Kerala High Court
B. Sudharma vs State Of Kerala on 28 January, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
THURSDAY, THE 28TH DAY OF JANUARY 2021 / 8TH MAGHA, 1942
WP(C).No.35220 OF 2019(S)
PETITIONERS:
1 B. SUDHARMA,
AGED 58 YEARS
TMC 36/580, NAYANI SHARANYAM, MANATH AYYATHMOOLA
ROAD, TRIKKAKARA, KOCHI - 682 021.
2 JOSEPH SHAJI GEORGE,
JISHA COTTAGE, NEAR R.C.CHURCH,
KAYAMKULAM - 690 502.
3 ASOKAN V.N.,
ALATHIRIPARAMBIL HOUSE, CHERANALLOOR,
KOCHI - 682 034.
4 RAMACHANDRAN C.P.,
VENGALIL, CHUNANGAD, OTTAPPALAM - 679 511.
BY ADVS.
SRI.T.V.AJAYAKUMAR
KUM.P.H.RIMJU
RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY, SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.
2 THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF KERALA,
HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.
3 THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL (A AND E),
KERALA, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.
4 KERALA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, PATTOM,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 014.
WP(C).No.35220 OF 2019(S) 2
5 COMMISSIONER OF FOOD SAFETY,
COMMISSIONERATE OF FOOD SAFETY, THYCAUD,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 014.
6 K.ANILKUMAR,
JOINT FOOD SAFETY COMMISSIONER (ADMINISTRATION AND
LEGAL), COMMISSIONERATE OF FOOD SAFETY, THYCAUD,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 014.
R1 TO R3 & R5 BY SRI.RANJITH THAMPAN, ADDL.ADVOCATE
GENERAL AND SRI.Y.JAFFAR KHAN, GOVERNMENT PLEADER
SRI.P.C.SASIDHARAN, STANDING COUNSEL FOR R4,
SRI.P.NANDAKUMAR FOR R6
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 06-
01-2021, THE COURT ON 28-01-2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
WP(C).No.35220 OF 2019(S) 3
CR
JUDGMENT
Dated this the 28th day of January,2021
SHAJI P.CHALY,J
This is a Public Interest Litigation filed by the petitioners, who were
retired as Additional/Assistant Commissioners of Food Safety under the 1 st
respondent State of Kerala, seeking a Writ of Quo Warranto against the 6th
respondent, functioning in the post of Joint Food Safety Commissioner
(Administration & Legal), questioning his authority for holding the aforesaid
post and further to declare that the 6th respondent is unqualified and
incompetent to hold the post of Joint Food Safety Commissioner
(Administration & Legal) and that he is not duly appointed to the above post in
the Commissionerate of Food Safety as per the Food Safety and Standards Act,
2006, hereinafter called, 'Act, 2006'.
2. Brief material facts for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows;
according to the petitioners, they are highly aggrieved by the unlawful holding
of a public office by the 6th respondent, who is unqualified and not duly
appointed to the above post. The 6 th respondent was appointed to the post of
Technical Assistant (Legal) in the Health Department as per Ext.P1 order dated
17.12.1999. The said post was re-designated as Law Officer - Prevention of
Food Adulteration (PFA) as per Ext P2 order dated 30-03-2001 and the pay
was re-fixed. After the Act, 2006 was enacted, the 6th respondent was
assigned the work of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration &
Legal) and directed to act in the above functional post as a temporary
arrangement during the transition period from PFA Act to Food Safety and
Standards Act as per Ext.P9 Government Order dated 17.2.2010. According to
the petitioners, no qualification and method of appointment to the aforesaid
post has been prescribed either by Special Rules or by executive orders by the
Government till now, evident from Exts.P18 reply given by the State Public
Information Officer of the Health and Family Welfare Department dated
1.12.2018.
3. It is also the case of the petitioners that the 6 th respondent is not
qualified and eligible to be appointed to the above post even on the basis of
the qualification prescribed for the subordinate post of Food Safety Officer
stipulated by the Food Safety and Standard Rules, 2011, hereinafter called,
'Rules, 2011', or on the basis of Ext.P13 Government Order dated 26.9.2014
prescribing qualification for the equivalent post of Joint Commissioner of Food
Safety (Enforcement) or the subordinate post of Assistant Commissioner of
Food Safety, Food Safety Officer, like Degree in Food Technology/Dairy
Technology etc. However, the 6th respondent has been continuously holding
the post since 18.2.2010 without legal authority, even after the Food Safety
Rules came into force w.e.f. 5. 8.2011, which action, according to the
petitioners, is absolutely arbitrary and illegal. It is also stated that the 6th
respondent was put in full additional charge of Commissioner of Food Safety
on that basis, which is also illegal.
4. The sum and substance of the contention of the petitioners is that the
6th respondent is an usurper to the post and it is just and necessary that a
Writ of Quo Warranto is issued against him in view of the law laid down by the
Apex Court in Dr.Kashinath G. Jalmi & Another v. the Speaker & others
[(1993)2 SCC 703, B.R.Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu & Another [(2001) 7
SCC 231], Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand Lal Jaiswal & Others [(2013)1 SCC
501], Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo &
others [(2014)1 SCC 161]. It is also the legal contention of the petitioners
that the 6th respondent is holding the post unlawfully and in violation of Article
320(3) of the Constitution of India and Rules 10, 18 and 28(b)(i) of the Kerala
State and Subordinate Service Rules (KS&SSR).
5. The 6th respondent has filed a detailed counter affidavit refuting the
allegations and claim and demands raised by the petitioners. Among other
contentions it is submitted that there were litigations between petitioners 1 to
3 and 6th respondent before various courts with regard to various service
benefits. Sixth respondent had filed W.P(C) No. 13754 of 2011 against the
promotion granted to the 1st petitioner as Additional Commissioner of Food
Safety and placing her above the 6th respondent in service. The 1st petitioner
had also filed W.P(C) No.11843 of 2011 before this Court seeking retrospective
promotion. Both these cases were subsequently transferred to the Kerala
Administrative Tribunal, when it was established.
6. In the meantime, the Government cancelled the promotion granted
to the 1st petitioner as Deputy Director (PFA) as per G.O(Rt) No.
1359/2011/H&FWD dated 07.04.2011. The 1 st petitioner retired from service on
superannuation later and the transferred applications were closed by the
Tribunal as per order dated 09.10.2017 evident from Ext.R6(a). The 1st
petitioner was seriously aggrieved against the cancellation of her promotion
order, which she believed at the instance of 6th respondent.
7. With regard to the 2nd petitioner, it was submitted that he was placed
under suspension by the Commissioner of Food Safety alleging serious
misconduct and was later imposed with a penalty of increment bar and for
that reason, his terminal benefits were delayed. Contending that the 6th
respondent was the reason for delaying his terminal benefits, the 2 nd petitioner
filed O.A(EKM) No. 628 of 2018 before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal
making the 6th respondent also a party in the proceedings and the Tribunal by
order dated 07.01.2020 directed to release the DCRG due to the 2 nd petitioner.
8. In the meantime, the 2nd petitioner has also filed various petitions
against the 6th respondent before the Government as well as the Vigilance
Department with unsubstantiated allegations. As regards the 3 rd petitioner, he
has also filed O.A(EKM) No.378 of 2017 raising various allegations against the
6th respondent including that the 6th respondent caused delay in granting
promotion to the 3rd petitioner as Assistant Commissioner of Food Safety.
9. The 4th petitioner is also in inimical terms with the 6 th respondent due
to various official actions taken by the 6th respondent against him. Therefore, it
was contented that all these petitioners have joined together against the 6 th
respondent with malafide intentions and have filed the instant writ petition. It
is submitted that the intention of the petitioners is highly malicious, to tarnish
the image of the 6th respondent, who has been occupying the post of Joint
Food Safety Commissioner (Administration and Legal) for the last 10 years by
misusing the writ jurisdiction of this Court and for this reason alone, the
instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
10. It is also submitted that the 6th respondent was originally appointed
as Technical Assistant (Legal) in the Directorate of Health Services upon
selection by the Kerala Public Service Commission as per Exhibit P1 order
dated 17.12.1999. The qualification prescribed for the post of Technical
Assistant (Legal) is a degree in law with minimum five years practice at the
Bar. The post of Technical Assistant (Legal) is an isolated post in the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Wing under the Directorate of Health Services.
At the time of his appointment as Technical Assistant (Legal), 6 th respondent
was having more than 10 years experience at the Bar and also having Post
Graduate Degree in Law. Thereafter, the Director of Health Services furnished
a proposal to the Government to re-fix the scale of pay of the post of Technical
Assistant (Legal) in the Health Services Department and to re-designate the
post as Law Officer (Prevention of Food Adulteration), which was approved by
the Council of Ministers and it was accordingly the Government issued Exhibit
P2 G.O(Rt) No. 926/2001/H&FWD dated 30.03.2001.
11. While working as Law Officer (Prevention of Food Adulteration), the
6th respondent was also deputed in full additional charge of the post of
Registrar, Travancore Cochin Medical Council & Kerala Nurses and Midwives
Council as per G.O(Rt) No.2547/2003/H&FWD dated 27.08.2003. Considering
his administrative skills, 6th respondent was also deputed as Administrator and
Secretary, Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee as per G.O (Rt) No.
