Kerala High Court

Venugopal vs State Of Kerala on 10 February, 2021

               IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                PRESENT

              THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN

                                   &

                 THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA

    WEDNESDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 21ST MAGHA,1942

                          CRL.A.No.296 OF 2017

  AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN SC 603/2015 DATED 07-10-2016 OF
            DISTRICT COURT & SESSIONS COURT, PALAKKAD

AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN CP 13/2015 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF
                     FIRST CLASS -I,PALAKKAD

      CRIME NO.734/2014 OF Kottayi Police Station , Palakkad


APPELLANT:

              VENUGOPAL, C.NO.947/2016, CENTRAL JAIL AND
              CORRECTIONAL HOME, KANNUR


              BY ADV. SMT.PREETHY.R.NAIR (STATE BRIEF)

RESPONDENT:

              STATE OF KERALA



OTHER PRESENT:

              SMT.S.AMBIKA DEVI, SPECIAL GOVERNMENT
              PLEADER,ATROCITIES AGAINST WOMAN AND CHILD

     THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 01.02.2021,
THE COURT ON 10-02-2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
 Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017
                                   -2-




                  K. Vinod Chandran & M.R.Anitha, JJ.
                 -------------------------------------
                      Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017
                  ------------------------------------
              Dated, this the 10th day of February, 2021

                                JUDGMENT

Vinod Chandran, J.

A mindless act of the husband, leading to the death

of the wife resulting in the conviction of the former on the

evidence of the son is the judgment from which the present

appeal is filed. The accused-husband was sentenced to

imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.25000/- with default

sentence of RI of three months.

2. Smt.Preethy R Nair, State Brief appointed for the

appellant-accused argued that the conviction was based on the

sole evidence of PW17 who was not an eye witness to the

incident. It is argued that PW17 did not have a version in

the evidence consistent to his statement before the Police.

The contradictions marked as D2 to D4 can result only in the

conclusion that PW17s evidence is not safe to be believed.

It is also argued that the accused is entitled to Exception 1

of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. The act if at all

pinned on the accused, was not premeditated and in all

probability would have been committed due to a provocation on Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

the part of the deceased. Alternatively it is contended that

except for PW17 none spoke of the presence of the accused at

the place of occurrence. The arrest said to have been made by

the Investigating Officer on the next day of the incident is

disproved by the evidence of PW17 and the SI of Police

examined as PW12, both of whom spoke of the presence of the

accused in the Police Station. PW17 admitted to have seen his

father in the Police Station on the night of the incident.

PW12 asserts to have seen the accused in the Police Station

on the next day morning; while the arrest is said to have

been made on the afternoon of the next day. There is no

scientific evidence to connect the accused in the crime since

neither his hands or his dress showed any trace of blood.

3. Learned Special Government Pleader for Atrocities

against Woman and Children Smt. S. Ambikadevi opposed the

claim of the accused under Exception 1 on the ground that a

hapless woman was killed by the accused without any

provocation and in a ghastly manner. The Postmortem report

noticed 14 ante mortem injuries, which according to the

Doctor could have been caused by MO3 granite stone which was

recovered by the Investigating Officer from the homestead

which was the place of occurrence. The injuries could have

been caused only by repeated clobbering on the head of the Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

poor woman with the granite stone. The stone reveals traces

of blood, which was not of sufficient quantity to discern the

exact Group. That an accident of a free fall could not have

led to the injuries was specifically spoken of by the Doctor

who conducted the Postmortem(PW21). PW17 though not an eye

witness saw his parents quarreling immediately before the

incident, upon which he retired to a room in the house. While

he was sitting inside the room, within a few minutes, he

heard a cry and on coming out, saw his mother lying down on

the floor, her head drenched in blood. He also spoke of

having seen his father, the accused going away from the scene

of occurrence and throwing away the granite stone. It is

argued that it is not the number of witnesses that matter,

but, the credibility of the witness who spoke on the specific

facts leading to the occurrence and what transpired

immediately later. The learned Government Pleader would seek

for dismissal of the appeal.

4. The incident leading to the crime occurred on

16.10.2014 at about 7.00 p.m. The FIS was by PW1 who is the

brother of the deceased. He was informed by another sister

about the death of his sister Sumathi, allegedly at the hands

of her husband, Venugopal, the accused herein. He did not

witness the incident and he was informed of the cause of Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

death by PW18 the elder son of the deceased who was in the

hospital along with others who accompanied the deceased

from her house. That the death was caused in the lean-to

attached to the house in which the accused and deceased

were residing is established. PW17 who came out of the room

hearing a sound categorically spoke about having seen his

mother on the floor with her head drenched in blood. This

much of the occurrence is confirmed by PW 3 & 16 the other

inmates of the house.

