The Manager vs Dileep Ganesh
2022 Latest Caselaw 1036 Ker

                                                      "C.R."



         IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
                            PRESENT
        THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
                               &
         THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR
THURSDAY, THE 27TH DAY OF JANUARY 2022 / 7TH MAGHA, 1943
                  R.C.REV.NO.105 OF 2021

 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 27.02.2021 IN R.C.A.NO.11 OF
2018 OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (ADDITIONAL
    DISTRICT JUDGE), IRINJALAKUDA AND THE ORDER DATED
  31.01.2018 IN R.C.P.NO.19 OF 2016 OF THE RENT CONTROL
               COURT (MUNSIFF), KODUNGALLUR

REVISION PETITIONERS:

    1     THE MANAGER,
          SAI SERVICE STATION LTD.,
          KAIPAMANGALAM VILLAGE, KODUNGALLUR TALUK,
          THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN-680681.
    2     M/S SAI SERVICE STATION LTD.,
          REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER,
          PHUGUWADI P.O, BOMBAY-PUNE ROAD, MAHARASHTRA,
          PIN-411012.
          BY ADVS.
          P.B.KRISHNAN
          ANTO THOMAS
          SABU GEORGE
          P.B.SUBRAMANYAN
          MEERA P.
                              2
R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021



RESPONDENT:

           DILEEP GANESH
           AGED 45 YEARS, S/O GANESH,
           THARAYIL HOUSE, KAIPAMANGALAM VILLAGE,
           KODUNGALLUR TALUK, THRISSUR DISTRICT-680681.


           BY ADV P.K.RAVI SANKAR



      THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL
HEARING ON 04.01.2022, THE COURT ON 27.01.2022 DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING:
                                3
R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021


                                                        "C.R."

                          ORDER

The respondent-landlord filed R.C.P.No.19 of 2016 before

the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Kodungallur for eviction of

the revision petitioners-tenants under Section 11(3) of the

Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The

R.C.P. was allowed. An appeal was filed by the petitioners as

R.C.A.No.11 of 2018 before the Rent Control Appellate

Authority (Additional District Judge), Irinajalakuda under

Section 18(1)(b) of the Act and that ended in dismissal. The

petitioners challenge the said judgment as well as the order of

the Rent Control Court in this revision petition filed under

Section 20 of the Act.

2. The respondent and his brother Deepak Ganesh

are the owners of the petition schedule building. They let

out it to the petitioners on a monthly rent of Rs.45,000/-

on 01.12.2009. The respondent, who was working abroad,

has come back and he wants to start an automobile

business in the petition schedule building. His brother

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

Deepak Ganesh has consented for the same. Hence, he

demanded vacant possession of the building on the

ground of bonafide need.

3. The petitioners resisted the petition contending as

follows; The respondent as well as his brother are working

abroad at Abudhabi. They have no intention to start an

automobile business as claimed. The petitioners put up

constructions of substantial nature and installed machinery

and related amenities with the knowledge of the landlords

spending more than one crore rupees, since the lease was

for a period of 15 years. The attempt of the respondent now

to evict the petitioners is with the object of helping someone

else and also to garner the benefits on account of the

proposed acquisition of a part of the property. Even he tried to

forcibly evict the petitioners, constraining the petitioners to

file O.S.No.1585 of 2016 seeking an injunction. The

petitioners are conducting a show room and authorised

service centre of Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. and in the event of

eviction now, they would be put to much loss and

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

inconvenience. Without junction of the other co owner, the

respondent has no right to claim eviction.

4. The Rent Control Court after considering the

evidence on either side ordered eviction. The Appellate

Authority by judgment dated 27.02.2021 confirmed the order

of eviction. In this revision petition, the petitioners would

contend that both the authorities below totally erred in

ordering eviction inasmuch as the other co-owner did not join

as a petitioner, the need urged was not bonafide for more

than one reason and the plea for eviction was barred owing to

the provisions of Section 11(9) of the Act.

5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the

petitioners and also the learned counsel appearing for the

respondent.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioners questions

maintainability of the petition for eviction on two grounds;

(i) the petitioners have protection from eviction for a period

of 15 years from the date of creation of tenancy, which

was on 09.09.2009, under the provisions of Section 11(9)

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

of the Act and, (ii) the ground under Section 11(3) of the

Act cannot be availed by a co-owner without junction of

other co-owners, as he cannot exclude the other co-owners

from possession.

7. The petitioners contended that the lease was for a

period of 15 years and therefore the action for eviction on the

ground of bonafide need was premature and not maintainable.