3201/2003/RD dated 17.10.2003.
12. While so, the Government of India promulgated the Food Safety and
Standards Act, 2006 and as per Ext.P8 G.O(Rt)No.3466/08/H&FWD dated
20.10.2008 it was ordered that the service of the 6 th respondent under the
Directorate of Health Services be utilized as the Special officer for
implementing the Food Safety Act, under the control of the State Food Safety
Commissioner. Later, the Government by Ext.P6 G.O(Ms)No.123/2009/H&FWD
dated 23.05.2009 ordered that as the first step for implementing the Food
Safety and Standards Act, 2006, the PFA wing at the Directorate of Health
Services including all enforcement staff, laboratory staff and ministerial staff
were placed under the administrative, statutory, financial control of the
Commissioner of Food Safety. The Government also issued, Ext.P7
G.O(Ms)No.122/2009/H&FWD dated 23.05.2009 ordering that the 6 th
respondent will function as Officer on Special Duty for setting up the Office of
the Commissioner of Food Safety as per Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.
13. In the meeting held in the year 2010 the Central Advisory Committee
under the Food Safety and Standards Act, had suggested a structure of Food
Safety set up in the states for the implementation of the Act in the true spirit.
As such, it was suggested to set up a Food Safety Cadre with Joint Food Safety
Commissioners (Administration/Enforcement/Training and Development/Legal)
and other designated officers. Consequently, the Government as per Ext.P9
G.O(Rt) No.578/2010/H&FWD dated 17.02.2010 decided to form four
functional wings ie (1) Enforcement Wing (2) Food Safety Laboratory (3)
Administration and Legal and (4) Research & Development and Training.
14. It was also decided that each of the above wings would be headed
by a Joint Food Safety Commissioner under the Commissioner of Food Safety.
By the very same order, the Government also assigned the work of Joint Food
Safety Commissioners to various Officers including the 6 th respondent.
Consequently, the Commissioner of Food Safety by Ext.P20 order dated
09.03.2010 delegated powers to various Joint Food Safety Commissioners
including Joint Food Safety Commissioner (Administration and Legal). Sixth
respondent, who was then working as Officer on Special Duty (Food Safety)
and Law Officer (PFA), was ordered to act as Joint Food Safety Commissioner
(Administration and Legal). The Government, also by Exhibit P10 G.O (Rt)
No.2483/2010/Fin dated 29.03.2010, authorized the Joint Food Safety
Commissioner (Administration and Legal) as Drawing and Disbursing Officer in
the Commissionerate of Food Safety. The Commissioner of Food Safety by
Exhibit P11 letter dated 21.04.2010 also forwarded the RTC of the 6 th
respondent after having taken charge in the post of Joint Food Safety
Commissioner (Administration and Legal).
15. Thereafter, in order to effectively implement the Act, 2006 in the
State, a meeting was held at the highest level on 13.09.2012 and two posts of
Joint Commissioners were created as per Exhibit P12 G.O(Ms) No.
24/2012/H&FWD dated 02.02.2013. Subsequently, the probation of the 6 th
respondent in the cadre of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration
and Legal) was declared as per Exhibit P16 G.O(Rt) No.1775/2014/H&FWD
dated 30.05.2014.
16. It is further submitted that the 1st petitioner retired from service as
Deputy Director (PFA) and not as Additional Commissioner of Food Safety, as
contended. The further contention that they had meritorious and dedicated
service is also made without any basis. As stated earlier, there were various
proceedings against petitioners 1 to 3, including Vigilance proceedings. The
statement that they are much concerned about Public Health and Food Safety
and for that purpose the instant writ petition is filed challenging the
appointment of the 6th respondent as Joint Commissioner of Food Safety is
also made without any bonafides. The intention of the petitioners is only
private interest, and a targeted attack against the 6th respondent after their
retirement from service.
17. It is further submitted that the post of Technical Assistant (Legal),
which is a first gazetted post in the Directorate of Health Services, was
upgraded and re-designated as Law Officer (PFA) by the decision of the
Council of Ministers. Now, the petitioners are even contending that the
proposal of the Director of Health Services for upgrading the post of Technical
Assistant (Legal) is incorrect, which has nothing to do with the subject matter
of the above case. The petitioners are even questioning the wisdom of the
Council of Ministers in taking a decision, which occurred about 19 years back.
The post of Law Officer (PFA) is the re-designated post of Technical Assistant
(Legal) and therefore, no separate qualification and method of appointment
was prescribed by the Government. The probation of the 6 th respondent in the
post of Law Officer (PFA) was also successfully declared. Now, the complaint of
the petitioners is that there is no rhyme and reason for enhancing the pay of
the Technical Assistant (Legal).
18. The further statement that the 6 th respondent sought and obtained
deputation as Administrator, Guruvaur Devaswom is also incorrect. Sixth
respondent was selected as Administrator by the Guruvayur Devaswom
Managing Committee, which requested the Government to issue necessary
orders to depute the 6 th respondent as Administrator. When the 6 th respondent
was deputed as Administrator of Guruvayur Devaswom, another person with
Law degree was given full additional charge of the post of Law Officer (PFA).
19. The post of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration and
Legal) is not a statutory post under the Food Safety and Standards Act or
Rules. The said post was created by the Government for administrative
convenience and to cater to the legal needs of the department. Even the posts
occupied by the petitioners i.e., Assistant Commissioner of Food Safety is not a
statutory post. As per the various provisions contained in the Food Safety and
Standards Act, only the posts of Commissioner of Food Safety, appointed
under Section 30, Designated Officers appointed under Section 36, Food
Analysts appointed under Section 45 and Food Safety Officers appointed under
Section 37 of the Act, 2006 have been prescribed.
20. Since the post of Joint Commissioner (Administration and Legal) is
not a post coming under the Food Safety and Standards Act, the qualification
and method of appointment will not be prescribed in the Rules made under
the Act, 2006. As stated earlier, while bifurcating the PFA wing under the
Directorate of Health Services, and forming the new Commissionarate, all the
existing employees under the erstwhile PFA wing were inducted into the newly
created Food Safety Commissionarate. In order to accommodate the 6 th
respondent, who was working as Law Officer (PFA) in the PFA wing of the
Directorate of Health Services to the Food Safety Commissionarate,
considering his qualification, experience and administrative capacity, the
6threspondent was originally posted as Special Officer to implement the FSS
Act in the State and later as Officer on Special Duty. Thereafter, on creating
the temporary post of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration and
Legal), the 6th respondent was put in charge and later on making the post
permanent, his probation was also declared. Since, the Government in its
wisdom thought it fit to accommodate the 6 th respondent as Joint
Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration and Legal), considering various
factors and no separate qualification or method of appointment was also
prescribed.
21. The question of prescribing new qualification and method of
appointment to the post of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration
and Legal) will arise only when the 6 th respondent vacates the post and the
Government intends to fill up the said post with a new incumbent. The
petitioners cannot contend that the Government cannot create, abolish or
upgrade a post in its wisdom and appoint competent officers it thinks fit. The
Government has the authority to prescribe the method of appointment and
qualifications to a post. Only if an appointment is made in contravention of the
existing statutory rules, the petitioners can complain of violation of a rule and
consequential illegality in an appointment. The petitioners have no case that
the appointment of the 6th respondent is in violation of any statutory rules. For
this reason alone, a Writ of Quo Warranto will not lie against the appointment
of the 6th respondent as Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration
and Legal).
22. Further it was submitted that the question of consultation with the
Kerala Public Service Commission arises only, if appointments are made by
direct recruitment. Only the post of Food Safety Officer is filled up by direct
recruitment, for which the qualification is prescribed under the Rules, 2011
and later by issuing an executive order by the Government. The post of Joint
Commissioner of Food Safety (Enforcement) and Assistant Commissioner of
Food Safety are promotion posts from the feeder category of Food Safety
Officers. It was in that circumstances, that qualifications and method of
appointment were prescribed by executive orders. No new qualification is also
prescribed for the post of Joint Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners
other than what has been prescribed for the post of Food Safety Officers as
per the Central Rules.
23. As stated earlier, the post of Law Officer (PFA) was an isolated post
in the PFA wing of the Directorate of Health Services, which was also absorbed
in the Food Safety Commissionarate. There is no other incumbent in the Food
Safety Commissionarate, who is qualified in law along with Bar experience, to
occupy the post of Joint Food Safety Commissioner (Administration and Legal).
Ext.P13 G.O is only an executive order for making appointments to the post of
Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Enforcement) and Assistant
Commissioners, for which there are large number of qualified hands. The
incumbent, who holds the post of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety
(Administration and Legal), is not supposed to conduct any enforcement
activities under the provisions of the Food Safety and Standards Act and
therefore, no separate qualification is prescribed under the Act or the Rules.
Whereas, the incumbents, who hold the post of Joint Commissioner
(Enforcement), and Assistant Commissioners, are expected to enforce the
provisions of the Act, 2006 and the rules thereto and even, these posts are not
statutory posts under the Act, 2006 or the Rules. Exhibit P15 order has not
been implemented at all in the department and no person has been appointed
as Technical Assistant (Legal) in the Food Safety Commissionarate pursuant to
the said order.
