who​ ​are​ ​not​ ​vigilant​ ​of​ ​their​ ​rights.​ ​Therefore,​ ​the​ ​view​ ​taken​ ​by​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​condoning​ ​the​ ​delay​ ​of​ ​nine​ ​years​ ​cannot be countenanced.​

​The​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​U.P.​ ​Jal​ ​Nigam​ ​Vs.​

​Jaswant Singh reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464​​has held​​as under :​

1​ 2.​ ​The​ ​statement​ ​of​ ​law​ ​has​ ​also​ ​been​ ​summarised​ ​in​ ​Halsbury's​ ​Laws​ ​of​ ​England,​ ​para​ ​911,​ ​p.​ ​395​ ​as​ ​follows:​ ​"In​ ​determining​​whether​​there​​has​​been​​such​​delay​​as​​to​​amount​ ​to laches, the chief points to be considered are:​ ​(i)​​acquiescence​​on​​the​​claimant's​​part;​​and​​(ii)​​any​​change​​of​ ​position​ ​that​ ​has​ ​occurred​ ​on​ ​the​ ​defendant's​ ​part.​ ​Acquiescence​ ​in​ ​this​ ​sense​ ​does​​not​​mean​​standing​​by​​while​ ​the​ ​violation​ ​of​ ​a​ ​right​ ​is​ ​in​ ​progress,​ ​but​ ​assent​ ​after​ ​the​ ​violation​ ​has​ ​been​ ​completed​ ​and​ ​the​ ​claimant​ ​has​ ​become​ ​aware​ ​of​​it.​​It​​is​​unjust​​to​​give​​the​​claimant​​a​​remedy​​where,​ ​by​ ​his​ ​conduct,​ ​he​ ​has​ ​done​ ​that​ ​which​ ​might​ ​fairly​ ​be​ ​regarded​ ​as​ ​equivalent​ ​to​ ​a​ ​waiver​ ​of​ ​it;​ ​or​ ​where​ ​by​ ​his​ ​conduct​ ​and​​neglect,​​though​​not​​waiving​​the​​remedy,​​he​​has​ ​put​ ​the​ ​other​ ​party​ ​in​ ​a​ ​position​ ​in​ ​which​ ​it​ ​would​ ​not​ ​be​ ​reasonable​ ​to​ ​place​​him​​if​​the​​remedy​​were​​afterwards​​to​​be​ ​asserted.​ ​In​ ​such​ ​cases​ ​lapse​ ​of​ ​time​ ​and​ ​delay​ ​are​ ​most​ ​material.​ ​Upon​ ​these​ ​considerations​ ​rests​ ​the​ ​doctrine​ ​of​ ​laches."​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 16​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​The​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​in​​the​​case​​of​​Jagdish​​Lal​​Vs.​​State​​of​

​Haryana reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538​​has held as under​​:​

1​ 8.​ ​That​ ​apart,​ ​as​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​has​ ​repeatedly​ ​held,​ ​the​ ​delay​ ​disentitles​ ​the​​party​​to​​the​​discretionary​​relief​​under​​Article​ ​226or Article 32 of the Constitution.​

​The​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​NDMC​ ​Vs.​ ​Pan​ ​Singh​

​reported in (2007) 9 SCC 278​​has held as under :​

1​ 6.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​another​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​the​ ​matter​ ​which​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​lost​ ​sight​ ​of.​ ​The​ ​respondents​ ​herein​ ​filed​ ​a​ ​writ​ ​petition​ ​after​ ​17​ ​years.​ ​They​ ​did​ ​not​ ​agitate​ ​their​ ​grievances​ ​for​ ​a​ ​long​ ​time.​ ​They,​ ​as​​noticed​​herein,​​did​​not​​claim​​parity​​with​ ​the​ ​17​ ​workmen​ ​at​ ​the​ ​earliest​ ​possible​ ​opportunity.​ ​They​ ​did​ ​not​ ​implead​ ​themselves​ ​as​ ​parties​ ​even​ ​in​​the​​reference​ ​made​ ​by​ ​the​ ​State​ ​before​ ​the​ ​Industrial​ ​Tribunal.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​not​ ​their​ ​case​ ​that​ ​after​ ​1982,​ ​those​ ​employees​ ​who​ ​were​ ​employed​ ​or​ ​who​ ​were​ ​recruited​ ​after​ ​the​ ​cut-off​ ​date​​have​ ​been​ ​granted​ ​the​ ​said​ ​scale​ ​of​ ​pay.​ ​After​ ​such​ ​a​ ​long​ ​time,​ ​therefore,​​the​​writ​​petitions​​could​​not​​have​​been​​entertained​ ​even​ ​if​ ​they​ ​are​ ​similarly​ ​situated.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​trite​ ​that​ ​the​ ​discretionary​ ​jurisdiction​ ​may​ ​not​ ​be​ ​exercised​ ​in​ ​favour​ ​of​ ​those​ ​who​ ​approach​ ​the​ ​court​ ​after​ ​a​ ​long​ ​time.​ ​Delay​ ​and​ ​laches​ ​are​ ​relevant​ ​factors​ ​for​ ​exercise​ ​of​ ​equitable​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 17​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

