Kerala High Court
Thiruvalla Government Employees ... vs Exhibit R1(A) True Copy Of The ... on 5 January, 2021
O.P.(CAT)No.207 OF 2020 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALEXANDER THOMAS
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE T.R.RAVI
TUESDAY, THE 05TH DAY OF JANUARY 2021 / 15TH POUSHA, 1942
OP (CAT).No.207 OF 2020
AGAINST THE ORDER OA 824/2019 DATED 10-01-2020 OF CENTRAL
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL,ERNAKULAM BENCH
PETITIONER/3rd PARTY:
THIRUVALLA GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD.
NO. A-213, THIRUVALLA P.O, THIRUVALLA,
PATHANAMTHITTA - 689101, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
(PRASANNAKUMAR D, S/O. DAMODARA KURUP,
TATUAMASI, KUTTOOR P.O,
THIRUVALLA - 689106.
BY ADV. SRI.S.SUBHASH CHAND
RESPONDENTS/APPLICANTS 1 AND 2 AND RESPONDENTS 1 TO 5 IN THE
ORIGINAL APPLICATION:
1 V.K.DEVARAJAN
S/O. KESAVAN, OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT,
PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION,
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL MANAGER, BSNL BHAVAN,
THIRUVALLA - 689101,
(RESIDING AT VARIKOLIL HOUSE,
VENPALA P.O, THIRUVALLA - 689102).
2 M. SASEENDRAN
S/O. MANIYAN V. SENIOR SUB DIVISIONAL ENGINEER,
BSNL BHAVAN, KUNNAMTHANAM, THIRUVALLA - 689581,
(RESIDING AT SUDARSANAM, P.C. KAVALA P.O,
PAYIPPAD, KOTTAYAM - 686537).
O.P.(CAT)No.207 OF 2020 2
3 BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LIMITED
BHARAT SANCHAR BHAVAN, HC MATHUR LANE,
JANPATH, NEW DELHI -110001, REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR.
4 THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER,
BSNL KERALA CIRCLE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695033.
5 THE GENERAL MANAGER(FINANCE)
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF GENERAL MANAGER,
BSNL KERALA CIRCLE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695033.
6 THE GENERAL MANAGER
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD,
PATHANAMTHITTA TELECOM DISTRICT,
THIRUVALLA - 689101.
7 THE DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER(FINANCE)
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL MANAGER,
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD, THIRUVALLA - 689101.
R1 BY ADV. SRI.VISHNU S.CHEMPAZHANTHIYIL
SRI.T.SANJAY- R3 TO 7
THIS OP (CAT) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 05.01.2021,
THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
O.P.(CAT)No.207 OF 2020 3
(CR)
ALEXANDER THOMAS & T.R. RAVI, JJ.
------------------------------------------------
O.P.(CAT) No.207 of 2020
[Arising out of order dated 10.01.2020 in
O.A.No.824/2019 of CAT, Ekm. Bench]
--------------------------------------------------
Dated this the 5th day of January, 2021
JUDGMENT
T.R.Ravi, J.
The Original Petition has been filed by a stranger to the
proceedings, challenging the order dated 10.01.2020 in O.A.No.824 of
2019 on the file of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam
Bench (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal). This Court granted
leave to the petitioners to file the Original Petition by order dated
18.11.2020. The petitioners challenge Ext.P20 order issued by the
Tribunal and Ext.P25 order issued by the 3rd respondent.