24. From a mere reading of the qualifications prescribed in the said
order, it can be seen that only lesser experience is sought for than the
previous qualifications prescribed for the post of Technical Assistant (Legal) in
the Directorate of Health Services. Sixth respondent was not transferred to the
new department from the post of Technical Assistant (Legal) but from the post
of Law Officer (PFA), which is a post equivalent to the cadre of Under
Secretary to Government. Now, the petitioners are relying on the opinions
given under the RTI Act to impress upon this Court to claim that the 6 th
respondent is not eligible to hold the post of Joint Commissioner of Food
Safety (Administration and Legal).
25. There were departmental actions against petitioners 1 to 3 and for
that reason their terminal benefits were delayed. Now, owing to that delay in
disbursal of their terminal benefits, the petitioners are challenging the very
appointment of the 6th respondent, who was their Drawing and Disbursing
Officer, while they were in service. For that purpose, the petitioners have been
submitting various frivolous and unsustainable complaints before different
authorities, who on examination of their complaints, found that the same is
unsubstantiated and unsustainable. Having failed in their attempts to malign
the 6th respondent, the petitioners are conducting a witch hunt against the 6 th
respondent by abusing the process of writ jurisdiction of this Court, is the
contention.
26. It was further submitted that the petitioners have not pointed out
that the appointment of the 6 th respondent as Joint Commissioner of Food
Safety (Administration and Legal) is in violation of any statutory rule. It is
settled law that a Writ of Quo Warranto will lie only if the alleged appointment
is in violation of any statutory provision to a statutory post. The Government
has found that the 6th respondent is competent to hold the post of Joint
Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration and Legal). Even in the absence
of any Special Rules or executive orders prescribing the qualification and
method of appointment to a post, the Government is well within its authority
to appoint a person to a post without any prescribed qualification or method
of appointment. Such an appointment cannot be the subject matter in a Writ
of Quo Warranto.
27. It was further submitted Apex Court in various decisions has held
that a Writ of Quo Warranto should be refused where it is an outcome of
malice or ill will. The conduct of the petitioners will definitely show that the
very purpose of filing the above Writ Petition is only to malign and tarnish the
reputation of the 6th respondent; that only a person who comes to the Court
with bonafides and public interest can have the locus standi to seek the writ
of quo warranto. Therefore, no relief could be granted to the petitioners in
the above proceedings, is the contention .
28. It was submitted that the 6th respondent had an unblemished
career for the past 20 years and has been awarded multiple accolades for his
selfless service and devotion to duty. He has also produced Ext.R6(b) letter
dated 26.9.2013 issued by the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India
recognising the steps taken by the 6th respondent in propagating and helping
to implement the objective laid down under the Act, 2006 and the Rules
thereto. The State and the Secretary to the Government of Kerala, Health and
Family Welfare Department, have filed a joint counter affidavit basically
submitting that the prevention of food adulteration wing has to have the
support of legally trained persons and it is in these circumstances, the post of
Law Officer was created in the PFA wing of the Health Department; that the
Law Officer post was a standalone post in the PFA wing; that while the 6 th
respondent was holding the post of Law Officer in the PFA wing, the new
statute viz., the Food Safety Standards Act, 2006 was promulgated; that
consequent to the same, the entire staff of the PFA wing in the directorate of
Health Services except ministerial staff was transferred to the administrative
control of the Commissioner of Food Safety constituted under the Act, 2006
as per Ext.P6 order of the Government of Kerala dated 23.5.2009. Thus, the
6th respondent was also made part of the office of Commissioner of Food
Safety as per Ext.P6 w.e.f. 23.05.2009.
29. It was also submitted that considering the legal implications and
technicalities involved in constituting and implementation of Act, 2006, the 6 th
respondent was put in additional charge as Officer on Special Duty under the
Commissionerate of Food Safety as per Ext.P9 order of the State Government
dated 17.2.2010.
30. According to the State Government, each of the aforesaid wing was
to be created, however, as per Ext.P9 order, the Government had assigned the
work of Joint Food Safety Commissioner (Enforcement) to one Usha Rani,
Senior Most District Food Inspector. First petitioner in the writ petition,
Smt.B.Sudharma, who was the Chief Government Analyst, was appointed as
Joint Food Safety Commissioner (Food Safety Laboratory) and the 6 th
respondent, who was the Officer on Special Duty (Food Safety) and Law
Officer (PFA), to act as Joint Food Safety Commissioner (Administration and
Legal) and these Officers were permitted to draw pay and allowances in the
then existing rates and the said arrangements continued.
31. In the meanwhile, Government as per Ext.P12 order dated 2.2.2013
sanctioned two posts of Joint Commissioner i.e., (1) Joint Food Safety
Commissioner (Administration & Legal) and (2) Joint Commissioner. The post
of Joint Food Safety Commissioner (Administration & Legal) held by the 6 th
respondent on charge arrangement from 2010 onwards was made a
permanent post, apart from creating one more post of Joint Commissioner.
Thereafter, as per Ext.P16 order dated 3.5.2014, the Government has declared
the probation of the 6th respondent in the cadre of Joint Food Safety
Commissioner (Administration & Legal) w.e.f. 18.8.2010. It is also submitted
that the post of Joint Food Safety Commissioner (Administration & Legal) is
not a statutory post and the 6th respondent, who was working as the Law
Officer in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Wing of the Health Services
Department, was put in additional charge of Joint Commissioner of Food
Safety (Administration & Legal) when the new Commissionerate was formed
and employees working in the erstwhile Prevention and Food Adulteration
Wing of Health Services Department merged with the new Department under
Act, 2006.
32. It is also submitted that all the employees working in the Prevention
of Food Adulteration Wing of the Health Services Department were
accommodated in the Food Safety Commissionerate in comparable posts. It
was accordingly that the 6th respondent was put in additional charge of the
present post. It was further submitted that there were no other qualified and
competent persons for holding the said post apart from the 6 th respondent,
who was put in additional charge, as such. It was in the said circumstances,
no separate qualifications and method of appointment was prescribed for the
post of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration & Legal). That
apart a submission is made that the 6 th respondent cannot be sent back to the
PFA wing of the Health Services Department as the said wing has been
merged with the Food Safety Commissionerate.
33. Above all, it was contended that the 6th respondent is holding the
post with authority as per Ext.P9 Government Order and therefore, the
petitioners are not entitled to maintain a Writ of Quo Warranto. Other legal
contentions are also raised in support of the 6th respondent.
34. Reply affidavits are filed refuting the contentions raised in the
counter affidavits and have also produced additional documents. The 6 th
respondent has also produced a copy of the complaint filed by the 2 nd
petitioner before the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission, New
Delhi, complaining about the appointment of the 6th respondent made by the
State Government and also expressing apprehension that the State
Government is taking steps for conferment of Indian Administrative Services to
the 6th respondent, wherein a peculiar submission is raised to the effect that,
the High Court of Kerala has prima facie found that the 6th respondent is not
competent to hold the post of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety
(Administration & Legal), by issuing notice in this writ of quo warranto.
Therefore, requested not to consider the proposal to confer IAS to
K.Anilkumar, the 6th respondent, till the disposal of this writ petition. These are
the basic background facts available for consideration of the writ petition. We
also make it clear that our endeavour would be to consider whether a writ of
quo warranto in the factual background is maintainable under law at all.
35. We have heard Sri.T.V.Ajaykumar, learned counsel for petitioners,
Sri.Ranjth Thampan, learned Additional Advocate General appeared for State
and its officials, and Sri.P.Nandakumar, appeared for the 6th respondent, and
perused the pleadings and materials on record.
36. The arguments advanced by learned counsel for petitioners was that
the 6th respondent is unlawfully continuing in the post of the Joint
Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration & Legal), which is arbitrary and
illegal as he is not legally entitled to continue in the above post on or after
5.8.2011, on which date the Food Safety and Standards Rules, 2011 has come
into force. It was also submitted that in Ext.P19 reply given to an application
under Right to Information Act, it is stated that the order appointing the 6 th
respondent in the above post did not come to his attention. Therefore, it is
submitted that the respondent is an usurper in the above post and is liable to
be ousted.
37. That apart it was argued that the 6 th respondent was appointed to
the post without any appointment order and holding the same for more than
10 years which is violative of Articles 14, 16, 319 and 323 of the Constitution
of India, apart from being violative of the provisions of Part I and Part II of the
Kerala State & Subordinate Service Rules especially rules 2(1), 2(11), 2(12)
and 2(13) of Part I KS&SSR and rules 5 , 9, 10, 18(a) and 28(b)(1) of Part II
KS&SSR, which are applicable to holders of all posts whether temporary or
permanent in service. It was again pointed out that the 6th respondent does
not possess any of the qualifications prescribed under the Act, 2006 and the
Rules, 2011. It was also contended that Article 319 of the Constitution of India
provides for drawing up of procedure and rules to regulate recruitment and
service conditions of candidates appointed to public service posts, but the 6 th
respondent was not appointed in the post in question as provided under
Article 319.