5. PW 3 and 16 are respectively the brother and

sister in law of the accused who were staying in the very

same house on the western portion. Both of these witnesses

turned hostile. PW3 deposed to his having seen Sumathi lying

down, dead. He also spoke of having heard the scream of his

wife (PW 16), upon which, he rushed to the spot and saw

Sumathi lying down, dead. He also admitted that the 3 rd son

of the accused, PW17 was in the house at that time. He was

declared hostile since he refused to subscribe to his

earlier statement to the Police, that the death was caused

by his brother and that his wife told him that his brother

had hit Sumathi with a granite stone. PW16, PW3's wife, also

came to the spot of the occurrence on hearing a sound, upon Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

which, she saw Sumathi lying on the floor, with a pool of

blood near her head. She too retracted from her statement to

the Police that it was the accused who was responsible for

the death of Sumathi. But she admitted the presence of Pw17

in the house at that time.

6. The prosecution case is that the deceased was

murdered within the lean-to in front of the house in which

she was residing. PW 16, the sister-in-law of the accused

though turned hostile with respect to material particulars of

the crime, admitted that she saw the deceased lying in a pool

of blood in the lean-to; which was affirmed by PW 3, her

husband. PW 3 also stated that the house in which they were

residing was the family house in which one portion was

occupied by himself and his wife, with a retarded brother and

another portion by the accused who was living there along

with his wife and three children. PW3 also stated that the

entire house was allotted to his share and the share of the

accused was a vacant land, lying to the south of the house.

The site plan prepared by PW 13, the Village Officer shows

the house facing north with the lean-to in front of the

house. On the inside of the lean-to for entrance into the

house there are two doors and there also exists two windows,

all facing north. PW 17 exited from one of the said doors and Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

saw his mother lying in a pool of blood. The description in

the site plan [Ext.P12] tallies with the site mahazar

[Ext.P7] prepared by PW 23 and attested by PW 8. Ext.P7 scene

mahazar is attested by PW8 who has spoken of having witnessed

the Circle Inspector preparing the same at the place of

occurrence. The house stands in the name of Chamy the father

of the accused and PW 3, as is evidenced from Ext.P13

Certificate of Ownership issued by PW 14.

7. Ext.P8 is the seizure mahazar by which the blood

samples collected from the place of occurrence by PW 2

Scientific Officer was seized by PW12, Sub Inspector. The

sample collection is conformed by PW9, the Civil Police

Officer who witnessed Ext.P8. The viscera samples collected

at the time of Postmortem by PW21, District Police Surgeon

was seized by PW23 Investigating Officer as per the Seizure

Mahazar Ext.P14 which is affirmed by PW15. ExtP20 is the

list of property wherein item No.1 includes the cotton swab

with blood stain collected from the varantha and control

sample. Ext.P21 is the forwarding note. Ext.P22 is the report

of the Joint Director, Regional Forensic Science Laboratory.

The blood stain on the cotton swab with blood collected from

the site of occurrence showed the same to be of human origin

and the group was detected as Group B. This was the group of Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

blood found in the dress of the deceased which was seized at

the time of inquest numbered as item No. 8 to 10. The

evidence discussed above establishes without doubt that the

deceased suffered the injuries within the lean-to and that

she died on the spot.

8. The cause of death as spoken of by PW21 Doctor

could have been by reason of the injuries caused by the

granite stone recovered. In this context it has to be

mentioned that though the recovery of the granite stone was

based on the confession statement of the accused the

witnesses who admitted their signatures on the seizure

mahazar turned hostile. PW21 spoke of fourteen ante mortem

injuries as seen from Ext.P17 postmortem certificate. In his

opinion the deceased died due to head injury, which was

sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

The external injuries 1 to 3 and 5 to 10 resulted in the

corresponding internal injuries described in Ext.P17. Even if

recovery of MO3 is discarded, the Doctor's statement in

cross-examination was also that the injuries can be caused by

a hard object. To a specific question, whether the injuries 2

and 3 could be caused by the deceased falling on a rough

surface or object, the answer was in the negative. PW21

unequivocally stated that such a possibility can be Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