j​ urisdiction.​ ​(See​ ​Govt.​ ​of​ ​W.B.​ ​v.​ ​Tarun​ ​K.​ ​Roy,​ ​U.P.​ ​Jal​ ​Nigam​ ​v.​​Jaswant​​Singh​​and​​Karnataka​​Power​​Corpn.​​Ltd.​ ​v. K. Thangappan.​​)​ ​17.​ ​Although,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​period​ ​of​ ​limitation​ ​provided​ ​for​ ​filing​ ​a​​writ​​petition​​under​​Article​​226​​of​​the​​Constitution​​of​ ​India,​ ​ordinarily,​ ​writ​ ​petition​ ​should​ ​be​ ​filed​ ​within​ ​a​ ​reasonable​ ​time.​ ​(See​ ​Lipton​ ​India​​Ltd.​​v.​​Union​​of​​India​​and​ ​M.R. Gupta v. Union of India.)​ ​18.​ ​In​ ​Shiv​ ​Dass​ ​v.​ ​Union​ ​of​ ​India​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​held:​ ​(SCC​ ​p.​ ​277,paras 9-10)​ ​"9.​​It​​has​​been​​pointed​​out​​by​​this​​Court​​in​​a​​number​​of​​cases​ ​that​ ​representations​ ​would​ ​not​ ​be​ ​adequate​ ​explanation​ ​to​ ​take​ ​care​ ​of​ ​delay.​ ​This​ ​was​ ​first​ ​stated​ ​in​ ​K.V.​​Rajalakshmiah​ ​Setty​ ​v.​ ​State​ ​of​​Mysore​​.​​There​​is​​a​​limit​​to​​the​​time​​which​​can​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​reasonable​ ​for​ ​making​ ​representations​ ​and​ ​if​ ​the​ ​Government​ ​had​ ​turned​ ​down​ ​one​ ​representation​ ​the​ ​making​ ​of​ ​another​ ​representation​ ​on​ ​similar​ ​lines​ ​will​ ​not​ ​explain​ ​the​ ​delay.​ ​In​ ​State​ ​of​ ​Orissa​ ​v.​ ​Pyarimohan​ ​Samantaray​ ​making​ ​of​ ​repeated​ ​representations​ ​was​ ​not​ ​regarded​​as​​satisfactory​​explanation​​of​​the​​delay.​​In​​that​​case​ ​the​ ​petition​ ​had​ ​been​ ​dismissed​ ​for​ ​delay​ ​alone.​ ​(See​ ​also​ ​State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik​​).​ ​10.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​pension​ ​the​ ​cause​ ​of​ ​action​ ​actually​ ​continues​ ​from​​month​​to​​month.​​That,​​however,​​cannot​​be​​a​ ​ground​ ​to​ ​overlook​ ​delay​ ​in​ ​filing​ ​the​ ​petition.​ ​It​ ​would​ ​depend​ ​upon​​the​​fact​​of​​each​​case.​​If​​petition​​is​​filed​​beyond​ ​a​ ​reasonable​ ​period​ ​say​ ​three​ ​years​ ​normally​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​would​ ​reject​ ​the​ ​same​ ​or​ ​restrict​ ​the​ ​relief​ ​which​ ​could​ ​be​ ​granted​​to​​a​​reasonable​​period​​of​​about​​three​​years.​​The​​High​ ​Court​​did​​not​​examine​​whether​​on​​merit​​the​​appellant​​had​​a​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 18​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

c​ ase.​​If​​on​​merits​​it​​would​​have​​found​​that​​there​​was​​no​​scope​ ​for​​interference,​​it​​would​​have​​dismissed​​the​​writ​​petition​​on​ ​that score alone."​ ​19.​​We,​​therefore,​​are​​of​​the​​opinion​​that​​it​​was​​not​​a​​fit​​case​ ​where​​the​​High​​Court​​should​​have​​exercised​​its​​discretionary​ ​jurisdiction in favour of the respondents herein.​

​The​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​State​ ​of​ ​Orissa​ ​v.​

