Kerala High Court
K.R.Kuttappan @ Appu (Legal Heir) vs Anandakkuttan on 22 March, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN
MONDAY, THE 22ND DAY OF MARCH 2021 / 1ST CHAITHRA, 1943
MACA.No.1325 OF 2010
AGAINST THE AWARD IN OPMV 2104/2000 DATED 22-01-2010 OF MOTOR
ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, KOTTAYAM
APPELLANTS:
1 K.R.KUTTAPPAN @ APPU (LEGAL HEIR)
KALATHIL HOUSE, KUMARAKOM NORTH VILLAGE,
KOTTAYAM.
1.1 SHYMOL P.K.
AGED 50 YEARS,
D/O OF LATE K.R.KUTTAPPAN,
KALATHIL HOUSE,
KUMARAKAM VILLAGE,
KOTTAYAM DISTRICT.
2 SHYMOL P.K
AGED 50 YEARS
SOUGHT TO BE IMPLEADED
BY ADVS.
SRI.K.M.VARGHESE
SRI.K.M.VARGHESE
RESPONDENTS:
1 ANANDAKKUTTAN
KAREEL HOUSE,
KUMARAKOM NORTH VILLAGE,
KOTTAYAM.
2 NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD.
KOTTAYAM, PIN-686001
3 SAN ALEX
SRAMBIKIL HOUSE, KUMARAKOM VILLAGE,
KOTTAYAM DISTRICT. PIN-686563
4 PENNAMMA
KARIYIL VEETTIL, NEAR ST.JOHN'S HOSPITAL,
PANDAVAM, AYMANAM,
KOTTAYAM. PIN-686015
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
2
5 SAJITHA
W/O. LATE GOPIDAS,
RAHUL BHAVAN (THAICHIRA),
KAVANATTINKARA,
KUMARAKOM VILLAGE,
KOTTAYAM. PIN-686566
6 GRESHMA
C/O. SAJITHA,RAHUL BHAVAN (THAICHIRA),
KAVANATTINKARA,
KUMARAKOM VILLAGE,
KOTTAYAM.PIN- 686566.
7 RAHULDAS
C/O. SAJITHA, RAHUL BHAVAN (THAICHIRA),
KAVANATTINKARA,
KUMARAKOM VILLAGE,
KOTTAYAM.PIN-686566
8 LAKSHMI
THAICHIRA HOUSE, VIRUPPUKALA,
CHEEPUNKAL,
AYMANAM, KOTTAYAM.PIN-686566.
R1 BY ADV. PHILIP J.VETTICKATTU
R1 BY ADV. SRI.PHILIP J.VETTICKATTU
R1 BY ADV. SRI.SIBY MATHEW
R2 BY ADV. M.JACOB MURICKAN
THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON 09-03-2021, THE COURT ON 22-03-2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
3
P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN, J.
=======================
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
=======================
Dated this the 22nd day of March 2021
JUDGMENT
The appellant is the first respondent in O.P.
(M.V.)No.2104/2000 on the file of the Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal, Kottayam. It was a claim petition filed by
respondent Nos.5 to 8 herein under Section 166 of the
Motor Vehicles Act.
2. The Tribunal after considering the contentions
of both parties passed an award in favour of the claimants
and directed the 2nd respondent to pay the compensation.
Second respondent is allowed to recover the
compensation from the first respondent, who is the
appellant herein. That right of recovery given to the
insurance company was challenged before this Court
earlier by the appellant/1st respondent by filing
M.A.C.A.No. 1112/2007. That appeal was allowed by this
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
Court as per judgment dated 27.11.2007 and remanded
the case to the tribunal for fresh consideration, after
giving an opportunity to the parties to adduce further
evidence. The relevant portion of the order is extracted
hereunder;
" 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
in the light of the fact that the vehicle has already
been transferred, the appellant has no liability to
satisfy the award. Learned counsel strenuously
pleaded for an opportunity before the Tribunal to
establish his case.
