Kerala High Court
Selma vs State Of Kerala on 7 August, 2025
Author: V Raja Vijayaraghavan
Bench: V Raja Vijayaraghavan
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. V. JAYAKUMAR
THURSDAY, THE 7TH DAY OF AUGUST 2025 / 16TH SRAVANA, 1947
WP(CRL.) NO. 606 OF 2025
PETITIONER:
SELMA, AGED 51 YEARS, W/O CICIEL DICKY, RESIDING AT
THAYADINILAM PARAMBU, NADAKKAVU P.O, KOZHIKODE PIN - 673011
BY ADV SRI.ADITHYA RAJEEV
RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY
TO GOVERNMENT, HOME DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR & DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, KOZHIKODE
DISTRICT, CIVIL STATION, ERANHIPPALAM, KOZHIKODE - 673020
3 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, PALAYAM, KOZHIKODE
DISTRICT., PIN - 673004
4 THE SUPERINTENDENT
CENTRAL JAIL, KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN - 670004
5 THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, NADAKKAVU POLICE STATION, NADAKKAVU,
KOZHIKODE DISTRICT, PIN - 673011
BY ADVS.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:ANAS K A
THIS WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
14.07.2025, THE COURT ON 07.08.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 2
JUDGMENT
K. V. Jayakumar, J.
This Writ Petition is filed by the mother of Christopher, aged 30 years ['the
detenu' for the sake of brevity] challenging Ext.P1 order passed under Section 3(1)
of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 ['the KAA(P) Act' for the
sake of brevity] dated 03.03.2025.
2. In Ext.P1 order, the detenu was classified as 'Known-Rowdy' under
Section 2p(iii) of the KAA(P) Act. In order to classify him as Known-Rowdy, the
sponsoring authority has reckoned six crimes. Out of these, the detaining authority
has taken into consideration five cases involving grave offences. The details of the
crimes are as follows:
1. Crime No.737/2023 of Kozhikode Kasaba Police Station, registered for offence under
Section 392 of IPC.
2. Crime No.738/2023 of Kozhikode Kasaba Police Station, registered for offence under
Section 395 of IPC.
3. Cime No.1017/2023 of Nadakkavu Police Station, registered for offences under
Section 506 IPC and Section 3(i) of PDPP Act, 1984.
4. Crime No.391/2024 of Kasaba Police Station, registered for offences under Sections
392 and 201 of IPC.
5. Crime No.491/2024 of Kannur Railway Police Station, registered for offence under
Section 305 of BNS, 2023.
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 3
3. The last prejudicial act is Crime No. 491 of 2024. In that matter, the
detenu has been arrayed as accused No. 1. He was arrested on 02.12.2024 and is
in judicial custody. The charge sheet has also been filed in the said case. The
allegation against the detenu is that, on 15.11.2024, while the complainant, Sunil
Raj, and his wife were travelling in the Mangala Express from Kalyan, Maharashtra
to Thrissur, he snatched their gold ornaments.
The submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner
4. Sri. Adithya Rajeev, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted
that the impugned order was passed without proper application of mind and in a
mechanical manner. Placing reliance on the judgment in Stenny Eliamma Saju v.
State of Kerala1, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
detaining authority has not arrived at the requisite satisfaction, before the
invocation of the power under Section 3 of the KAA(P) Act.
5. It is further submitted that the live link between the last prejudicial
act and the detention order has snapped in this case. The last prejudicial act was
on 15.11.2024. The detenu was arrested in connection with the last prejudicial act
on 02.12.2024. The detention order was passed on 03.03.2025. Thus, there is an
unexplained delay of 108 days between the last prejudicial act and the passing of
2017(3) KHC 517
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 4
the detention order, which the detaining authority has failed to justify.
6. The learned counsel then pointed out that the detention order does
not specify any compelling reasons for its issuance. He placed reliance on Rekha
v. State of Tamil Nadu2.
7. It is further submitted that the mere involvement in some crimes is
not sufficient to book the detenu as Known Rowdy or Known Goonda. The offences
alleged against the detenu must be prejudicial to public order and not mere
violation of law and order. The detention order was passed without proper
application of mind and based on extraneous materials. In order to fortify this
contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Ameena
Begum v. State of Telangana3.