​Pyarimohan​​Amantaray​​reported​​in​​(1977)​​3​​SCC​​396​ ​has​​held​​as​

​under :​

6​ .​ ​It​ ​would​ ​thus​ ​appear​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​justification​ ​for​ ​the​ ​argument​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Solicitor-General​ ​that​ ​even​ ​though​ ​a​ ​cause​ ​of​ ​action​ ​arose​ ​to​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​as​ ​far​ ​back​ ​as​ ​1962,​ ​on​ ​the​ ​rejection​ ​of​ ​his​ ​representation​ ​on​ ​November​ ​9,​ ​1962,​ ​he​ ​allowed​ ​some​ ​eleven​ ​years​ ​to​ ​go​ ​by​ ​before​ ​filing​ ​the​ ​writ​ ​petition.​ ​There​ ​is​ ​no​ ​satisfactory​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​inordinate​ ​delay​ ​for,​ ​as​ ​has​ ​been​ ​held​ ​by​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​Rabindra​ ​Nath​ ​Bose​ ​v.​ ​Union​ ​of​ ​India​ ​the​ ​making​ ​of​ ​repeated​ ​representations,​ ​after​ ​the​ ​rejection​ ​of​ ​one​ ​representation,​ ​could​ ​not​ ​be​ ​held​ ​to​ ​be​ ​a​ ​satisfactory​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​delay.​​The​​fact​​therefore​​remains​​that​​the​​petitioner​​allowed​ ​some​ ​years​​to​​go​​by​​before​​making​​a​​petition​​for​​the​​redress​ ​of​ ​his​ ​grievances.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​meantime​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​other​ ​appointments​ ​were​ ​also​ ​made​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Indian​ ​Administrative​ ​Service​ ​by​ ​promotion​ ​from​ ​the​ ​State​ ​Civil​ ​Service,​ ​some​ ​of​ ​the​ ​officers​ ​received​ ​promotions​ ​to​ ​higher​ ​posts​ ​in​ ​that​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 19​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

s​ ervice​ ​and​ ​may​ ​even​ ​have​ ​retired.​ ​Those​ ​who​ ​continued​​to​ ​serve​​could​​justifiably​​think​​that​​as​​there​​was​​no​​challenge​​to​ ​their​ ​appointments​ ​within​ ​the​ ​period​ ​prescribed​ ​for​ ​a​ ​suit,​ ​they​ ​could​ ​look​ ​forward​ ​to​ ​further​ ​promotion​ ​and​ ​higher​ ​terminal​ ​benefits​ ​on​ ​retirement.​ ​The​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​therefore​ ​erred​​in​​rejecting​​the​​argument​​that​​the​​writ​​petition​​should​ ​be​ ​dismissed​ ​because​ ​of​ ​the​ ​inordinate​ ​and​ ​unexplained​ ​delay​ ​even​ ​though​ ​it​ ​was​ ​"strenuously"​ ​urged​ ​for​ ​its​ ​consideration on behalf of the Government of India.​

​The​​Supreme​​Court​​in​​the​​case​​of​​State​​of​​Orissa​​v.​​Arun​

​Kumar​ ​Patnaik​ ​reported​ ​in​ ​(1976)​ ​3​ ​SCC​ ​579​ ​has​ ​held​ ​as​

​under:​

1​ 4​ ​.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​unnecessary​ ​to​ ​deal​ ​at​ ​length​ ​with​ ​the​ ​State's​ ​contention​ ​that​ ​the​ ​writ​ ​petitions​ ​were​ ​filed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​after​ ​a​ ​long​ ​delay​ ​and​ ​that​ ​the​ ​writ​ ​petitioners​ ​are​ ​guilty​ ​of​ ​laches.​ ​We​ ​have​ ​no​ ​doubt​ ​that​ ​Patnaik​ ​and​ ​Mishra​ ​brought​ ​to​ ​the​ ​court​ ​a​ ​grievance​ ​too​ ​stale​ ​to​ ​merit​ ​redress.​ ​Krishna​ ​Moorthy's​ ​appointment​ ​was​ ​gazetted​ ​on​ ​March​ ​14,​ ​1962​ ​and​ ​it​ ​is​ ​incredible​ ​that​ ​his​ ​service-horoscope​ ​was​ ​not​ ​known​ ​to​ ​his​ ​possible​ ​competitors.​ ​On​ ​November​ ​15,​ ​1968​ ​they​​were​​all​​confirmed​​as​​Assistant​​Engineers​​by​​a​​common​ ​gazette​ ​notification​ ​and​ ​that​ ​notification​ ​showed​ ​Krishna​ ​Moorthy's​ ​confirmation​ ​as​ ​of​ ​February​ ​27,​ ​1961​ ​and​ ​that​ ​of​ ​the​ ​other​ ​two​ ​as​ ​of​ ​May​ ​2,​ ​1962.​ ​And​ ​yet​ ​till​ ​May​ ​29,​ ​1973​ ​when​ ​the​ ​writ​ ​petitions​ ​were​ ​filed,​ ​the​ ​petitioners​ ​did​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 20​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​ othing​​except​​to​​file​​a​​representation​​to​​the​​Government​​on​ n ​June​ ​19,​ ​1970​ ​and​ ​a​ ​memorial​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Governor​ ​on​ ​April​ ​16,​ ​1973.​​The​​High​​Court​​made​​light​​of​​this​​long​​and​​inexplicable​ ​delay​​with​​a​​casual​​remark​​that​​the​​contention​​was​​"without​ ​any​ ​force".​ ​It​ ​overlooked​ ​that​ ​in​ ​June,​ ​1974​ ​it​ ​was​ ​setting​ ​aside​​an​​appointment​​dated​​March,​​1962​​of​​a​​person​​who​​had​ ​in​ ​the​ ​meanwhile​ ​risen​ ​to​ ​the​ ​rank​ ​of​ ​a​ ​Superintending​ ​Engineer.​ ​Those​ ​12​ ​long​ ​years​ ​were​ ​as​ ​if​ ​writ​ ​in​ ​water.​ ​We​ ​cannot​ ​but​ ​express​ ​our​ ​grave​​concern​​that​​an​​extraordinary​ ​jurisdiction​ ​should​ ​have​ ​been​ ​exercised​ ​in​ ​such​ ​an​ ​abject​ ​disregard​​of​​consequences​​and​​in​​favour​​of​​persons​​who​​were​ ​unmindful of their so-called rights for many long years.​