7. Herein, the insurance company has already
satisfied the award by depositing the amount.
Therefore, by remanding the matter for fresh
consideration, the claimants will not be prejudiced
also. Hence, in the interest of justice, the matter has
to be remanded to the Tribunal
8. Appeal is allowed, and the case is remanded
to the Tribunal. The appellant will take steps to
implead the alleged transferee before the Tribunal for
a just determination of the issue. All parties are
allowed to adduce evidence before the Tribunal. The
remand is only on the limited question as to whether
the vehicle was transferred on the date of the
accident. For this purpose, the claimants need not be
drawn before the Tribunal also. They will be entitled
to withdraw the amount now deposited as per the
stipulation already made. The claimants are not
arrayed as respondents in this appeal by the owner of
the vehicle. We make it clear that the award as
regards the quantum of compensation will be treated
as final and the said issue need not be reopened by
the Tribunal. Until the matter is again decided by the
Tribunal, no recovery steps shall be taken by the
insurance company."
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
3. After remand, no oral evidence is adduced by
the appellant/1st respondent. He produced Exts. B3 and
B4 agreement before the tribunal and Exts. B5 to B7
produced by the other respondents. Thereafter, the
tribunal considered the matter fresh and confirmed the
recovery order passed by the tribunal earlier, as per
judgment dated 22.01.2010 in the revised judgment. The
relevant portion is extracted here under;
" 8. As per the case of the petitioner they filed the
petition alleging that the first respondent was the
owner of the offending bus and the second respondent
was the driver of the bus. The 3 rd respondent is the
insurance company. The first respondent raised a
contention that the vehicle was transferred to one San
Alex and later it was transferred to the additional 5 th
respondent pennamma. Now the question to be
answered by this court is regarding the ownership of
the vehicle involved in the accident on the date of
accident. The accident was occurred on 21.11.2000 at
9.30 a.m. Ext.B2 is the insurance certificate issued in
the name of first respondent Kuttappan for the period
from 24.07.2000 to 23.07.2001. This documents
makes it clear that on the date of accident the
insurance certificate of bus No.KL-5C-9751 stands in
the name of first respondent Kuttappan. His case is
that he had transferred the vehicle to one San Alex.
An agreement dated 19.11.1998 was produced and
marked as Ext.B3. It is seen that Kuttappan and San
Alex are signed in the agreement. Two witnesses are
also seen signed in Ext.B3. However neither the first
respondent nor the additional 4 th respondent tendered
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
evidence in proof of Ext.B3 agreement. Ext.B4 is the
photocopy of the agreement executed between first
respondent Kuttppan, additional 4th respondent San
Alex and 5th respondent Pennamma. This agreement is
dated 03.03.1999. Ext.B3 agreement is seen referred
in Ext. B4 and the vehicle was transferred to the
additional 5th respondent with certain liabilities. This
agreement was also not proved by the first respondent
or the 4th respondent. Ext.B7 is a certificate of
insurance of bus No.KL-5C-9751 in the name of 5 th
respondent for the period from 24.07.2002 to
23.07.2003. This certificate is one which came into
existence after the expiry of Ext.B2 insurance
certificate. When the first respondent contends that he
has sold the vehicle to the second respondent as per
Ext.B3 agreement it is for him to prove the same. He
has not come forward to give oral evidence to prove
Ext.B3. Therefore no evidentiary value will be attached
to Ext.B3.
9. On the side of the respondent, Rws 1 and 2
are examined to support the respondents claim. The
evidence of RW1 is that the driver of the bus was
RW2, Babu and conductor was one Santhosh.