They produced the rent agreement before the Rent Control

Court to prove the term of the tenancy. It was not admitted in

evidence since it was unregistered and insufficiently stamped.

The Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority did

not accept the contention of the petitioners that they are

entitled to get protection of Section 11(9) of the Act.

8. The learned Counsel for the petitioners conceded

that the period of lease having been mentioned as 15 years,

registration of the document is mandatory in view of the

provisions of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

and Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. In Paul v.

Saleena [2004 (1) KLT 924] after referring to the principle

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

laid down by the Apex Court in Satish Chand Makhan and

others v. Govardhan Das Byas and others [(1984) 1 SCC

369], Anthony v. K.C. Ittoop & Sons [(2000) 6 SCC 394]

and in Samir Mukherjee v. Davinder K. Bajaj and others

[(2001) 5 SCC 259] it was held that in the absence of a

registered instrument no valid lease from year to year or a term

exceeding one year or reserving yearly rent can be created.

9. Having said so, the question is what shall be the

nature of the relationship between the parties? Section 11 of

the Act enables a landlord to get the tenant evicted on

specified grounds. Section 11(9) however is a rider to that

right. The tenant would not be evicted for a specified period if

parties agreed that the lease shall be for a specific period.

That gives an assurance to the tenant so that he can

modulate his future course of action accordingly. A plea for

eviction on the ground of bona fide need for own occupation

or his dependent, who is a member of his family or

requirement for additional accommodation etc.,is not available

to be raised by the landlord during that specific period.

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

10. In Paul v. Saleena (supra) this Court also

considered the question as to, even if the document is an

unregistered one, whether the period mentioned therein

would be binding on the parties and consequently a petition

filed before the period mentioned in the document would be

hit by Section 11(9) of the Act? The Court took into

consideration the following decisions of the Apex Court for

answering the question. Satish Chand Mukhan and others

v. Goverdhandas Byas and others [AIR 1984 SC 143], in

which it was held that where a lessee remained in possession

under an unregistered deed of renewal of lease, such deed of

renewal was inadmissible in evidence under S.49 except for

the collateral purpose of proving the nature and character of

his possession. In A.N. Parkas v. N.H. Nagvi [AIR 1989

Delhi 277] it was held that an unregistered document of

lease can be looked into to know the purpose of letting

whether residential or commercial, because the said term can

be deemed to be collateral matter. Rai Chand Jain v. Miss

Chandra Kanta Khosla [AIR 1991 SC 744], which also

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

postulated that an unregistered lease can be looked into for

collateral purposes like for ascertaining whether the purpose

of the lease was residential or not. After taking into

consideration those principles this Court in Paul v. Saleena

(supra) held that the period of lease is an integral part of the

agreement and not a collateral one. Hence, unregistered lease

deeds cannot be pressed into service to create, declare,

assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in or to

the property comprised in the document and that such a lease

deed creates only month to month tenancy. If the lease is

registered under the Registration Act alone, it would create

transfer of right to enjoy the immovable property for a specific

term exceeding one year. This proposition has been reiterated

by this Court in Chandrakala v. Soman [2004 (3) KLT

432] and Basheer M. v. Remani Gopalan and another

[2014 (1) KHC 436]. We agree with the said view.

11. In view of the above, the Rent Control Court and

the Appellate Authority were right in refusing to admit the

unregistered lease deed in evidence. In the said

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

circumstances, it can only be said that the relationship

between the parties is month to month tenancy and the

contention that the plea for eviction of the petitioners is

barred under provisions of Section 11(9) of the Act is

untenable.

12. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners

next contended that the petition is not maintainable since the

other co-owner has not joined with the respondent in filing

the petition for eviction. The learned counsel placed strong

reliance on Ibrahim v. Zeena Robert [2021 (5) KHC 759]

in order to fortify his contention that unless all co-owners join

hands with the petitioners in filing a petition for eviction on

the ground, bonafide need of the building for his own

occupation, no eviction can be ordered.

13. In Ibrahim (supra) the petition was laid seeking

eviction on the ground that the tenanted building was needed

for the occupation of the petitioner, who is having only

fractional interest. There was no pleading to the effect that

the other co-owners have consented or agreed for the need

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

advanced by the petitioner that he required the petition

scheduled building for his own occupation. The Court in the

above context held,

'3. xx xx In order to test the bona fides of the need, it is within the jurisdiction of both the Rent Control Court as well as the Rent Control Appellate Authority to look into the question whether the need advanced is capable of being put in execution. If it is found that it is not capable of being put in execution without the consent of the other co-owners, it is not permissible to grant an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. In other words, the consent of all the co-owners, who are having fractional interest over the property, is required for the alleged occupation of the petitioner. For that purpose, all co-owners should join hands with the petitioner in filing the application and they should be in the party array of such petition. Even a pleading to the effect that the other co-owners have consented to give the petition schedule shop room for the user of one of the co - owners, is not at all sufficient, as it can be withdrawn at any time by any of the co-owners. So, it is a mandatory requirement that all co-owners should join hands with the petitioner in filing the petition for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, if it really requires for the occupation of one of the co-owners.'