38. It was also the contention of the petitioners that Ext.P9, which
according to the 6th respondent, is his appointment order is only an order
giving additional charge to act in the post in question till the implementation of
the FSS Act. That apart it was submitted that as per Ext.P20 order of the
Commissioner of Food Safety, prescribing allocation of duties to the Joint
Commissioner of Food Safety shows that enforcement duties are entrusted to
the Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration & Legal). It is also
evident from Ext.R6(b) and R6(c) testimonials produced by the 6 th respondent
and Ext.P28 and Ext.P29 documents produced along with the reply affidavit of
the petitioners that the 6 th respondent has been discharging the duties of Joint
Commissioner of Food Safety (Enforcement) and also Joint Commissioner of
Food Safety (Food).
39. The sum and substance of the contention advanced is that, the
incumbent, who holds the post of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety
(Administration & Legal) is not supposed to conduct enforcement activities
under the provisions of the Act, 2006 and therefore, no separate qualification
is prescribed under the Act or Rules, is factually incorrect and legally
unsustainable.
40. It is also submitted that one Sri.D.Sivakumar and Sri.C.L.Dileep,
presently working as Deputy Commissioners, who were legally trained and
experienced officers in the Commissionerate were liable to be posted as Joint
Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration & Legal) while issuing Ext.P9
order and they are working as District Food Inspector and Food Inspector,
respectively, which are statutory posts and therefore, contention of the 6 th
respondent that they are not qualified persons to hold the post is manifestly
wrong and liable to be rejected. That apart a prime contention is advanced
relying upon Ext.P14 order of the Government dated 7.6.2016, that the
functional designation post created as per Ext.P9 was a temporary
arrangement and no functional designation post created in the light of the
above order are not now existing in the Commissionerate and therefore, the
6th respondent cannot continue in the post on the basis of the above order
also.
41. So also the petitioners have attacked Ext.P16 order passed by the
State Government declaring probation of the 6th respondent contending that
the 6th respondent was not regularly appointed to the post and no such post
was also created at the time of issuing Ext.P9 order giving additional charge
of the Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration & Legal) to the 6 th
respondent. However, Ext.P12 order creating the post was issued belatedly
on 2.2.2013. Besides no rules or executive orders are issued by the
Government prescribing conditions for completion of probation in the above
post, is the contention. Other contentions are also raised relying upon the
provisions of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules as specified
above and finally contended that, the 6 th respondent is liable to be removed
from the post and in view of the factual and legal circumstances, writ petition
seeking a writ of quo warranto is clearly maintainable under law.
42. On the other hand, the Additional Advocate General submitted that
the 6th respondent was appointed as Technical Assistant in the Health
Department as per Ext.P1 on 17.12.1999 and the post was re-designated as
Law Officer (Prevention of Food Adulteration) as per Ext.P2 dated
30.03.2001. It is also submitted that as per Ext.P6 order dated 23.5.2009, all
the staff working in the implementation of Prevention of Food Adulteration
Act, 1954, were transferred to the division, which will implement the Act,
2006 except the then existing ministerial staff, who were directed to be
continued as such until further orders. It was accordingly that the 6 th
respondent was also shifted in the Food Safety and Standards Act Wing. It
was also submitted that since no rule was in force in respect of the post of
Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration & Legal), Ext.P16 order
was issued invoking the power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India
43. The paramount contention advanced by the learned Additional
Advocate General was that Ext.P9 and other Government orders are in favour
of the 6th respondent and they are statutory executive orders issued by the
State Government and therefore, a writ of quo warranto as is sought for by
the petitioners is not maintainable and the issues are purely service matters.
Apart from the same, it was submitted that there is a delay of 6 years in
making the challenge, which is fatal in nature for securing any reliefs in a
writ of quo warranto. That apart it was submitted that section 30 of the Act,
2006 only deals with the post of Commissioner of Food Safety; section 36
deals with Designated Officer; section 37 deals with Food Safety Officer and
section 45 deals with Food Safety Analyst and therefore, neither the Act,
2006 nor the Rules, 2011 prescribes any qualification to the post of Joint
Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration & Legal), thus enabling the
State Government to invoke the powers conferred under Article 162 of the
Constitution of India so as to make necessary appointments for the effective
implementation of the provisions of the Act, 2006 and the Rules thereto.
44. It was also submitted that the decisions relied upon by the learned
counsel for petitioners are all dealing with the issues on the basis of available
statutory rules and provisions and in the case on hand, there is no statutory
rule in force and therefore, the judgments relied on by the petitioners have
no factual or legal foundation. Learned counsel for 6 th respondent submitted
that at the time of appointment as per Ext.P1 order in the year 1999, the 6th
respondent was a Post Graduate in Law and was qualified for the post of
Technical Assistant (Legal), which was re-designated as is specified above. It
is the further contention that the 6th respondent has assumed charge in the
post as per Ext.P9 order on 18.2.2010 and Ext.P11 letter dated 21.04.2010 is
only a routine communication for drawing the salary, not only for the 6 th
respondent, but for others, who were holding the post in accordance with
Ext.P9 order dated 17.2.2010 including the 1st petitioner.
45. It was also argued that as per Ext.P12 order dated 2.2.2013, it was
recommended to make permanent and temporary posts of Joint
Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration & Legal) and to create a post of
Joint Commissioner of Food Safety along with other posts and therefore, 1 st
petitioner, who was holding the post, was also made permanent along with
the 6th respondent and the probation of the 6th respondent was declared as
per Ext.P16. It was also submitted that the 6 th respondent has completed 10
years of service as Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration &
Legal) and by virtue of Exts.P9, P12, and P16 Government Orders, 6 th
respondent is entitled to continue as of right since no other statutory rules in
regard to that post is in vogue, which is an admitted fact .
46. Learned counsel for 6th respondent has invited our attention to
various circumstances available on record to establish that the petitioners
have approached this Court with unclean hands and they were nurturing ill-
will against the 6th respondent for various reasons. Significantly it was
pointed out that the 1st petitioner has retired as Deputy Director but in the
writ petition it is stated that she has retired as Joint Commissioner of Food
Safety. That apart it was submitted that the 6 th respondent has filed W.P.(C)
No.13754/2011 challenging the posting given to the 1 st petitioner as
Additional Commissioner and later Government cancelled the said order and
also the post of Deputy Director since the Departmental Promotion
Committee was not convened before appointing the 1st petitioner. However,
later she was promoted as Deputy Director in accordance with law.
47. Likewise, 2nd petitioner was placed under suspension by
Commissioner of Food Safety and later he filed an Original Application before
the Kerala Administrative Tribunal making the 6 th respondent a party alleging
that the 6th respondent caused delay in disbursing pensionary benefits, apart
from filing various petitions against the 6 th respondent and therefore, in
inimical terms. So also the 3rd petitioner has filed an Original Application
before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal making the 6 th respondent a party
alleging that the 6th respondent caused delay in granting promotion to him as
Assistant Commissioner of Food Safety. Similarly the 4 th petitioner, who
retired from service on 30.4.2017, was not in good terms with the 6 th
respondent in view of various actions taken against him. It was also pointed
out that it was in the above background that these persons joined together
and filed this writ petition seeking a writ of quo warranto.
48. Yet another submission made was that the service of the 6 th
respondent as Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration & Legal)
has already been appreciated by the Food Safety and Standards Authority of
India as per Ext.P6(b) communication and Ext.R6(c) proceedings of the State
Government on the basis of the appreciation of the prompt action taken in
complying with the directions issued by this Court in connection with
preparation of food at Sabarimala amidst the heavy workload in the
Commissionerate. It was also submitted that during the tenure of service
there was no challenge made against Ext.P9 and other consequential orders
because the 1st petitioner was a beneficiary of the said Government Orders.
Again it was submitted that evident from Ext.R6(d) produced along with
I.A.No.3 of 2020 in the writ petition, the 2 nd petitioner has addressed the
Union Public Service Commission apprehending that there is likelihood of
conferment of IAS to the 6th respondent by incorrectly stating that this Court
in this writ petition has prima facie found that appointment of the 6 th
respondent is illegal by issuing notice in a writ of quo warranto.
49. The sum and substance of the contention advanced by the learned
counsel for the 6th respondent was that the petitioners have not approached
this Court with clean hands which they are expected to do especially in a
public interest litigation seeking a writ of quo warranto. It was also pointed
out that since the 6th respondent was appointed by the State Government
invoking the powers conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution of India,
the 6th respondent is continuing in the post for the past 10 years under
authority of law and on the basis of appropriate orders and therefore, the
writ of quo warranto sought for cannot be sustained under law.
50. Learned counsel has also addressed arguments relying upon Part I
and Part II of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules especially
contending that since all the employees of the Health Department
functioning under the provisions of the Food Adulteration Act were absorbed
when the Food Safety and Standards Act was implemented, there is no
requirement of any consultation with the Public Service Commission as is
contemplated under rules 3 & 13B of KS&SSR. So also it was submitted that
rule 28B(12) deals with recommendation for promotion and the sum and
substance of the contention is that in view of the absorption made, there
are no such requirements under the Rules to consult the Kerala Public
Service Commission.
51. It was also submitted that as per rule 9 of the Kerala Civil Service
(Qualification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Government is the appointing
authority and for convenience it is delegated to the head of the departments.