According to RW1, he witnesses the accident. RW2
Babu Jacob deposed that on 21.11.2005 he was the
driver of the bus No.KL-5C-9751. While he was driving
the bus a person sustained injury and the injured was
taken to the medical college hospital. He would saw
that K.R.Kuttappan was the owner of the bus and he
was working under the said Kuttappan. It is pertinent
to note that Police have registered case against the
second respondent in the petition and not against
RW2. RW2 has also produced copy of the driving
license which is marked as Ext.B5. Ext.B6 judgment
shows that the case against the second respondent
here in entitled in acquittal. Result of criminal case is
not a material fact to be considered in deciding the
case. Now the court is not probing as to who was the
driver of the bus at the time of accident? That fact
does not germane for consideration after remand from
the appellate court. The only point to be decided is
regarding the ownership. On the date of accident
insurance of the vehicle stands in the name of first
respondent. It pre-supposes that he was the
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
registered owner of the vehicle. Though Ex.B3 and B4
was produced and marked no evidence was adduced
to prove the documents to substantiate the alleged
transfer of the vehicle. Hence I find that there is no
evidence that the first respondent had transferred the
vehicle to the 4th respondent or any other person on
the date of the accident. Therefore the first
respondent is vicariously liable for the negligence of
the second respondent. Ext.B1 charge sheet shows
that the 2nd respondent was charge sheeted under
Section 3(1) r/w 181 of Motor vehicles Act, apart from
IPC offenses. This shows that the 2 nd respondent was
not having valid driving license on the date of the
accident. The 3rd respondent has no case that the 1st
respondent has not taken reasonable care in
entrusting the vehicle to the 1st respondent. Therefore,
the 3rd respondent is liable to pay the award amount to
the petitioners at the first instance and the 3rd
respondent is entitled to recover the same from the 1 st
respondent."
4. Aggrieved by the above award, this appeal is
filed.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the
learned counsel for the 2nd respondent-insurance company
and the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, who is the
driver of the vehicle.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that, as per Ext. B3 agreement the vehicle is transferred
to 3rd respondent San Alex on 19.11.1998. The accident in
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
this case was on 21.11.2000. Therefore, the appellant/1 st
respondent has no liability to pay the compensation. The
learned counsel submitted that, Exts. B3 and B4 are not
disputed by respondents 3 and 4 before the tribunal after
remand. The learned counsel takes me through the
written statement filed by the 4th respondent, Pennamma
in which there is no specific denial of the agreement.
Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that, simply
because there is no oral evidence adduced by the
appellant, the tribunal erred in not accepting Exts. B3
and B4 agreement. The learned counsel specifically
contented that, if this Court feels that oral evidence is
necessary to prove Exts. B3 and B4 agreement, a further
opportunity may be given by remanding the matter. A
specific ground is raised in the appeal memo that, a junior
lawyer was appearing for the appellant before the tribunal
and therefore, the case was not properly conducted.
7. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent
submitted that, it is an admitted fact that the registered
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
owner of the vehicle as per record is this appellant. The
learned counsel submitted that, even if Exts. B3 and B4
are accepted, in the light of the fact that, the registration
details shows that, the appellant is the registered owner,
the tribunal justified in allowing the 2 nd respondent to
recover the compensation from the appellant. The learned
counsel relied the judgment of the Apex Court in
Prakash Chand Daga v. Saveta Sharma and others
(2018 KHC 7011). The learned counsel submitted that,
in the light of the above judgment, the contention of the
appellant will not stand.
8. It is an admitted fact that, the alleged transfer
of the vehicle is not reported to the registering authority.
The appellant is relying in Exts. B3 and B4 agreement to
show that, there is transfer of the ownership of the
vehicle. Admittedly, the registration of the vehicle is in the
name of the appellant as on date of the accident.
Moreover, the insurance policy is also in the name of the
appellant as on the date of the accident. This point is
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
considered by the Apex Court in detail in Prakash Chand
Daga's Case (Supra). The relevant portion is extracted
hereunder;
" 5. It is true that in terms of Section 50 of the
Act, the transfer of a vehicle ought to be registered
within 30 days of the sale. Section 50(1) of the Act
obliges the transferor to report the fact of transfer
within 14 days of the transfer. In case the vehicle is
sold outside State, the period within which the transfer
ought to be reported gets extended. On the other
hand, the transferee is also obliged to report the
transfer to the registering authority within whose
jurisdiction the transferee has the residence or place of
business where the vehicle is normally kept. Section
50 thus prescribes timelines within which the
transferor and the transferee are required to report the
factum of transfer. As per Sub-Section 3 of
said Section 50, if there be failure to report the fact of
transfer, fine could be imposed and an action
under Section 177 could thereafter be taken if there is
failure to pay the amount of fine. These timelines and
obligations are only to facilitate the reporting of the
transfer. It is not as if that if an accident occurs within
the period prescribed for reporting said transfer, the
transferor is absolved of the liability.
