Kerala High Court
Rasheedali K.M vs The Divisional Forest Officer, ... on 30 September, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ZIYAD RAHMAN A.A.
THURSDAY, THE 30TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2021 / 8TH ASWINA 1943
W.P(C) NO.22429 OF 2017
PETITIONER/S:
JOHN.V.P., S/O.PORINCHU,
VITHAYATHIL HOUSE, ATTUPURAM, AYROOR P.O.,
NORTH KUTHIYATHODU, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT.
BY ADV. SRI.M.P.MADHAVANKUTTY
RESPONDENT/S:
1 DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, THRISSUR-680 001.
2 RANGE FOREST OFFICER,
PATTIKKAD FOREST STATION, THRISSUR-680 001.
3 DEPUTY RANGE FOREST OFFICER,
MANNAMANGALAM, THRISSUR-680 001.
R1-R3 BY SPECIAL GOVT.PLEADER (FOREST)
SRI.NAGARAJ NARAYANAN
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
22.09.2021, ALONG WITH W.A.NO.1879/2014, THE COURT ON 30.09.2021
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WP(C).No.22429 of 2017 & - 2 -
WA.No.1879 of 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ZIYAD RAHMAN A.A.
THURSDAY, THE 30TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2021 / 8TH ASWINA 1943
W.A.NO.1879 OF 2014
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN W.P(C) NO.5823/2014 DATED 21.10.2014
OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.
APPELLANT/ PETITIONER:
RASHEEDALI K.M., S/O MOIDEENKUTTY,
KALLIDUMBIL HOUSE, EDAKKARA P.O.,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT.
BY ADVS.
SRI.BABU S. NAIR
SMT.SMITHA BABU
RESPONDENTS/ RESPONDENTS:
1 THE DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, NILAMBUR (NORTH),
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN-679329.
2 THE FOREST RANGE OFFICER,
FOREST RANGE, VAZHIKKADAVU,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN-679333.
R1&R2 BY SPECIAL GOVT.PLEADER (FOREST)
SRI.NAGARAJ NARAYANAN
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 22.09.2021,
ALONG WITH W.P(C).NO.22429/2017-C, THE COURT ON 30.09.2021
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WP(C).No.22429 of 2017 & - 3 -
WA.No.1879 of 2014
"C.R"
K.Vinod Chandran & Ziyad Rahman A.A., JJ.
-----------------------------------------------
W.P(C)No.22429 of 2017-C & W.A.No.1879 of 2014
-----------------------------------------------
Dated this the 30th September 2021
JUDGMENT
Vinod Chandran, J.
Whether the machinery in a sawmill is liable to
seizure under Section 52 of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961
['Forest Act' for brevity], a precursor to confiscation, on
the ground that it had been used to saw timber illegally
felled or removed from a reserved forest?
2. A learned Single Judge of this Court, in
W.P(C)No.22429 of 2017, doubted the correctness of the
decision of another learned Single Judge in Moosa v.
Authorised Officer [2014 (2) KHC 731]. The Learned Single
Judge who referred the matter, was of the opinion that an
offence under Section 27(1)(e)(iii) of the Act would attract
seizure of tools used for sawing timber in the reserved
forest and not machinery in a sawmill. Confiscation, being a
penal provision has to be construed strictly and when
there are two views possible, the Court should lean in
favour of the person on whom the penalty is to be imposed,
was the observation. The legislature has failed to explain
WA.No.1879 of 2014
unambiguously, the 'tools used in committing offence', the
implementing officer cannot seize the tools used for sawing
such timber, that too in far off places and a contrary
interpretation would put to peril the prospects of a sawmill
owner who will have to conduct a roving enquiry into the
antecedents of every customer who approaches him. The learned
Single Judge opined that such a seizure and confiscation was
not intended by the legislature, from Section 52.
3. This Court in Kallara Sukumaran v. Union of India
[1987 (1) KLT 226] held that when a learned Single Judge
refers a question, then the entire case would have to be
referred. The Writ Appeal is from an order which declined
similar contentions by a sawmill owner. We propose to answer
the reference and then consider the cases on merits.