So also as per rule 10 of Part II KS&SSR, the Government is at liberty to fix
the qualifications either through a statute or issuing executive orders and
viewed in that manner, the appointment order issued in favour of the 6 th
respondent and others are valid in law and to which the 1 st petitioner is a
beneficiary. So also it was submitted that the post held by the 6 th respondent
is not a promotion post since there was no feeder category for the same and
the post is a standalone post and therefore, at this distance of 10 years time,
if the appointment is held to be bad, there is no post available for the 6 th
respondent to go back.
52. It was also predominantly contended that even if there are any
irregularities in the appointment, it can be looked into only in a writ of
certiorari and not in a writ of quo warranto. It was also submitted that the
contention put forth by the petitioners that there are qualified hands to man
the post of joint Commissioner of Food Safety and also to take over the
charge of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety, is not correct since the persons
named by the petitioners and specified above are holding inferior posts and
they are not entitled to secure any promotion to the superior post of Joint
Commissioner of Food Safety.
53. Learned counsel for petitioners has invited our attention to the
judgment of this Court in Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala [1983 KLT
784]. However, that was a case where the petitioner therein has sought a
writ of mandamus directing the respondents to promote the petitioner to the
post of Deputy Drugs Controller since no rules have been so far framed in
regard to the post of Assistant Drugs Controller (Ayurveda) as it existed or in
regard to the upgraded post of Deputy Drugs Controller (Ayurveda) and
further that no special rules or executive orders have been made in that
behalf. The principles of law laid down in the said judgment, in our view,
would not enure to the benefit of the petitioners since petitioners are not
affected persons consequent to the non-framing of the rules.
54. The judgment of the apex court in Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand Lal
Jaiswal & Others [(2013)1 SCC 501] was pressed into service by the
learned counsel for petitioners, wherein the issue of maintainability of quo
warranto was considered. But we find that there the subject matter was
relating to an appointment made contrary to statutory provisions as
Chairperson of the State Electricity Regulatory Commission. But here in this
case, it is an admitted fact that so far as the Joint Commissioner of Food
Safety (Administration & Legal) is concerned, there is no qualification
prescribed to the said post.
55. In the judgment of the Apex Court in B.R.Kapur v. State of
Tamil Nadu & Another [(2001)7 SCC 231], the question considered was
whether the appointment made by the President or the Governor, of a person
to a constitutional office, the qualification of that person to hold that office
can be examined in quo warranto proceedings and appointment can be
quashed. There is no doubt, in our view, that if a qualification is prescribed,
definitely when the same is overlooked, the person can be said to be an
usurper in the office of the concerned post.
56. Learned counsel for petitioners has also relied upon the judgment
of the Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v.
Umadevi & Ors. [(2006)4 SCC 1], wherein the question considered was in
regard to the regular process of recruitment or appointment and held that
recruitment or appointment has to be resorted to when regular vacancies in
posts at a particular point of time are to be filled up so far as the public
employment is concerned and has to be in terms of the constitution scheme
whereby equality of opportunity is to be provided to all the qualified persons.
Admittedly in the case on hand, the officers, who held the post in the Health
Department under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act were absorbed
when the Act, 2006 was implemented and therefore, there was no question
of inviting applications for any public employment.
57. The judgment in Ramesh Narain Saxena v. Chairman, Jal
Sansthan, Agra and Others [ 2009(8)ADJ 741(DB)] of the Allahabad High
Court was pressed into service wherein the dispute was between two
persons, who were working as Account Clerks, and the rules as well as
resolution referred to, made any provision for the promotion of Account
Clerks to the post of Accountant and it was held that the post of Accountant
is not a promotional post and therefore, the facts and circumstances are
entirely different and the judgment was rendered taking into account the
peculiar facts and circumstances involved in the case and wherein it was
observed that framing of rules for promotion is to be adopted by the
Government in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Water Supply and
Sewerage Act, 1975 so as to conform to Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution
of India.
58. In Centre for PIL and another v. Union of India and another
[92011)4 SCC], the question considered was in respect of the relevance of
personal integrity to be taken into account while making appointments so as
to protect the institutional integrity. To apply the principles of law laid down
in the same, we do not think the petitioners have made any allegations so as
to interfere with the integrity or good conduct of the 6 th respondent.
59. In Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei
Sahoo & others [(2014)1 SCC 161], definitely the question considered was
in respect of requisites of issuing a writ of quo warranto, but ultimately we
find that the law laid down was that the writ of quo warranto is intended to
confer jurisdiction of constitutional courts to ensure that public office is not
held by an usurper without legal authority.
60. In University of Mysore v. C.D.Govinda Rao and Another
[AIR 1965 SC 491], the Apex Court considered the question of issuing quo
warranto after referring to various propositions in regard to the issuance of
writ of quo warranto. It was held that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo
waranto, he must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is a
public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that
necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said
alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not.
61. In State of Orissa & Another v. Mamata Mohanty [(2011)3
SCC 436] wherein the Apex Court considered basically the requirement to
maintain the high academic standard to education and also considered the
concept of adverse possession in service jurisprudence and ultimately held
that if an order is abinitio void, all consequent proceedings will be non est in
the eye of law. In fact, the question considered therein was with respect to
the appointment made on temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting
applications from all eligible candidates and held that for a valid and legal
appointment, mandatory compliance of the constitutional requirement is to
be fulfilled. In our view, the facts and circumstances involved are entirely
different and it was in respect of appointments made by merely inviting
names from the Employment Exchange or putting a note on the Notice
Board, which was held to be not meeting the requirements of Articles 14 &
16 of the Constitution of India.
62. So also the judgment of the Apex Court in Dr.M.S.Patil v.
Gulbarga University & Others [(2010)2 SCC 63], was pressed into service
by the counsel for the petitioners wherein an employee continued in service
for a period of 17 years and ultimately held that the appellant working on ad
hoc basis cannot be continued indefinitely. We do not think any such issue is
remaining in the case on hand since the appointment of 6 th respondent to the
entry post and the subsequent appointment to the present post are never
adhoc, and finally it was held that mere continuance in the post for a period
of 17 years would not provide any right to the appellant to claim any adverse
possession or holding over.
63. Learned Additional Advocate General has pressed into service the
judgments of the Apex Court in B.N.Nagarajan and Others v. State of
Mysore and Others [AIR 1966 SC 1942] and Ramesh Prasad Singh v.
State of Bihar [ 1978(1) SCC 37] wherein it was held that the rules did not
prevent the State from exercising its executive power conferred under Article
162 of the Constitution of India and that it cannot be overlooked that it is not
obligatory to make rules of recruitment before a service is constituted or a
post is created or filled up and in such situations the authorities concerned
would have the power to appoint or terminate the administrative personnel
under the general power of administration vested in them.
64. Learned Additional Advocate General had invited our attention to
the judgment of the Apex Court in Tirupathi K. v. Government of Andra
Pradesh and Others [ 1983 KHC 791] wherein the question considered was
whether the State Government can create a post and recruitment could be
made in exercise of its executive power and it was held that even in the
absence of rules, a post can be created and recruitment could be made by
State Government in exercise of its executive power under Article 162 of the
Constitution of India.
65. So also the Additional Advocate General had invited our attention
to the judgment of the Apex Court in T.Cajee v. U.Jormonik Siem [AIR
1961 SC 276] wherein it was held that the authorities concerned would at all
relevant times have the power to appoint or remove administrative personnel
under the general power of administration vested in them and therefore, the
view taken by the High Court that there could be no appointment or removal
by the District Council without a law having been first passed in that behalf
cannot be sustained.
66. Learned Additional Advocate General further invited our attention
to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Alex Beets v.
M.A.Urmese [1970 KLT 639] wherein the question considered was in regard
to the appointment of honorary Medical officers invoking the powers under
Article 162 of the Constitution of India vis -a- vis equality of opportunity, and
held that it cannot be heard in motion for a writ of quo warranto since the
petitioner therein was not an aspirant of the post.
67. Learned counsel for the 6th respondent has also relied upon the
judgment of the constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in C.D.Govinda Rao
supra and according to him, the findings rendered therein is absolutely in
favour of the 6th respondent. It is true that in the said judgment the Apex
Court has clearly entered into a finding that the judgment does not show
that any statutory provision or rules were placed before the court and that in
making appointment of appellant No.2 therein, those statutory provisions had
been contravened. It was also held therein that the matter appears to have
been argued before the High Court on the assumption that, if the
appointment of appellant No.2 was shown to be inconsistent with the
qualifications as they were advertised by appellant No.1, that itself would
justify the issue of writ of quo warranto.
68. Learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex
Court in B.Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and
Drainage Board Employees' Association and Others [(2006)11 SCC
731] wherein the question of issuing a writ of quo warranto in respect of a
temporary appointment was considered and held that the order appointing
the appellant clearly stated that the appointment is until further orders and
the terms and conditions of appointment made it clear that appointment is
temporary and is until further orders and therefore, the High Court has erred
in law in issuing a writ of quo warranto. It was further found that neither the
Act involved therein nor the rule prescribed any mode of appointment or
tenure of appointment and when the mode and tenure of appointment have
been left to the discretion of the Government by the Act and the Rules, and
the Act makes it clear that the Managing Director shall hold office at the
pleasure of the Government the High court could not have fettered the
discretion of the Government by holding that section 4(2) of the Act does not
expressly give the power to the State Government to make ad hoc or
contract appointment when the Act and the statutory Rules have not
prescribed any definite term and any particular mode, and it was further held
that the High Court could not have read into the statute a restriction or
prohibition that is not expressly prohibited by the Act and the Rules.