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

14. The learned Counsel for the petitioners would

contend that the said dictum having been rendered in a fact

situation quite at par with the facts of this case, the same has

to be followed in this case. Although the preponderance of the

judicial opinion is that one of the co-owners without junction

of other co-owners can maintain an action for eviction of the

tenant, the learned Counsel submits, that rule is of general

application only and in an action for eviction on the ground of

bonafide need, the decision in Ibrahim (supra) is applicable.

15. The learned Counsel for the respondent, on the

other hand, would submit that decision in Ibrahim is against

the principle of law laid down by the Apex Court and this

Court in a long line of decisions on the point and therefore it

is per incuriam. Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath [AIR

1976 SC 2335]; Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak [AIR 1977

SC 1599]; India Umbrella Mfg. Co. v. Bhagabandei

Agarwalla [(2004) 3 SCC 178]; Mohinder Prasad Jain v.

Manohar Lal Jain [(2006) 2 SCC 724]; FGP Ltd. v. Saleh

Hooseini Doctor and another [(2009) 10 SCC 223];

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

Raphael v. Sudhodhanan [2013 (2) KLT 500] and

Kumaran A. v. Madambillath Subaida and another

[2019 (3) KLJ 866] are the decisions, according to the

learned counsel, which took the view that one co-owner can

file a petition for eviction of a tenant without the junction of

other co-owners as long as other co-owners have no

objection regarding the rights of the suing co-owner.

16. In Sri Ram Pasricha (supra), the Apex Court held

as under:

'Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes place.

17. In Kanta Goel (supra) the question was whether

one co-lessor can on his own sue for eviction even if the other

co-lessors have no objection. The question was considered in

the context of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Definition of the

'landlord' in Section 2(e) of the said Act reads,

'2(e) 'Landlord' means a person who, for the time being

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant.'

18. The Apex Court considered the right of one of the

co-owners to sue for eviction in the capacity of 'landlord' and

held that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire

property as any sole owner of the property is.

Jurisprudentially, it is not correct to say that a co-owner of

property is not its owner. He owns every part of the

composite property along with others and it cannot be said

that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the

property. Accordingly the Apex Court upheld the right of a co-

owner to sue for eviction for and on behalf of other co-owners

also.

19. India Umbrella Mfg. Co. which in turn relies on

Sri.Ram Pasricha (supra). The principles which have been

affirmed in Mohinder Prasad Jain (supra) are that one co-

owner filing a suit for eviction against the tenant does so on

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other

co-owners. In this matter, the consent of other co-owners is

assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-owners

were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was filed

in spite of their disagreement.

20. The definition of 'landlord' in Delhi Rent Control

Act, 1958 is pari materia the definition of 'landlord' in Section

2(3) in the Kerala Act which reads,

'2(3) "landlord" includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant.'

21. Therefore, the principle laid down by the Apex

Court in aforesaid decisions is very much binding as far as

similar cases under the Kerala Act are concerned.

22. In Raphael v. Sudhodhanan (supra) the

application for eviction under sub-sections (2)(b), (3), (4)(i)

and (4)(ii) of Section 11 of the Act by a co-owner. One of the

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

grounds for eviction was bonafide need of the building for own

occupation. This Court confronted with a contention that the

application was not maintainable for want of joining of the

other co-owner as applicant, had held,

'3. Admittedly, even going by the case of the respondent therein, the rent control petition is instituted by a co- owner. That apart, the building was, admittedly, taken on rent, either by Devassy or his son, who is the respondent in the rent control petition. The specific plea of the respondent in the rent control petition is that after the demise of Ananthakrishnan, there was no demand or payment of rent. With the aforesaid undisputed facts, the fact of the matter is that the person in occupation, who is the respondent in the rent control petition, falls within the definition of 'tenant' under the Act. The person, who has filed the application for eviction, is admittedly, a co - owner of the property. He, therefore, falls within the definition of 'landlord' under the Act. Exclusive or absolute title to property is not necessary to institute a rent control petition.'

