Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 3887 Ker
Judgement Date : 3 February, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE T.V.ANILKUMAR
WEDNESDAY, THE 03RD DAY OF FEBRUARY 2021 / 14TH MAGHA,1942
OP(C).No.164 OF 2021
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 28.10.2020 I.A.NOS.01/2020, 02/2020,
05/2020 AND 06/2020 IN O.S.NO.195/2020 OF PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF
COURT,NEDUMANGAD
PETITIONER/APPELLANTS/DEFENDANTS:
1 ANILKUMAR,
AGED 56 YEARS,
S/O. GOPALAPILLAI,
'ANASWARA', NEAR SNDP HALL, PURAVOORKONAM,
KARAKULAM, KARAKULAM VILLAGE, NEDUMANGAD TALUK,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695564.
2 ANITHADEVI,
AGED 50 YEARS,
W/O. ANILKUMAR, 'ANASWARA', NEAR SNDP HALL,
PURAVOORKONAM, KARAKULAM, KARAKULAM VILLAGE,
NEDUMANGAD TALUK, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695564.
3 DINESH,
AGED 60 YEARS,
S/O. VISWANATHAN, 'MURALIKA', NEAR SNDP HALL,
PURAVOORKONAM, KARAKULAM, KARAKULAM VILLAGE,
NEDUMANGAD TALUK, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695564.
4 PUSHPALATHA,
AGED 55 YEARS,
W/O. DINESH, 'MURALIKA', NEAR SNDP HALL,
PURAVOORKONAM, KARAKULAM, KARAKULAM VILLAGE,
NEDUMANGAD TALUK, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695564.
BY ADVS.SRI.R.SUNIL KUMAR
SMT.A.SALINI LAL
RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF:
K.RAJENDRAN,
AGED 72 YEARS,
S/O. KUNJUKRISHNAN, INDHRAJAYAM, T.C. 16/784-3,
NEAR KRISHNAN COVIL, JAGATHI, THYCAUD VILLAGE,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, THYCAUD P.O - 695014.
O.P.(C)No.164/2021
-:2:-
BY ADVS. SRI.RIJI RAJENDRAN
SMT.SURYA BINOY
SMT.MITHA SUDHINDRAN
THIS OP (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
22-01-2021, THE COURT ON 03-02-2021 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
O.P.(C)No.164/2021
-:3:-
"CR"
Dated this the 3rd day of February, 2021
J U D G M E N T
The concurrent orders of interim mandatory
injunction issued by two courts below in a suit
for prohibitory injunction directing restoration
of status quo ante as it existed prior to the date
of institution of the suit, are assailed by
defendants in this original petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
2. The legal question that arises for
consideration is whether court has power in a suit
instituted for permanent prohibitory injunction to
issue temporary mandatory injunction directing the
defendants in the suit to put the property in
dispute back to its original position as it existed
anterior to the suit.
3. The petitioners/defendants are owners of
plaint 'B' schedule item Nos.1 and 2 in the suit.
The sole respondent/plaintiff owns plaint 'A'
schedule 50 cents. The parties purchased respective
portions of land from common owners. The plaint 'A'
and 'B' schedule properties lie respectively on the O.P.(C)No.164/2021
eastern and western sides of plaint 'C' schedule
pathway which measures a width of 3.7 meters.
4. The existence of 'C' schedule pathway is
undisputed by parties. The 'C' schedule lies in
north-south direction forming part of the pathway
which starts from the public road on the south.
5. The respondent claims that after plaint 'A'
schedule property was purchased in 1993, he put up
eight feet wide gate on the western boundary of his
property for access to his land from plaint 'C'
schedule and acquired by long user,a right of
easement by prescription. It is said that he
recently widened the existing entrance of 'A'
schedule to 15 feet and put up a new iron gate.
6. Allegation against the petitioners is that
they put up 'D' schedule wall made of hollow bricks
in 'C' schedule at a height of five feet covering
the new gate and blocked the respondent's entry to
and fro the plaint 'A' schedule. Consequentially,
the respondent was forced to file the instant suit
for permanent prohibitory injunction on 10.03.2020
for a decree restraining the petitioners from
committing mischief to the newly installed iron
gate and further interfering with his right to use
plaint 'C' schedule pathway. He specifically O.P.(C)No.164/2021
contended that the unauthorised wall was put up on
02.03.2020, a week anterior to the date of suit.
7. The petitioners filed written statement as
well as a counter claim admitting erection of 'D'
schedule wall which, according to them, was quite
necessary to protect their alleged exclusive right
of user of plaint 'C' schedule acquired by grant as
borne out from the title deeds taken in their
names.
8. They also contended that respondent did not
have any lawful right to use 'C' schedule pathway
and at no point of time, any gate or entrance
existed on the western side of plaint 'A' schedule.
The entrance was created a few days prior to the
date of institution of suit and 'D' schedule
construction was put up in exercise of their lawful
right.