69. It was again stated therein in unequivocal terms that it is well
settled that when the statute does not lay down the method of appointment
or term of appointment and when the Act specifies that the appointment is
one of sure tenure, the Appointing Authority, who has power to appoint has
absolute discretion in the matter and it cannot be said that discretion to
appoint does not include power to appoint on contract basis. Therefore, it
was held that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge of the High
Court that the appointment was bad for the reason that it was made on
temporary basis and continued for nearly 2 years, was wholly contrary to law
particularly when the Act and the Rule do not stipulate maximum period of
appointment. It was also held therein that the jurisdiction of the High Court
to issue a writ of quo warranto is a limited one which can only be issued
when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. The Apex Court in
that judgment had conducted a survey of its earlier judgments on the point
and it is only appropriate that relevant paragraphs of the judgment are
extracted:
53. It is settled law by a catena of decisions that the court cannot sit in
judgment over the wisdom of the Government in the choice of the person to
be appointed so long as the person chosen possesses the prescribed
qualification and is otherwise eligible for appointment. This Court in R.K.
Jain v. Union of India [(1993) 4 SCC 119 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1128 : (1993) 25
ATC 464] was pleased to hold that the evaluation of the comparative merits
of the candidates would not be gone into a public interest litigation and only
in a proceeding initiated by an aggrieved person, may it be open to be
considered. It was also held that in service jurisprudence it is settled law
that it is for the aggrieved person, that is, the non-appointee to assail the
legality or correctness of the action and that a third party has no locus
standi to canvass the legality or correctness of the action. Further, it was
declared that public law declaration would only be made at the behest of a
public-spirited person coming before the court as a petitioner. Having regard
to the fact that neither Respondents 1 and 2 were or could have been
candidates for the post of Managing Director of the Board and the High
Court could not have gone beyond the limits of quo warranto so very well
delineated by a catena of decisions of this Court and applied the test which
could not have been applied even in a certiorari proceedings brought before
the Court by an aggrieved party who was a candidate for the post.
54. The judgment impugned in this appeal not only exceeds the limit
of quo warranto but has not properly appreciated the fact that the writ
petition filed by the Employees' Union and the President of the Union,
Halakatte was absolutely lacking in bona fides. In the instant case, the
motive of the second respondent Halakatte is very clear and the Court might
in its discretion decline to grant a quo warranto.
55. This Court in A.N. Shashtri v. State of Punjab [1988 Supp SCC 127 :
1988 SCC (L&S) 536 : (1988) 7 ATC 290] held that the writ of quo
warranto should be refused where it is an outcome of malice or ill will. The
High Court failed to appreciate that on 18-1-2003 the appellant filed a
criminal complaint against the second respondent Halakatte, that cognizance
was taken by the criminal court in CC No. 4152 of 2003 by the Jurisdictional
Magistrate on 24-2-2003, process was issued to the second respondent who
was enlarged on bail on 12-6-2003 and the trial is in progress. That apart,
the second respondent has made successive complaints to the Lokayukta
against the appellant which were all held to be baseless and false. This
factual background which was not disputed coupled with the fact that the
second respondent Halakatte initiated the writ petition as President of the 1st
respondent Union, which had ceased to be a registered trade union as early
as on 2-11-1992 suppressing the material fact of its registration having been
cancelled, making allegations against the appellant which were no more than
the contents of the complaints filed by him before the authorities which had
been found to be false after thorough investigation by the Karnataka
Lokayukta, would unmistakably establish that the writ petition initiated by
Respondents 1 and 2 lacked in bona fides and it was the outcome of the
malice and ill will the 2nd respondent nurses against the appellant. Having
regard to this aspect of the matter, the High Court ought to have dismissed
the writ petition on that ground alone and at any event should have refused
to issue a quo warranto, which is purely discretionary. It is no doubt true that
the strict rules of locus standi are relaxed to an extent in a quo
warranto proceedings. Nonetheless an imposter coming before the Court
invoking public law remedy at the hands of a constitutional court suppressing
material facts has to be dealt with firmly.
56. This Court in B. Singh (Dr.) v. Union of India [(2004) 3 SCC 363] held
that only a person who comes to the Court with bona fides and public interest
can have locus. Coming down heavily on busybodies, meddlesome
interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public
interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a
proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of
publicity, this Court at para 14 of the Report held as under: (SCC p. 373, para
14)
"14. The court has to be satisfied about: (a) the credentials of the
applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by
him; and (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information
should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike a balance
between two conflicting interests: (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in
wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii)
avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to
assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case,
however, the court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful
to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not
encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the executive and
the legislature. The court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters
and busybodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited
holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in
the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or
even of their own to protect."
70. In the instant case, there is no violation of statutory provision and,
therefore, in our view, a writ of quo warranto does not lie. If there be any
doubt, it has to be resolved in favour of upholding the appointment.
71. In Statesman (P) Ltd. v. H.R. Deb [(1968) 3 SCR 614 : AIR 1968 SC
1495] Hidyatullah, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench indicated: (SCR
p. 621 F)
"The High Court in a quo warranto proceeding should be slow to
pronounce upon the matter unless there is a clear infringement of the law."
72. In the circumstances which we have narrated above in paragraphs
supra, it is indeed difficult to hold that the appellant did not have the
requisite qualification.
73. The above ruling was followed in A.N. Shashtri v. State of
Punjab [1988 Supp SCC 127 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 536 : (1988) 7 ATC 290] . We
are of the view that in the facts of this case, the reasonable conclusion to
reach should have been that the writ petitioners had failed to establish that
the appellant did not possess requisite qualification and the appeals are,
therefore, allowed and the judgment of the High Court has to be set aside
and the writ petition has to be dismissed.
78. The High Court, in the instant case, was not exercising certiorari
jurisdiction. Certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only at the instance of a
person who is qualified to the post and who is a candidate for the post. This
Court in Umakant Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [(1973) 1 SCC 485] held that the
appointment cannot be challenged by one who himself is not qualified to be
appointed. In Kumari Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 228] a
Constitution Bench of this Court held as under: (SCC p. 234, para 12)
"12. The other question which was canvassed before the High Court
and which has been pressed before us relates to the merits of the
nominations made to the reserved seats. It seems to us that the
appellants do not have any right to challenge the nominations made by
the Central Government. They do not compete for the reserved seats
and have no locus standi in the matter of nomination to such seats. The
assumption that if nominations to reserved seats are not in accordance
with the rules all such seats as have not been properly filled up would be
thrown open to the general pool is wholly unfounded."
84. In our opinion, the finding of legal mala fides is unsustainable
being based on a misunderstanding of the law and facts. When a
competent and experienced officer of an outstanding merit is appointed to
a higher post on contract basis after his superannuation from service in the
larger public interest, it does not suffer from legal malice at all. The
decision of the then Chief Minister, Shri S.M. Krishna, recorded in the file is
also extracted by the High Court at p. 69 of SLP paper-book, Vol. II. In the
context of the note put up by the Secretary of the Department, it is again
extracted at pp. 67 and 68 which clearly bring out the fact that the
appointment was made in the interest of the Board and the State at a time
when nobody else other than the appellant could have served the interests
of the State better. The High Court failed to appreciate the element of
urgency involved in making the appointment because of impending
negotiations with World Bank scheduled for 9-2-2004. The writ petition, in
our opinion, was motivated as Respondent 1 had lodged a false complaint
to the Lokayukta against the appellant which was found to be baseless by
the Lokayukta (Annexure P-9). A petition praying for a writ of quo
warranto being in the nature of public interest litigation, it is not
maintainable at the instance of a person who is not unbiased. The second
respondent is the President of the first respondent Union. He has chosen
this forum to settle personal scores against his erstwhile superior officer
after his retirement. The proceeding, in our view, is not meant to settle
personal scores by an employee of the department. The High Court, in our
view, ought to have dismissed the writ petition filed by Respondent 1 at
the threshold.
91. Two important considerations must weigh with us in determining our
approach to these questions. First, the post of Managing Director is a highly
respectable post. It is a post of great confidence--a lynchpin in the
administration and smooth functioning of the administration requires that
there should be complete rapport and understanding between the Managing
Director and the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister as a head of the
Government is in ultimate charge of the administration and it is he who is
politically answerable to the people for the achievements and failures of the
Government. If the Chief Minister (sic places) confidence on the appellant, he
may legitimately in the larger interests of administration appoint him until
further orders as MD of the Board. It does not involve violation of any legal or
constitutional rights. Secondly, given the vast multitudinous activities in which
a modern State is engaged, there are bound to be some posts which require
for adequate discharge of their functions, high degree of intellect and
specialised experience. It is always a difficult problem for the Government to
find suitable officers for such specialised posts. There are not ordinarily many
officers who answer the requirements of such specialised posts and the choice
with the Government is very limited and this choice becomes all the more
difficult, because some of these posts, though important and having onerous
responsibilities, do not carry wide executive powers and officers may not,
therefore, generally be willing to be transferred to those posts. The
Government has in the circumstances to make the best possible choice it can,
keeping in view the larger interests of the administration. When in exercise of
this choice, the Government transfers an officer from one post to another, the
officer may feel unhappy because the new post does not give him the same
amplitude of powers which he had while holding the old post. But that does
not make the appointment arbitrary. So long as the appointment is made on
account of the exigencies of administration, it would be valid and not open to
attack under Articles 14 and 16. Here the post of MD was admittedly a
selection post and after careful examination of the merits, the Chief Minister
selected the appellant for the post of MD. It was not the case of the
respondents that the appellant was not found qualified to the task or that his
work was not satisfactory."