23. Kumaran A. v. Madambillath Subaida and

another (supra) again is a case where the right of a co-

owner to claim eviction of the tenant without junction of other

co-owners has been considered. There the petition was for

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

eviction under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act. Here

also, one of the grounds for eviction was bonafide need of the

building for own occupation. It was held,

'8. xx xx It is trite law that every co-owner is an owner of each and every parcel of co-ownership property insofar as a third party is concerned. Catena of decisions are available for the proposition that one co-owner can file a petition for eviction of a tenant without the junction of other co-owners as long as other co-owners have no objection regarding the rights of the suing co-owner.'

24. The law on the point was thus settled. Even if the

eviction is sought for own occupation of the suing co-owner

and the petition is filed by him without junction of the other

co-owner/s, it is maintainable as long as it is not objected by

the non-suing co-owner/s. The ratio in Ibrahim (supra) that

all co-owners should join as petitioners in an application for

eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is against the principle

laid down by the Apex Court and this Court in the abovesaid

decisions.

25. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Bengal

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

Immunity Co.Ltd. v. State of Bibar [AIR 1955 SC 661],

followed the principle laid down in Young v. Bristol

Aeroplane Co.Ltd. [1944 KB 718 CA)] which explained as

to when a decision is said to be per incuriam. The principle is

as follows:

'Where the court has construed a statute or a rule having the force of a statute its decision stands on the same footing as any other decision on a question of law, but where the court is satisfied that an earlier decision was given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or a rule having the force of a statute the position is very different. It cannot, in our opinion, but right to say that in such a case the court is entitled to disregard the statutory provision and is bound to follow a decision of its own given when that provision was not present to its mind.

Cases of this description are examples of decisions given per incuriam.'

26. This principle has consistently been followed by the

Apex Court henceforth. In Government of Andra Pradesh

and another v. B.Satyanarayana Rao [(2000) 4 SCC

262] the Apex Court observed that the rule of per incuriam

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

can be applied when a court omits to consider a binding

precedent of the same court rendered as the same issue or

where a court omits to consider any statute while deciding

that issue.

27. In Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development

Authority v. L.G.Chaudhary Engieners and Contractors

[(2012) 3 SCC 495], the Apex Court explained in detail

when a decision is said to be per incuriam. It was observed

that 'as a general rule the only cases in which decisions

should be held to have been given per incuriam are those of

decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some

inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding

on the court concerned.' This case was referred to a larger

Bench and the larger Bench affirmed it. The decision of the

larger Bench is reported in Madhya Pradesh Rural Road

Development Authority & another v. L.G.Choudhary

Engineers and Contractors [(2018) 10 SCC 826].

28. The Apex Court in Jagannath Temple Managing

Committee v. Siddha Math and others [(2015) 16 SCC

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542] reiterated the above principle. The Apex Court further

held,

'16. xx xx While the doctrine of stare decisis is crucial to maintain judicial discipline, what cannot be lost sight of the fact is that decisions which are rendered in ignorance of existing statutes and law laid down by this Court cannot bind subsequent Benches of this Court.'

29. We found above that the judgment rendered in

Ibrahim v. Zeena Robert (supra) is against the law laid

down by the Apex Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath;

Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak; India Umbrella Mfg. Co. v.

Bhagabandei Agarwalla; Mohinder Prasad Jain v.

Manohar Lal Jain; FGP Ltd. v. Saleh Hooseini Doctor and

another and the decision of this Court in Raphael v.

Sudhodhanan and Kumaran A. v. Madambillath Subaida.

In that view of the matter, this Court is constrained to hold

that the decision in Ibrahim (supra) is per incuriam.

30. Notice to quit, Ext.A1 was issued on 30.06.2016 by

the respondent's counsel on the instructions of the respondent

and his brother, the other co-owner. But the brother did not

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

join in the petition, nor it is averred in the petition that the

brother had given consent to the respondent to start a

business in the petition schedule building. When the Counsel

has been instructed by the brother also to issue such a notice,

his consent can certainly be inferred. There is nothing on

record to show that he ever had withdrawn the consent. On

that score also, it has to be said that there is no vice to the

petition for eviction.

31. The petitioners raised several contentions to

challenge bona fides of the need urged by the respondents.

One is that since the parties agreed to have the rental

arrangement for a period of 15 years by virtue of the

covenants in the rent agreement entered into between them,

the need now urged cannot be termed bonafide. It is

contended that acting upon the assurance, the petitioners

invested a huge amount of more than one crore rupees for

making constructions in the land appurtenant to the tenanted

building in order to suit their business. Insofar as the

structures put up by them, the petitioners contend that there

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is no landlord-tenant relationship. It is alleged that the

respondent without reckoning such aspects, filed the petition

for eviction.