reasonably ruled out when all the injuries are considered

together and in view of the depressed comminuted fracture of

skull at the right frontal bone. The suggestion that the

fracture to the skull could be caused by a fall, on a rough

object or surface was denied and it was submitted that the

nature and the distributed number of injuries, reasonably

rule out such a possibility. The suggestion with respect to

other injuries being caused by a fall was also negatived. The

Doctors testimony remains unshaken in cross-examination and

the possibility of the deceased having suffered the injuries

in a free fall can be definitely ruled out. The death is

established to have been caused by a hard object with which

the deceased was hit on the head; more aptly put as,

clobbered repeatedly on the head. Any reasonable person would

have the knowledge that such repeated clobbering, especially

on the head would result in grievous injuries which could

lead to the death of the person who is at the receiving end.

9. We respectfully notice the judgment of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, 1966 Supp

SCR 230 : AIR 1966 SC 1874 wherein the guiding principles for

determining the applicability of Section 300 is dilated upon.

9. The first clause says that culpable homicide is murder if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death. An intention to kill a person brings the matter so clearly within the general principle Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

of mens rea as to cause no difficulty. Once the intention to kill is proved, the offence is murder unless one of the exceptions applies, in which case the offence is reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. As there is no question of any of the exceptions they need not be mentioned. But it is plain that the appellants did not contemplate killing the Lt. Commander. No part of their preparations shows an intention to kill. Had they so desired, they had ample time and opportunity to effectuate that purpose without going to the trouble of using cotton soaked in chloroform to stuff the nostrils. They had only to hold his nose closed for a few minutes. The confession to which we have referred also shows that the news of the death of the Lt. Commander came to them with as much surprise as shock. In these circumstances, the first clause of Section 300 cannot apply.

10. The second clause deals with acts done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom harm is caused. The mental attitude here is two-fold. There is first the intention to cause bodily harm and next there is the subjective knowledge that death will be the likely consequence of the intended injury. English Common Law made no clear distinction between intention and recklessness but in our law the foresight of the death must be present. The mental attitude is thus made of two elements-- (a) causing an intentional injury and (b) which injury the offender has the foresight to know would cause death. Here the injury or harm was intended. The appellants intended tying up the victim, closing his mouth by sticking adhesive plaster and plugging his nose with cotton wool soaked in chloroform. They intended that the Lt. Commander should be rendered unconscious for some time but they did not intend to do more harm than this. Can it be said that they had the subjective knowledge of the fatal consequences of the bodily harm they were causing? We think that on the facts the answer cannot be in the affirmative. To say that the act satisfied the test of subjective knowledge would be really tantamount to saying that the appellants intended to commit the murder of the Lt. Commander which, as said already, was not the case.

11. The third clause discards the test of subjective knowledge. It deals with acts done with the intention of causing bodily injury to a person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In this clause the result of the intentionally caused injury must be viewed objectively. If the injury that the offender intends causing and does cause is sufficient to cause death in the Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

ordinary way of nature the offence is murder whether the offender intended causing death or not and whether the offender had a subjective knowledge of the consequences or not. As was laid down in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab[1953] SCR 1495 for the application of this clause it must be first established that an injury is caused, next it must be established objectively what the nature of that injury in the ordinary course of nature is. If the injury is found to be sufficient to cause death one test is satisfied. Then it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that very injury and not some other injury and that it was not accidental or unintentional. If this is also held against the offender the offence of murder is established.

10. This decision has been reiterated and affirmed

recently in 2021 (1) SCC 596 [Shatrughna Baban Meshram v.

State of Maharashtra]. Here the accused had pursuant to a

quarrel with the intention of causing bodily injury, picked

up a hard object and clobbered the deceased, on the head,

causing 14 ante-mortem injuries of which 1 to 3 and 5 to 10

were injuries possible of causing the internal injuries. The

deceased died of head injury as spoken of by the Doctor [PW

21}. The instant crime can be brought under Section 300,

Thirdly; where the person who inflicted the injury having

done so with the intention of causing bodily injur(y)/(ies),

which in the ordinary course of nature are sufficient to

cause death.