2. Respondents 1 and 2 filed the Original Application before the
Tribunal alleging that their employer (BSNL) has been delaying the
payment of salary from February, 2019 onwards and that amounts due
to the various financial institutions which were being deducted from the
salary of the applicant are not being remitted to their credit since May,
2019, resulting in threat of coercive action for recovery, by the said
financial institutions. The applicants before the Tribunal have stated
that loans have been availed from the Employees Co-operative Society
Ltd. and the Government Employees Co-operative Bank, Thiruvalla and
amounts were being deducted from their salary for payment to the
financial institutions on a monthly basis. Even though the grievance
projected appears to be that salary is denied and remittance towards
loans are not being made, the prayers made in the Original Application
would make it appear that the applicants are praying for disbursal of the
amounts deducted from their salary, instead of the specific direction
seeking the respondents to remit such amounts to the financial
institutions. The financial institutions have also not been made party to
the proceedings, though in our opinion, they were necessary parties,
having regard to the prayers made in the Original Application. The
Original Application was disposed of by the Tribunal by order dated
10.01.2020, directing the employer BSNL not to make any deduction
from the salary of the applicants henceforth towards the loans availed by
them and to pay the entire salary due to the applicants from December,
2019, so that they can pay their outstanding dues to the Bank and other
financial institutions from their salary.
3. It is aggrieved by the above direction that the petitioner, who
is one of the institutions to which amounts are due from the applicants,
has approached this Court. The petitioner contends that under
Section 37 of the Co-operative Societies Act, applicants before the
Tribunal had executed the agreements in favour of the petitioner Bank,
authorising their employer to deduct from their salary the amounts
specified in the agreement and pay the same to the petitioner towards
the amounts owed by the applicants to the petitioner.
4. Heard Sri S.Subhash Chand on behalf of the petitioner,
Sri Vishnu S. Chempazhanthiyil on behalf the 1 st respondent and
Sri T.Sanjay, Standing Counsel for respondents 3 to 7. The notice issued
to the 2nd respondent has not returned after service. In the light of the
orders that we propose to issue, we are of opinion that it is not necessary
to wait for completion of notice on the 2nd respondent.
5. The 1st respondent has filed a preliminary objection that the
original petition is not maintainable before this Court in the light of the
judgments of this Court in W.P.(C)No.20979 of 2010 and
O.P(KAT)No.1286 of 2003, wherein this Court relying on the judgment
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajeev Kumar & Anr. v. Hemraj
Singh Chauhan & Ors. reported in [(2010) 4 SCC 554], has held that
the grievance of third parties, who are not parties before the Tribunal,
have to be raised before the Tribunal itself and they cannot be permitted
to approach this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India, treating the High Court as a court of first instance. The learned
counsel for the petitioner on the other hand submits that the above
decisions cannot in any way fetter the right of the petitioners to
approach this Court, invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, particularly, having
regard to the fact that the party respondents have committed fraud on
the Court while obtaining orders from the Tribunal in O.A.No.824 of
2019 and before this Court in O.P.(CAT)No.36 of 2020, without making
the petitioners as parties to the case, knowing fully well that the
petitioners are necessary parties.
6. In Rajeev Kumar supra [(2010) 4 SCC 554], the Hon'ble
Supreme Court considered the effect of the Larger Bench judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in L.Chandrakumar v. Union of India
reported in [(1997) 3 SCC 461] and after referring to paragraph 93 of the
Larger Bench judgment, in paragraph 11 it was held as follows;
"11. On a proper reading of the abovequoted two sentences, it
is clear:
(a) The Tribunals will function as the only court of first
instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been
constituted.
(b) Even where any challenge is made to the vires of
legislation, excepting the legislation under which tribunal has been
set up, in such cases also, litigants will not be able to directly
approach the High Court "overlooking the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal".
7. A Division Bench of this Court in the judgment in Gireesh
Babu M.B. & Ors. v. Pavithran T.T.V. & Ors. reported in [2013 (3)
KHC 165] followed the judgment in Rajeev Kumar supra [(2010) 4
SCC 554] and held that persons who are not parties before the Tribunal
ought to have approached the Tribunal instead of approaching the High
Court by treating it as a court of first instance. The effect of the
judgments in Rajeev Kumar supra [(2010) 4 SCC 554] and Gireesh
Babu supra [2013 (3) KHC 165] came up for consideration before a Full
Bench of this Court in Haris K.M. v. Jahfar K. reported in [2020 (4)
KLJ 846]. The Full Bench in paragraph 9, 11 and 27 held as follows;
"9. On a consideration of the totality of these
circumstances, the principles laid down in Rajeev Kumar (Supra)
and Gireesh Babu (Supra) will not in any way affect the rights of
persons who were parties in one or other O.A.'s, to get impleaded in
the original petition, even though they were not parties in the
particular original application from which the original petition arises.
The rights of such persons cannot be treated at par with the rights of
persons who were strangers to the proceedings. None of these
persons can or need to approach the Tribunal with a review petition
or any other petitions, since they are beneficiaries of the judgment of
the Tribunal. Even the strangers to the O.A's who would stand
affected by the decision of this Court in the O.P. would have a right to
seek for impleadment since the respondents before the Tribunal were
impleaded in a representative capacity and every person similarly
situated is deemed to have been represented before the Tribunal.
Hence Haris too has a right to be impleaded and heard, in defense of
the order of the Tribunal.
xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx
11. We are not considering the merits of the claim for
impleadment alone, but a reference of a Division Bench as to whether
the cited decisions of this Court and of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
would act as an inviolable rule that none who are parties before the
Tribunal could approach this Court, either as petitioners or seek
impleadment as respondents; in the latter case for resisting or
supporting the order of the Tribunal. We do not and cannot
contemplate all of the situations that may arise. For clarity we
consider a few, which could in normal circumstances arise, which
only occur when there is outright rejection or acceptance of the claims
raised in the Original Application, before the Tribunal.
(a) When the Original Application is dismissed by the
Tribunal:
The applicants before the Tribunal can no doubt approach
this Court and challenge the decision of the Tribunal. All
the same, persons seeking similar reliefs as the Applicants,
are not entitled to get themselves impleaded in the original
petition filed by the Applicants, merely to ensure that they
too get the benefit of the order of this Court, if there is
reversal of the order of the Tribunal. Such persons have to
necessarily approach the Tribunal with a review or a fresh
original application and only thereafter can they approach
the High Court, based on the decision of the Tribunal. At
the same time, persons identically situated to the
respondents in the above said illustration, who were not
parties before the Tribunal, will not be entitled to seek
impleadment in the original petition filed by the Applicants,
to support the dismissal of the Original Application, since
that is a case covered by Rajeev Kumar (supra).
(b) When the Original Application is allowed by the
Tribunal:
The respondents in such cases can approach this Court and
file an original petition to challenge the judgment of the
Tribunal. However, in such original petitions, persons
similarly placed like the successful applicants before the
Tribunal cannot seek impleadment and claim the same
relief as the Applicants. Nor can they get impleaded, for the
purpose of supporting the order of the Tribunal. The
remedy available to such persons is either to approach the
Tribunal with a fresh original application or to wait for the
result of the original petition, since they cannot be allowed
to bypass the Court of first instance. Whether they choose
to file an original application while the original petition is
pending or they file it after the original petition is
dismissed, it would be for the Tribunal to consider whether
they are guilty of delay or laches. As regards, persons
similarly situated as respondents, their remedy is not to
approach this Court and get impleaded in the original
petition filed by the respondents. They will have to seek a
review of the judgment before the Tribunal. Such situation
is similar to the one in Gireesh Babu (supra).
(c) A unique situation that may arise is the one which has
occasioned this reference, the facts of which have already
been detailed earlier. In such situations, we are of the
opinion that all persons who were respondents before the
Tribunal in any of the original applications, which has been
jointly dismissed by a common judgment, are entitled to get
themselves impleaded in an original petition filed against
the judgment in one such original application, since they
are all persons entitled to be treated as parties to the
"proceedings" and are not persons who have bypassed the
court of first instance. This would also apply to persons who
are interested and are affected, but were not physically
present before the Tribunal, since they are deemed to be
represented by those respondents impleaded, in a
representative capacity, that too after a paper publication.
So also, those petitioners in I.A.1294 of 2018, who are
similarly situated to such respondents, who also had
approached the Tribunal for similar reliefs and have either
succeeded before the Tribunal or their original application
is pending consideration, are also persons entitled to get
themselves impleaded, to support the decision in the
original application, since such persons cannot be treated
as having bypassed the court of first instance and at the
same time are likely to be affected by the decision in the
original petition.
xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx
27. In the manner in which we have understood the
decisions in Rajeev Kumar (supra) and Gireesh Babu (supra), we are
not in a position to accept the propositions of law laid down in
S.Prabha (supra) and Rajesh (supra) and we overrule the judgments
in so far as they hold that that the original petition was maintainable
directly to the High Court at the instance of third parties. With all due
respect to the Division Bench, we are of the opinion that entertaining
the original petition at the instance of third parties, was against the
dictum laid down in Rajeev Kumar (supra) and Gireesh Babu (supra).
We are of the considered opinion that both the Division Benches in
S.Prabha (supra) and Rajesh (supra), if they were in
disagreement with the judgment of the Division Bench in
Gireesh Babu (supra) ought to have referred the matter to a Full
Bench." (emphasis supplied)
8. Even though the Full Bench has stated in paragraph 11 that it
is not possible to contemplate all the situations that may arise, we are of
the opinion that the present case is one in which the petitioners will
have to approach the Tribunal as the court of first instance and place
their grievance before the Tribunal. In Gireesh Babu supra [2013 (3)
KHC 165], the Division Bench has in paragraph 6 noted as follows;
"6. Incidentally, the Apex Court had also noted in Rajeev
Kumar that the Tribunal has also the power of review. We do not see
that expression, as excluding any other mode available before the
Tribunal, for grant of relief, to persons who were entitled to be
heard, if found so; yet, not heard before the verdict was handed
down by it.
9. In the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court and by
the Division Bench and Full Bench of this Court in the aforesaid
decisions, we find that there is considerable force in the preliminary
objection raised by the 1st respondent that the petitioner is not entitled
to approach this Court as the Court of first instance. However, that is not
to say that we approve of the conduct of the 1 st respondent in having not
made the petitioner as party to the proceedings.
10. It can be seen that the Division Bench in Gireesh Babu
(Supra) had contemplated not only the remedy of review, but also left
open any other mode available before the Tribunal for grant of relief to
persons who are entitled to be heard, but were not heard while
rendering the impugned judgment. Apparently, the Division Bench had
made the observation, being aware of the legal position that a power of
review is not necessarily an inherent power and the same will have to be
exercised within the four corners of the statutory provision which is the
source of the power.
11. On the question of other remedies being available to a
person who, though entitled to be heard before an order affecting him is
issued, was neither made a party nor heard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held that the Courts in India are invested with powers to recall their
orders in certain situations, in exercise of their inherent powers. In
paragraph 19 of the decision in Sunitadevi Singhania Hospital
Trust v. Union of India, reported in [(2008) 16 SCC 365], the Apex
Court held as follows:
"19. It is true that the period of limitation specified in terms
of sub-section (2) of Section 129-B of the Customs Act, 1962 is
required to be observed but the Tribunal failed to notice that it has
inherent power of recalling its own order if sufficient cause is shown
therefor. The principles of natural justice, which in a case of this
nature, in our opinion, envisage that a mistake committed by the
Tribunal in not noticing the facts involved in the appeal which would
attract the ancillary and/or incidental power of the Tribunal
necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of
doing justice between the parties, were required to be complied
with."
12. Earlier, in the decision in Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres
(India) (P) Ltd., reported in [(1996) 5 SCC 550], the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in paragraphs 20 to 23, dealt with the inherent power of Court in
cases of fraud and stated the law as follows:
"20. By filing letter No. 2775 of 26-8-1991 along with the review
petition and contending that the other letter, namely, letter No. 2776
of the even date, was never written or issued by the respondent, the
appellant, in fact, raised the plea before the Commission that its
judgment dated 16-11-1993, which was based on letter No. 2776, was
obtained by the respondent by practising fraud not only on the
appellant but on the Commission too as letter No. 2776 dated 26-8-
1991 was forged by the respondent for the purpose of this case. This
plea could not have been legally ignored by the Commission which
needs to be reminded that the authorities, be they constitutional,
statutory or administrative, (and particularly those who have to
decide a lis) possess the power to recall their judgments or orders if
they are obtained by fraud as fraud and justice never dwell together
(Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). It has been repeatedly said that
fraud and deceit defend or excuse no man (Fraus et dolus nemini
patrocinari debent).
21. In Smith v. East Elloe Rural Distt. Council [1956 AC 736 : (1956)
1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888] the House of Lords held that the
effect of fraud would normally be to vitiate any act or order. In
another case, Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley [(1956) 1 QB 702 :
(1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 2 WLR 502] (QB at p. 712), Denning,
L.J. Said:
"No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to
stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything."
22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially
under Section 151 CPC, to recall its judgment or order if it is
obtained by fraud on court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit
or proceedings, the court may direct the affected party to file a
separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. Inherent
powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of
superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but
from the nature and the constitution of the tribunals or courts
themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure
obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity
and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is
necessary for the orderly administration of the court's business.
23. Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of
the proceedings of the court and also amounts to an abuse of the
process of court, the courts have been held to have inherent power
to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon that court.
Similarly, where the court is misled by a party or the court itself
commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the court has the
inherent power to recall its order. (See: Benoy Krishna
Mukerjee v. Mohanlal Goenka [AIR 1950 Cal 287] ; Gajanand
Sha v. Dayanand Thakur [AIR 1943 Pat 127 : ILR 21 Pat
838] ; Krishnakumar v. Jawand Singh [AIR 1947 Nag 236 : ILR
1947 Nag 190] ; Devendra Nath Sarkar v. Ram Rachpal Singh [ILR
(1926) 1 Luck 341 : AIR 1926 Oudh 315] ; Saiyed Mohd.
Raza v. Ram Saroop [ILR (1929) 4 Luck 562 : AIR 1929 Oudh 385
(FB)] ; Bankey Behari Lal v. Abdul Rahman [ILR (1932) 7 Luck 350
: AIR 1932 Oudh 63] ; Lekshmi Amma Chacki Amma v. Mammen
Mammen [1955 Ker LT 459] .) The court has also the inherent
power to set aside a sale brought about by fraud practised upon the
court (Ishwar Mahton v. Sitaram Kumar [AIR 1954 Pat 450] ) or to
set aside the order recording compromise obtained by fraud.
(Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary v. Debendra Pd. Singh [AIR 1958 Pat
618 : 1958 BLJR 651] ; Tara Bai v. V.S. Krishnaswamy Rao [AIR
1985 Kant 270 : ILR 1985 Kant 2930]."
13. Apart from contending that Ext.P20 order of the Tribunal
has been issued as a result of a fraud played by the applicants on the
Court, Sri S.Subhash Chand, learned counsel for the petitioner has also
raised a contention that Exts.P20 and P25 can only relate to the
deductions from the salary and do not in any way relate to deductions
that may be made from the pensionary benefits due to respondents 1
and 2. We find considerable force in the above said contention raised by
the counsel. In paragraph 7 of Ext.P20 which contains the operative
portion of the order, the Tribunal has specifically directed that no
further deductions from the salary of the applicants before the Tribunal
shall be made towards the loans availed by the applicants and that the
entire salary due to the applicants from December, 2019 onwards should
be paid. The order further says that if the entire salary is paid to the
applicants, it would facilitate them to directly pay off the amounts
outstanding to the concerned financial institutions in time. It is thus
clear that the Tribunal had only restrained making of further deductions
from the salary and nothing more. So also, Ext.P25 issued by the BSNL
to the petitioner herein refers to the order of the Tribunal dated
10.01.2020 in O.A.No.824/2019 and says that the previous agreement
signed by the AO (Estt.) of the BSNL office for making monthly recovery
stands null and void and recovery from the applicants before the
Tribunal is not possible on implementation of the order of the Tribunal.
Ext.P25 has been issued only on the basis of the order of the Tribunal
and it cannot be understood to mean that the BSNL is not entitled to
make any recovery from the pension or other retirement dues payable to
the applicants before the Tribunal, if they are otherwise entitled in law.
Ext.P25 can only be understood to be an information from the BSNL to
the petitioner regarding the directions contained in Ext.P20 order of the
Tribunal which restrains the BSNL from making any deductions from
the salary. We also note that Section 37 of the Co-operative Societies
Act, under which agreements are executed by the members of the
Society in favour of the Society, authorising their employers to make
deductions from the salary payable to them and to pay the amount so
deducted to the Society, refers only to 'salary'. Since the applicants
before the Tribunal have already retired from service, the question of
deduction from the salary no longer arises. We hence make it clear that
Exts.P20 and P25 will not in any way affect the right, if any, of the
petitioner to recover the amounts due to them from the applicants
before the Tribunal, from the retirement/ pensionary benefits.
14. Having said so, we feel that it may not be proper on our part
to relegate the petitioners to the Tribunal by merely observing that the
remedy is to file a review before the Tribunal. Instead, we leave open all
the remedies of the petitioner before the Tribunal, including the remedy
by way of review as well as the remedy to approach the Tribunal for
recalling its order, since the petitioner has taken a contention that the
orders were obtained by playing fraud on the Tribunal as well as this
Court.
15. The writ petition is hence disposed of, with liberty to the
petitioner to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam
Bench by filing either a petition for review of its order dated 10.1.2020 in
O.A.No.824 of 2019 or with any other application, including an
application for recalling the order above stated. In case such petition is
filed beyond the period of limitation that is prescribed, it will be open to
the petitioner to seek condonation of the delay in filing such applications
and the petitioner will be entitled to plead that the period taken for
prosecution of this original petition before this Court is liable to be
excluded for calculation of the period of delay as envisaged in Section 14
of the Limitation Act. If such a petition is filed by the petitioner, the
Tribunal may dispose of the same at the earliest, in accordance with law
and having regard to the observations contained in this judgment. It is
made clear that we are not making any observation regarding the
correctness or otherwise of the contentions of the parties, which are left
to be considered and decided by the Tribunal.
In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
Sd/-
ALEXANDER THOMAS, JUDGE
Sd/-
T.R. RAVI, JUDGE
dsn
APPENDIX
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION FOR LOAN DATED
29.06.2016 SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 BEFORE
THE PETITIONER BANK.
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE INDEMNITY BOND DATED
29.06.2016 EXECUTED IN FAVOUR OF THE PETITIONER
BANK.
EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE SALARY CERTIFICATE DATED
14.06.2016 ISSUED BY THE 6TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE SALARY CERTIFICATE DATED
14.06.2016 OF SURETY NAMELY,
SRI, SASEENDRAN M.
EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF THE SALARY CERTIFICATE
DATED 14.06.2016 OF SURETY NAMELY SMT.SULOCHANA
K
EXHIBIT P6 TRUE COPY OF THE PERSONAL BOND EXECUTED BY
RESPONDENT NO.1.
EXHIBIT P7 TRUE COPY OF THE PERSONAL BOND EXECUTED BY
SURETY NAMELY, SRI. SASEENDRAN M.
EXHIBIT P8 TRUE COPY OF THE PERSONAL BOND EXECUTED BY
SURETY NAMELY, SMT. SULOCHANA K.
EXHIBIT P9 TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION FOR LOAN DATED
11.08.2016 SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT NO.2 BEFORE
THE PETITIONER BANK.
EXHIBIT P10 TRUE COPY OF INDEMNITY BOND DATED 11.08.2016
EXECUTED IN FAVOUR OF THE PETITIONER BANK.
EXHIBIT P11 TRUE COPY OF THE SALARY CERTIFICATE DATED
21.07.2016 ISSUED BY THE 6TH RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P12 TRUE COPY OF THE SALARY CERTIFICATE
DATED 24.06.2016 OF SURETY NAMELY, SMT.P.K.
RAJASREE.
EXHIBIT P13 TRUE COPY OF THE SALARY CERTIFICATE DATED
19.07.2016 OF SURETY NAMELY,SRI.BABURAJ.
EXHIBIT P14 TRUE COPY OF THE PERSONAL BOND EXECUTED BY
RESPONDENT NO.2.
EXHIBIT P15 TRUE COPY OF THE PERSONAL BOND EXECUTED BY
SURETY NAMELY,SMT.P.K.RAJASREE.
EXHIBIT P16 TRUE COPY OF THE PERSONAL BOND EXECUTED BY
SURETY NAMELY, SRI. BABURAJ.
EXHIBIT P17 TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL APPLICATION BEARING
OA NO. 824/2019 ALONG WITH ANNEXURES A1 TO A4.
EXHIBIT P17(A1) TRUE COPY OF THE PAY SLIP OF THE 1ST APPLICANT
FOR SEPTEMBER, 2019
EXHIBIT P17(A2) TRUE COPY OF THE PAY SLIP OF THE 1ST APPLICANT
FOR OCTOBER, 2019.
EXHIBIT P17(A3) TRUE COPY OF THE PAY SLIP OF THE 2ND APPLICANT
FOR NOVEMBER,2019.
EXHIBIT P17 TRUE COPY OF THE PAY SLIP OF THE 2ND APPLICANT
(A4) APPLICATION FOR OCTOBER,2019
EXHIBIT P18 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY STATEMENT FILED ON
BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.3 TO 7 IN OA
NO.824/2019.
EXHIBIT P19 TRUE COPY OF THE M.A NO.2/2020 IN OA
SEEKING A DIRECTION TO RESPONDENT NOS 3 TO 7.
EXHIBIT P20 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 10.01.2020 PASSED
BY THE HON'BLE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL,
ERNAKULAM BENCH IN OA NO.824/2019.
EXHIBIT P21 TRUE COPY OF THE RULING OF THIS HON'BLE COURT
REPORTED AS TRIVANDRUM COOPERATIVE AGRI.RURAL
DEVELOPMENT BANK.V STATE OF KERALA, (2004 KHC
815).
EXHIBIT P22 TRUE COPY OF THE RULING OF THIS HON'BLE COURT
REPORTED AS GODWIN V.KOLLAM DISTRICT
COOPERATIVE BANK LTD, (2005 KHC 102).
EXHIBIT P23 TRUE COPY OF THE RULING OF THIS HON'BLE COURT
REPORTED AS SURENDRAN V. MAVELIKARA PRIMARY
COOP.AGRI.AND R.D BANK LTD(2005 KHC 1796)
EXHIBIT P24 TRUE COPY OF THE RULING OF THIS HON'BLE COURT
REPORTED AS SIVAPRASAD K.S AND ANOTHER V.
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR, TVM AND OTHERS(2015 KHC
7020)
EXHIBIT P25 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION DATED 27.01.2020
ISSUED BY RESPONDENT NO.7 TO THE PETITIONER
BANK.
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT R1(a) TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 12.7.2010 IN
W.P.(c) NO.20979/2010 OF THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT
OF KERALA.
EXHIBIT R1(b) TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 19.6.2013 IN
OP(KAT) NO.1286/2013 OF THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT
OF KERALA.