32. The Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate

Authority considered the contention that the petitioners have

put up structures annexing to the existing building. The

concurrent finding is that the petitioners had put up certain

temporary structures in order to suit their service station

business. A two-storied RCC building having an area of 2400

sq.ft. along with a few other structures, which originally had

been used as an automobile workshop, was let out to the

petitioners. After analysing the entire evidence, the

authorities below found that the structures put up by the

petitioners were of temporary nature and the same could be

dismantled and reconstructed at another place. It may be

noted that there is nothing on record to show that the

petitioners on the basis of any agreement, either written or

oral, such structures were put up. In such circumstances, the

petitioners, who are admittedly the tenants, cannot claim any

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right, except that of a tenant, with respect to the premises

which are in their possession on the basis of the tenancy

arrangement. Even if any structure of temporary nature as

pointed out above, has been put up, that does not clothe the

petitioners with any exemption or protection from eviction as

per the provisions of Section 11 of the Act.

33. The rent agreement, Ext. B1, has not been

admitted in evidence. Therefore, the terms of such an

agreement cannot be taken into account. What then governs

the parties is the admission made by either side as regards

the tenancy arrangement. In view of that matter, the

contention of the petitioners that the respondent came with

the plea of eviction prematurely and that tells upon their bona

fides, cannot be reckoned with.

34. Admittedly, the tenancy began on 9.9.2009.

Petition for eviction was filed in 2016. According to the

respondent, the need of his starting a business emerged,

since he lost his job abroad. The need so arisen on account of

unforeseen reasons cannot be said, in any way, to be a false

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assertion. It is in evidence that the landlords were conducting

an automobile workshop in the tenanted premises. Father of

the respondent died. The respondent and his brother, who

were assisting his father in the business, got employment

abroad. Since the respondent is compelled to come back

home, he decided to start the same business. Being a

qualified and experienced person, PW1 desires to resume the

business in which he inferrably has a passion and interest.

There is absolutely no reason to find that the same is not a

bonafide need.

35. Proceedings for acquisition of a part of the property

in dispute is on the anvil. Both PW1 and RW1 deposed in

Court about its details. The learned Counsel for the petitioners

would contend that the respondent clamoured for eviction

now with the sole object of denying the respondents their due

on account of the acquisition. They claim that being tenants

who installed structures in the demised premises by spending

a huge sum, they are entitled to get a share in the

compensation amount. The learned Counsel on either side

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

would agree that the Land Acquisition Officer already assessed

compensation. If so, compensation entitled, if any, by each

party should have already been assessed. That apart,

compensation is assessed as on the date of notification for the

acquisition, which was obviously issued much earlier. Therefore

the contention that the projected need is a ruse and it was

triggered with a malafide objective of garnering the entire

compensation consequent to the land acquisition is untenable.

36. The learned Counsel for the petitioners lastly

contended that after acquisition a portion of the land and

building alone will be left and the purpose for which eviction

sought will be eclipsed by such an event. The petitioners'

request to ascertain those aspects by deputing a commission

was declined by the Appellate Authority and for those reasons

also the impugned judgment and order directing eviction are

liable to be set aside, the learned Counsel contends. The need

urged is to start an automobile workshop and spare parts

business. There is no case for the petitioners that there is any

rule prescribing a minimum area of land or building for an

R.C.Rev.No.105 of 2021

automobile workshop and even if there is, it is not contended

that such minimum area would not be left after acquisition. It

is for the landlord to plan and shape his business depending

upon the facilities available. The tenant cannot have a say or

right to insist on the nature of the business the landlord

planning to materialise. This Court is of the view that the said

contention is also not of avail to the petitioners.

37. In view of what is stated above, we see no reason

to doubt the bona fides of the need urged by the respondent

that he wants the petition schedule building for starting an

automobile workshop and spare parts business. The learned

Counsel for the petitioners do not have a case that either the

first or the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has

application in this case.

38. In the circumstances, we find no reason to

interfere with the findings in the judgment of the Appellate

Authority dated 27.02.2021 or the order of the Rent Control

Court dated 31.03.2018, in exercise of the powers under

Section 20 of the Act. The findings therein are not suffering

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from any illegality, irregularity or impropriety. Therefore, we

hold that the Rent Control Revision can only fail. It is

accordingly dismissed. The petitioners-tenants shall hand over

vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the

respondent-landlord within a period of three months from

today.

Sd/-

ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE

Sd/-

P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE dkr