4. Sri.M.P. Madhavankutty, appearing for the writ
petitioner, asserts that Section 27(1)(e)(iii) only takes in
the cutting of trees from the reserved forest, meaning the
offence committed inside the forest. It is also argued that
there are various other enactments and statutory rules for
the preservation of trees and promotion of tree growth; which
have not been invoked against the petitioner. The nominal
heading of Section 27 is specifically read to point out that
the penalty therein can only be for trespass or damage,
WA.No.1879 of 2014
occasioned in reserved forests and for committing any act
within such forests which is prohibited under law. Voicing
the oft-quoted proposition, it is asserted that in construing
penal and taxation statutes, the Court has to apply the
strict rule of interpretation as has been held in R.Kalyani
v. Janak C.Mehta & Others [(2009) 1 SCC 516], Govind Impex
(P) Ltd. & Others v. Appropriate Authority [(2011) 1 SCC 529]
and Achal Industries (M/s.) v. State of Karnataka [(2019) 7
SCC 703].
5. Sri. Babu S. Nair, appearing for the appellant,
painstakingly took us through the provisions to urge that
Sections 52, 61A and 61B consistently uses the words 'used in
committing such an offence', which lays bare the intention of
the legislature to subject only the tools so used in the
commission of the offence to seizure and confiscation. The
use of the word 'machinery' in the Explanation to Section 52
reveals the clear intention of the legislature, which
avoided that word in the body of the provision. To counter
the arguments of the Special Government Pleader, it is
pointed out that Section 27(1)(d) speaks only of receipt or
possession and here the timber has only been sawed, which
does not answer the description of either a receipt or a
possession as such. Distinguishing the context in which a
WA.No.1879 of 2014
learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court held to the
contrary in Surma Valley Saw Mill (P) Ltd. v. State of Assam
[1998 KHC 1975 = AIR 1998 Gau.35], it is pointed out that
there was a specific rule making the sawing, conversion and
removal of timber an offence, which is absent in the Act
which we are concerned with.
6. Sri. Nagaraj Narayanan, Special Government
Pleader (Forests) appearing for the State, would emphasize
Section 27(1)(d) and argue that the mere receipt or
possession of illegally felled timber, even if it is for
sawing purposes, the offence is attracted. The State relies
heavily on the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Moosa
(supra), which is now doubted. Sri. Nagaraj Narayanan also
relies on Surma Valley Saw Mill (supra) and the decision of
the Bombay High Court in Kantilal Prekjit Patel v. Range
Forest Officer and Another [1987 Crl.LJ 1373]. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. K.Krishnan [(2000) 7
SCC 80] has dealt with seizure and confiscation proceedings
and dilated upon how the proceedings for release, pending
confiscation, is to be dealt with. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
found any release leading to the very frustration of
the provisions of the Act to be bad in law. The learned
Special Government Pleader also urged the intention of the
WA.No.1879 of 2014
legislature in bringing out the enactment, which is for the
preservation of forests.
7. We bow to the proposition that a penal statute
which makes an act, a penal offence and imposes penalty is to
be strictly construed and if two views are possible, one
favourable to the citizen should ordinarily be preferred. The
proposition has been carefully worded and it arises in
situations where two views are possible. In analysing the
provisions under the Forest Act, we have to necessarily keep
the intention of the legislature in mind and adopt a
purposive interpretation to further the object and never to
frustrate it. The preamble itself speaks of protection and
management of forests in the State of Kerala, the depletion
of which, because of expanding human communities, has put the
very planet in trouble and nature in turmoil, with
unprecedented climatic changes and natural calamities.
8. In this context, we specifically refer to the
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balram Kumawat v.
Union of India [(2003) 7 SCC 628] where the question raised
was whether 'mammoth ivory' imported into India answers the
description of the words 'ivory imported in India' contained
in Wildlife (Protection) Act. Mammoth is a prehistoric
animal that is extinct and such ivory is distinguishable from
WA.No.1879 of 2014
the extant elephant ivory was the contention raised. We
specifically extract paragraphs 20 and 23:
"20. Contextual reading is a well-known proposition
of interpretation of statutes. The clauses of a
statute should be construed with reference to the
context vis-a-vis the other provisions so as to make a
consistent enactment of the whole statute relating to
the subject matter. The rule of 'ex visceribus actus'
should be resorted to in a situation of this nature.
xxx xxx xxx
23. Furthermore, even in relation to a penal
statute any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical
construction may not always be given effect to. The
law would have to be interpreted having regard to the
subject matter of the offence and the object of the
law it seeks to achieve. The purpose of the law is not
to allow the offender to sneak out of the meshes of
law. Criminal Jurisprudence does not say so".