​The​​Supreme​​Court​​in​​the​​case​​of​​BSNL​​v.​​Ghanshyam​​Dass​

​reported in (2011) 4 SCC 374​​has held as under :​

2​ 6.​ ​On​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand,​ ​where​ ​only​ ​the​ ​affected​ ​parties​ ​approach​ ​the​ ​court​ ​and​ ​relief​ ​is​ ​given​ ​to​ ​those​ ​parties,​ ​the​ ​fence-sitters​ ​who​ ​did​ ​not​ ​approach​ ​the​ ​court​ ​cannot​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​such​ ​relief​ ​should​ ​have​ ​been​ ​extended​​to​​them​​thereby​ ​upsetting​​or​​interfering​​with​​the​​rights​​which​​had​​accrued​​to​ ​others.​ ​27.​ ​In​ ​Jagdish​ ​Lal​ ​v.​ ​State​ ​of​​Haryana​​,​​the​​appellants​​who​​were​ ​general​ ​candidates​ ​belatedly​ ​challenged​ ​the​ ​promotion​ ​of​ ​Scheduled​​Caste​​and​​Scheduled​​Tribe​​candidates​​on​​the​​basis​ ​of​ ​the​ ​decisions​ ​in​​Ajit​ ​Singh​ ​Januja​ ​v.​​State​​of​​Punjab,​​Union​​of​ ​India​ ​v.​ ​Virpal​ ​Singh​ ​Chauhan​ ​and​ ​R.K.​ ​Sabharwal​ ​v.​ ​State​ ​of​ ​Punjab​ ​and​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​refused​ ​to​ ​grant​ ​the​ ​relief​ ​saying:​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 21​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

(​ ​Jagdish​​Lal​​case​​,​​SCC​​pp​​.​​562-63,​​para​​18​​)​​"18.​​...​​this​​Court​​has​ ​repeatedly​ ​held,​ ​the​ ​delay​ ​disentitles​ ​the​ ​party​ ​to​ ​the​ ​discretionary​ ​relief​ ​under​ ​Article​ ​226​ ​or​ ​Article​ ​32​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Constitution.​​It​​is​​not​​necessary​​to​​reiterate​​all​​the​​catena​​of​ ​precedents​ ​in​ ​this​ ​behalf.​ ​Suffice​ ​it​ ​to​ ​state​ ​that​ ​the​ ​appellants​ ​kept​ ​sleeping​ ​over​ ​their​ ​rights​ ​for​ ​long​ ​and​ ​elected​ ​to​ ​wake​ ​up​ ​when​ ​they​ ​had​ ​the​ ​impetus​ ​from​ ​Virpal​ ​Chauhan​ ​and​ ​Ajit​ ​Singh​ ​ratios.​ ​But​ ​Virpal​ ​Chauhan​ ​and​ ​Sabharwal​ ​cases​​,​ ​kept​ ​at​ ​rest​ ​the​ ​promotion​​already​​made​​by​ ​that​ ​date,​ ​and​ ​declared​ ​them​ ​as​ ​valid;​ ​they​ ​were​ ​limited​ ​to​ ​the​​question​​of​​future​​promotions​​given​​by​​applying​​the​​rule​ ​of​ ​reservation​ ​to​ ​all​ ​the​ ​persons​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​the​ ​date​ ​of​ ​judgment​ ​in​ ​Sabharwal​ ​case​ ​which​ ​required​ ​to​​be​​examined​ ​in​ ​the​ ​light​ ​of​ ​the​ ​law​ ​laid​ ​in​ ​Sabharwal​ ​case.​ ​Thus​ ​earlier​ ​promotions​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​reopened.​ ​Only​ ​those​ ​cases​ ​arising​ ​after​​that​​date​​would​​be​​examined​​in​​the​​light​​of​​the​​law​​laid​ ​down​​in​​Sabharwal​​case​​and​​Virpal​​Chauhan​​case​​and​​equally​ ​Ajit​ ​Singh​ ​case.​ ​If​ ​the​ ​candidate​ ​has​ ​already​ ​been​ ​further​ ​promoted​ ​to​ ​the​ ​higher​ ​echelons​ ​of​ ​service,​ ​his​ ​seniority​ ​is​ ​not​ ​open​ ​to​ ​be​ ​reviewed.​ ​In​ ​A.B.S.​ ​Karamchari​ ​Sangh​ ​case​ ​a​ ​Bench​ ​of​ ​two​ ​Judges​ ​to​ ​which​ ​two​ ​of​ ​us,​​K.​ ​Ramaswamy​ ​and​ ​G.B.​ ​Pattanaik,​ ​JJ.​ ​were​ ​members,​ ​had​ ​reiterated​ ​the​ ​above​ ​view​ ​and​ ​it​ ​was​ ​also​ ​held​ ​that​ ​all​ ​the​ ​prior​ ​promotions​ ​are​ ​not​​open​​to​​judicial​​review.​​In​​Chander​​Pal​​v.​​State​​of​​Haryana​​a​ ​Bench​ ​of​ ​two​ ​Judges​ ​consisting​ ​of​ ​S.C.​ ​Agrawal​ ​and​ ​G.T.​ ​Nanavati​​,​​JJ​​.​​considered​​the​​effect​​of​​Virpal​​Chauhan,​​Ajit​​Singh,​ ​Sabharwal​​and​​A.B.S.​​Karamchari​​Sangh​​cases​​and​​held​​that​​the​ ​seniority​ ​of​ ​those​ ​respondents​ ​who​ ​had​ ​already​ ​retired​ ​or​ ​had​ ​been​ ​promoted​ ​to​ ​higher​ ​posts​ ​could​ ​not​ ​be​ ​disturbed.​ ​The​ ​seniority​ ​of​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​therein​ ​and​ ​the​ ​respondents​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 22​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​ ho​ ​were​ ​holding​ ​the​ ​post​ ​in​ ​the​ ​same​ ​level​ ​or​ ​in​​the​​same​ w ​cadre​ ​would​ ​be​ ​adjusted​ ​keeping​ ​in​ ​view​ ​the​ ​ratio​ ​in​ ​Virpal​ ​Chauhan​ ​and​​Ajit​​Singh;​​but​​promotion,​​if​​any,​​had​​been​​given​ ​to​​any​​of​​them​​during​​the​​pendency​​of​​this​​writ​​petition​​was​ ​directed not to be disturbed."​