Submissions of the learned Public Prosecutor
8. Per contra, Sri. Anas K.A, the learned Public Prosecutor, submitted
that the detenu is involved in several grave crimes affecting the public order. The
sponsorship was on 13.01.2025. The additional reports were submitted on
20.01.2025 and 10.02.2025. Since the accused was in judicial custody, there was
no imminent threat at that time. The detenu was released on bail on 20.02.2025
2011(5) SCC 244
2023 KHC 6816
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 5
and the sponsorship was on 13.01.2025, prior to his release. Therefore, there is no
inordinate delay in the sponsorship or passing of the detention order. The learned
Public Prosecutor, placing reliance on Rahila Nazeer v. State of Kerala and
others4, submitted that the period of detention under Section 3 of the KAA(P) Act
cannot be a determining factor to assess whether there is inordinate or unexplained
delay. If the delay is satisfactorily explained, it cannot be said that the live link has
snapped.
9. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel
for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor.
10. The first point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that
the impugned order was passed without requisite satisfaction, and the parameters
laid down in Stenny Aleyamma Saju (supra) were not followed. Mere registration
of an FIR is insufficient to invoke the power conferred on the detaining authority
under Section 3 of the KAA(P) Act. Paragraph 28 of the aforesaid judgment reads
thus:
"28. This Court does not intend to say that mere registration of FIR is
enough under such circumstances. Of course, something more is
necessary which is collected by the Investigating Officer during the
course of investigation. If the data collected in such process is
adequate enough to meet the requirements under the Statute, so as
to record the 'objective' as well as 'subjective satisfaction' to the
extent it is necessary, it is open for the detaining authority to have it
2016(3) KHC 189
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 6
acted upon and need not wait till completion of the investigation and
submission of the charge sheet under S.173(2) of the Cr.P.C."
11. The last prejudicial act was on 15.11.2024. The records would reveal
that the detenu was arrested on 02.12.2024. The investigation in this case has
been completed, and a chargesheet was laid on 03.12.2024 before the jurisdictional
magistrate. In view of this matter, we are unable to accept the above contention
put forward by the learned counsel.
12. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that
the delay between the last prejudicial act and the issuance of the detention order
has snapped the live link between the two. As held by the Apex Court in In T.A.
Abdul Rahiman v. State of Kerala5, the question whether the prejudicial
activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the
time when the order is made or the live link between the prejudicial activities and
the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of
each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be
applicable under all circumstances, and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down
on that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test
by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the
order of detention. However, when there is an undue and long delay between the
[1990 SCC (Cri) 76]
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 7
prejudicial activities and the passing of the detention order, the court has to
scrutinize whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay
and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has
occasioned when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate
whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.
13. In the case at hand, we are of the view that there is no undue delay
in passing the order, as contended by the learned counsel. The detenu has been in
judicial custody for quite a long period. He was released on bail on 20.02.2025. The
sponsorship report was submitted on 13.01.2025. Thereafter, additional reports
were filed on 20.01.2025 and 10.02.2025. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is
inordinate or untenable delay in passing the order and the last prejudicial act. It is
trite law that delay by itself is insufficient to set aside the detention order, if the
said delay is properly explained. Delay in some cases may be unavoidable and
natural. If the delay is properly explained, it would not vitiate the detention order.
Therefore, we are not persuaded by the said contention advanced by the learned
counsel for the petitioner.
14. The next contention is that the compelling circumstances that
necessitated the passing of Ext.P1 detention order were not stated in the said
order. The principle laid down in Rekha (supra) is that when the detenu is already
in judicial custody, a detention order can be validly passed if the detaining authority
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 8
is satisfied, based on cogent material, that there is a real possibility of the detenu
being released on bail, and that upon such release, he is likely to indulge in
anti-social activities imminently. The Apex Court observed that Article 21 is the
most important fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Liberty
of a citizen is a most important right won by our forefathers after long, historic, and
arduous struggles. Preventive detention is only an exception to Article 21 of the
Constitution. Relevant paragraphs of this judgment are extracted hereunder:
"10. In our opinion, if details are given by the respondent
authority about the alleged bail orders in similar cases mentioning
the date of the orders, the bail application number, whether the
bail order was passed in respect of the co-accused in the same
case, and whether the case of the co-accused was on the same
footing as the case of the petitioner, then, of course, it could be
argued that there is likelihood of the accused being released on
bail, because it is the normal practice of most courts that if a
co-accused has been granted bail and his case is on the same
footing as that of the petitioner, then the petitioner is ordinarily
granted bail. However, the respondent authority should have given
details about the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not
been done in the present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in the
grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to
be ignored.
11. In our opinion, the detention order in question only contains
ipse dixit regarding the alleged imminent possibility of the accused
coming out on bail and there was no reliable material to this effect.
Hence, the detention order in question cannot be sustained.