The Court observed that it would be unnecessary to go into
the question of whether scientifically mammoth ivory can be
deciphered from elephant ivory since there is a complete
prohibition of the ivory trade. It was held that what
requires to be considered, in the teeth of the clear
prohibition, is the dictionary meaning of the term and the
commercial or technical meaning is taken recourse of only
when the requirements of the particular enactment necessitate
WA.No.1879 of 2014
it. We also extract a quote made by the Hon'ble Judges from
Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam [AIR
1990 SC 123]:
"In Whitney v. IRC 1926 AC 37, Lord Dunedin said:
(AC p.52)
'A statute is designed to be workable, and the
interpretation thereof by a court should be to
secure that object, unless crucial omission or
clear direction makes that end unattainable.' "
It was so observed in Balram Kumawat (supra):
"26. The courts will therefore reject that
construction which will defeat the plain intention of
the legislature even though there may be some
inexactitude in the language used. [See Salmon v.
Duncombe [1886 (11) AC 627 at p.634).] Reducing the
legislation futility shall be avoided and in a case
where the intention of the legislature cannot be given
effect to, the courts would accept the bolder
construction for the purpose of bringing about an
effective result. The courts, when rule of purposive
construction is gaining momentum, should be very
reluctant to hold that Parliament has achieved nothing
by the language it used when it is tolerably plain
what it seeks to achieve. [See BBC Enterprises v.
Hi-Tech Xtravision Ltd., 1990 (2) All ER 118 at 122-3.
xxx xxx xxx
37. We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that
potential public mischief cannot be a ground to invoke
WA.No.1879 of 2014
the court's interpretative role to make a new offence.
Making of legislation is not the job of the judiciary.
Making of a penal legislation by the judiciary is
strictly out of its bound. However, when the law
working in the field is clear then what is necessary
for it is to find out as to whether any offence has
been created or not. Once it is held that the subject-
matter comes within the purview of the law, the court
may not go further and say by interpretive reasoning
that the same is not so created".
9. We keep these principles in mind while embarking
upon the interpretative exercise we are called upon to. At
the outset, we cannot but observe that a provision cannot be
interpreted by its nominal heading when the statute itself
has to be considered as a whole without looking at the
provisions in isolation. In the statute we are concerned
with, the object is the preservation of forests, highly
necessary not only for the survival of human beings, but also
for the continued existence of the very planet itself. Any
interpretation should be consistent with the object of the
enactment, the intention of the lawmakers, the context of the
statute and its dominant purpose; applying the explicit words
employed and without doing any violence to the language.
WA.No.1879 of 2014
10. The first contention is concerning the definition
of 'tool' and whether it brings within its ambit machinery in
a sawmill. We approvingly notice the consideration made in
Kantilal Prekjit Patel (supra), which extracted the meaning
of the word 'tool' from the Webster's Dictionary of the
English language, which reads as under:-
"... an instrument employed in manual labour for
facilitating mechanical operations; the cutting part
on various machines driven by power, as a drill or
lathe, a machine tool; the entire machine".