​The​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​Ghulam​ ​Rasool​ ​Lone​ ​v.​

​State of J&K reported in (2009) 15 SCC 321​​has held​​as under:​

2​ 2​ ​.​ ​If​ ​at​ ​this​ ​late​ ​juncture​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​is​ ​directed​ ​to​ ​be​ ​promoted​ ​to​ ​the​ ​post​ ​of​ ​Sub-Inspector​ ​even​ ​above​ ​Abdul​ ​Rashid​ ​Rather,​ ​the​ ​seniority​ ​of​ ​those​ ​who​ ​had​ ​been​ ​promoted​ ​in​ ​the​ ​meantime​ ​or​ ​have​ ​been​ ​directly​ ​recruited​ ​would​​be​​affected.​​The​​State​​would​​also​​have​​to​​pay​​the​​back​ ​wages​ ​to​ ​him​ ​which​ ​would​ ​be​ ​a​ ​drainage​ ​of​ ​public​ ​funds.​ ​Whereas​ ​an​ ​employee​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​denied​ ​his​ ​promotion​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​the​ ​rules,​ ​the​ ​same​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​granted​ ​out​ ​of​ ​the​ ​way​ ​as​ ​a​ ​result​ ​whereof​ ​the​ ​rights​ ​of​ ​third​ ​parties​ ​are​ ​affected.​ ​The​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​public​ ​interest​ ​as​ ​also​ ​the​ ​general​ ​administration​ ​must,​ ​therefore,​ ​be​ ​kept​ ​in​ ​mind​ ​while​ ​granting equitable relief.​ ​23.​ ​We​ ​understand​ ​that​ ​there​ ​would​ ​be​ ​a​ ​heart​ ​burning​ ​insofar​ ​as​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​is​ ​concerned,​ ​but​ ​then​ ​he​ ​is​ ​to​ ​thank​ ​himself​ ​therefor.​ ​If​ ​those​ ​five​ ​persons,​ ​who​ ​were​ ​seniors​ ​to​ ​Hamiddulah​​Dar​​filed​​writ​​petitions​​immediately,​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​might​ ​have​ ​directed​ ​cancellation​ ​of​ ​his​ ​illegal​ ​promotion.​ ​This​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​Maharaj​ ​Krishan​ ​Bhatt​ ​did​ ​not​ ​take​ ​into​ ​consideration​ ​all​ ​these​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​the​ ​matter​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 23​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

a​ nd​ ​the​ ​binding​ ​decision​ ​of​ ​a​ ​three-Judge​ ​Bench​ ​of​ ​this​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​Govt.​ ​of​ ​W.B.​ ​v.​ ​Tarun​ ​K.​ ​Roy​​.​ ​The​ ​Division​ ​Bench​ ​of​ ​the​ ​High​ ​Court,​ ​therefore,​ ​in​ ​our​ ​opinion​ ​was​ ​right​ ​in​ ​opining​ ​that​ ​it​ ​was​ ​not​ ​necessary​ ​for​ ​it​ ​to​ ​follow​ ​Maharaj​ ​Krishan Bhatt.​

​The​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​P.S.​ ​Sadasivaswamy​ ​v.​

​State of T.N., reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152​​has held​​as under :​

