Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 3247 Ker
Judgement Date : 8 August, 2025
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2025:KER:59608
Crl. Appeal No.2353/2007
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE JOHNSON JOHN
FRIDAY, THE 8TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 17TH SRAVANA, 1947
CRL.A NO. 2353 OF 2007
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 04.08.2007 in CC NO. 349 OF 2005 OF
JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE-II (ADDITIONAL MUNSIFF), KASARAGOD
APPELLANT/COMPLAINANT:
M/S.MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA FINANCIAL
SERVICES LIMITED, HAVING ITS CORPORATE OFFICE AT, SADHANA
HOUSE, 2ND FLOOR, 570 PB MARG,BEHIND MAHINDRA,
TOWERS,WORLI, MUMBAI- 400 018, DULY REPRESENTED BY THE
POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER, SRI.TONY GEORGE, AGED 29 YEARS,
BRANCH IN-CHARGE, M/S. MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA FINANCIAL
SERVICES LIMITED, KASARAGOD BRANCH.
BY ADV SRI.DEVAPRASANTH.P.J.
RESPONDENT/ACCUSED:
1 AMJAS.M.P. @ MOHAMED AMJAS
AGED 27 YEARS, S/O. ABDUL RAHIMAN, 5/106,, F (13/124), KUKKATH,
PULIYAKKOTTU HOUSE,, KARASSERY, KOZHIKODE.
2 STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA.
BY ADVS.
SRI.K.M.MUHAMMED HUSSAIN
SMT.P.K.PRIYA
R1 BY SRI.K.V.SREE VINAYAKAN
SRI.T.K.VIPINDAS
SMT. HASNAMOL N.S., PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07.08.2025, THE
COURT ON 08.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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Crl. Appeal No.2353/2007
JOHNSON JOHN, J.
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Crl. Appeal No. 2353 of 2007
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Dated this the 8th day of August, 2025
JUDGMENT
In this appeal, the complainant before the trial court is challenging
the acquittal of the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act (for short 'N.I Act') as per the impugned judgment.
2. As per the complaint, the accused availed finance for
purchasing a vehicle from the complainant company after executing an
agreement on 08.01.2002. The accused committed default in payment of
the monthly instalments and there was a balance of Rs.57,000/- and
towards discharge of the said liability, the accused issued cheque dated
19.11.2004 for Rs.57,000/-. When the complainant presented the
cheque for collection, the same was dishonoured for the reason
'payment stopped by the drawer' as per the memo dated 15.2.2005 and
in spite of statutory notice, the accused failed to pay the cheque amount
to the complainant.
3. From the side of the complainant, PWs 1 and 2 were examined
and Exhibits P1 to P10 were marked, and from the side of the accused,
Exhibits D1 and D2 were marked.
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4. After considering the oral and documentary evidence on record
and hearing both sides, the trial court found that the complainant has
not succeeded in proving the offence under Section 138 of the N.I Act
against the accused and hence, the accused was acquitted.
5. Heard both sides and perused the records.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the accused
has not disputed the signature in Exhibit P1 cheque and that the trial
court ought to have found that the complainant is entitled for the benefit
of the presumptions under Sections 139 and 118 of the N.I Act.
7. But, the learned counsel for the accused/first respondent
argued that the complainant has not disclosed the alleged date of
execution and issuance of the cheque in the complaint or in the statutory
notice. Further, PWs 1 and 2 have no case that they witnessed the
execution and issuance of Exhibit P1 cheque by the accused to the
complainant and in the absence of prima facie evidence regarding
execution and issuance of cheque, the appellant/complainant cannot
claim the benefit of the presumptions under Sections 138 and 118 of the
N.I Act.
8. It is pertinent to note that even though the case of the
complainant company is that the accused executed an agreement in
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favour of the company on 08.01.2002, the said agreement is not seen
produced or marked in evidence. Exhibit P8 loan agreement is dated
18.11.2002 and Exhibit P9 loan agreement is dated 31.10.2002. The
case of the accused is that he had entered into an agreement with the
complainant company on 31.10.2002 for the purchase of a vehicle and
since he could not repay the instalments, he returned the vehicle to the
company and the company sold the vehicle.
9. It is also the case of the accused that the company initiated
arbitration proceedings against him and realised the balance amount in
execution and in support of the said contention, the accused also
produced Exhibit D1, copy of the execution petition, and Exhibit D2,
statement regarding full satisfaction in E.P No. 89 of 2006.
10. In M.S.Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala [2006(6) SCC
39], the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the nature of the standard of
proof for rebutting the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I Act and
it was held that if some material is brought on record consistent with the
innocence of the accused, which may reasonably be true, even though it
is not positively proved to be true, the accused would be entitled to
acquittal.
11. In Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa [2019 (5) SCC 418], the
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Hon'ble Supreme Court summarised the principles of law governing the
presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act in the following
manner :
"(i) Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability.
(ii) The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.
(iii) To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.
(iv) That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.
(v) It is not necessary for the accused to come inthe witness box to support his defence."
12. The standard of proof which is required from the accused to
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rebut the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I
Act is preponderance of probabilities and the accused is not required to
prove his case beyond reasonable doubt.
13. As noticed earlier, the complainant has not disclosed the date
of execution and issuance of cheque in the complaint or statutory notice.
Further, PWs 1 and 2 have no case that they witnessed the execution
and issuance of cheque by the accused to the complainant.
14. From Exhibits D1 and D2, it can be seen that the complainant
company has initiated arbitration proceedings against the accused
herein, and Exhibit D2 statement dated 23.02.2007 would show that the
company has reported full satisfaction of the arbitration award against
the accused. Therefore, I find no reason to interfere with the finding in
the impugned judgment that the complainant has not succeeded in
proving the offence under Section 138 of the N.I Act against the
accused. Therefore, I find that this appeal is liable to be dismissed.
In the result, this appeal is dismissed.
sd/-
JOHNSON JOHN, JUDGE.
Rv
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