The tools used by human communities have evolved with the
communities themselves from handheld tools to machines driven
by power. Earlier, sawing of timber was facilitated, by
cumbersome and time consuming manual labour, with a saw
blade. Now sophisticated machinery are available, which carry
out the sawing within no time. Considering the girth of the
timber, the machinery is also large and the sawmills are
established; to which location the felled trees are brought
as such, to saw them into boards, planks and rafters. It
cannot at all be said that tools include only handheld ones
and in the present circumstances, it includes machinery also
within its ambit since, otherwise, sophisticated machinery
used to cut timber as distinct from handheld ones would be
WA.No.1879 of 2014
taken out of the purview of tools which are liable to
seizure. The interpretation has to go with the times, again
to advance the purpose for which the enactment is brought. As
observed in Balram Kumawat (supra) we need only look at the
dictionary meaning and "The rule of strict construction does
not also prevent the court in interpreting a statute
according to its current meaning and applying the language to
cover developments in science and technology not known at the
time of passing of the statute" (sic). What was intended is
any tool used in the commission of a forest offence and there
is no warrant for us to assume that the legislature intended
only the conventional handheld tools; even when it brought
out the enactment, much less could the interpretation be
restricted, looking at the advancements made on the
mechanical sphere. In fact, the use of machinery in the
Explanation, of those mounted on vehicles and vessels, is a
clear indication that the tools referred to in the body of
the section included machinery. The contrary argument raised
by the appellant cannot be countenanced since the explanation
to a provision could not have included things excluded in the
main body.
11. The next contention is concerning the seizure
being possible only when it is used in committing any such
WA.No.1879 of 2014
offence. To buttress the contention, the learned Counsel has
also referred to the nominal heading of Section 27 which
brings in 'penalties for trespass or damage in Reserved
Forests and acts prohibited in such forests'. It would be
fallacious for us to hold that only those acts which are
committed within the boundaries of the reserved forest would
fall under the rigour of the provisions of Sections 27 and
52. If we hold so, then, only if an illegal felling is caught
red-handed within the forest, would the offence be attracted.
The offences enumerated under subsection (1) of Section 27
would command us to hold to the contrary. When a tree is
illegally felled inside the forest, it is only for a
commercial purpose and it would have to be brought outside
the forest to put it to use commercially. It is hence, in
addition to cutting and felling of trees, the receipt or
possession of a forest produce, sawing or converting it and
removal of such trees, including fallen or felled, are
brought under the ambit of a prohibited act by Section 27,
which also imposes a penalty. The trees removed from the
forest in a vehicle, if later transported in another vehicle
from outside the boundaries of the reserved forest; then both
vehicles would be equally liable for the consequences of the
prohibited act and will invite both penalty and confiscation
WA.No.1879 of 2014
proceedings. Likewise, any sawmill which receives timber for
sawing has to ensure that it is not illegally removed from a
forest or obtained by a prohibited act under the Forest Act,
which, otherwise, would be liable to the proceedings under
the Act. The offence attracted in an illegal felling inside a
forest would not cease on such felling having been concluded.
The transportation of such illegally felled trees, the
measures employed to convert it into boards, planks or
rafters, by sawing, cutting or otherwise and the receipt or
possession of such timber also would be encompassed in the
offence and would attract penalty with equal rigour. There is
no warrant for us to assume that legislature intended only
tools, vehicles and other materials used for the acts
committed inside the reserved forest to fall under the words
employed of 'used in committing any such offence' under
Section 52 of the Act.
12. We cannot also agree with the learned Counsel
for the appellant that, while in the Assam Forest Regulation,
1891 there is a specific offence of sawing, conversion and
removal of timber, it is not available under the Kerala
Forest Act. The Kerala Forest Act by Section 27(1)(e)(iii)
makes sawing, conversion and removal of any tree including
fallen or felled in a reserved forest to be an offence, for
WA.No.1879 of 2014
which penalty is also specified. As has been rightly argued
by the learned Special Government Pleader, both Section 27(1)
(d) and (e) are attracted. It would be puerile to contend
that the receipt and possession intended by the enactment is
a receipt for ultimate possession. Receipt and possession are
disjunctively used in the clause and it cannot be argued that
the receipt should be for enduring possession. Even persons
who receive such illegally felled timber for onward transport
or to saw or convert it or for subsequent sale or ultimate
possession would all be treated as an offender under the
above provision. What absolves an individual be it a
transporter, sawmill owner or ultimate possessor is the
diligent care in ensuring that the timber is not one involved
in any offence under the Forest Act. In this context, we
would refer to the procedure by which confiscation
proceedings can be taken.