"​ 2.​ ​...​ ​A​​person​​aggrieved​​by​​an​​order​​of​​promoting​​a​​junior​ ​over​ ​his​ ​head​ ​should​ ​approach​ ​the​​Court​​at​​least​​within​​six​ ​months​ ​or​ ​at​ ​the​ ​most​ ​a​ ​year​ ​of​ ​such​ ​promotion.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​not​ ​that​ ​there​ ​is​ ​any​ ​period​ ​of​ ​limitation​ ​for​ ​the​ ​courts​ ​to​ ​exercise​ ​their​ ​powers​ ​under​ ​Article​ ​226​ ​nor​ ​is​ ​it​ ​that​ ​there​ ​can​ ​never​ ​be​ ​a​ ​case​ ​where​ ​the​ ​courts​ ​cannot​ ​interfere​ ​in​ ​a​ ​matter​ ​after​ ​the​ ​passage​ ​of​ ​a​ ​certain​ ​length​ ​of​ ​time.​ ​But​ ​it​ ​would​ ​be​ ​a​ ​sound​ ​and​ ​wise​ ​exercise​ ​of​ ​discretion​ ​for​ ​the​ ​courts​ ​to​ ​refuse​ ​to​ ​exercise​ ​their​ ​extraordinary​ ​powers​ ​under​ ​Article​ ​226​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​persons​ ​who​ ​do​ ​not​ ​approach​ ​it​ ​expeditiously​ ​for​ ​relief​ ​and​ ​who​ ​stand​ ​by​ ​and​ ​allow​ ​things​ ​to​ ​happen​ ​and​ ​then​​approach​​the​​Court​​to​​put​ ​forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters."​ ​10.​ ​The​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​Administrator​ ​of​

​Union​ ​Territory​ ​of​ ​Daman​ ​and​ ​Diu​ ​and​ ​others​ ​v.​ ​R.D.​ ​Valand​

​reported in 1995 Supp (4) 593​​has held as under:-​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 24​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

"​ 4.​ ​We​​are​​of​​the​​view​​that​​the​​Tribunal​​was​​not​​justified​​in​ ​interfering​ ​with​ ​the​ ​stale​ ​claim​ ​of​ ​the​ ​respondent.​ ​He​ ​was​ ​promoted​ ​to​ ​the​ ​post​ ​of​ ​Junior​ ​Engineer​ ​in​ ​the​ ​year​ ​1979​ ​with​ ​effect​ ​from​ ​28-9-1972.​ ​A​ ​cause​ ​of​ ​action,​ ​if​ ​any,​ ​had​ ​arisen​​to​​him​​at​​that​​time.​​He​​slept​​over​​the​​matter​​till​​1985​ ​when​ ​he​ ​made​ ​representation​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Administration.​ ​The​ ​said​ ​representation​ ​was​ ​rejected​ ​on​ ​8-10-1986.​ ​Thereafter​ ​for​ ​four​ ​years​ ​the​ ​respondent​ ​did​ ​not​ ​approach​ ​any​ ​court​ ​and​ ​finally​ ​he​ ​filed​ ​the​ ​present​ ​application​ ​before​ ​the​ ​Tribunal​ ​in​ ​March,​ ​1990.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​facts​ ​and​ ​circumstances​ ​of​ ​this​ ​case,​​the​​Tribunal​​was​​not​​justified​​in​​putting​​the​​clock​ ​back​ ​by​ ​more​ ​than​ ​15​ ​years.​ ​The​ ​Tribunal​ ​fell​ ​into​ ​patent​ ​error​ ​in​ ​brushing​ ​aside​ ​the​ ​question​ ​of​ ​limitation​ ​by​ ​observing​ ​that​ ​the​ ​respondent​ ​has​ ​been​ ​making​ ​representations​​from​​time​​to​​time​​and​​as​​such​​the​​limitation​ ​would not come in his way."​

​11.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​well​ ​established​ ​principle​ ​of​ ​law​ ​that​ ​in​​old​​and​

​stale​ ​cases​ ​the​ ​court​ ​should​ ​not​ ​even​ ​pass​ ​an​ ​order​ ​directing​

​the​ ​respondents​ ​to​ ​decide​ ​the​ ​representation​ ​and​ ​even​ ​if​ ​any​

​representation​​is​​decided​​on​​such​​direction,​​still​​the​​said​​order​

​will not give rise to any new cause of action.​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 25​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​12.​​The​​Supreme​​Court​​in​​the​​case​​of​​State​​of​​Uttaranchal​