9. In the trial court, a commission was taken
out simultaneously with institution of the suit and
the Commissioner noticed the age of 'D' schedule
construction to be a week old. This is not a
disputed fact between parties. It is quite relevant
to note that the age of 'D' schedule wall alone was
inspected and reported. The age of construction of
the entrance was neither inspected nor sought to be O.P.(C)No.164/2021
reported. It is also a matter of fact that
respondent owns substantial extent of land close to
the southern side of plaint 'A' schedule and to the
immediate east of the pathway which starts from the
southern public road and joins plaint 'C' schedule.
That looks to be one of the reasons as to why the
respondent has not chosen to claim a right of
easement by necessity.
10. The respondent filed a petition before the
munsiff court for issue of temporary mandatory
injunction directing the petitioners to remove 'D'
schedule construction and restore 'C' schedule to
its original position as it stood a week prior to
the institution of the suit.
11. The petitioners also filed a similar
petition for temporary mandatory injunction seeking
issue of direction against respondent to remove the
newly erected iron gate fixed in his compound wall
and to restore the boundary wall to its original
position.
12. The learned Munsiff after examining the
contentions of parties found that prima facie case
and balance of convenience existed in favour of the
respondent and rejected petitioners' contention
that court did not possess the power, in a suit O.P.(C)No.164/2021
brought for prohibitory injunction, to issue
interim mandatory injunction and call upon parties
to suit to undo a mischief which was allegedly
committed anterior to the suit. In rejecting this
contention, the court below relied on J.James v.
Jaimon James [1998(1)KLJ 281].
13. Though the petitioners challenged the
impugned order passed by the learned Munsiff, it
was only confirmed by the learned Sub Judge in
appeal endorsing the same view. That is how the
legality of Exts.P7 and P8 orders passed by the
courts below, have now come to be challenged
before this Court.
14. In order to address the legal question
posed in this proceeding, it is quite necessary to
comprehend the true purport, scope and distinction
between the suits instituted for decree of
prohibitory injunction and mandatory injunction,
in the light of the statutory provisions in
Chapter VIII of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for
short, 'the Act') and also Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (for short,
'the CPC').
15. Looking at Sections 38 and 39 of the O.P.(C)No.164/2021
Act, it is obvious from these provisions that
decrees for prohibitory and mandatory injunction
are issued by courts for the purpose of preventing
commission of breach of legal obligation existing
in favour of the suitor when the defendant invades
or threatens to invade former's right to or
enjoyment of property.
16. Though prevention of breach of legal
obligation is the objective underlying both the
suits, what distinguishes each other is the nature
and scope of relief which the court is legally
empowered to grant in such suits. The prevention
of breach of legal obligation could be made by the
court either by forbidding a future action from
happening or by compelling performance of positive
acts which the court is capable of enforcing.
17. In order that the commission of a future
wrong is prevented, suit for prohibitory
injunction must be brought ahead of such
apprehended wrong. Once the wrong has already been
committed, then the possible way of preventing
continuance of the wrong done is to sue for a
decree of mandatory injunction directing removal
of the wrong committed before the suit. It will be O.P.(C)No.164/2021
a futile exercise for a person affected by such
wrong, to sue for a decree of prohibitory
injunction and hope to get a final relief. The
court cannot grant any order of temporary
injunction in such as suit since on the date of
the suit itself, the cause of action for a
preventive relief already ceases to exist. A suit
claiming a preventive relief in similar
circumstance is itself not maintainable also.
18. A close reading of Order XXXIX Rules 1
and 2 of the CPC demonstrates that the court
derives power to order temporary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory from these
provisions. They equip the court with all the
powers to make such orders as are necessary for
prevention of commission of wrongful acts in
relation to the property in dispute in the suit.
The interim reliefs requisite for preserving the
subject matter during the pendency of the suit,
are issued by following parameters as to the
existence of prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparability of loss.
19. Even though the plea for issue of
temporary prohibitory injunction and temporary O.P.(C)No.164/2021
mandatory injunction is commonly tested on the
touchstone of prima facie case, balance of
convenience and theory of irreparability of
injury, the rigour of the test to be followed in
both proceedings is, however, different. The
prima facie case to be satisfied in a proceedings for temporary prohibitory injunction is whether a
bona fide substantial question which needs
investigation as well as decision on merits,
exists in the suit. But a mere establishing of a
bona fide substantial question will not satisfy the test of prima facie case for granting a
temporary mandatory injunction. The prima facie
case made out in such proceedings must be so
strong and unusually clear that the suit has a
high probability of success. The hallmark decision
in Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden and
Others [(1990) 2 SCC 117] lays down the principles of law which courts have to essentially follow
while considering the plea for issue of interim
mandatory injunction. Paragraph Nos.16 and 17 of
the said decision are extracted below:
16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending O.P.(C)No.164/2021
controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injuries or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have been evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:
(1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie cae that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.
(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief.
17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunction would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion.