6. Chapter XII of the Act deals with Claims Tribunals
and as to how applications for compensation are to be
preferred and dealt with. While considering such
claims, the Claims Tribunal, in case of an accident is
required to specify the amount which shall be paid by
the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved
in the accident or whether such amount be paid by all
or any of them, as the case may be. It is well settled
that for the purposes of fixing such li ability the
concept of ownership has to be understood in terms of
specific definition of 'owner' as defined in Section
2(30) of the Act.
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
7. In Pushpa alias Leela and Ors. Vs. Shakuntala and
Ors. 2011 (2) SCC 240 the vehicle in question
belonged to one Jitender Gupta who was its registered
owner. He sold said vehicle to one Salig Ram on
02.02.1993 and gave its possession to the transferee.
Despite said sale, the change of ownership was not
entered in the Certificate of Registration. The earlier
insurance policy having expired, the transferee took
out fresh insurance policy in the name of original
owner Jitender Gupta. In an accident that took place
on 07.05.1994 two persons lost their lives. The heirs
and legal representatives lodged separate claims and
an issue arose as to who was liable as owner. The
submissions that Jitender Gupta, the registered owner
had no control over the vehicle and the possession
and control of the vehicle was in the hands of the
transferee and as such no liability could be fastened
on the transferor were rejected by this Court. It was
observed in para 11 as under:
"11. It is undeniable that notwithstanding the sale of
the vehicle neither the transferor Jitender Gupta nor
the transferee Salig Ram took any step for the change
of the name of the owner in the certificate of
registration of the vehicle. In view of this omission
Jitender Gupta must be deemed to continue as the
owner of the vehicle for the purposes of the Act, even
though under the civil law he ceased to be its owner
after its sale on 2.2.1993."
8. In the decision in Naveen Kumar (supra) the legal
position was adverted to and this Court observed as
under:
"13. The consistent thread of reasoning which
emerges from the above decisions is that in view of
the definition of the expression "owner" in Section
2(30), it is the person in whose name the motor
vehicle stands registered who, for the purposes of the
Act, would be treated as the "owner". However, where
a person is a minor, the guardian of the minor would
be treated as the owner. Where a motor vehicle is
subject to an agreement of hire purchase, lease or
hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
under that agreement is treated as the owner. In a
situation such as the present where the registered
owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but
continues to be reflected in the records of the
Registering Authority as the owner of the vehicle, he
would not stand absolved of liability. Parliament has
consciously introduced the definition of the expression
"owner" in Section 2(30), making a departure from
the provisions of Section 2(19) in the earlier 1939 Act.
The principle underlying the provisions of Section
2(30) is that the victim of a motor accident or, in the
case of a death, the legal heirs of the deceased victim
should not be left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant
for compensation ought not to be burdened with
following a trail of successive transfers, which are not
registered with the Registering Authority. To hold
otherwise would be to defeat the salutary object and
purpose of the Act. Hence, the interpretation to be
placed must facilitate the fulfilment of the object of
the law. In the present case, the first respondent was
the "owner" of the vehicle involved in the accident
within the meaning of Section 2(30). The liability to
pay compensation stands fastened upon him.
Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured. The High Court
has proceeded upon a misconstruction of the
judgments of this Court in Reshma 2015 (3) SCC 679
and Purnya Kala Devi 2014 (14) SCC 142.
14. The submission of the petitioner is that a failure to
intimate the transfer will only result in a fine under
Section 50(3) but will not invalidate the transfer of the
vehicle. In T.V. Jose 2001 (8) SCC 748, this Court
observed that there can be transfer of title by
payment of consideration and delivery of the car. But
for the purposes of the Act, the person whose name is
reflected in the records of the Registering Authority is
the owner. The owner within the meaning of Section
2(30) is liable to compensate. The mandate of the law
must be fulfilled."
9. The law is thus well settled and can be
summarised:-
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
"Even though in law there would be a transfer of
ownership of the vehicle, that, by itself, would not
absolve the party, in whose name the vehicle stands in
RTO records, from liability to a third person.... Merely
because the vehicle was transferred does not mean
that such registered owner stands absolved of his
liability to a third person. So long as his name
continues in RTO records, he remains liable to a third
person." (P.P Mohammed vs. K.Rajappan and Ors.,
2008 (17) SCC 624 para 4) The High Court was
therefore absolutely right in allowing the appeal. The
challenge raised by the appellant must fail.
9. In the light of the above judgment, the
contention of the appellant will not stand in a claim
petition initiated under the Motor Vehicles Act. The
learned counsel for the appellant also relied Section 68 of
the Evidence Act, which is extracted hereunder;
" 68. Proof of execution of document required by
law to be attested.--If a document is required by
law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence
until one attesting witness at least has been called for
the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an
attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of
the Court and capable of giving evidence:
Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an
attesting witness in proof of the execution of any
document, not being a Will, which has been registered
in accordance with the provisions of the Indian
Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its
execution by the person by whom it purports to have
been executed is specifically denied."
10. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
that, when there is no dispute regarding the genuineness
of the agreement, the examination of the parties in the
agreement is not necessary. The learned counsel
submitted that, the proviso to Section 68 of the Evidence
Act is that, it shall not be necessary to call an attesting
witness in proof of the execution of any document or
unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to
have been executed is specifically denied. On this aspect,
I cannot agree with the learned counsel for the appellant,
because it is a case in which there is dispute from the
side of the 2nd respondent-insurance company. According
to them, the appellant is the registered owner of the
vehicle and he is liable in a proceedings under the Motor
Vehicles Act. The learned counsel also relied Section
2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 2(30) of the
Motor Vehicles Act is extracted hereunder;
" (30) "owner" means a person in whose name a
motor vehicle stands registered and where such
person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in
relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a
hire-purchase, agreement, or an agreement of lease
or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
possession of the vehicle under that agreement."
11. The learned counsel submitted that, the owner
is defined under Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act,
and it means a person in whose name a motor vehicle
stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the
guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle
which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or an
agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation,
the person in possession of the vehicle under that
agreement. The learned counsel submitted that, vehicle is
in possession of respondents 3 and 4 based on the
agreement produced by the appellant. Therefore, the
appellant is not the owner as defined under Section 2(30)
of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is true that, there is some
force in the argument of the appellant. But in the light of
the Apex Court decision in Prakash Chand Daga's Case
(Supra), I am not in a position to accept this contention
also. In Prakash Chand Daga's Case (Supra), the Apex
Court consider this point in detail. Considering that, Motor
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation, the Apex Court,
concluded that, the RC owner is primarily liable and the
claimant need not go from the pillar to post. In such
circumstances, in the light of the decision in Prakash
Chand Daga's Case (Supra), I am not in a position to
accept that contention while considering a claim petition
under the Motor Vehicles Act also.
12. Then the learned counsel relied in Exts. B6 and
B7 produced before the tribunal. Ext.B6 is the copy of the
judgment in CC No.1094/2001 of the Judicial First Class
Magistrate Court-III. The counsel takes me through the
declaration submitted by the owner before the criminal
court. The counsel submitted that in the light of the such
a declaration before a court of law, it is clear that the
appellant is not the owner of the vehicle and the same
may be accepted and the appellant may be exonerated
from the paying the compensation. I leave open this
question. This Court is now only considering an
appeal filed against an award passed by the Motor
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
Accident Claims Tribunal. While considering such an
appeal, this Court is bound by the decision of the Apex
Court in Prakash Chand Daga's Case (Supra).