13. Section 52 deals with the seizure of property
liable for confiscation. When there is reason to believe that
a forest offence has been committed in respect of timber or
other forest produce, such timber or produce and anything
used in the commission of such offence including tools,
ropes, chains, boats, vehicles and cattle are liable to
seizure by the Forest Officer. By subsection (2), such
WA.No.1879 of 2014
officer shall place a mark indicating the factum of seizure
on the object and report seizure of such goods to the
Magistrate and if the offender is unknown, to the official
superior. Section 53 confers power on the Forest Officer of a
rank not inferior to Ranger, to release any objects seized
under Section 52 with a bond to ensure production when
required by the Magistrate having jurisdiction. Section 54
speaks of the trial of the accused and the disposal of
property in accordance with law by the Magistrate on receipt
of a report under Section 52. Section 55 empowers the
Magistrate to confiscate the objects seized when the trial
ends in a conviction.
14. A parallel machinery for confiscation by Forest
Officers was created by incorporating Sections 61A to 61F by
Act 28 of 1975. By the Amending Act, a separate procedure
for confiscation is contemplated even when the offender is
not prosecuted by the Department, with respect to specific
items, one of which is timber. Under Section 61A, after
seizure under Section 52, the officer seizing the property
under subsection (1) of Section 52 shall produce it before
the authorized officer. Sub-section (2) of Section 61A
empowers the authorised officer who has seized any
property under Section 52(1) or before whom it is produced
WA.No.1879 of 2014
under Section 61A(1), to confiscate the same, whether or not
a prosecution is instituted. Section 61B speaks of a
show-cause notice before the confiscation under Section 61A.
Sub-section (2) prohibits any order confiscating the seized
property under Section 61A if the owner of the tool, rope,
chain, boat, vehicle or cattle proves to the satisfaction of
the authorized officer that, it was used in the particular
act upon which an offence has been charged; without his
knowledge or connivance or even that such owner had taken all
reasonable and necessary precautions against such use. Here,
we pertinently observe that subsection (2) absolves from
confiscation, only the materials or vehicles used in the
commission of the offence and does not save the timber or the
other specified forest produce, which is the subject of the
offence, since that, in any event, is the property of the
Government.
15. A sawmill owner is regulated by the Kerala
Forest (Regulation of Sawmills and Other Wood-based
Industrial Units) Rules, 2012. While the said Rules provide
for penalties by way of suspension or cancellation of
license, that does not absolve the owner from being proceeded
with under the Kerala Forest Act 1961, the Biological
Diversity Act, 2002 and the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972;
WA.No.1879 of 2014
the commission of offences under which enactments invite a
penalty of suspension or cancellation of license under the
Rules of 2012. The suspension or cancellation of license
would be in addition to the penalties for the commission of
offences under the respective enactments.
16. We do not agree with the order of reference
made by the learned Single Judge that there are two possible
views going by the words employed in Section 27(1)(e)(iii).
The offence of cutting or felling of trees or removal, sawing
or converting of a felled or fallen tree is not confined to
the act committed inside a reserved forest. When such felled
or fallen timber is brought out and transported, the vehicle
which is detained outside the forest would definitely be
liable to seizure under Section 52 and a proceeding for
confiscation, either before a Magistrate after trial and
conviction or before the authorized officer as contemplated
in Section 61A. The order of confiscation passed by an
authorised officer is not final and can be subjected to a
revision or appeal under Section 61C or 61D. Likewise,
timber, of the fallen trees illegally removed and that of
illegally felled trees, if received or possessed, in
connivance with the offender who felled or removed the timber
from the reserved forest or without exercising due diligence
WA.No.1879 of 2014
required, such sawmill owner would equally be liable for the
offence and the tools used in the sawmill, including the
machinery, would be liable for seizure and attract
confiscation proceedings. Just as the distance from the
reserved forest would be irrelevant insofar as a vehicle
transporting timber or forest produce belonging to
Government; the factum of the sawmill being situated at a
place far off from the reserved forest would not by that
reason alone be absolved from the offence or the confiscation
proceedings. We are in perfect agreement with the decision of
the learned Single Judge in Moosa (supra) from which we
extract paragraph 9:
"9. On a plain reading of the expressions
'saws' and 'converts' employed under S.27(1)(e)
(ii) in juxta position, it can also be held that
tools take in its fold machinery used for
converting the timber or other items and it not
only means tools used for cutting or felling or
removing the tree from the area within the forest
but also tools or machineries used for sawing and
converting the timber at a place far away from the
forest area in a sawmill. So, it is incumbent on
the owner of the mill or his agent to make sure
that the timber which has been brought to the mill
for sawing is not a timber, illicitly cut and
removed from the forest. He can take reasonable
WA.No.1879 of 2014
and necessary precaution as contemplated under
S.61B(2) of the Act by requiring the production of
necessary documents which would show that the
timber is not a Government property".