20. Both the courts below after being fully
conscious that 'D' schedule construction was
already completed a week prior to the suit, chose
to order interim mandatory injunction directing
removal of obstruction assuming that the courts O.P.(C)No.164/2021
did have power to order restoration of status quo
ante as it existed prior to the date of suit. I find it very difficult to endorse the view taken
by the courts below in the light of the legal
discussion made above.
21. The power of the court to restore the
state of affairs to a position anterior to suit by
issue of an interim mandatory injunction cannot be
exercised in a suit for a decree of prohibitory
injunction. The court is of course, well within
its own powers to issue interim mandatory
injunction restoring status quo ante to a date
prior to suit provided such a relief is claimed in
a suit brought for a decree of mandatory
injunction and further all necessary conditions as
laid down in Dorab Cawasji Warden's case (supra)
are established by the applicant in the
proceedings. On the other hand, if such relief is
claimed in a suit for prohibitory injunction and
is granted, the court would be exceeding its own
jurisdiction and enlarging the scope of the suit.
22. It is an accepted position of law that in
a suit laid for prohibitory injunction, what
cannot be granted as final relief in the suit O.P.(C)No.164/2021
cannot be granted as interim relief also. This,
however, should not be understood to deprive the
court's power in a suit for prohibitory
injunction, to issue interim mandatory injunction
to restore status quo ante as on the date of suit
when in a particular case, the property in dispute
is shown to be interfered with by the defendant
during the pendency of the suit, whether it be in
violation of an existing order of injunction or
otherwise. This power to order status quo ante
flows out of the inherent power vested in the
court and it is liable to be exercised, with due
regard to the happening of subsequent events in
the suit with a view to setting things right and
undoing mischiefs committed by the defendant . The
court may exercise this power even suo motu provided necessary facts and materials justifying
such exercise of power are brought on record in
the suit.
23. What the courts below exercised in the
instant case is not a power to restore status quo
ante as it existed on the date of suit; but a power to reinstate state of affairs which pre
existed the suit. The legal conclusion that O.P.(C)No.164/2021
emerges from the entire discussion above is that a
court which has reason to order restoration of
status quo ante to a period prior to the date of suit is not empowered to issue an interim
mandatory injunction in suits brought otherwise
than for a decree of mandatory injunction.
24. Having gone through J.James's case
(supra) relied by the courts below, I am unable to
find from the said decision that it intended to lay
down a law different from what was discussed above.
Since the courts below have failed to follow the
legal principles adverted to above while passing
Exts.P7 and P8 orders, I hold that they are liable
to be set aside. It is incomprehensible as to how
could have the existence of a prima facie case
been found by the courts below in favour of the
respondent when the suit was not, as a matter of
fact, one brought for mandatory injunction.
In the result, original petition succeeds and
it is allowed setting aside Exts.P7 and P8 orders.
However, I make it clear that this judgment will
not stand in the way of the parties seeking to
bring necessary amendments to their pleadings, if
they so choose and in that event, it will be open O.P.(C)No.164/2021
to the learned Munsiff at the request made by the
parties if any, to consider the applications
before it over again on merits in accordance with
principles of law aforementioned.
All pending interlocutory applications will
stand closed.
Sd/-
T.V.ANILKUMAR,JUDGE
DST //True copy/
P.A.To Judge
O.P.(C)No.164/2021
APPENDIX
PETITIONERS' EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE PLAINT IN OS
NO.195/20.
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE WRITTEN STATEMENT IN
OS NO.195/20
EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF IA NO.1/2020 IN OS NUMBER
195/2020.
EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF IA NO.2/2020 IN OS NUMBER
195/2020.
EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF IA NO.5/2020 IN OS NUMBER
195/2020.
EXHIBIT P6 TRUE COPY OF IA NO.6/2020 IN OS NUMBER
195/2020.
EXHIBIT P7 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON ORDER OF THE
HONOURABLE PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF NEDUMANGAD IN IA: NO:1/2020
EXHIBIT P8 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE SUBORDINATE JUDGE, NEDUMANGAD IN CMA 10/2020.
EXHIBIT P9 TRUE COPY OF THE SALE DEED NUMBER 105/93 KARAKULAM SRO.
EXHIBIT P10 TRUE COPY OF THE SALE DEED NUMBER 25/2000 OF OF KARAKULAM SRO.
EXHIBIT P11 TRUE COPY OF THE SALE DEED NUMBER 148/2001 OF KARAKULAM SRO.
EXHIBIT P12 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMISSION APPLICATION IA NO.11/2020 IN OS NO.195/2020.
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT R1(A) PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE UNAUTHORISED CONSTRUCTION OF D SCHEDULE WALL.
EXHIBIT R1(B) CERTIFIED COPY OF THE COMMISSION REPORT IN O.S 195 OF 2020.
O.P.(C)No.164/2021
EXHIBIT R1(C) CERTIFIED COPY OF THE GIFT DEED NO.182/1972 MARKED BY THE MUNSIFF COURT.
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