12. Moreover, even if a bail application of the petitioner relating
to the same case was pending in a criminal case the detention
order can still be challenged on various grounds e.g. that the act in
question related to law and order and not public order, that there
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 9
was no relevant material on which the detention order was passed,
that there were mala fides, that the order was not passed by a
competent authority, that the condition precedent for exercise of
the power did not exist, that the subjective satisfaction was
irrational, that there was non-application of mind, that the grounds
are vague, indefinite, irrelevant, extraneous, non-existent or stale,
that there was delay in passing the detention order or delay in
executing it or delay in deciding the representation of the detenu,
that the order was not approved by the Government, that there
was failure to refer the case to the Advisory Board or that the
reference was belated, etc.
13. In our opinion, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India
which permits preventive detention is only an exception to Article
21 of the Constitution. An exception is an exception, and cannot
ordinarily nullify the full force of the main rule, which is the right to
liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution. Fundamental rights are
meant for protecting the civil liberties of the people, and not to put
them in jail for a long period without recourse to a lawyer and
without a trial. As observed in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home
Deptt., ex p Stafford [(1998) 1 WLR 503 (CA)]
" ... The imposition of what is in effect a substantial term of
imprisonment by the exercise of executive discretion, without
trial, lies uneasily with ordinary concepts of the rule of law."
Article 22, hence, cannot be read in isolation but must be
read as an exception to Article 21. An exception can apply
only in rare and exceptional cases, and it cannot override the
main rule.
14. Article 21 is the most important of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Liberty of a citizen is a
most important right won by our forefathers after long, historical
and arduous struggles. Our Founding Fathers realised its value
because they had seen during the freedom struggle civil liberties of
our countrymen being trampled upon by foreigners, and that is
why they were determined that the right to individual liberty would
be placed on the highest pedestal along with the right to life as the
basic right of the people of India."
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 10
15. The records would reveal that the detenu was arrested on 02.12.2024
and enlarged on bail on 20.02.2025. Admittedly, he has been in custody for more
than two months. In such a case, the detaining authority ought to have stated the
compelling reasons which persuaded it to invoke the powers under Section 3(1) of
the KAA(P) Act. No such reasons were stated in the impugned order.
16. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned
order was passed without proper application of mind.
17. It appears that proceedings under Section 107 Cr.P.C were initiated on
27.10.2021, and the detenu executed bond on 27.03.2024. Thereafter, he was
involved in Crime No.391/2024 of Kasaba Police Station, violating the conditions of
the bond. On 17.07.2024 a rowdy history sheet was opened in the name of the
detenu. Externment order was passed against the detenu on 25.10.2024. Despite
all these steps, the detenu continues to indulge in anti-social activities prejudicial to
public order. The detaining authority has also considered the efficacy of the bail
conditions. A report is submitted for cancellation of bail in Crime No.391/2024 of
Kasaba Police Station. Upon perusal of the records, we are of the view that the
detaining authority has passed the order after arriving at a subjective and objective
satisfaction based on the materials placed before it.
18. In this case, the detaining authority has arrived at the requisite
satisfaction, which is recorded in the detention order itself, and therefore, we are
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 11
not persuaded by the said contention.
19. In Ameena Begum (supra), the Apex Court observed as under:
"25. Be that as it may, culling out the principles of law flowing
from all the relevant decisions in the field, our understanding of the
law for deciding the legality of an order of preventive detention is
that even without appropriate pleadings to assail such an order, if
circumstances appear therefrom raising a doubt of the detaining
authority misconceiving his own powers, the Court ought not to shut
its eyes; even not venturing to make any attempt to investigate the
sufficiency of the materials, an enquiry can be made by the Court
into the authority's notions of his power. Without being remotely
concerned about the sufficiency or otherwise of the materials on
which detention has been ordered, the Court would be justified to
draw a conclusion, on proof from the order itself, that the detaining
authority failed to realize the extent of his own powers. This is quite
apart from questioning the action for want of sufficient materials that
were before the detaining authority. The authority for the detention
is the order of detention itself, which the detenu or the Court can
read. Such a reading of the order would disclose the manner in
which the activity of the detenu was viewed by the detaining
authority to be prejudicial to maintenance of public order and what
exactly he intended should not be permitted to happen. Any order of
a detaining authority evincing that the same runs beyond his powers,
as are actually conferred, would not amount to a valid order made
under the governing preventive detention law and be vulnerable on a
challenge being laid. In the circumstances of a given case, a
Constitutional Court when called upon to test the legality of orders of
preventive detention would be entitled to examine whether
(i) the order is based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit subjective,
of the detaining authority, for, the absence of such satisfaction as to
the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the
exercise of the power is predicated, would be the sine qua non for
the exercise of the power not being satisfied;
(ii) in reaching such requisite satisfaction, the detaining authority
has applied its mind to all relevant circumstances and the same is
not based on material extraneous to the scope and purpose of the
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 12
statute;
(ii) power has been exercised for achieving the purpose for which it
has been conferred, or exercised for an improper purpose, not
authorised by the statute, and is therefore ultra vires;
(iv) the detaining authority has acted independently or under the
dictation of another body;
(v) the detaining authority, by reason of self created rules of policy
or in any other manner not authorized by the governing statute, has
disabled itself from applying its mind to the facts of each individual
case;
(vi) the satisfaction of the detaining authority rests on materials
which are of rationally probative value, and the detaining authority
has given due regard to the matters as per the statutory mandate;
(vii) the satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind existence
of a live and proximate link between the past conduct of a person
and the imperative need to detain him or is based on material which
is stale;
(viii) the ground(s) for reaching the requisite satisfaction is / are
such which an individual, with some degree of rationality and
prudence, would consider as connected with the fact and relevant
to the subject matter of the inquiry in respect whereof the
satisfaction is to be reached;
(ix) the grounds on which the order of preventive detention rests
are not vague but are precise, pertinent and relevant which, with
sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the satisfaction for the
detention, giving him the opportunity to make a suitable
representation; and
(x) the timelines, as provided under the law, have been strictly
adhered to.