70. Likewise the judgment of the Apex Court in Hari Bansh Lal v.
Sahodar Prasad Mahto and Others [(2010)9 SCC 655] was pressed into
service wherein also the Apex Court held that even for issuance of a writ of
quo warranto the High Court has to specify that the appointment is contrary
to the statutory rules and further that whether a candidate is suitable for
appointment to a post is the function of the appointing authority and it is not
for the court to decide such issues unless the appointment is contrary to
statutory provisions or rules.
71. Learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex
Court in Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar v. Union of India and
Others [AIR 1991 SC 1145] to canvass the proposition that mere order
passed by the State Government to discharge the duties of the Commissioner
of Food Safety as per the order of the Government cannot be equated to a
promotion and it was held as follows at paragraph 4:
4. On the first contention, the very terms of the office order dated
August 30, 1963 [Ex. A] is clear and conclusive. It says:
"Shri Ramakanta Sripada Sinai Advolpalcar, acting Grade 3 Officer of
the Caixa Economica de Goa will perform the duties of the Treasurer of
Caixa Economica de Goa, vice Shri Antonio Xavier Furtado, who died this
morning. Shri Advolpalcar should assume the function of the post from
today.
Shri Advolpalcar will draw besides the monthly salary of his own post as
acting Grade 3 Officer an allowance of Rs 100 p.m. which is payable to the post
of treasurer under the existing rules ...."
(emphasis supplied)
The arrangements contemplated by this order plainly do not amount to a
promotion of the appellant to the post of Treasurer. The distinction between
a situation where a government servant is promoted to a higher post and
one where he is merely asked to discharge the duties of the higher post is
too clear to require any reiteration. Asking an officer who substantively holds
a lower post merely to discharge the duties of a higher post cannot be
treated as a promotion. In such a case he does not get the salary of the
higher post; but gets only what in service parlance is called a "charge
allowance". Such situations are contemplated where exigencies of public
service necessitate such arrangements and even consideration of seniority
do not enter into it. The person continues to hold his substantive lower post
and only discharges the duties of the higher post essentially as a stop-gap
arrangement."
72. It is an admitted fact that the Food Safety and Standards Act,
2006, the Rules, 2011 and the executive orders issued are not prescribing
any qualification for the post of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety
(Administration and Legal). We have also noted that the provisions of the
Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, has not prescribed any qualifications
in regard to the post now held by the 6th respondent. It is virtually an
admitted fact even by the petitioners, though petitioners have a case that by
virtue of the Government Orders, the 6 th respondent as the Joint
Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration and Legal) is discharging the
duties of enforcement and others to which qualifications are prescribed. But
on a perusal of the Government orders it is clear that the 6th respondent was
given charge of the Commissioner of Food Safety which would not in any
manner be accepted as a promotion to the post of Commissioner of Food
Safety. It is also an admitted fact that the 6th respondent was appointed to
act as Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration and Legal) while he
was an Officer on Special Duty (Food Safety) and Law Officer (Prevention of
Food Adulteration).
73. In fact as per Ext.P9 order the Government have decided to
restructure the Commissionerate of Food Safety to undertake new
responsibility under the Act, 2006 and it was accordingly that four functional
wings were created viz., (1) Enforcement wing (2) Food Safety (Laboratory)
(3) Administration and Legal and (4) Research, Development and Training. It
is worthwhile to note that 1 st petitioner viz.,B. Sudharma was a beneficiary of
Ext.P9 order since she was appointed to act as Joint Commissioner of Food
Safety (Laboratory) and she has harvested the benefits of that post. Likewise
it was by the Government Order dated 29.3.2010, the Government
authorised the 6th respondent to function as Drawing and Disbursing Officer
in the Commissionerate of Food Safety and it was only in that capacity the
6th respondent has issued Ext.P11 order dated 21.4.2010 assigning work to
the beneficiaries of Ext.P9 order for and on behalf of the Commissioner of
Food Safety.
74. It is also evident from Ext.P12 Government Order dated 2.2.2013
that it was on recommendation of the Commissioner of Food Safety to make
permanent the temporary post of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety
(Administration and Legal) and to create a post of Joint Commissioner of
Food Safety, the Government have issued the said order, with a condition
that, those posts would come into existence w.e.f. 1.4.2013 in effect. As per
Ext.P12 Government Order, two posts of Joint Commissioners were created
along with 57 posts of Food Safety Officers. So also it is evident from Ext.P13
Government Order dated 3.12.2013 that the Government, after consultation
with the Kerala Public Service Commission, accorded sanction to fix the
qualification and method of appointment under the enforcement wing in
accordance with the Act, 2006 and the qualification to the post of Joint
Commissioner of Food Safety (Enforcement) and Assistant Commissioner of
Food Safety/Assistant Commissioner of Food Safety (Intelligence) were fixed
along with other Officers under the Act, 2006 and Ext.P13(a) Government
Order dated 26.9.2014 was issued revising the Government Order fixing the
qualification and method of appointment and name of post, modifying
Ext.P13 order dated 3.12.2013. Therefore, it is evident that the post held by
the 6th respondent is a standalone post created by the State Government
exercising its powers conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution of India
in order to effectively implement the Food Safety and Standards Act by
appointing the 6th respondent as the Joint Commissioner of Food Safety
(Administration and Legal).
75. There is no case for the petitioners that 6 th respondent is not
qualified to hold the post of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety
(Administration and Legal) on the basis of any statutory rules or executive
orders besides the fact that the 6 th respondent is a Post Graduate in Law and
he was appointed in the Health Department as Technical Assistant (Legal),
which was re-designated as per Ext.P2 order dated 30.3.2001 as Law Officer
(Prevention of Food Adulteration). It is also equally important to note that as
per Ext.P20 order dated 9.3.2010, powers were delegated to the Joint Food
Safety Commissioners of Enforcement, Food Safety Lab, and Administration
and Legal by which the 6th respondent was conferred with; (i) All matters
relating to Administration including leave, sanctioning of higher grade,
financial matters, purchases, provident fund, motor vehicle etc. (ii) All legal
matters in the Commissionerate of Food Safety and (iii) All matters relating to
the creating of posts, re-organisation, restructuring of Commissionerate of
Food Safety, preparedness of the Commissionerate of Food Safety and
introduction of FSSAI Act in Kerala etc. Again the probation of the 6th
respondent was declared as per Ext.P16 order dated 30.5.2014 in the cadre
of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration and Legal).
76. The discussions made above would make it clear that the 6th
respondent is holding the post in question in terms of appropriate
Government Orders. We are also conscious of the fact that under the Act,
2006, there is no qualification prescribed so far as the Joint Commissioner of
Food Safety (Administration and Legal) is concerned. Therefore, taking into
account the facts, circumstances and law discussed above, we are of the
clear opinion that it can never be said that the 6 th respondent was appointed
to the present post overlooking the provisions of the Act, 2006 or the Rules,
2011 or any other executive orders.
77. The proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court also makes it
explicit and clear that a writ of quo warranto cannot be maintained, if the
appointment was made not in violation of any statutory provisions. The case
projected by the petitioners is that since no statutory provisions are made for
the appointment of the Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Administration
and Legal), the Government was not at liberty to issue any Government
Orders and appoint the 6th respondent. However it is clear from the law laid
down by the Apex Court discussed above that, the Government is vested
with powers under Article 162 of the Constitution of India to exercise the
executive power to make any appointments. The proviso thereto also makes
it clear that the executive power exercised by the Government shall be
subject to and limited by the executive power expressly conferred by the
constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities
thereof. Which thus means, if there are no specific statutory provisions in
order to make any appointment, the Government is at liberty to carry out the
functions of the Government by invoking the power conferred under Article
162 of the Constitution of India. After all it is for the Government to decide
as to how to carry on with its functions in its various departments. It was
accordingly that the Government decided to create four wings in the Food
Safety and Standards Department so as to efficiently and appropriately carry
out the functions of the said department. It is curious to note that the 1 st
petitioner was a beneficiary of Ext.P9 order, which she now attacks as an
illegal order and having enjoyed the benefits of a post created as per Ext.P9,
the1st petitioner was not at liberty to turn around and attack the said order.
78. It is also significant to note that the 6 th respondent was given good
service entry by the State Government taking into account the efficient
service rendered by the 6th respondent in various duties entrusted to him. It
is also important to note that efficiency of the 6 th respondent was recognised
by the National Food Safety Department when it has appreciated the work
carried out by the 6th respondent, evident from Ext.6(b) dated 27.9.2013 for
effective leadership and guidance in the implementation of the Act, 2006 and
the Rules and regulations framed thereunder.