13. Then the counsel argued that the driver and the
owner is liable jointly and severally. Therefore, liability may
be mulcted to the driver also. On this point also, I am not in
a position to accept the contention of the appellant because
this Court remanded the matter as per judgment dated
27.11.2007 for the limited purpose. In the judgment, this
Court clearly stated that the remand is only on the limited
question as to whether the vehicle was transferred as on
the date of the accident. The Division Bench of this Court in
the judgment in MACA No.1112/2007 clearly stated the
purpose of remand. The Tribunal or this Court can't re-
consider those issues again in a claim petition or an appeal
arises from the claim petition. Then, the counsel relied the
judgment of the Apex Court in Purnya Kala Devi v. State
of Assam and anr. [(2014) 14 SCC 142]. The counsel
submitted that in para No.16 of the above judgment, the
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
Apex Court considered the point raised by the appellant.
Para No.16 of the Purnya Kala Devi's case (supra) is
extracted hereunder :
"16. Though the above point was pressed into service, the
High Court, without adverting to S.5 of the Assam Act,
merely on the basis of the definition of "owner" as
contained in S.2(30) of the 1988 Act, mulcted the award
payable by the owner of the vehicle. The High Court failed
to appreciate that at the relevant time the offending
vehicle was under the requisition of Respondent No. 1 -
State of Assam under the provisions of the Assam Act.
Therefore, Respondent No. 1 was squarely covered under
the definition of "owner" as contained in S.2(30) of the
1988 Act. The High Court failed to appreciate the
underlying legislative intention in including in the definition
of "owner" a person in possession of a vehicle either under
an agreement of lease or agreement of hypothecation or
under a hire - purchase agreement to the effect that a
person in control and possession of the vehicle should be
construed as the "owner" and not alone the registered
owner. The High Court further failed to appreciate the
legislative intention that the registered owner of the
vehicle should not be held liable if the vehicle was not in
his possession and control. The High Court also failed to
appreciate that S.146 of the 1988 Act requires that no
person shall use or cause or allow any other person to use
a motor vehicle in a public place without an insurance
policy meeting the requirements of Chapter XI of the 1988
Act and the State Government has violated the statutory
provisions of the 1988 Act. The Tribunal also erred in
accepting the allegation of Respondent No. 2 that the
vehicle was released on the date of the accident at 10.30
a.m. and the accident occurred at 10.30 a.m. without any
evidence even though in the claim petition, it was stated
that the accident had occurred at 10.15 a.m."
14. But the facts of this case is different. According to
me, in the light of the Prakash Chand Daga's case
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
(supra), the Tribunal is perfectly justified in dismissing the
contention of the appellant. No other contentions are raised
by the appellant. Therefore, according to me, the Tribunal is
perfectly justified in passing the revised judgment, in which
also the Insurance company is allowed to recover the
amount from the appellant.
15. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the
original appellant is no more and his daughter is impleaded
as additional appellant. Her only property is now attached
for recovering the compensation. But I make it clear that if
any amount is recovered from the appellant as per the
impugned award, the appellant is free to recover that
amount from the 3rd and 4th respondent in accordance to
law. If the appellant is able to prove before the civil court
that there is transfer of title and delivery of the vehicle, this
order will not stand in the way. This is possible because, the
Apex Court in Prakash Chand Daga's Case (Supra)(para
14) clearly stated that only for the purpose of Motor
Vehicles Act, the name reflected in the records of the
MACA No. 1325 of 2010
Registering Authority is treated as the owner of the vehicle.
Hence, if any other civil remedy is available to the appellant
against 3rd and 4th respondent, the appellant is free to
agitate the same in accordance to law.
With these observations, this appeal is dismissed.
` (Sd/-)
P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN
JUDGE
ss
LU
SKS