Should the Court find the exercise of power to be bad and / or to be
vitiated applying any of the tests noted above, rendering the
detention order vulnerable, detention which undoubtedly visits the
person detained with drastic consequences would call for being
interdicted for righting the wrong."
20. With regard to the submission of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that the offences alleged against the detenu pertain to private disputes
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 13
and do not fall within the ambit of 'public order' as contemplated under preventive
detention laws, it would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in
Pesala Nookaraju v. Government of Andhra Pradesh6. The Apex Court,
referring to a catena of precedents on the issue of public order, observed as under:
"64. Thus, from the various decisions referred to above, it is evident
that there is a very thin line between the question of law and order
situation and a public order situation, and some times, the acts of a
person relating to law and order situation can turn into a question of
public order situation. What is decisive for determining the connection
of ground of detention with the maintenance of public order, the object
of detention, is not an intrinsic quality of the act but rather its latent
potentiality. Therefore, for determining whether the ground of detention
is relevant for the purposes of public order or not, merely an objective
test based on the intrinsic quality of an act would not be a safe guide.
The potentiality of the act has to be examined in the light of the
surrounding circumstances, posterior and anterior for the offences
under the Prohibition Act.
21. We are unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for
the petitioner that the offences attributed to the detenu arise out of private
disputes and do not attract the scope of 'public order' under the preventive
detention laws. The detenu is accused of grave offences such as robbery and
extortion, which are capable of disturbing public tranquillity and creating a sense of
fear among the public.
2023 KHC 6779
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 14
22. From a perusal of the records, we are satisfied that all the
requirements before passing an order under Section 3(1) of KAA(P) Act have been
scrupulously complied with in this case. The competent authority passed the
detention order after thoroughly verifying all the materials placed by the sponsoring
authority and after arriving at the requisite objective, as well as subjective
satisfaction. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed under Section 3(1)
of the KAA(P) Act is vitiated in any manner.
In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that the petition
lacks merit. The Writ Petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V
JUDGE
Sd/-
K. V. JAYAKUMAR
JUDGE
Sbna/
2025:KER:58586
W.P(Crl) No.606 of 2025 15
APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 606/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit-P1 A TRUE COPY OF ORDER OF DETENTION AGAINST THE
DETENU ON 03.03.2025 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT
Exhibit-P2 A TRUE COPY OF GROUNDS FORMING BASIS FOR DETENTION
ORDER DATED 03.03.2025 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT
Exhibit-P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED NIL ISSUED
BY THE 5TH RESPONDENT TO THE 3RD RESPONDENT ALONG
WITH THE REPORT DATED 14-01-2025 SUBMITTED BY THE
5TH RESPONDENT
Exhibit-P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED 20.01.2025
ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT
Exhibit-P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED 03.02.2025
ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT
Exhibit-P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED 10-02-2025
SUBMITTED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT
Exhibit-P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED 18.02.2025
ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT
Exhibit-P8 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED 20-02-2025
SUBMITTED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT
Exhibit-P9 A TRUE COPY OF THE MEMO OF EXECUTING ORDER OF
DETENTION DATED 03.03.2025 ISSUED BY THE 2ND
RESPONDENT TO THE 3RD RESPONDENT
Exhibit-P10 A TRUE COPY OF THE JAIL ADMISSION AUTHORISATION
DATED 03.03.2025 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO
THE 4TH RESPONDENT