79. Moreover, the provisions of the Kerala State and Subordinate
Service Rules discussed above would make it clear that they have their own
unique features while making necessary appointments. It is clear from the
provisions of the KS&SSR that, only at the time of recruitment as per rule
3(a) Part II KS&SSR and at the time of promotion to a selection post in terms
of rule 28(b)(i)(12) of Part II KS&SSR, consultation with the Public Service
Commission is required. It is also equally clear and evident from Ext.P13
qualification and method of appointment prescribed by the Government to
the post of Joint Commissioner of Food Safety (Enforcement) since it is a
promotion post of Assistant Commissioner (Enforcement) for which the
feeder category post is the Food Safety Officer, which is a statutory post, for
which qualification have been prescribed in Rules, 2011, whereas the post of
Joint Commissioner Food Safety (Administration and Legal) is not a
promotion post to any other post or from any other post and as rightly
pointed out it is a standalone post created by the Government for efficiently
and effectively discharging the functions of Food Safety Department of the
State Government.
80. In that view of the matter, the contentions advanced by the
learned counsel for petitioners relying upon the provisions of KS & SSR may
not have much force at all. It is also clear and evident from the specific
pleadings put forth by the 6th respondent in his counter affidavit that
petitioners were not in good terms with the 6 th respondent and has even
made the 6th respondent a party in the litigation preferred by them before
the Kerala Administrative Tribunal in regard to their pensionary benefits,
promotion etc. etc. alleging that those service benefits were delayed to the
petitioners consequent to the interference of the 6 th respondent. It is also
evident that various complaints were filed by the 3 rd petitioner before various
statutory authorities against the 6th respondent, and it is in continuation of
the same, Ext.R6(d) letter was addressed by the 2nd petitioner to the
Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission informing that several
attempts are made to confer IAS to the 6 th respondent and necessary steps
shall be taken to ensure that the IAS is not conferred on the 6 th respondent,
which is in turn a continuation of e-mail representation dated 17.8.2020.
81. Taking into account the aforesaid aspects and the conduct of the
1st petitioner having attacked the relevant Government Orders, which were
beneficial to her, after her retirement and the retirement of others, cannot be
said to have approached this Court by filing a Public Interest Litigation
seeking a writ of quo warranto against the 6th respondent, bonafidely and in
the larger interest of public. It is a well settled position in law that a public
interest litigant always should approach the court not only with clean hands
but with a clean heart, soul and mind.
82. Taking into account the relevant inputs provided by the 6 th
respondent and the Government, we are of the opinion that petitioners have
not approached this Court with clean hands and pure mind and soul and we
are also of the opinion that the conduct of the petitioners show that they
always had an axe to grind with the 6 th respondent. Thinking so we are of
the opinion that a writ of quo warranto sought for by the petitioners against
the 6th respondent cannot be sustained under law especially due to the fact
that the 6th respondent is holding the post in accordance with the orders
issued by the Government exercising the powers conferred under Article 162
of the Constitution of India and there are no statutory rules prescribing
qualifications so far as the appointment of the 6th respondent is concerned in
the present post.
Upshot of the discussion is that, the writ petition fails, accordingly it is
dismissed.
Sd/-
S.MANIKUMAR
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
SHAJI P.CHALY
JUDGE
APPENDIX
PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.EG1-3991/94/DHS
DATED 17/12/1999 OF THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH
SERVICES.
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE G.O.RT.NO.926/2000/H&FWD
DATED 30/3/2001.
EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE GO(RT) NO.3201/2003/RD
DATED 17/10/2003.
EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 18/11/2019 OF
THE CENTRAL PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER OF
3RD RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPIES OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE
ENTITLEMENT REGISTER OF THE 6TH RESPONDENT
FURNISHED TO THE 2ND PETITIONER UNDER
R.T.I.ACT.
EXHIBIT P6 TRUE COPY OF THE GO(MS) 123/2009/H&FWD
DATED 23/5/2009.
EXHIBIT P7 TRUE COPY OF THE GO(MS) NO.122/2009/H&FWD
DATED 23/5/2009.
EXHIBIT P8 TRUE COPY OF THE GO(RT) NO.3466/08/H&FWD
DATED 20/10/2008.
EXHIBIT P9 TRUE COPY OF THE G.O.(RT) NO.578/2010/H&FWD
DATED 17/2/2010.
EXHIBIT P10 TRUE COPY OF THE GO(RT) NO.2483/2010/FIN
DATED 29/3/2010.
EXHIBIT P11 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 21/4/2010 OF
THE FOOD SAFETY COMMISSIONER ADDRESSED TO
THE 3RD RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P12 TRUE COPY OF THE G.O.(MS) NO.24/2013/H&FWD
DATED 2/2/2013.
EXHIBIT P12A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXT.P11.
EXHIBIT P13 TRUE COPY OF THE G.O.(MS) 465/2013/H&FWD
DATED 3/12/2013.
EXHIBIT P13A TRUE COPY OF THE G.O.(MS) NO.287/2014/H&FWD
DATED 26/9/2014.
EXHIBIT P14 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER
NO.603414/E1/1206/H&FWD DATED 7/6/2016
ADDRESSED TO 5TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P14A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE EXT.P14.
EXHIBIT P15 TRUE COPY OF THE G.O.(MS) NO.200/2016/H&FWD
DATED 24/10/2016.
EXHIBIT P16 TRUE COPY OF THE G.O.(RT)
NO.1775/2014/H&FWD DATED 30/5/2014.
EXHIBIT P17 TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION DATED 6/3/2014
SUBMITTED BY THE 6TH RESPONDENT TO THE 5TH
RESPONDENT, CFS.
EXHIBIT P18 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 1/12/2018 OF
THE DY. SECRETARY AND STATE PUBLIC
INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P18A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXT.P18.
EXHIBIT P19 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY OF THE JOINT
SECRETARY & APPELLATE AUTHORITY, HEALTH AND
FAMILY WELFARE DEPARTMENT.
EXHIBIT P19A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXT.P19.
EXHIBIT P20 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO.B-77/20019/CFS
DATED 9/3/2010 ISSUED BY THE 5TH
RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P21 TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION DATED 10/4/2019
SUBMITTED BY THE 2ND PETITIONER TO THE
ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY, HEALTH AND FAMILY
WELFARE DEPARTMENT.
EXHIBIT P22 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY OF THE STATE PUBLIC
INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT
UNDER LETTER DATED 29/8/2019.
EXHIBIT P22A TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXT.P22.
EXHIBIT P23 TRUE COPY OF THE G.O.(RT) NO.6797/2019/GAD
DATED 27/11/2019.
EXHIBIT P 24 TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PORTION OF THE
PROCEEDINGS NO.CAP VI/MISC/2008-09 DATED
31/12/2008 ISSUED BY THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL
EXHIBIT P25 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 18/5/2015
ISSUED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF FOOD SAFETY
EXHIBIT P26 TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED
21/12/09 SUBMITTED BY THE 6TH RESPONDENT TO
THE 2ND RESPONDENT
EXHIBIT P27 TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT OF THE
PAY REVISION COMMISSION REPORT ALONG WITH
THE TABLE
EXHIBIT P28 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO.E-8583/2019/FCS
DATED 13/12/2019 ISUED BY THE 6TH
RESPONDENT
EXHIBIT P28(a) TRUE TRUE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXT.P-28
EXHIBIT P29 TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT PF AGENDA
OF THE INTERACTION WITH FOOD SAFETY
OFFICIALS.
EXHIBIT P30 TRUE COPY OF THE GO(Rt)NO.734/2011 H&FWD
DATED 25/2/2011
EXHIBIT P31 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT OF TRANSFER OF
CHARGE
EXHIBIT 32 TRUE COPY OF THE G.O)Rt) NO.1359/2011/H&FWD
ORDER DATED 7/4/2011
EXHIBIT P33 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 11/4/2011 OF
THIS HON'BLE COURT IN WPC 11843/2011
EXHIBIT P34 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 16/8/2011 OF
THIS HONBLE COURT IN WPC NO.11843/2011
EXHIBIT P35 TRUE COPY OF THE GO(Rt) NO.206/2017/H&FWD
DATED 27/1/2017
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT R6(A) TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON ORDER DATED
09.10.2017 IN T.A.NO.6429 OF 2012 AND
CONNECTED CASES.
EXHIBIT R6(B) TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER OF THE FOOD SAFETY
AND STANDARDS AUTHORITY OF INDIA DATED
27.09.2013.
EXHIBIT R6(C) TRUE COPY OF G.O.(RT) NO.2581/2013/F&FWD
DATED 17.07.2013 ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT.
EXHIBIT R6(d) TRUE COPY OF THE PETITION SUBMITTED BY THE
2ND PETITIONER BEFORE THE CHAIRMAN, UPSC
DATED 08/2020.
EXHIBIT R6(e) TRUE COPY OF THE REVISED GRATUITY PAYMENT
ORDER OF THE 1ST PETITIONER DATED
06.02.2020 ISSUED BY THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL
