Kerala High Court
Muhammed Shafi P. vs National Investigation Agency on 18 February, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 29TH MAGHA, 1942
CRL.A.No.826 OF 2020
AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER DATED 15-10-2020 IN CRL.M.P.NO.139/2020
IN RC NO.02/2020/NIA/KOC OF SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA
CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/PETITIONER/ACCUSED NO.7:
MUHAMMED SHAFI P.,AGED 36 YEARS
S/O.ABOOBACKER PANNIKKOTTIL,
PANNIKKOTTIL HOUSE,IKKARAPADY(PO),
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT-676637.
BY ADVS.
SRI.PHIJO PRADEESH PHILIP
SRI.VIPIN NARAYAN
SRI.P.V.ANOOP
SRI.K.V.SREERAJ
RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY,KOCHI,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
ERNAKULAM-682023.
BY ADV.SHRI SURYAPRAKASH V. RAJU,
ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR,
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI ARJUN AMBALAPPATTA,
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
07-12-2020, ALONG WITH CRL.A.894/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE
COURT ON 18-02-2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 2
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 29TH MAGHA, 1942
CRL.A.No.894 OF 2020
AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER DATED 15-10-2020 IN
CRL.M.P.NO.186/2020 IN RC NO.02/2020/NIA/KOC OF SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY, 28/443,
GIRI NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA, ERNAKULAM-682020.
BY ADV.SHRI SURYAPRAKASH V. RAJU,
ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR,
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI ARJUN AMBALAPPATTA,
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENT/BAIL PETITIONER/8TH ACCUSED:
SAID ALAVI E.,AGE 60 YEARS
S/O.SHRI ABDULLA, EDAKKANDAN HOUSE,
PARMBILPADI, VEGARA P.O., MALAPPURAM-676304.
BY ADV. SRI.V.T.RAGHUNATH
BY ADV. SRI.MOHAMMED RAFIQ
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07-12-2020,
ALONG WITH CRL.A.826/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
18.02.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 3
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 29TH MAGHA, 1942
CRL.A.No.901 OF 2020
AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER DATED 15-10-2020 IN
CRL.M.P.NO.173/2020 IN RC NO.02/2020/NIA/KOC OF SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY, 28/443,
GIRI NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA, ERNAKULAM-682 020
BY ADV.SHRI SURYAPRAKASH V. RAJU,
ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI ARJUN AMBALAPPATTA,
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENT/BAIL PETITION/22ND ACCUSED:
ABOOBACKER PAZEDATH (A-22)
AGE 61/2020,S/O. KADEEJA.K., PAZEDATH HOUSE,
PAZHAMALLUR, KOOTTILANGADI, MALAPPURAM-676 506
BY ADV. SRI.S.SREEKUMAR (SENIOR ADVOCATE)
BY ADV. SRI.P.MARTIN JOSE
BY ADV. SRI.P.PRIJITH
BY ADV. SRI.M.A.MOHAMMED SIRAJ
BY ADV. SRI.THOMAS P.KURUVILLA
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 4
BY ADV. SRI.MANJUNATH MENON
BY ADV. SRI.AJAY BEN JOSE
BY ADV. SRI.R.GITHESH
BY ADV. SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07-12-2020,
ALONG WITH CRL.A.826/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
18.02.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 5
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 29TH MAGHA, 1942
CRL.A.No.903 OF 2020
AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER DATED 15-10-2020 IN
CRL.M.P.NO.131/2020 IN RC NO.02/2020/NIA/KOC OF SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY, 28/443,
GIRI NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA, ERNAKULAM-682020
BY ADV.SHRI SURYAPRAKASH V. RAJU,
ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI ARJUN AMBALAPPATTA,
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENT/BAIL PETITIONER/9TH ACCUSED:
ABDU.P.T., AGE 48 YEARS, S/O.SHRI MOOSA P.T.,
PATTATHODI HOUSE, VALAKKULAM P.O., KOTAKKAL,
KOZHICHENNA, MALAPPURAM-676 508
BY ADV. SRI.M.BALAGOPAL
BY ADV. SRI.ABU MATHEW
BY ADV. SMT.R.DEVIKA (ALAPPUZHA)
BY ADV. SRI.AJU MATHEW
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07-12-2020,
ALONG WITH CRL.A.826/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
18.02.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 6
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 29TH MAGHA, 1942
CRL.A.No.904 OF 2020
AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER DATED 15-10-2020 IN
CRL.M.P.NO.121/2020 IN RC NO.02/2020/NIA/KOC OF SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY, 28/443,
GIRI NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA, ERNAKULAM-682020
BY ADV.SHRI SURYAPRAKASH V. RAJU,
ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI ARJUN AMBALAPPATTA,
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENT/BAIL PETITIONER/9TH ACCUSED:
MOHAMED ANWAR T.M. (A-16),AGE 43/2020,
S/O.KAMMU, THARAMANNIL HOUSE, P.V.R.METRO VILLA,
KOOMAMKULAM POST, MANJERI, MALAPPURAM-676 123
BY ADV. SRI.BABU S. NAIR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07-12-2020,
ALONG WITH CRL.A.826/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
18.02.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 7
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 29TH MAGHA, 1942
CRL.A.No.905 OF 2020
AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER DATED 15-10-2020 IN
CRL.M.P.NO.176/2020 IN RC NO.02/2020/NIA/KOC OF SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY, 28/443,
GIRI NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA,
ERNAKULAM-682020.
BY ADV.SHRI SURYAPRAKASH V. RAJU,
ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI ARJUN AMBALAPPATTA,
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENT/BAIL PETITIONER/14TH ACCUSED:
MUHAMMED SHAFEEQ A. (A-14)
AGE 33/2020,S/O. ABDUL RAZAK A.,
AMBAZHAKODE HOUSE, KANDAMANGALAM P. O.,
MANNARKKAD, PALAKKAD - 678583.
BY ADV. SRI.NIREESH MATHEW
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07-12-2020,
ALONG WITH CRL.A.826/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
18.02.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 8
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 29TH MAGHA, 1942
CRL.A.No.906 OF 2020
AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER DATED 15-10-2020 IN
CRL.M.P.NO.140/2020 IN RC NO.02/2020/NIA/KOC OF SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY, 28/443,
GIRI NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA, ERNAKULAM - 682020.
BY ADV.SHRI SURYAPRAKASH V. RAJU,
ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI ARJUN AMBALAPPATTA,
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENT/BAIL PETITIONER/19TH ACCUSED:
HAMJAD ALI (A-19),AGE 51/2020
S/O.MOIDIEN KUTTY, BABU NIVAS, KALOTH POST,
KONDOTTY, MALAPPURAM - 673 638.
BY ADV. SRI.V.T.RAGHUNATH
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07-12-2020,
ALONG WITH CRL.A.826/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
18.02.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 9
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 29TH MAGHA, 1942
CRL.A.No.907 OF 2020
AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER DATED 15-10-2020 IN
CRL.M.P.NO.145/2020 IN RC NO.02/2020/NIA/KOC OF SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY, 28/443,
GIRI NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA, ERNAKULAM- 682020.
BY ADV.SHRI SURYAPRAKASH V. RAJU,
ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI ARJUN AMBALAPPATTA,
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENT/BAIL PETITIONER/21ST ACCUSED:
JIFSAL.C.V. (A-21),AGE 38/2020
S/O.USMAN KOYA C.V., KONKANDY PARAMBA, VATTAKINAR,
ARTS COLLEGE P.O., KOZHIKODE - 673 018.
BY ADV. SRI.BABU S. NAIR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07-12-2020,
ALONG WITH CRL.A.826/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
18.02.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 10
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 29TH MAGHA, 1942
CRL.A.No.908 OF 2020
AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER DATED 15-10-2020 IN
CRL.M.P.NO.146/2020 IN RC NO.02/2020/NIA/KOC OF SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY, 28/443,
GIRI NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA,
ERNAKULAM-682020.
BY ADV.SHRI SURYAPRAKASH V. RAJU,
ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI ARJUN AMBALAPPATTA,
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENT/BAIL PETITIONER/23RD ACCUSED:
MUHAMMED ABDU SHAMEEM (A-23)
AGE 26/2020,S/O USSAIN K V, KAIVELIKKAL HOUSE,
MANIPURAM P O, KODUVALLY, KOZHIKODE-673572.
BY ADV. SRI.BABU S. NAIR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07-12-2020,
ALONG WITH CRL.A.826/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
18.02.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 11
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 29TH MAGHA, 1942
CRL.A.No.909 OF 2020
AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER DATED 15-10-2020 IN
CRL.M.P.NO.175/2020 IN RC NO.02/2020/NIA/KOC OF SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY, 28/443,
GIRI NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA, ERNAKULAM - 682020.
BY ADV.SHRI SURYAPRAKASH V. RAJU,
ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI ARJUN AMBALAPPATTA,
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENT/BAIL PETITIONER/11TH ACCUSED:
MUHAMMED ALI EBRAHIM,AGE 36/2020
S/O.E.M.EBRAHIM, EDAKKATTIL HOUSE,
KIZHAKKEKARA, MUVATTUPUZHA - 686 661.
BY ADV. SRI.NIREESH MATHEW
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07-12-2020,
ALONG WITH CRL.A.826/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
18.02.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 12
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 29TH MAGHA, 1942
CRL.A.No.910 OF 2020
AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER DATED 15-10-2020 IN
CRL.M.P.NO.141/2020 IN RC NO.02/2020/NIA/KOC OF SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY, 28/443,
GIRI NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA, ERNAKULAM-682 020.
BY ADV.SHRI SURYAPRAKASH V. RAJU,
ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI ARJUN AMBALAPPATTA,
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENT/BAIL PETITIONER/24TH ACCUSED:
ABDUL HAMEED P.M.(A-24),AGE 54/2020
S/O.ABDUL RAHMAN, PADIKKAMANNIL HOUSE,
KOOTTILANGADI P.O., MALAPPURAM-676 506.
BY ADV. SRI.E.C.AHAMED FAZIL
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07-12-2020,
ALONG WITH CRL.A.826/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
18.02.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 13
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 29TH MAGHA, 1942
CRL.A.No.915 OF 2020
AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER DATED 23-10-2020 IN
CRL.M.P.NO.190/2020 IN RC NO.02/2020/NIA/KOC OF SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY, 28/443,
GIRI NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA, ERNAKULAM-682020
BY ADV.SHRI SURYAPRAKASH V. RAJU,
ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI ARJUN AMBALAPPATTA,
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENT/BAIL PETITIONER/17TH ACCUSED:
HAMZATH ABDU SALAM @ KUNJUMON (A-17)
AGE 57/2020,S/O. KUNHAHAMMED HAJI, PULIKKUTH
HOUSE, VEEMBOOR POST, MARIYAD, MALAPPURAM - 676
122.
BY ADV. SRI.MANU TOM CHERUVALLY
BY ADV. SRI.K.R.JITHIN
BY ADV. SHRI.BALAMURALI K.P.
BY ADV. SHRI.SHAJI T.M.
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07-12-2020,
ALONG WITH CRL.A.826/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
18.02.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 14
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
&
THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA
THURSDAY, THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 29TH MAGHA, 1942
CRL.A.No.922 OF 2020
AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER DATED 23-10-2020 IN
CRL.M.P.NO.191/2020 IN RC NO.02/2020/NIA/KOC OF SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
NATIONAL INVESTIGATING AGENCY, 28/443,
GIRI NAGAR, KADAVANTHARA, ERNAKULAM-682 020.
BY ADV.SHRI SURYAPRAKASH V. RAJU,
ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG OF INDIA
BY ADV. SHRI ARJUN AMBALAPPATTA,
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
RESPONDENT/BAIL PETITIONER/18TH ACCUSED:
SAMJU THAZHE MANEDATH (A-18)
AGED 40/2020,S/O. KUNHALAVI, RAZIYA MANZIL,
NEDIYARAMBATH, POST ELATHUR, KOZHIKODE-673303.
BY ADV. SHRI.BALAMURALI K.P.
BY ADV. SHRI.SHAJI T.M.
BY ADV. SRI.K.R.JITHIN
BY ADV. SRI.MANU TOM
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07-12-2020,
ALONG WITH CRL.A.826/2020 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON
18.02.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
connected cases 15
C.R.
A.HARIPRASAD & M.R.ANITHA, JJ.
--------------------------------------
Crl.Appeal Nos.826, 894, 901, 903,
904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 915
and 922 of 2020
--------------------------------------
Dated this the 18th day of February, 2021
COMMON JUDGMENT
Hariprasad, J.
This batch of criminal appeals are directed against the orders
passed by the learned Judge presiding over the Special Court for trial of NIA
Cases, Ernakulam on applications for bail submitted by various accused in
R.C.2/2020/NIA/KOC. It is seen that two common orders are passed by the
learned Judge of the Special Court. Bail was granted to accused 8, 9, 11, 14,
16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24 as per order dated 15.10.2020 and to
accused 17 and 18 as per order dated 23.10.2020. Both the orders are
challenged before this Court by the Union of India represented by the National
Investigation Agency, Kochi ("NIA", in short). 7 Th accused, whose bail plea was
rejected, has preferred a separate appeal challenging the order dated
15.10.2020. Since identical factual and legal questions arise in all these
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
cases, they are heard together. We dispose them by this common judgment.
2. Heard Shri Surya Prakash V.Raju, learned Additional Solicitor
General of India (ASG) and Shri Arjun Ambalapatta, learned prosecutor for
NIA and Shri S.Sreekumar, Shri Vipin Narayan, Shri V.T.Raghunath, Shri
M.Balagopal, Shri Babu S.Nair, Shri Nireesh Mathew, Shri E.Ahamed Fazil
and Shri Manu Tom, learned counsel appearing for the accused persons. For
the sake of convenience, the respondents in the appeals filed by NIA are
referred to in their ranks before the trial court.
3. Undisputed facts are as follows:NIA registered the above
mentioned case alleging offences punishable under Sections 16, 17 and 18 of
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 ("UA(P) Act", in short). Accused
persons were arrested by NIA on different dates and they have been confined
to custody for a considerable time. Allegations raised by the investigating
agency in brief is that on 05.07.2020, the officers of the Customs Department
seized 30kgs of 24 carat gold, from International Airport, Thiruvananthapuram,
secreted in a consignment camouflaged as a diplomatic baggage sent from
United Arab Emirates (UAE). It is alleged that the gold was smuggled through
the diplomatic channel pursuant to a conspiracy hatched by the accused 1 to
4 and other accused persons. It is also alleged that they made use of the
contacts maintained by the accused 1 and 2 with the Consulate of UAE at
Thiruvananthapuram. The initial enquiry revealed, according to NIA, that the
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
proceeds of the smuggled gold could have been used for financing terrorist
activities in India.
4. Prosecution would allege that 7th accused is one of the main
organizers of the smuggling activity along with accused 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10. It is
the definite prosecution case that they had smuggled gold about 21 times
through diplomatic baggages sent to UAE Consulate from November 2019
with the intention of destabilizing economic security of India. 7 th accused had
direct contact with accused 1, 2 and 4 in addition to accused 17 to 19 and 25.
Allegation is that 7th accused and persons having connection with him had
funded for smuggling gold weighing 47.5kgs. 8 th accused had funded for
smuggling 15kgs of gold through diplomatic baggages since November 2019
by conspiring with 5th accused. 9th accused is a hawala operator and he
financed the gold smuggling activity through diplomatic baggage since
November 2019. Accused 11 and 12, in association with accused 6 and 10,
had smuggled gold and they are suspected to have used the proceeds for
financing terrorism. 12th accused herein is one of the accused in the infamous
handchopping case having a linkage to terrorism in which some of the
accused were convicted. However, he had been acquitted in that case.
5. Allegation against accused 13 and 14 is that they had associated
with accused 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 to smuggle gold 21 times in various forms and
after November 2019, they assisted other accused persons for exchanging
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
the smuggled gold at various places. 16th accused had conspired with 8th
accused and arranged funds for smuggling gold multiple times in June 2020
through the diplomatic channel. 19th accused had funded `65lakhs for
smuggling gold since June 2020 and obtained 1.5kgs of smuggled gold at
Thiruvananthapuram on multiple occasions. He did so by conspiring with
accused 5, 6, 7 and 16. It is further alleged that 21 st accused had conspired
with accused 8, 16 and 23 and handed over `70lakhs during June 2020 for
purchasing smuggled gold. He had also travelled to Thiruvananthapuram
along with accused 16 and 23 to receive the smuggled gold from accused 4
and 5 in the month of June 2020. Accusation against 22 nd accused is that he
had funded `1.25crore each on three occasions for obtaining smuggled gold
through the above said channel. It is further alleged that he had associated
with accused 7, 17 and 22. 23rd accused also conspired with accused 8, 16
and 21 since June 2020 and handed over `1.8crore for purchasing gold. He
had also travelled to Thiruvananthapuram along with accused 16 and 21 for
receiving the smuggled gold. According to the prosecution, 24 th accused had
also conspired with accused 7, 8, 17 and 22 during June 2020 and had
invested `1.25crore each on three occasions for purchasing smuggled gold.
Prosecution would contend that each of the accused had contacted many
other accused persons as is evident from the Call Data Records (CDR) in
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
respect of each of them. NIA had filed a diagram before the learned trial
Judge showing the details of contacts between the accused persons. A
revised diagram has been filed by NIA before this Court describing how the
accused persons contacted each other in the course of the criminal
transaction. It is shown as "Diagram I". To cut NIA's long story short, the
aforementioned accused persons are alleged to have funded for smuggling
gold through diplomatic channel or conspired together for arranging the same.
Besides, they contacted each other either directly or through intermediaries.
Accused 1 to 5 and 7 had played a prominent role in committing the offences.
Distribution of the gold, alleged to have been obtained through the diplomatic
baggages on various occasions, among the accused is explained by NIA with
the help of a diagram. It is shown as "Diagram II":
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
Diagram I
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
Diagram II
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
6. Common grounds taken in the appeals filed by NIA are that the
court below ought to have seen that the facts in the case, viewed in the
background of Sections 15 and 43D of the UA(P) Act, did not justify grant of
bail in favour of the accused, that the court below failed to consider the over
all effect of the materials gathered by the prosecution and made available
before the court indicating a prima facie case against the accused and that the
court below should have considered the peculiar nature of the offence,
wherein numerous persons are involved, requiring a time consuming
investigation deep into the matter to bring out true facts. Further, the court
below ought to have seen that out of 99 devices taken into custody, the
evidence from 22 devices only could be decoded and examined which itself
produced voluminous and substantial evidence in respect of the roles played
by the accused persons. Having found that there are legal reasons for
granting an extension of time to 180 days to complete the investigation, the
court below should not have granted bail to some of the accused persons.
7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the accused contended
that despite consuming much time, the investigating agency could not find out
any reason justifying further detention of the accused persons. It is also
contended that Section 15 of the UA(P) Act is totally inapplicable to the facts
of this case. In the appeal filed by 7th accused, he questioned the legal and
factual reasons stated by the trial court for denying bail.
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
8. Learned ASG contended that the court below viewed the matter
as a simple case of smuggling. According to him, the inconsistent views taken
by the learned Judge can be seen on a conjoint reading of paragraphs 2 to 6,
wherein the facts have been mentioned, and in paragraph 19, it is indicated
that the case on hand is a mere act of smuggling gold without attracting the
offence of "terrorist act" as defined under Section 15 of the UA(P) Act.
9. At the outset, the learned counsel appearing for the accused
persons canvassed a proposition that the appeals filed by NIA are
incompetent as they were not properly instituted before this Court. It is seen
from the cause title to the appeal memoranda that the appeals are filed by
Union of India, represented by the Superintendent of Police, NIA, Ernakulam.
Memoranda of appeals have been signed by the Superintendent of Police,
NIA, Kochi. Shri Arjun Ambalappatta, learned prosecutor for NIA submitted
that he presented the appeal memoranda on which the learned Assistant
Solicitor General of India, High Court of Kerala, Kochi had also signed. We
notice that there is no dispute raised by the other side about this assertion by
the learned prosecutor. According to the learned counsel for the accused
persons, the provisions in Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
("Cr.P.C.", in short) was not followed while instituting these appeals. Relevant
parts of Section 24 of Cr.P.C. is quoted hereunder for clarity of expression:
"Public Prosecutors.-(1) For every High Court, the
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
Central Government or the State Government shall, after
consultation with the High Court, appoint a Public
Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional
Public Prosecutors, for conducting in such Court, any
prosecution, appeal or other proceeding on behalf of the
Central Government or State Government, as the case
may be.
(2) The Central Government may appoint one or more
Public Prosecutors for the purpose of conducting any
case or class of cases in any district or local area.
xxxxxxxx
(7) A person shall be eligible to be appointed as a
Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor
under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section (3)
or sub-section (6), only if he has been in practice as an
advocate for not less than seven years.
(8) The Central Government or the State Government
may appoint, for the purposes of any case or class of
cases, a person who has been in practice as an advocate
for not less than ten years as a Special Public Prosecutor:
Provided that the Court may permit the victim to
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
engage an advocate of his choice to assist the
prosecution under this sub-section.
xxxxxxxx"
10. Relying on Section 24 of Cr.P.C. learned counsel for the accused
contended that the Superintendent of Police, NIA, Kochi has no authority to
file the appeals and they should have been filed through the public prosecutor.
To advance this argument, reliance is placed on two decisions rendered by
Division Benches of this Court in State of Kerala v. Krishnan (1981 KLT 839)
and Benny P. Jacob and another v. Rajesh Kumar Unnithan and another
(2019 KHC 737). In Krishnan's case, the Division Bench noticed the admitted
fact that the State had filed appeals against an acquittal through Additional
Advocate General at a time when admittedly there was no public prosecutor
appointed for the High Court. Therefore, the question was whether the State
Government could have directed the Advocate General or Additional Advocate
General to present an appeal under Section 378(1) of Cr.P.C. without
appointing them as public prosecutors under Section 24(1) of Cr.P.C. in view
of Article 165 of the Constitution of India and the Rules framed by the
Government under Clauses 2 and 3 of Article 165. The Bench, after an
elaborate consideration, refused leave to appeal sought for by the State
finding that the appeals were not filed by the public prosecutor as required
under Section 378(1) of Cr.P.C. Following this decision, another Bench in
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
Benny P. Jacob held that the appeal preferred by the State could be treated
as defective as it was not preferred by the State public prosecutor. It is
therefore forcefully argued that the appeals filed by NIA should be dismissed
in limine finding that they are incompetent.
11. Refuting these contentions, learned ASG and public prosecutor
for NIA argued that there is no defect in the institution of appeals and they are
laid properly in accordance with the provisions of the National Investigation
Agency Act, 2008 ("NIA Act" in short) and the Cr.P.C. Contextually, we may
refer to a Full Bench decision by this Court in Mastiguda Aboobacker and
another v. National Investigation Agency (N.I.A.) and others (2020 (6)
KHC 265), wherein it has been held that generally the provisions of Cr.P.C.
are applicable to the proceedings in cases relating to NIA Act and wherever a
different course is prescribed by the NIA Act, the procedure in the Cr.P.C. will
stand modified to that extent.
12. In order to reinforce NIA's contention that the appeals are
maintainable, learned ASG relied on a notification issued by the Ministry of
Home Affairs, Government of India, which reads as follows:
"MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
(INTERNAL SECURITY-I DIVISION)
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi, the 12th September, 2011
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
S.O.2070(E)-In exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the National
Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (34 of 2008), read with
sub-section (8) of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Central Government
hereby appoints Shri Ahmad Khan, Senior Public
Prosecutor, NIA, Shri S K Rama Rao, Senior Public
Prosecutor, NIA, Shri S Abdul Khader Kunju, Public
Prosecutor, NIA and Shri Arjun Ambalapatta, Public
Prosecutor, NIA as 'Public Prosecutors' for conducting
the cases instituted by the National Investigation Agency
in the trial courts, appeals, revisions or other matters
arising out of the case in revisional or appellate courts
established by law of the country.
[F.No.1-11011/65/2011-IS-IV]
DHARMENDRA SHARMA, Jt.Secy."
On a perusal of the notification, it will be clear that Shri Arjun Ambalapatta,
along with others, has been appointed as public prosecutor for conducting
cases instituted by NIA in the trial courts, appeals, revisions or other matters
arising out of the case in the revisional or appellate courts established by law
of the country. Sources of power for appointing them are Section 15 of NIA Act
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
and Section 24(8) of Cr.P.C. On a conjoint reading of Section 24(8) of Cr.P.C.
and Section 15 of NIA Act, it will be clear that the appeals are properly laid
before this Court. Section 378(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. specifically says that the State
Government may direct the public prosecutor to present an appeal to the High
Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court other
than a High Court. Interpreting this provision, in Krishnan and Benny P.
Jacob (supra) it was held that what is important is the presentation of criminal
appeals under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. through a public prosecutor appointed
under Section 24 of Cr.P.C. Section 15 of NIA Act is extracted hereunder as it
is also relevant for our purpose:
"Public Prosecutors.-(1) The Central Government
shall appoint a person to be the Public Prosecutor and may
appoint one or more persons to be the Additional Public
Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutors:
Provided that the Central Government may also
appoint for any case or class or group of cases a Special
Public Prosecutor.
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed
as a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor
or a Special Public Prosecutor under this section unless he
has been in practice as an Advocate for not less than
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
seven years or has held any post, for a period of not less
than seven years, under the Union or a State, requiring
special knowledge of law.
(3) Every person appointed as a Public
Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor or a Special
Public Prosecutor under this section shall be deemed to be
a Public Prosecutor within the meaning of clause (u) of
section 2 of the Code, and the provisions of the Code shall
have effect accordingly."
According to Section 2(u) of Cr.P.C. "public prosecutor" means any person
appointed under Section 24 and includes any person acting under the
directions of a public prosecutor. If we look into Sub-section (3) of Section 15
of NIA Act, it can be seen that every person appointed as a public prosecutor
or an additional public prosecutor or a special public prosecutor under the
Section shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor within the meaning of
Section 2(u) of Cr.P.C. So, the deeming provision in Section 15(3) of NIA Act
and linking it to Section 24 of Cr.P.C. through Section 2(u) of Cr.P.C. makes
the argument on behalf of NIA, that the appeals are properly presented,
legally sound, especially when there is no dispute to the fact that the appeals
were presented by the public prosecutor.
13. As pointed out earlier, Section 24(8) of Cr.P.C. permits the Central
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
Government or the State Government to appoint for the purposes of any case
or class of cases a person who has been in practice as an advocate for not
less than ten years as a special public prosecutor. In the matter of
appointment of a special public prosecutor under Section 24(8) of Cr.P.C., we
find no reason to insist that it should be done in consultation with the High
Court as provided under Section 24(1) of Cr.P.C. In other words, the power
conferred on the authorities to appoint a special public prosecutor, specified
under Section 24(8) of Cr.P.C., could be regarded as a deviation from the
procedure prescribed under Section 24(1). Our reasoning is strengthened by
a pronouncement made by the apex Court in Assistant Commissioner of
Central Excise, Hyderabad v. Sabnife Power Systems Ltd. and others
((2002) 9 SCC 389). In that case the State approached the High Court for
enhancement of sentence imposed against the accused by the Special Judge
for economic offences, Hyderabad. The appeal was dismissed by the High
Court for two reasons. First, the appeal for enhancement of sentence under
Section 377(2) of Cr.P.C. could be filed by the public prosecutor duly
authorized by the Central Government and the special public prosecutor
appearing on behalf of the appellant fairly admitted that the complainant was
not empowered by the Central Government to file the appeal. Second, the
appeal was not filed by the public prosecutor as contemplated under Section
377(2) of Cr.P.C., but it was filed by the special public prosecutor. The first
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
ground on which the appeal was dismissed is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
However, in respect of the second ground the following observations are
made:
"6. This submission of the learned Additional
Solicitor-General requires to be accepted. Section 24(8)
CrPC specifically empowers the Central Government or the
State Government to appoint a Special Public Prosecutor
for conducting any case or class of cases. Such Special
Public Prosecutor would be Public Prosecutor for all the
purposes under the Act. It cannot be said that the Special
Public Prosecutor is not a Public Prosecutor. Hence, the
second reason recorded by the High Court cannot be
justified."
14. Admittedly NIA Act is a special law to which Section 4(2) of
Cr.P.C. may apply in respect of investigation, inquiry, trial, etc. Viewing the
rival contentions in this background, we find that the challenges raised against
maintainability of the appeals are not sustainable, especially when we
consider the fact that the appeals were presented by the public prosecutor
appointed by NIA under Section 15 of NIA Act. We, therefore, find that the
appeals filed by NIA are competent.
15. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by NIA in its appeals,
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
it becomes necessary to consider firstly the relevant provisions. Section 2(c)
of the UA(P) Act clearly says that "Code" means the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. Another expression specifically defined under the above Act
is "economic security". In Section 2(ea) the term "economic security" is
defined as follows:
""economic security" includes financial, monetary and
fiscal stability, security of means of production and
distribution, food security, livelihood security, energy
security, ecological and environmental security."
It is pertinent to note that the above definition is an inclusive one capable of
taking in many other aspects also.
16. Section 15 of the UA(P) Act defines "terrorist act" in the following
terms:
"Terrorist act.-(1) Whoever does any act with intent
to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security,
economic security or sovereignty of India or with intent to
strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any
section of the people in India or in any foreign country,-
(a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive
substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other
lethal weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological
radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or
by any other means of whatever nature to cause or likely to
cause-
(i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; or
(ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property;
or
(iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to
the life of the community in India or in any foreign country;
or
(iiia) damage to, the monetary stability of India by
way of production or smuggling or circulation of high quality
counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other
material; or
(iv) damage or destruction of any property in India or
in a foreign country used or intended to be used for the
defence of India or in connection with any other purposes
of the Government of India, any State Government or any
of their agencies; or
(b) overawes by means of criminal force or the
show of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of any
public functionary; or
(c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and
threatens to kill or injure such person or does any other act
in order to compel the Government of India, any State
Government or the Government of a foreign country or an
international or inter-governmental organization or any
other person to do or abstain from doing any act; or
commits a terrorist act.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-section,-
(a) "public functionary" means the constitutional
authorities or any other functionary notified in the Official
Gazette by the Central Government as public functionary;
(b) "high quality counterfeit Indian currency" means
the counterfeit currency as may be declared after
examination by an authorized or notified forensic authority
that such currency imitates or compromises with the key
security features as specified in the Third Schedule.
(2) The terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an
offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the
treaties specified in the Second Schedule."
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
17. In the backdrop of the rival contentions, we are obliged to
interpret the scope of Section 15 of UA(P) Act. Section 15(1) is the
substantive part of the Section, wherein it is mentioned that whoever does any
act with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security,
economic security or sovereignty of India through any of the modes specified
in Clauses (a), (b) or (c) commits a terrorist act. Likewise, whoever does any
act with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any
section of the people in India or in any foreign country by resorting to any of
the acts mentioned under Clauses (a), (b) or (c) is said to commit a terrorist
act. If we dissect Section 15, the following aspects will emerge:
15(1) Whoever does any act -
(A) with intent to threaten
(i) the unity (ii) integrity (iii) security (iv) economic security
or (v) sovereignty of India
or (B) likely to threaten
(i) the unity (ii) integrity (iii) security (iv) economic security
or (v) sovereignty of India
or (C) with intent to strike terror in the people or any section of the
people in India or in any foreign country
or (D) likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the
people in India or any foreign country -
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
in any manner specifically enumerated under Clauses (a), (b) or
(c), commits a terrorist act.
18. Main thrust of arguments raised by learned ASG is based on
Section 15(1)(a)(iiia) of UA(P) Act to establish that the impugned order is
legally unsustainable. If we understand Section 15(1) as above, it is easy to
understand Clause (a) thereto. Clause (a) to Section 15(1) illustrates some of
the means by which the unity, integrity, security, economic security or
sovereignty of India could be threatened or terror could be struck in people or
any section of the people in India or in any foreign country. It can be seen
from Section 15(1)(a) that using bombs, dynamite or any explosive
substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or
poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances
(whether biological radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature,
the unity, integrity, etc. of the nation could be threatened or terror could be
struck in people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country.
Clause (a) makes it abundantly clear that the illustrations of criminal acts
therein are not exhaustive. The effects produced by such acts are dealt with in
Sub-clauses (i) to (iv) thereunder. If by using bombs, dynamites, etc, death or
injuries to any person or persons occur, it will be a terrorist act under Sub-
clause (i). Likewise, under Sub-clause (ii), by using bombs, dynamites, etc. if
loss or damage or destruction of property has happened, then also it will fall
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
within the definition of terrorist act. Similarly, the disruption of any supplies or
services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country
caused by any of the means referred to above will also be a terrorist act. Most
importantly, under Sub-clause (iiia) to Section 15(1)(a) by any means of
whatever nature if any damage to the monetary stability of India is caused or
likely to be caused by way of production or smuggling or circulation of high
quality counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other material, then
also it will amount to a terrorist act.
19. In this context, we shall consider Explanation (b) to the above
Section, wherein high quality counterfeit Indian currency is explained.
Pertinently, no mention about coin can be seen therein. We quote the
explanation -
"(b) "high quality counterfeit Indian currency"
means the counterfeit currency as may be declared after
examination by an authorized or notified forensic
authority that such currency imitates or compromises
with the key security features as specified in the Third
Schedule."
20. It will be apposite at this juncture to look into the Third Schedule
to UA(P) Act which specifies the security features to define high quality
counterfeit Indian currency notes:
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
"THE THIRD SCHEDULE
[See clause (b) of Explanation to section 15(1)]
SECURITY FEATURES TO DEFINE HIGH QUALITY
COUNTERFEIT INDIAN CURRENCY NOTES
Watermark(s), Security thread and any one of the following
features:-
(a) Latent image; (b) See through registration; (c) Print quality
sharpness; (d) Raised effect; (e) Fluorescent characteristics; (f)
Substrate quality; (g) Paper taggant; (h) Colour shift effect in
OVI; (I) Colour shift effect in security thread."
21. Our attention has been drawn to the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Amendment Bill, 2011 intended to further amend the UA(P) Act.
In the Bill, as per Clause 4, the existing Section 15 of UA(P) Act was proposed
to be amended in the following lines:
"Section 15 of the principal Act shall be renumbered
as sub-section (1), thereof and in sub-section (1) as so
renumbered,-
(i) in the opening portion, after the word "security", the
words "economic security", shall be inserted;
(ii ) in clause (a), after sub-clause (iii), the following sub-
clause shall be inserted namely :-
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
"(iiia) damage to, the monetary stability of India by way of
production or smuggling or circulation of high quality
counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other
material; or
(iii) in clause (c), for the words "any other person to do or
abstain from doing any act", the words "an international or
inter-governmental organization or any other person to do
or abstain from doing any act; or" shall be
substituted; ";
(iv) after clause (c), the following clause shall be inserted,
namely:-
"(d) demands any bomb, dynamite or other explosive
substances or inflammable substances or fire arms or
other lethal weapons or poisonous or noxious or other
chemicals or any biological, radiological, nuclear material
or device with the intention of aiding, abetting or
committing terrorism.";
(v) for the Explanation, the following Explanation shall be
substituted, namely :-
'Explanation.- For the purpose of this section,-
(a) "public functionary" means the constitutional
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
authorities or any other functionary notified in the Official
Gazette by the Central Government as public functionary :
(b) "high quality counterfeit currency" means the
counterfeit currency as may be declared after examination
by an authorized or notified forensic authority that such
currency imitates or compromises with the key security
features as specified in the Third Schedule.';
(v) after sub-section (1) , the following sub-section shall be
inserted, namely :-
"(2) The terrorist act under sub-section (1) includes an act
which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as
defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second
Schedule.".
The Bill was passed by the Parliament and Act 3 of 2013 came into force.
Section 15(1)(a)(iiia) was inserted by the Amending Act with effect from
01.02.2013. Relevant portion of the statement of objects and reasons to the
Bill reads thus:
"The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 has
been enacted to provide for the more effective prevention
of certain unlawful activities of individuals and
associations and for matters connected therewith. The
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
scope of the Act was widened in 2004 and the terrorist
activities were brought within the scope of the said Act.
2. An Inter-Ministerial Group was constituted to
evaluate the existing provisions of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 and to recommend necessary
amendments to the said Act. In addition to the above, the
Financial Action Task Force, an Inter-Governmental
organization set-up to devise policies to combat money
laundering and terror financing admitted India as its 34 th
member. On the basis of commitment made by India at
the time of admission to the said Financial Action Task
Force, various legislative and other legally binding
measures were required to be taken on a medium term
basis, i.e., by 31st March, 2012. These recommendations
were examined and it is proposed to amend the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 to make it more effective
in prevention of unlawful activities and dealing with
terrorist activities.
3. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment
Bill, 2011, inter alia, provides to -
(a) increase the period of declaration of an
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
association as unlawful from two years to five years as
specified under section 6;
(b) amend section 15 of the aforesaid Act (which
defines Terrorist act) and include therein -
(i) economic security and damage to the
monetary stability of India by way of production or
smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian
paper currency, coin or of any other material as the
existing provisions of the aforesaid Act do not include
within their scope an act done with an intent to threaten or
threaten likely to economic security of India and
counterfeiting Indian paper currency or coin;
(ii) any international or inter-governmental
organization against which any person indulges in acts
described in clause (c) of section 15, since the existing
provision does not explicitly mention such international or
inter-governmental organization.
(iii) act of demanding any bomb, dynamite
or other explosive substances or inflammable substances
or fire arms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or
noxious or other chemicals or any biological, radiological,
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
nuclear material or device with the intention of aiding,
abetting or committing terrorism;
xxxxxx"
22. It is contended by the learned counsel for the accused that
Section 15(1)(a)(iiia) cannot be invoked in the facts of the case to hold that the
alleged activities by the accused amounted to a terrorist act. According to
them, a smuggling activity simplicitor cannot amount to a terrorist act under
the scheme of UA(P) Act. Forcefully it is argued that NIA has no authority to
investigate into an offence of smuggling defined under Section 2(39) of the
Customs Act, 1962 ("Customs Act", in short). It is pointed out that in the
Schedule attached to the NIA Act, dealing with specified enactments, the
Customs Act is not included. Specific case advanced by the learned counsel
for the accused is that the materials on record do not justify the contention
raised by NIA that the accused are liable to be proceeded under Chapter IV of
UA(P) Act dealing with punishment for terrorist activities since no terrorist act
as defined under Section 15 of UA(P) Act has been attracted in this case.
23. Per contra, learned ASG and the Prosecutor contended that the
investigation at that time was gradually progressing in various directions. It
may be too premature to form an opinion as to whether a terrorist act, as
defined under Section 15 of UA(P) Act, would be attracted or not. Reliance is
placed by the learned counsel for NIA on the Financial Action Task Force
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
(FATF) report to advance their contentions. FATF is an independent inter-
governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect the global
financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and financing of
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the FATF report, the
significance of gold as a vehicle for money laundering was considered at page
6. According to the report, gold is used for money laundering for the following
two reasons:
"There are two broad characteristics of gold and the
gold market which make it enticing to criminal groups.
The first is the nature and size of the market itself which
is highly reliant on cash as the method of exchange. The
second is the anonymity generated from the properties of
gold which make tracking its origins very difficult to do.
These factors make gold highly attractive to criminal
syndicates wishing to hide, move or invest their illicit
proceeds. "
The report takes note of the fact that gold can be traded anonymously and
transactions are difficult to be traced and verified. It also notices the fact that
gold is a form of global currency and acts as a medium for exchange in
criminal transactions. Further, investment in gold provides reliable returns. It is
also observed in the report that gold is easily smuggled and traded - both
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
physically and virtually. FATF report further takes note of the opportunities for
generating illicit profit in the gold industry. After discussing all these matters,
the "red flags" identified by the organization are mentioned at page 20. It is
argued by the learned ASG that bullion transferred among associates using
bullion accounts (including family members) for no apparent commercial
purpose and customer buying gold bullion and using a general post office or
private service provider, mail box as their address, without listing a
corresponding box number are some of the instances of customer behaviour.
Insofar as the trade based behaviour (also related to trade based money
laundering) is concerned, cash payments for high value orders are indications
of trade based money laundering activity. It is therefore argued on behalf of
NIA that these aspects could be unearthed only on a wide spread probe
involving scrutiny of voluminous evidence recovered in the paper form and
also decoded from the electronic gadgets. It is true that the case involves a lot
of transactions connecting various accused persons and accomplices. We are
of the view that the investigating agency is justified in taking time for
completing a threadbare investigation into all the aspects.
24. At the same time, the contention of the accused persons that the
materials placed before the court at the time of considering their bail
applications did not reveal any of the offences charged against them has also
to be considered to assess the legality of the impugned order.
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
25. Learned senior counsel appearing for 22 nd accused contended
that no contention regarding a direct communication of this accused with the
kingpins has been raised in the remand application filed by NIA. According to
him, if Section 15 of UA(P) Act is not applicable, then Sections, 16, 17 and 18
of the said Act will have no application. This argument is opposed by the
learned counsel on behalf of NIA contending that there are enough materials
to rope the accused persons in the alleged offences. Further, Section 17
deals with punishment for raising funds for terrorist act. Section 18 deals with
punishment for conspiracy for not only a terrorist act, but for any act
preparatory to commission of a terrorist act. We are of the opinion that the
offences described under Sections 17 and 18 of UA(P) Act are not fully
dependant on the definition of terrorist act in Section 15. Proof of other
aspects also could attract those offences. It may be too early for us to express
any opinion either way relating to the offences attracted in the case at this
stage. Therefore, we do not express any opinion regarding the offences that
could be made out against the accused persons after the investigation.
26. Learned senior counsel and other counsel appearing for the
accused persons strongly contended that on a plain reading of Section 15(1)
(a)(iiia) of UA(P) Act, it can be seen that the definition of terrorist act falling
within this part of the Section does not deal with smuggling of gold.
Indisputably, smuggling as defined under Section 2(39) of the Customs Act is
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
punishable under Section 135 of the said Act. As mentioned earlier, the
Customs Act is not included in the Schedule to the NIA Act and therefore NIA
cannot have a jurisdiction to investigate into any offence exclusively falling
within the Customs Act.
27. It is discernible from Section 15(1)(a)(iiia) that what becomes a
terrorist act thereunder is causing damage to the monetary stability of India by
producing high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or any other
material or smuggling of high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or
any other material or circulating high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency,
coin or any other material. It is important to note that the qualifying words
"high quality counterfeit" are applicable to Indian paper currency and coin.
This is evident from the statement of objects and reasons to the Bill
introduced for amending the statute as shown above. This is the split up of the
above Sub-clause to Section 15(1).
28. It is therefore strongly argued that what is sought to be declared
as a terrorist act in this Sub-clause is the production, smuggling or circulation
of high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or any other material so
as to cause damage to the monetary stability of India. Learned counsel for the
accused persons emphasized that the words "high quality counterfeit Indian
paper currency, coin or any other material" will have to be understood as one
class of items intended to be produced or smuggled or circulated in order to
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
damage the monetary stability of India. In other words, it is contended that
high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency or coin cannot be disassociated
or separated from the words "any other material". According to them, the
principle of ejusdem generis should be applied to interpret this provision.
29. In this context, it will be apposite to consider the wafer-thin
distinction between "noscitur a sociis" and "ejusdem generis". According to
Black's Law Dictionary the expression "noscitur a sociis" means thus:
"A canon of construction holding that the meaning of
an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the
words immediately surrounding it."
The expression "ejusdem generis", according to Black's Law Dictionary,
means thus:
"A canon of construction that when a general word
or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the
general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only
persons or things of the same type as those listed. For
example, in the phrase horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats,
or any other barnyard animal, the general language or
any other barnyard animal - despite its seeming breadth
- would probably be held to include only four-legged,
hoofed mammals (and thus would exclude chickens)."
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
30. According to Broom's Legal Maxims (12th edition) the
expression "noscitur a sociis" implies that the meaning of a doubtful word may
be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. At
page 433 in Broom's Legal Maxims, it is observed thus:
"In the construction of statutes, likewise, the rule
noscitur a sociis is frequently applied, the meaning of a
word, and, consequently, the intention of the legislature,
being ascertained by reference to the context, and by
considering whether the word in question and the
surrounding words are, in fact, ejusdem generis, and
referable to the same subject-matter. Especially must it be
remembered that the sense and meaning of the law can be
collected only by comparing one part with another and by
viewing all the parts together as one whole, and not one
part only by itself - " nemo enim aliquam partem recte
intelligere possit antequam totum iterum atque iterum
perlegerit "
We may quote the following passages from Statutory Interpretation by Sir
Rupert Cross (Reprint 1978) dealing with rules of language:
"Rules of Language
Something must now be said about the rule of ejusdem
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
generis ("of the same kind"), the maxim noscitur a sociis ("a
thing is known by its companions"), the rule of rank and the
maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius ("the mention of
one thing is the exclusion of another"). Noscitur a sociis and
the rule of rank can, roughly speaking, be respectively
regarded as an extended and attenuated version of the
ejusdem generis rule. These rules or maxims have
attracted an unduly large quantity of case law because they
are neither legal principles nor legal rules. It is hardly
correct to speak of them as rules of language for they
simply refer to the way in which people speak in certain
contexts. They are no more than rough guides to the
intention of the speaker or writer."
31. Learned senior counsel for the accused placed reliance on
Ishwar Singh Bagga v. State of Rajasthan ((1987) 1 SCC 101) to contend
that high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or any other material
should be read and understood as anything directly related to currency or
coin. In the above decision, the Supreme Court considered the interpretation
of Section 129-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 wherein the power to detain
vehicles used without certificate of registration or permit had been dealt with.
Opening words of the Section showed that any police officer authorized in this
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
behalf or other person authorized in this behalf by the State Government may,
if he has reason to believe that a motor vehicle has been or is being used in
contravention of the provision of law, he may seize and detain the vehicle. The
words "any police officer authorized in this behalf or other person authorized
in this behalf by the State Government may" were interpreted in paragraphs 7
and 9 of the decision. In paragraph 9 the following observations are made:
"9. ........... A reading of Section 129-A and Section
133-A of the Act together shows that the "other person"
referred to in Section 129-A of the Act, who may be
empowered to discharge the powers under that section can
only mean an officer of the government, such as the Motor
Vehicles Officer appointed under Section 133-A of the Act or
of any other department. It could never have been the
intention of the Central legislature, while enacting Section
129-A and Section 133-A of the Act that the powers
exercisable under Section 129-A of the Act could be
conferred on persons who were not officers of the
government. If the Central legislature intended that such
powers could be entrusted to private persons or employees
of any statutory Corporation the section would have
expressly provided in that regard. Ordinarily, whenever a
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
statute empowers the State Government to appoint persons
to administer any of the provisions of the statute, the
persons who may be appointed by the State Government
under such provision can only be persons appointed in
connection with the affairs of the State. In other words they
should be employees or officers of the State Government,
who are subject to the administrative and disciplinary control
of the State Government directly. The powers of search,
seizure and detention of vehicles belonging to private
parties and of launching prosecutions are incidental to the
sovereign powers of the State and they cannot ordinarily be
entrusted to private persons unless the statute concerned
makes express provisions in that regard. It is a different
matter if a private person on his own files a complaint before
a magistrate and wishes to establish a criminal charge. In
such a case the private person would not be investigating
into the crime with the aid of the powers of search, seizure
or detention. The magistrate may, if he so desires, direct a
police officer to investigate into the allegations and report to
him. In order to illustrate the above point reference may be
made to Section 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
1973. It provides that any private person may arrest or
cause to be arrested any person who in his presence
commits a non-bailable and cognizable offence, or any
proclaimed offender, and, without unnecessary delay, shall
make over or cause to be made over any person so
arrested to a police officer, or, in the absence of a police
officer, take such person or cause him to be taken in
custody to the nearest police station. We are of the view that
the expression "other person" mentioned in Section 129-A of
the Act which has to be read ejusdem generis with the
words 'any police officer' which precede that expression in
Section 129-A of the Act can only refer to an officer of the
government and not to any officer or employee of any
statutory Corporation or to any other private person. We
have a similar provision in Section 129 of the Act. That
section authorizes the State Government to empower any
police officer or other person to exercise the powers under
that section. Such police officer or other person may, if he
has reason to believe that any identification mark carried on
a motor vehicle or any licence, permit, certificate of
registration, certificate of insurance or other document
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
produced to him by the driver or person in charge of a motor
vehicle is a false document within the meaning of Section
464 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), seize the mark
or document and call upon the driver or owner of the vehicle
to account for his possession of or the presence in the
vehicle of such mark or document. That section also
provides that any police officer authorized in that behalf or
other person authorized in that behalf by the State
Government may, if he has reason to believe that the driver
of a motor vehicle who is charged with any offence under
the Act may abscond or otherwise avoid the service of a
summons, seize any licence held by such driver and
forward it to the court taking cognizance of the offence and
the said court shall, on the first appearance of such driver
before it, return the licence to him in exchange for the
temporary acknowledgment given under sub-section (3) of
Section 129 of the Act. Having regard to the nature of the
power, the expression "other person" in Section 129 also will
have to be interpreted as meaning any other person
appointed in connection with the affairs of the State
Government and not any private person or officer of a
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
Corporation."
The Supreme Court in Maharashtra University of Health Sciences v.
Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal ((2010) 3 SCC 786) considered the scope of
Section 2(35) of Maharashtra University of Health Sciences Act, 1998,
wherein definition of the word "teachers" occurs in the following manner:
"17. ........
"2(35) 'teachers' means full time approved
demonstrators, tutors, assistant lecturers, lecturers,
readers, associate professors, professors and other
persons teaching or giving instructions on full-time basis
in affiliated colleges or approved institutions in the
University."
xxxxxxxx
23. The definition of teachers under Section 2(35) is
wide enough to include even unapproved teachers. In
fact the said definition has two parts, the first part deals
with full time approved demonstrators, tutors, assistant
lecturers, lecturers, etc. and the second part deals with
other persons teaching or giving instructions on full-time
basis in affiliated colleges or approved institutions in the
University. Even though the approved teachers and
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
those "other persons" who are teaching and giving
instructions fall in two different classes both are
encompassed with the definition of teacher under
Section 2(35) of the Act. The word "and" before "other
persons" is disjunctive and indicates a different class of
people.
24. A class is a conceptual creation taking within its
fold numerous categories of persons with similar
characteristics. Here in the group of "other persons" fall
those who, on full-time basis, are teaching or giving
instructions in colleges affiliated with the University and
they are also teachers even if they are unapproved. This
seems to be the purport of Section 2(35) of the Act.
xxxxx
27. The Latin expression "ejusdem generis" which
means "of the same kind or nature" is a principle of
construction, meaning thereby when general words in a
statutory text are flanked by restricted words, the
meaning of the general words are taken to be restricted
by implication with the meaning of the restricted words.
This is a principle which arises "from the linguistic
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
implication by which words having literally a wide
meaning (when taken in isolation) are treated as
reduced in scope by the verbal context". It may be
regarded as an instance of ellipsis, or reliance on
implication. This principle is presumed to apply unless
there is some contrary indication [see Glanville Williams,
The Origins and Logical Implications of the Ejusdem
Generis Rule. 7 Conv (NS) 119].
28. This ejusdem generis principle is a facet of the
principle of noscitur a sociis. The Latin maxim noscitur a
sociis contemplates that a statutory term is recognized
by its associated words. The Latin word "sociis" means
"society". Therefore, when general words are juxtaposed
with specific words, general words cannot be read in
isolation. Their colour and their contents are to be
derived from their context. (See similar observations of
Viscount Simonds in Attorney General v. Prince Ernest
Augustus of Hanover (1957 AC 436:(1957) 2 WLR 1 :
(1957) 1 All ER 49(HL), AC at p.461)"
32. A Full Bench decision in State of Kerala v. Amalgamated
Malabar Estates (P) Ltd. (1979 KLT 829) is pressed into service by the
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
learned senior counsel for the accused to contend a proposition that the
words of a statute are to be understood in the sense in which they are best
harmonised with the subject of the enactment. Another decision cited in this
context is M/s.Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and
another ((1989) 2 SCC 458) wherein the following observations are made:
"12. The expression ejusdem generis - 'of the
same kind or nature' - signifies a principle of construction
whereby words in a statute which are otherwise wide but
are associated in the text with more limited words are, by
implication, given a restricted operation and are limited to
matters of the same class or genus as preceding them. If a
list or string or family of genus-describing terms are
followed by wider or residuary or sweeping-up words, then
the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the
preceding words limit the scope of such words."
Learned Judges, after referring to Statutory Interpretation by Sir Rupert
Cross, made the following observations in paragraph 14:
"14. The principle underlying this approach to
statutory construction is that the subsequent general
words were only intended to guard against some
accidental omission in the objects of the kind mentioned
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
earlier and were not intended to extend to objects of a
wholly different kind. This is a presumption and operates
unless there is some contrary indication. But the
preceding words or expressions of restricted meaning
must be susceptible of the import that they represent a
class. If no class can be found, ejusdem generis rule is
not attracted and such broad constructions as the
subsequent words may admit will be favoured. As a
learned author puts it:
...........if a class can be found, but the
specific words exhaust the class, then rejection of the
rule may be favoured because its adoption would make
the general words unnecessary; if, however the specific
words do not exhaust the class, then adoption of the rule
may be favoured because its rejection would make the
specific words unnecessary."
33. Sum and substance of the above discussion is that by applying
the above mentioned well known rules of interpretation of statutes, we are
unable to hold that smuggling of gold simplicitor will fall within Section 15(1)(a)
(iiia) of UA(P) Act. In other words, gold smuggling clearly covered by the
provisions of the Customs Act will not fall within the definition of terrorist act in
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
Section 15 of UA(P) Act unless evidence is brought out to show that it is done
with the intent to threaten or it is likely to threaten the economic security or
monetary stability of India. In our view, what is made an offence under Section
15(1)(a)(iiia) of UA(P) Act is causing damage to the monetary stability of India
by way of production or smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit
Indian paper currency, coin or any other material relatable to currency or coin.
"Other material" can be any material connected to counterfeit Indian paper
currency or counterfeit Indian coin, like machinery or implements or high
quality paper or any other material which could be used for producing or
circulating fake currency or coin. Illegal acts referred to in the above provision
certainly will have a direct impact on the economic security of India. In our
opinion, it does not include gold as the words employed in the Sub-clause
specifically mention about production or smuggling or circulation of high
quality counterfeit Indian paper currency or coin and therefore gold cannot be
grouped along with paper currency or coin even though gold is a valuable
substance and has a great potential to get converted into cash. Arrangement
of words indicating the things mentioned in the provision does not prompt us
to think that gold smuggling with a mere illegal profit motive will fall within the
aforementioned definition of terrorist act. Besides, we take cognizance of the
fact that there can be many other things of enormous value like precious
metals and stones that could be smuggled for making an unlawful gain. We do
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
not find any logic to include gold alone along with counterfeit Indian paper
currency or coin.
34. One more rule of interpretation of statutes fortifies our view.
Casus omissus, meaning a situation omitted from or not provided by statute,
cannot be supplied by courts, as to do so will be legislation and not
construction. Plethora of case law on this subject need not be mentioned here
to buttress this proposition. In our opinion, if the legislature had an intention to
include gold smuggling also as terrorist act, there is no difficulty in expressly
providing a limb to Section 15 of UA(P) Act. We can only presume that the
legislature must have been aware of the existence of the Customs Act when it
amended Section 15. Non-inclusion of the Customs Act in the Schedule to NIA
Act also must be regarded as a conscious act by the legislature. These
aspects also strengthen our above view.
35. After reserving the cases for judgment, learned prosecutor for NIA
placed a decision rendered by a learned single Judge of High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan (Jaipur Bench) in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous
(Petition) No.5139 of 2020 dated 01.02.2021 through a memo dated
08.02.2021 with due notice to the opposite side. In the above case, the
accused approached the High Court by presenting a petition under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. requesting to quash FIR in respect of a crime registered under
Section 16 of UA(P) Act read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code,
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
1860. Allegation against the accused therein is that he had smuggled huge
quantity of gold. Prosecution therefore contended that he had smuggled gold
with an intent to threaten the economic security of India as provided in Section
15(1)(a)(iiia) of UA(P) Act. It was argued that the words "any other material"
do not specifically refer to smuggling of gold. Learned single Judge did not
accept this contention. It is observed that smuggling of gold with intent to
threaten or likely to threaten the economic security of the country is covered
under the smuggling of "any other material". It is clear from the decision that
no analysis of the provision was made by the learned single Judge. Moreover,
no specific reason has been stated for making the aforementioned
observations. It is to be remembered that the learned single Judge was
examining whether there was any sufficient reason to quash an FIR at the
initial stage of the investigation. We do not find any law laid down in the above
decision. We are, therefore, not persuaded by the single line observation
made by the learned single Judge that "any other material" occurring in
Section 15(1)(a)(iiia) of UA(P) Act is intended to cover gold smuggling also.
36. Our attention has been drawn to a Full Bench decision of this
Court in Abdul Salam v. National Investigation Agency, Kochi (2018 (3)
KHC 1) wherein Sections 15, 16 and 18 of UA(P) Act were interpreted. Facts
in the decision would show that a huge quantity of high quality counterfeit
Indian paper currency had been brought or imported to India by the 1st
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
accused. At the time when the offence was committed, importing counterfeit
currency was not a terrorist act under the UA(P) Act. The alleged offence was
on 26.01.2013. Section 15 was amended with effect from 01.02.2013.
Considering these aspects the Full Bench held that the accused cannot be
convicted or punished for an act which was not punishable under the law as
on the date of commission of the said act and this was held so in the light of
Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India. In the above decision, the Full Bench
made the following observations:
"19. No doubt, the property meant and defined
under Section 2(h) of the U.A.(P) Act must be something
having some value in ordinary transactions, whether it is
tangible or intangible, or movable or immovable or
corporeal or incorporeal. Valueless objects cannot be
covered by the term property. The interpretation of the
Division Bench in Shareef's case is that the finance of
the country is included in the definition of property.
Finance is a broad term covering so many aspects of
monetary set up, and it is not something that can be
simply called property. To be property as meant under
the law, the object must satisfy the definition of property
under Section 2(h) of the U.A.(P) Act. The Division
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
Bench has gone too far with an imaginative
interpretation to find that the definition of property under
Section 2(h) of the U.A.(P) Act will cover the finance of
the country also. Finance of the country is something
different, having broader connotations and applications
in the country's economic set up, and it cannot be
brought down to a narrow concept or object as property.
So also, the term "security" occurring in S.15 of the U.A.
(P) Act cannot be stretched by interpretative process to
include economic security. To understand what exactly
security is, as meant by law, the whole section must be
read and appreciated carefully. It is quite clear from such
interpretation and understanding that the term security
meant under the law is the country's security vis-a-vis.,
law and other situations and internal or external affairs of
the country, and not financial or economic fabric. When
the parliament in its wisdom realised that economic
security of the country also must be brought within the
definition of terrorist act, the Parliament inserted the
words 'economic security' specifically in Section 15 of
the U.A.(P) Act by a specific amendment. Though
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
generally the objects and reasons of a statute cannot be
given much weight or value or importance in the process
of interpretation, the objects and reasons of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2012 will clearly
indicate that the Parliament inserted words to cover
economic security in Section 15 of the U.A.(P) Act
because the existing provision did not cover such
situations or instances of acts like smuggling or
circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian paper
currency causing damage to the finance of the country
and economic stability of the country. We find that the
Parliament in its wisdom inserted the words 'economic
security' in Section 15 of the U.A.(P) Act, and also
introduced clause (iiia) in Section 15 regarding
production or smuggling or circulation of 'high quality
counterfeit Indian paper currency', making it an act of
terrorism within the meaning of Section 15, only because
the existing provision did not take care of such situations
and acts, and a provision was felt absolutely necessary
by the Parliament to punish production or smuggling or
circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian paper
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
currency as a terrorist act damaging or destroying the
monetary stability of India and the economic security of
India. We, thus come to the conclusion and finding that
production or smuggling or circulation of high quality
counterfeit Indian paper currency was not punishable till
01/02/2013 under Section 16 of the U.A.(P) Act as a
terrorist act defined under Section 15 of the U.A.(P) Act.
We also find that the question of law was not properly
considered and decided in Shareef's case.
It is submitted on behalf of NIA that in the Third Schedule, no specification
about coin has been mentioned. According to NIA, that is one of the
indications to infer that gold smuggling, though not expressly mentioned, also
will fall within the definition of terrorist act. We are not impressed with this
contention because mentioning about some matters in the Third Schedule
cannot be taken as a decisive factor to find whether gold smuggling will be a
terrorist act under the Section. The substantive law contained in the Sections
cannot be controlled by the recitals in the Schedule is a well settled legal
principle.
37. Another contention raised by NIA is that counterfeit currency
notes cannot be smuggled because under the Customs Act, smuggling is an
offence against levying duty. We notice that the word "smuggling" is not
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
defined under the UA(P) Act. Definition of a particular expression occurring in
one statute cannot be applied to another, unless they are pari materia. This is
an indisputable proposition. We do not think that the Customs Act and UA(P)
Act are pari materia. Going by the dictionary meaning, "smuggling" is the
illegal transportation of objects, substances, information or people, such as
out of a house or building, into a prison or across an international border in
violation of the applicable laws or other regulations. Cambridge Dictionary
defines the word "smuggling" as an act or process of taking things or people
to or from a place secretly and often illegally. In all cases, smuggling need not
be in respect of articles on which a duty could be levied. For example, narcotic
drugs or other contraband articles are smuggled at times on which no duty
could be levied. In our opinion, "smuggling" is a generic term indicating the
illegal transport of various articles. Therefore, this argument raised by NIA
cannot be accepted. We are therefore of the view that the learned trial Judge
is right in holding that the materials presented before the court at the time of
considering the bail application did not reveal prima facie that the accused
persons released on bail are involved in a terrorist act, as defined under
Section 15 of the UA(P) Act.
38. Learned trial Judge has observed that the case diary produced by
NIA in six volumes consist of nearly 2500 pages and on scanning through the
materials, the court below found that the persons to whom it had granted bail
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
had funded the front line accused persons for smuggling gold through
diplomatic channel and they did conspire with some others in this regard. The
materials on record prima facie did not indicate that the accused to whom bail
had been granted had acted with an intention to damage economic security of
India. Trial court took note of the fact that most of the accused persons are
businessmen having considerable assets. The materials on record revealed
that the accused, who are enlarged on bail, were indulging in smuggling
activity for illegal gain. Of course, they were using a diplomatic channel for
committing the offence of smuggling. On going through the materials placed
before us, we are of the view that the court below is justified in entering such a
finding.
39. Learned ASG harping on Section 43-D(5) of UA(P) Act contended
that the court below did not comply with the mandate of law therein. Section
43-D(5) of UA(P) Act reads thus:
"43-D. Modified application of certain provisions
of the Code.-
..............
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code,
no person accused of an offence punishable under
Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be
released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard
on the application for such release :
Provided that such accused person shall not
be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a
perusal of the case diary or the report made under section
173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accusation against such
person is prima facie true."
What is important about the above provision is the expression, "where there
are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person
is prima facie true". Sub-section (6) to Section 43-D of UA(P) Act makes it
clear that the restriction on granting bail specified in Sub-section (5) is in
addition to the restrictions under the Cr.P.C. or any other law for the time being
in force. On a look at Section 43-D(2) of UA(P) Act, it will be clear that
Section 167 of Cr.P.C. has been modified to the extent provided therein. So,
the court will have to consider the existence of a prima facie case in a different
perspective than what is provided under the provisions of Cr.P.C.
40. On a reappraisal of the entire materials, we agree with the
learned trial Judge that the materials produced before the court at that point of
time are insufficient to hold prima facie that the accused persons have
committed a terrorist act. We shall not be understood as declaring that the
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
accused persons have not committed any of the offences alleged against
them. We make it clear that we are only endorsing the trial court's view that
the materials placed before it for considering the bail plea are insufficient to
hold prima facie that those released accused were involved in any terrorist
act. We make it further clear that none of the observations in this judgment will
preclude the investigating agency from collecting any evidence to establish
the involvement of the accused in any of the offences alleged. Likewise, the
investigating agency is free to take all steps to convince the trial court that the
accused are liable for all the offences alleged in the final report. Moreover, we
caution the court below not to be influenced by any of the observations in this
judgment at the time of trial.
41. On a perusal of the operative portion of the bail order, we find that
the trial court has carefully taken enough precautions to see that the accused
persons, to whom bail had been granted, are obeying the directions and they
do not interfere with progress of the investigation. Similarly, measures have
been taken in the bail order by imposing necessary conditions to secure their
presence at the time of trial. Therefore, we find no reason to think that the
accused to whom bail had been granted will flee from justice or meddle with
the investigation. Moreover, the investigating agency, if succeeds in digging
out materials to show their complicity in a terrorist act, certainly can move the
court for cancellation of bail.
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
42. Insofar as the appeal preferred by 7th accused is concerned, the
court below for valid reasons declined his bail plea. In paragraph 25 of the
impugned order the trial court considered various distinctions between the
case against 7th accused and other accused to whom bail was granted. Case
diary clearly revealed that 7th accused played a pivotal role in the alleged
conspiracy. Various accused persons obtained smuggled gold through 7th
accused. Allegations against him are certainly graver than those against the
accused who were enlarged on bail. Therefore the court below rightly declined
his bail plea.
In the result, the appeals under consideration are dismissed
affirming the orders passed by the Judge, Special Court for NIA Cases.
All pending applications will stand closed.
A.HARIPRASAD,
JUDGE.
M.R.ANITHA
JUDGE.
cks
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
APPENDIX OF CRL.A 826/2020
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE A TRUE COPY OF THE COUNTER FILED BY THE
RESPONDENT BEFORE THE SPECIAL COURT.
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE R1(a) TRUE CPOY OF THE FATF REPORT ON "MONEY
LAUNDERING/TERRORIST FINANCIAL RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES
ASSOCIATED WITH GOLD
ANNEXURE R1(b) TRUE COPY OF THE NARRATIVE SUMMARY ISSUED BY
UNSCR 1267/1989/2253 SANCTIONS COMMITTEE
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
APPENDIX OF CRL.A 894/2020
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE A1 TRUE COPY OF THE BAIL APPLICATION FILED
BY THE RESPONDENT.
ANNEXURE A2 TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED IN
CRL.M.P.NO.186/2020.
ANNEXURE A3 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL COMMON
OBJECTION DATED 07.10.2020 AND
14.10.2020.
ANNEXURE A4 TRUE COPY OF THE SAID REPORT DATED
08.10.2020 FILED BY SENIOR PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR OF THE APPELLANT.
ANNEXURE A5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE SAID ORDER DATED
12.10.2020.
ANNEXURE A6 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON BAIL ORDER DATED
15.10.2020 IN CRL.M.P.NO.186 OF 2020.
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
APPENDIX OF CRL.A 901/2020
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE-A1 TRUE COPY OF THE BAIL APPLICATION FILED
BY THE RESPONDENT
ANNEXURE-A2 TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED IN
CRL.M.P.NO.173 OF 2020
ANNEXURE-A3 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL COMMON
OBJECTION DATED 07.10.2020 AND 14.10.2020
ANNEXURE-A4 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 08.10.2020
FILED BY SENIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE
APPELLANT
ANNEXURE-A5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
12.10.2020
ANNEXURE-A6 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON BAIL ORDER DATED
15.10.2020 IN CRL.M.P.NO.173 OF 2020 OF
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,
ERNAKULAM
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
APPENDIX OF CRL.A 903/2020
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE A1 TRUE COPY OF THE BAIL APPLICATION FILED
BY THE RESPONDENT
ANNEXURE A2 TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED IN
CRL.M.P.NO.131 OF 2020
ANNEXURE A3 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL COMMON
OBJECTION DATED 7.10.2020
ANNEXURE A4 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 8.10.2020
FLED BY SENIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE
APPELLANT
ANNEXURE A5 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 12.10.2020
ANNEXURE A6 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON BAIL ORDER DATED
15.10.2020 IN CRL.M.P.NO.131OF 2020
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
APPENDIX OF CRL.A 904/2020
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE-A1 TRUE COPY OF THE BAIL APPLICATION FILED
BY THE RESPONDENT.
ANNEXURE-A2 TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED IN CRL M
P NO.176/2020
ANNEXURE-A3 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL COMMON
OBJECTION DATED 07.102020 AND 14.10.2020.
ANNEXURE-A4 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 08.10.2020
FILED BY SENIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE
APPELLANT.
ANNEXURE-A5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
12.10.2020.
ANNEXURE-A6 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON BAIL ORDER DATED
15.10.2020 OM CRL M P NO.121 OF 2020 OF
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OR NIA CASES,
ERNAKULAM.
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
APPENDIX OF CRL.A 905/2020
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE A1 TRUE COPY OF THE BAIL APPLICATION FILED
BY THE RESPONDENT.
ANNEXURE A2 TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED IN CRL.
M.P. NO.176 OF 2020 IN RC2/20/NIA/KOC.
ANNEXURE A3 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL COMMON
OBJECTION DATED 07.10.2020 AND
14.10.2020.
ANNEXURE A4 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 08.10.2020
FILED BY SENIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE
APPELLANT.
ANNEXURE A5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
12.10.2020.
ANNEXURE A6 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON BAIL ORDER DATED
15.10.2020 IN CRL. M.P.NO.176 OF 2020 IN
RC2/20/NIA/KOC OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR
TRIAL OF NIA CASES, ERNAKULAM.
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
APPENDIX OF CRL.A 906/2020
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE A1 TRUE COPY OF THE BAIL APPLICATION FILED
BY THE RESPONDENT.
ANNEXURE A2 TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED IN
CRL.MP.NO.14O OF 2020.
ANNEXURE A3 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL COMMON
OBJECTION DATED 07/10/2020 & 14/10/2020.
ANNEXURE A4 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 08/10/2020
FILED BY SENIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE
APPELLANT.
ANNEXURE A5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
12/10/2020.
ANNEXURE A6 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON BAIL ORDER DATED
15/10/2020 IN CRL.M.P.NO.140 OF 2020 OF
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,
ERNAKULAM.
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
APPENDIX OF CRL.A 907/2020
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE A1 TRUE COPY OF THE BAIL APPLICATION FILED
BY THE RESPONDENT.
ANNEXURE A2 A TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED IN
CRL.MP.NO.145 OF 2020.
ANNEXURE A3 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL COMMON
OBJECTION DATED 07/10/2020 & 14/10/2020.
ANNEXURE A4 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 08/10/2020
FILED BY SENIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE
APPELLANT.
ANNEXURE A5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
12/10/2020.
ANNEXURE A6 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON BAIL ORDER DATED
15/10/2020 IN CRL.M.P.NO.145 OF 2020 OF
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,
ERNAKULAM.
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
APPENDIX OF CRL.A 908/2020
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE-A1 TRUE COPY OF THE BA FILED BY THE
RESPONDENT.
ANNEXURE-A2 TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED IN CRL M
P NO.146/2020.
ANNEXURE-A3 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL COMMON
OBJECTION DATED 07/10/2020 AND
14.10.2020.
ANNEXURE-A4 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 08.10.2020
FILED BY THE SENIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF
THE APPELLANT.
ANNEXURE-A5 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 12.10.2020.
ANNEXURE-A6 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON BAIL ORDER DATED
15.10.2020 OM CRL MP NO.146 OF 2020 IN RC
NO.2/2020 IN THE FILES OF SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES, ERNAKULAM.
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
APPENDIX OF CRL.A 909/2020
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE A1 TRUE COPY OF THE BAIL APPLICATION FILED
BY THE RESPONDENT.
ANNEXURE A2 TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED IN
CRL.M.P.NO.175 OF 2020.
ANNEXURE A3 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL COMMON
OBJECTION DATED 07/10/2020 & 14/10/2020.
ANNEXURE A4 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 08/10/2020
FILED BY SENIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE
APPELLANT.
ANNEXURE A5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
12/10/2020.
ANNEXURE A6 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON BAIL ORDER DATED
15/10/2020 IN CRL.MP.NO.175 OF 2020 OF
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,
ERNAKULAM.
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
APPENDIX OF CRL.A 910/2020
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE A1 TRUE COPY OF THE BAIL APPLICATION FILED
BY THE RESPONDENT.
ANNEXURE A2 A TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED IN
CRL.MP NO.141 OF 2020.
ANNEXURE A3 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL COMMON
OBJECTION DATED 07.10.2020 AND
14.10.2020.
ANNEXURE A4 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 08.10.2020
FILED BY SENOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE
APPELLANT.
ANNEXURE A5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
12.10.2020.
ANNEXURE A6 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON BAIL ORDER DATED
15.10.2020 IN CRL.MP NO.141 OF 2020 OF
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,
ERNAKULAM.
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
APPENDIX OF CRL.A 915/2020
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE A1 TRUE COPY OF THE BAIL APPLICATION FILED
BY THE RESPONDENT.
ANNEXURE A2 TRUE COPY OF THE COUNTER FILED IN
CRL.M.P. NO. 190 OF 2020 IN
RC2/2020/NIA/KOC DATED 19.10.2020
ANNEXURE A3 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL COMMON DATED
07.10.2020 AND 14.10.2020.
ANNEXURE A4 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 08.10.2020
FILED BY SENIOR PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE
APPELLANT.
ANNEXURE A5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
12.10.2020.
ANNEXURE A6 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON BAIL ORDER DATD
23.10.2020 IN CRL.M.P. NO. 190 OF
2020/NIA/KOC OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR
TRIAL OF NIA CASES, ERNAKULAM.
Crl.Appeal No.826 of 2020 and
APPENDIX OF CRL.A 922/2020
PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:
ANNEXURE A1 TRUE COPY OF THE BAIL APPLICATION FILED
BY THE RESPONDENT.
ANNEXURE A2 TRUE COPY OF THE COUNTER FILED IN
CRL.M.P.NO.191 OF 2020 IN RC2/20/NIA/COC
ANNEXURE A3 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDITIONAL COMMON
OBJECTION DATED 14.10.2020.
ANNEXURE A4 TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 8.10.2020
FILED BY SENIOR UBLIC PROSECUTOR OF THE
APPELLANT.
ANNEXURE A5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
12.10.2020.
ANNEXURE A6 TRUE COY OF THE COMMON BAIL ORDER DATED
23.10.2020 IN CRL.M.P.NO.191 OF 2020 OF
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES,
ERNAKULAM.