​v.​​Shiv​​Charan​​Singh​​Bhandari​​reported​​in​​(2013)​​12​​SCC​​179​​has​

​held as under :​

1​ 9.​ ​From​ ​the​ ​aforesaid​ ​authorities​ ​it​ ​is​ ​clear​ ​as​ ​crystal​​that​ ​even​ ​if​ ​the​ ​court​ ​or​ ​tribunal​ ​directs​ ​for​ ​consideration​ ​of​ ​representations​​relating​​to​​a​​stale​​claim​​or​​dead​​grievance​​it​ ​does​ ​not​​give​​rise​​to​​a​​fresh​​cause​​of​​action.​​The​​dead​​cause​ ​of​ ​action​ ​cannot​ ​rise​ ​like​ ​a​ ​phoenix.​ ​Similarly,​ ​a​ ​mere​ ​submission​ ​of​ ​representation​ ​to​ ​the​ ​competent​ ​authority​ ​does not arrest time.​ ​* * * *​ ​28.​ ​Remaining​ ​oblivious​ ​to​ ​the​ ​factum​ ​of​ ​delay​ ​and​ ​laches​ ​and​ ​granting​ ​relief​ ​is​ ​contrary​ ​to​ ​all​ ​settled​ ​principles​ ​and​ ​even​ ​would​ ​not​ ​remotely​ ​attract​ ​the​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​discretion.​ ​We​ ​may​ ​hasten​ ​to​ ​add​ ​that​​the​​same​​may​​not​​be​​applicable​ ​in​ ​all​ ​circumstances​ ​where​ ​certain​ ​categories​ ​of​ ​fundamental​ ​rights​ ​are​ ​infringed.​ ​But,​ ​a​ ​stale​ ​claim​ ​of​ ​getting​ ​promotional​ ​benefits​ ​definitely​ ​should​ ​not​ ​have​ ​been​ ​entertained​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Tribunal​​and​​accepted​​by​​the​​High​ ​Court.​ ​The​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​C.​ ​Jacob​ ​v.​ ​Director​ ​of​

​Geology​ ​and​ ​Mining​ ​reported​ ​in​ ​(2008)​ ​10​ ​SCC​ ​115​ ​has​ ​held​ ​as​

​under :​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 26​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

"​ 10.​​Every​​representation​​to​​the​​Government​​for​​relief,​​may​ ​not​ ​be​ ​replied​ ​on​ ​merits.​ ​Representations​ ​relating​ ​to​ ​matters​ ​which​ ​have​ ​become​ ​stale​ ​or​ ​barred​ ​by​ ​limitation,​ ​can​​be​​rejected​​on​​that​​ground​​alone,​​without​​examining​​the​ ​merits​ ​of​ ​the​ ​claim.​ ​In​ ​regard​ ​to​ ​representations​ ​unrelated​ ​to​​the​​Department,​​the​​reply​​may​​be​​only​​to​​inform​​that​​the​ ​matter​ ​did​ ​not​ ​concern​ ​the​ ​Department​ ​or​ ​to​ ​inform​ ​the​ ​appropriate​ ​Department.​ ​Representations​ ​with​ ​incomplete​ ​particulars​ ​may​ ​be​ ​replied​ ​by​ ​seeking​ ​relevant​ ​particulars.​ ​The​ ​replies​ ​to​ ​such​ ​representations,​ ​cannot​ ​furnish​ ​a​ ​fresh​ ​cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim."​

​The​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​Union​ ​of​ ​India​ ​v.​ ​M.K.​

​Sarkar reported in (2010) 2 SCC 59​​has held as under​​:​

"​ 15.​ ​When​ ​a​ ​belated​ ​representation​ ​in​ ​regard​ ​to​​a​​'stale'​​or​ ​'dead'​ ​issue/dispute​ ​is​ ​considered​ ​and​ ​decided,​ ​in​ ​compliance​ ​with​ ​a​ ​direction​ ​by​ ​the​​court/tribunal​​to​​do​​so,​ ​the​​date​​of​​such​​decision​​cannot​​be​​considered​​as​​furnishing​ ​a​ ​fresh​ ​cause​ ​of​ ​action​ ​for​ ​reviving​ ​the​ ​'dead'​ ​issue​ ​or​ ​time-barred​ ​dispute.​ ​The​ ​issue​ ​of​ ​limitation​ ​or​ ​delay​ ​and​ ​laches​ ​should​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​with​ ​reference​ ​to​ ​the​ ​original​ ​cause​​of​​action​​and​​not​​with​​reference​​to​​the​​date​​on​​which​ ​an​ ​order​ ​is​ ​passed​ ​in​ ​compliance​ ​with​ ​a​ ​court's​ ​direction.​ ​Neither​ ​a​ ​court's​ ​direction​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​a​ ​representation​ ​issued​​without​​examining​​the​​merits,​​nor​​a​​decision​​given​​in​ ​compliance​ ​with​ ​such​ ​direction,​ ​will​ ​extend​ ​the​ ​limitation,​ ​or erase the delay and laches."​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 27​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

​The​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​State​ ​of​ ​T.N.​ ​v.​

​Seshachalam reported in (2007) 10 SCC 137​​has held​​as under :​

"​ 16.​ ​...​ ​filing​ ​of​ ​representations​ ​alone​ ​would​ ​not​ ​save​ ​the​ ​period​ ​of​​limitation.​​Delay​​or​​laches​​is​​a​​relevant​​factor​​for​ ​a​ ​court​ ​of​​law​​to​​determine​​the​​question​​as​​to​​whether​​the​ ​claim​ ​made​ ​by​ ​an​ ​applicant​ ​deserves​ ​consideration.​ ​Delay​ ​and/or​ ​laches​ ​on​ ​the​ ​part​ ​of​ ​a​ ​government​ ​servant​ ​may​ ​deprive​ ​him​​of​​the​​benefit​​which​​had​​been​​given​​to​​others.​ ​Article​ ​14​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Constitution​ ​of​ ​India​ ​would​ ​not,​ ​in​ ​a​ ​situation​ ​of​ ​that​ ​nature,​ ​be​ ​attracted​ ​as​ ​it​ ​is​ ​well​ ​known​ ​that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant."​