11. Now the question arises as to who is responsible

for the murder of the accused and the motive, if there is

any. Motive immediate or in the near past is not an Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

imperative circumstance to arrive at the conclusion of guilt

or otherwise. It is only one of the factors that could be

considered in arriving at the guilt or dismissing or

excluding any or every reasonable hypothesis consistent with

the innocence of the accused. As to the marital relationship,

the witnesses spoke differently. PW3 and PW16 the brother and

sister in law of the accused, who turned hostile, deposed

that the accused and deceased were having a good life. PW1

the brother of the deceased spoke off intermittent discords

in the marital life of his sister. He deposed that after the

birth of their first child, his sister and the child, due to

allegations raised by the accused, were staying with him. In

cross-examination he also deposed that the eldest son of the

accused, Rajagopalan (PW18) had once beaten his father for

having assaulted his mother with a sickle on account of which

the accused and deceased were hospitalised. PW3 the brother

of the accused also in cross-examination by the prosecution,

after having been declared hostile, admitted that there was

an instance where the son hit the father. This incident was

spoken of by both the sons, PW's 17 & 18. The sister of the

deceased who was examined as PW19 spoke of the marital

discords in the family of the deceased. It can be safely

assumed that the marriage had seen rough weather and it was Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

definitely not a smooth sail for the couple.

12. The immediate provocation, in the nature of a

quarrel, is spoken of by PW17, the son, who is the crucial

witness. His presence in the house is admitted even by PW3

and PW16, hostile witnesses. There is a minor discrepancy in

the evidence of PW's 16 and 17 as to who first saw the

deceased lying on the floor, in a pool of blood, which

however is not relevant. PW16 states that she first saw the

deceased and that on hearing her scream PW17 came out of the

room, followed by her husband who was in the bathroom. PW17

in chief examination stated that it was hearing his cry that

PW16 came to the spot. The facts remain that when PW16 and

17 came to the lean-to they saw the deceased lying in a pool

of blood. PW 16, as per Ext.P15(a) contradiction marked,

stated that she saw the accused standing near the supine

deceased and that she queried him as to his deed. It was

denied by her before Court. PW3 also retracted from his

earlier statement of having seen the accused at the scene of

occurrence and denied he having stated before the Police that

his wife told him that the accused had hit the deceased on

the head. PW17 though stated in chief examination that he saw

his father hitting his mother on the head with a stone, such

a statement was not available in the 161 statement, that Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

given to the Police, as suggested in cross-examination; which

is a material omission.

13. At the risk of repetition it is to be stated

that the presence of PW17 in the house is admitted by the

other residents, who turned hostile on the material aspects

of the crime. PW17, the son, spoke against his father and his

evidence has a ring of truth. What can be indubitably

accepted in his evidence is that just prior to the incident

he saw his father and mother quarreling. He then spoke of his

father having displayed frustration for not being able to

raise a loan for the construction of a house in the vacant

land adjacent to the scene of occurrence. PW3 also spoke of

the fact that his brother, the accused was trying to build a

house in the vacant plot allotted to his share. PW17 and PW18

spoke of the general irritability of their father. PW17 went

to his room and switched on the TV while the quarrel between

his father and mother continued in the lean-to. Then he heard

his mother screaming and came out to see his father

clobbering his mother with a stone. Even if the eye-witness

account, as spoken of in the box, is eschewed, PW17 spoke of

having seen his mother lying in a pool of blood and his

father standing there with a stone in his hands; immediately

prior to which he heard his father quarreling with his Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

mother. He also spoke of his father having thrown away the

stone while leaving the scene of occurrence.

14. There was no other person present in the house

as spoken of by PW's 3, 16 and 17. PW17 also spoke of he

having informed his elder brother PW18, who came to the house

immediately thereafter so as to take their mother to the

hospital. PW18 stated in the box that he heard the death of

his mother and the narration of what transpired, from his

brother. PW1, who first came to the hospital, also spoke of

PW18 having told him that, PW18 came to know of the incident

from PW17, over the telephone. The circumstances conclusively

point an accusing finger at the husband. The contradictions

marked from the statement of PW17 are not significant to

disbelieve his version regarding the circumstances in which

his mother died, though he cannot be said to be an eye

witness. The hostile witnesses at best spoke of the absence

of the accused in the premise which cannot be accepted in

view of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary as spoken

of by PW17, the son of the accused and deceased, who cannot

be said to have any ulterior motive in accusing his father.

15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR 1990 SC 2140

Kishore Chand v. State of H.P spoke on how the evidence has

to be evaluated where the accusation regarding the guilt is Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

based purely on the immediate and surrounding circumstances.