We answer the reference respectfully affirming the view taken
by the learned Single Judge in Moosa (supra).
17. In both the appeal and the writ petition the
seizure proceedings have not been finalised. In the appeal
the contention is that, there is evidence to show that the
timber is sawed in another mill and even the statements of
the accused do not inculpate the appellant. In the writ
petition, the contention is of due diligence having been
employed in sawing the timber. Both these contentions would
have to be established in the confiscation proceedings
initiated. Insofar as the petitioner and the appellant are
concerned, we notice that the proceeding for seizure and
confiscation were stayed by this Court and they were
functioning all this while; the appellant from 2014 and the
petitioner from 2017. In that circumstance, we direct the
officer to proceed with the seizure and also carry out an
inventory of the materials subjected to seizure without
actual removal from the premises of the sawmill. The
authorised officer would then issue a show-cause notice and
WA.No.1879 of 2014
conclude the proceedings of confiscation after hearing the
parties. The Empowered Officer is also entitled to proceed
under the Rules of 2012. If proceedings of seizure are taken,
then the mill shall not be operated and we direct that the
confiscation proceedings shall be finalised within a period
of six months from seizure. The question referred is answered
against the petitioner and in favour of the State. The
judgment impugned in the appeal is upheld for the reasons
stated above.
The writ petition and appeal are dismissed with the
above reservations and observations.
Sd/-
K.Vinod Chandran
Judge
Sd/-
Ziyad Rahman A.A.
Judge
vku/-
WA.No.1879 of 2014
APPENDIX OF W.P(C)NO.22429/2017-C
PETITIONER'S EXHIBIT(S) NIL.
RESPONDENT EXHIBIT(S)
Exhibit R1(A) TRUE COPY OF THE FORM-I REPORT OF
OR NO.18/2016.
Exhibit R1(B) TRUE COPY OF THE FORM-I REPORT OF
OR NO.19/2016.
Exhibit R1(C) TRUE COPY OF THE FORM-I REPORT OF
OR NO.02/2017.
Exhibit R1(D) TRUE COPY OF THE FORM-I REPORT OF
OR NO.04/2017.
Exhibit R1(E) TRUE COPY OF THE FORM-I REPORT OF
OR NO.05/2017.
Exhibit R1(F) TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT ON SEIZURE OF
FASHIONED UP CONTRABANDS.
Exhibit R1(G) TRUE COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF SRI. SHIJO.
Exhibit R1(H) TRUE COPY OF CONFESSION OF SRI. SAJU JOHN.
Exhibit R1(I) TRUE COPY OF CONFESSION OF SRI. THIRUMENI.
Exhibit R1(J) TRUE COY OF SAW MILL LICENSE NO.82/12-13
ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER.
Exhibit R1(K) TRUE COPY OF ORDER IN CRL.M.P.4094/2017.
Exhibit R1(L) TRUE COPY OF ORDER IN CRL.M.P.4093/2017.
Exhibit R1(M) TRUE COPY OF ORDER IN CRL.M.P.4091/2017.
Exhibit R1(N) TRUE COPY OF ORDER IN CRL.M.P.4092/2017.
Exhibit R1(O) TRUE COPY OF ORDER IN CRL.M.P.4095/2017.
Exhibit R1(P) TRUE COPY OF INTERIM ORDER IN WPC.22429/2017
DATED 6.7.2017.
Exhibit R1(Q) TRUE COPY OF BLANK FORM NO.XA.
Exhibit R1(R) TRUE COPY OF FORM NO.XB