​The​​Supreme​​Court​​in​​the​​case​​of​​Union​​of​​India​​and​​others​

​v. Chaman Rana reported in (2018) 5 SCC 798​​has held​​as under:-​

"​ 10.​ ​Mere​ ​repeated​ ​filing​ ​of​ ​representations​ ​could​ ​not​ ​be​ ​sufficient​ ​explanation​ ​for​ ​delay​ ​in​ ​approaching​ ​the​ ​Court​ ​for​ ​grant​ ​of​ ​relief,​ ​was​ ​considered​ ​in​ ​Gandhinagar​ ​Motor​ ​Transport​ ​Society​ ​v.​ ​Kasbekar​ ​[Gandhinagar​ ​Motor​ ​Transport​ ​Society​​v.​​Kasbekar,​​1953​​SCC​​OnLine​​Bom​​64​​:​​AIR​​1954​​Bom​​202]​​,​ ​by​​Chagla,​​C.J.​​observing​​as​​follows:​​(SCC​​OnLine​​Bom​​:​​AIR​​p.​​203,​ ​para 2)​ ​"2.​​...​​Now,​​we​​have​​had​​occasion​​to​​point​​out​​that​​the​​only​ ​delay​​which​​this​​Court​​will​​excuse​​in​​presenting​​a​​petition​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 28​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

i​ s​ ​the​ ​delay​ ​which​ ​is​ ​caused​ ​by​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​pursuing​ ​a​ ​legal​ ​remedy​​which​​is​​given​​to​​him.​​In​​this​​particular​​case​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​did​ ​not​ ​pursue​ ​a​ ​legal​ ​remedy.​​The​​remedy​ ​he​​pursued​​was​​extra-legal​​or​​extra-judicial.​​Once​​the​​final​ ​decision​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Government​ ​is​ ​given,​ ​a​ ​representation​ ​is​ ​merely​ ​a​ ​n​ ​appeal​ ​for​ ​mercy​ ​or​ ​indulgence,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​pursuing a remedy which the law gave to the petitioner. ..."​

​In​ ​view​ ​of​ ​the​ ​aforesaid​ ​legal​ ​pronunciation​ ​by​ ​the​

​Hon'ble​ ​Apex​ ​Court,​ ​we​ ​are​ ​not​ ​inclined​ ​to​ ​interfere​​with​​the​

​order​ ​passed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​learned​ ​Tribunal​ ​on​ ​merits​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​on​

​delay and laches. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed.​

Sd/-​ ​ SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI​ ​ JUDGE​ ​

Sd/-​ ​ SYAM KUMAR V.M.​ ​ JUDGE​ ​ MC/4.8​ ​ ​W.P(C).No.5243 of 2025 29​ 2025:KER:58943​ ​

APPENDIX OF WP(C) 5243/2025​ ​

PETITIONER EXHIBITS​ ​

Exhibit P-1​ ​ ​RUE​ ​ T COPY​ ​ OF​ ​ O.A.​ ​344​ ​ OF​ ​ 2018​ ​ALONG​ WITH ALL ANNEXURE​ ​ Exhibit P-2​ ​ TRUE​ ​ ​ COPY​ ​OF​ ​THE​ ​REPLY​ ​ STATEMENT​ ALONG WITH ALL ANNEXURE​ ​ Exhibit P-3​ ​ TRUE​ ​ ​ COPY​ ​ OF​ ​ ORDER​ ​ DATED​ ​ 29.06.2022​ IN​ ​ ​ OA​ ​NO.344​ ​OF​ ​2018​ ​ON​ ​ FILES​ ​ OF​ HON'BLE ARMED FORCES TRIBUNAL​ ​ Exhibit P-4​ ​ TRUE​ ​ ​ COPY​ ​OF​ ​ NOTIFICATION​ ​ NO.SO​ 5370(E)​ ​ ​ DATED​ ​ 17.10.2018​ ​ OF​ ​ THE​ MINISTRY​ ​ ​ OF​ ​ SOCIAL​ ​ JUSTICE​ ​ AND​ EMPOWERMENT​ ​ (DEPARTMENT​ ​ OF​ ​ EMPOWERMENT​ ​ OF​ ​ PERSONS​ ​ WITH​ ​ DISABILITIES)​ ​ Exhibit P-5​ ​ TRUE​ ​ ​ COPY​ ​ OF​ ​ ORDER​ ​ DATED​ ​ 18.10.2023​ IN​ ​ ​ OA​ ​ NO.​ ​ 111​ ​OF​ ​ 2022​ ​ IN​ ​ NAIK​ ​GLADY​ WILLS VS. UNION OF INDIA & ORS​ ​ Exhibit P-6​ ​ TRUE​ ​ ​ COPY​ ​OF​ ​THE​ ​GOI​ ​ (MOD)​ ​ LETTER​ NO.12​ ​ (06)/2019/D(PEN/POL)​ ​ DATED​ ​ 16.07.2020​ ​