We extract the following from the above decision:

4. The question, therefore, is whether the prosecution proved guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. In a case of circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully and cogently established. All the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The proved circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and definite tendency, unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused. They should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. The circumstances must be satisfactorily established and the proved circumstances must bring home the offences to the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. It is not necessary that each circumstance by itself be conclusive but cumulatively must form unbroken chain of events leading to the proof of the guilt of the accused. If those circumstances or some of them can be explained by any of the reasonable hypothesis then the accused must have the benefit of that hypothesis.

16. It is hence incumbent upon every Court looking

into the guilt of the accused on the basis of circumstantial

evidence to exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent

with the innocence of the accused. Though the absence of the

accused, at the scene of occurrence, was attempted to be

projected by the hostile witnesses there was no alibi as such

offered by the accused. The presence of the accused has been

spoken of by PW17, whose evidence is found to be trustworthy.

As early as in V.Thevar Vs. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

614), it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that

corroboration not being insisted upon by the statute, there

cannot be a rule of law that conviction cannot be based on

the testimony of a single witness. However, even as a rule of

prudence, it was held that the insistence of corroboration

would always depend on the circumstances of the case as also

the quality of evidence. On a consideration of the relevant

authorities and the provisions of the Evidence Act, the

propositions that are firmly established were stated by the

Supreme Court as follows:-

"(1) As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character.

(2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, for example in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character.

(3) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes"

17. "Evidence has to be weighed and not counted"

said the Supreme Court in Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra

((2007) 14 SCC 150) and Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh v. State of Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

Gujarat ((2011) 10 SCC 158). The testimony of a solitary

witness can be made the basis for conviction if the

credibility of the witness is free from blemish and suspicion

as also the quality of his evidence impresses the Court as

natural, wholly truthful and convincing. The Court can in

such circumstances unhesitatingly record a conviction. In the

present case, the evidence of PW 17, the son of the accused,

is one which inspires the confidence of Court. PW 17's

presence is unerringly established and his credibility stands

unchallenged. We are of the definite opinion that P.W.17's

evidence is wholly truthful and utterly reliable.

18. The learned State Brief sought to urge that

though the Police is said to have arrested the accused on the

next day, his presence in the Police Station on the previous

day and the morning of the next day has been spoken of by

PW17 and PW12. PW17, the son of the accused, deposed in the

box that he saw his father in the Police Station in the night

on which the incident occurred. PW12, Sub Inspector of Police

and Station House Officer of Kottayi Police station, who took

the FI statement, spoke of the accused being in police

custody at 8.00 a.m on 17.10.2014, the next day of the

incident. True, there is a discrepancy insofar as the accused

having been arrested at 2.30 p.m on the next day from near Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

an ATM. The accused obviously was not present in the hospital

after his injured wife was brought there and he was not

present in the house after the incident. His conduct after

the incident is a very relevant aspect. His presence in the

Police Station on the previous night and the next day morning

neither shakes the prosecution case nor does it lead to any

reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the

accused. Further more the accused has no contention regarding

the specific discrepancy and during cross-examination of

PW23 no question was put to him in this regard. The

discrepancy regarding the arrest is hence not material to

upset the evidence regarding the crime and there can be no

bias visited on the accused; which rules out any ground of

miscarriage of justice having been occasioned.

19. The accused has no explanation as to his

whereabouts at the time the incident occurred, even in his

Section 313 statement. The death of the wife occurred in the

lean-to of the house in one portion of which the husband and

wife are living, along with their children; and the other

occupied by the husbands brother and family. One of the sons

whose presence in the house is established; as spoken of even

by the other occupants, who turned hostile on the material

aspects of the crime, accuses his father of having caused the Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

death of his mother. In cases of uxoricide, especially within

the confines of a home the Hon'ble Supreme Court, considered

Section 106 of the Evidence Act and said so in Trimukh

Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006 (10) SCC 681):

16.In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye-witness account is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind. The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. [See State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 (para 6); State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40); State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 (para

27); Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 731 (para 15) and Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. (1995) 3 SCC 574 (para 4)].

17.Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the Crl.Appeal No. 296 of 2017

accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime.

20. Considering the entire evidence, it definitely

indicates a chain of circumstances without any weak link,

conclusively leading to the inevitable finding of the accused

having murdered his wife, in a fit of anger, as supported by

the scientific and medical evidence regarding the cause of

death. The quarrel between the husband and wife, the sound

which emanated from the scene which brought running the

witnesses who saw the wife supine and lifeless, the abrupt

disappearance of the accused from the scene of occurrence,

the injuries caused on her head, the unimpeachable medical

evidence regarding the cause of death, the subsequent conduct

of the accused-husband and the absence of any explanation on