[Cites 22, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Jagadish vs Special Land Acquisition Officer on 29 January, 2026
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M.F.A. No.1543/2022
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.1543/2022 (LAC)
BETWEEN:
JAGADISH
S/O BASAVARAJAPPA, MAJOR
Digitally signed R/O HUNASODU VILLAGE
by HOLALUR HOBLI, SHIVAMOGGA TALUK
ARSHIFA BAHAR AND DISTRICT 577201.
KHANAM ...APPELLANT
HIGH COURT OF (BY SRI. RAJU BHAT, ADV.,)
KARNATAKA
AND:
1. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
UPPER THUNGA PROJECT
SHIMOGA 577201.
2. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
UPPER THUNGA PROJECT
SHIMOGA 577201.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. RADHA RAMASWAMY, AGA FOR R1
SRI. PRASHANTH B.R. ADV., FOR R2)
---
THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 54(1) OF LAND ACQUISITION
ACT, PRAYING TO MODIFY THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED
02.12.2010 PASSED BY THE COURT OF I ADDL. SENIOR CIVIL
JUDGE & CJM AT SHIVAMOGGA IN LAC NO.54/2001 BY
AWARDING COMPENSATION AT THE RATE OF RS.105/- PER
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SQUARE FEET WITH ALL OTHER STATUTORY BENEFITS IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
19.01.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT, THIS DAY VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL J., DELIVERED
THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
Heard Sri.Raju Bhat, learned counsel for the
appellant, Sri.Prashant B.R., learned counsel for the
respondent No.2 and Smt.Radha Ramaswamy, learned
Additional Government Advocate for the respondent No.1.
2. This appeal is filed challenging the impugned
judgment and award dated 02.12.2010 passed in LAC
No.54/2001 by the I Addl. Senior Civil Judge and CJM,
Shivamogga, seeking for higher compensation on the
ground that in cases of similarly placed land owners, the
compensation has been re-determined at Rs.105/- per sq.
ft.
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3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that
the appeal is filed along with an application seeking for
condonation of delay of 3311 days in filing the appeal. It
is submitted that the appellant is mainly dependant on the
agricultural income and since the said land has been
acquired, he is left only with a small portion of dry land,
which is not sufficient for survival. After the said
acquisition, the appellant undertook Coolie work and since
the income was not sufficient to maintain his family
expenses, he borrowed money from private persons. It is
further submitted that in the year 2008, the appellant's
son got married and at that time, he was required to
borrow money as the award of compensation fixed by the
Reference Court was not deposited immediately. Hence,
he could not save any money for the purpose of filing the
appeal and for payment of Court fee. It is also submitted
that the compensation awarded by the Reference Court is
very less and hence, he has made continuous effort to
arrange money for the purpose of filing the appeal.
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However, in the year 2017, the appellant suffered from
issues relating to cardiac health and was admitted to
Apollo Hospital, Bengaluru. It is contended that in the
month of February 2020, the appellant approached this
counsel and after discussions, he came to know that there
was a requirement to pay the Court fee of Rs.5,00,000/-
to claim the compensation at the rate of Rs.105/- per sq.
ft. It is further contended that the appellant was not
having money and hence, he returned back to his village.
Thereafter, due to Covid-19 pandemic, there was
lockdown and later, after lifting of the lockdown and after
recovering to some extent from the financial crisis, the
appellant approached his counsel and time was sought to
arrange the Court fee and the appeal came to be filed and
hence, if the delay is not condoned, great injustice and
financial loss would be caused to the appellant.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant places
reliance on the memos dated 05.08.2025 and 17.09.2025
as well as the documents produced along with the said
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memos. He also places reliance on the decision of the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in MFA No.1189/2021 and
MFA No.8200/2015 and connected appeal and submits
that the Co-ordinate Bench has condoned the delay of
4084 days in filing the appeal and granted the benefit of
Rs.105/- per sq. ft. and on the ground of parity, he seeks
to condone the delay by allowing the present appeal. He
further places reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of URBAN IMPROVEMENT
TRUST Vs. SMT. VIDHYA DEVI AND ORS1.
5. Per contra, Sri.Prashanth B.R., learned counsel
for the respondent No.2 and the learned Additional
Government Advocate for the respondent No.1 submit that
there is an enormous delay in filing the appeal and no
sufficient cause is shown. It is submitted that the
appellant was a fence-sitter and he has filed the appeal
only when he came to know that some higher
compensation is awarded to similarly placed persons. It is
Civil Appeal No.14473/2024 dt. 13.12.24
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further submitted that the averments and the documents
produced along with the memo do not support the case of
the appellant to condone the delay of 3311 days. It is also
submitted that the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench in
MFA No.1189/2021 has no application to the facts of the
case as in the said case, the appellant, a widow aged 65
years met with a road accident, initially hospitalized in
McGann Hospital, Shivamogga and later at Kasturba
hospital, Manipal where she took treatment as an inpatient
and taking note of the cause shown in the affidavit, the
delay was condoned and the same principle cannot be
adopted in this case. It is contended that the decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred by the appellant also
has no application to the facts of the case. It is further
contended that if the delay is condoned and the appeal is
allowed in terms of the decision of this Court, there would
be great hardship and financial difficulty to the State as
well as the beneficiary of the acquisition and it would open
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flood gate of the fence-sitters seeking similar relief.
Hence, they seek to dismiss the appeal.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the
appellant, learned counsel for the respondent No.2, the
learned Additional Government Advocate for the
respondent No.1 and meticulously perused the affidavits
accompanying the application for condonation of delay and
other material available on record.
7. The appellant has filed an affidavit in support of
an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963, seeking for condonation of delay. The averments in
the affidavit indicate that the appellant claims that he is
mainly depending on the agriculture for his livelihood, the
major portion of his agricultural land has been acquired,
only a small portion of the dry land is left out which is not
suitable for agricultural activity. The affidavit also
indicates that due to the said acquisition, he started coolie
work for his family livelihood and the acquisition has
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forced him to borrow loan from the private money lenders
for urgent necessities at higher rates of interest. The
aforesaid averments are not supported with any legally
acceptable evidence. The averments are very vague. It is
not forthcoming as to the total extent of the land owned
by the appellant, acquired by the Authority, the remaining
extent and from whom he has borrowed the money and to
what extent. Hence, the said explanation can be termed
as a self-serving statement of the appellant, which would
not help the appellant in seeking condonation of delay. It
is further averred that the appellant's son got married in
the year 2008 and the marriage certificate is produced
along with the memo. It is to be noticed that the
impugned judgment is dated 02.12.2010 which is almost
after two years of the marriage. The affidavit is silent with
regard to borrowing of money for the purpose of marriage.
It is averred that the award of compensation by the
Reference Court is not deposited and the entire amount
was paid to clear the loan. Again the said assertion is a
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self-serving statement as there is no specific averment
with regard to the borrowing of the amount, receipt of
compensation amount, etc. Paragraph 6 of the affidavit
indicates that the appellant had suffered health issues.
However, the said paragraph was not supported with any
evidence except the medical records produced along with
the memo dated 05.08.2025 which indicate that the
appellant was hospitalized on 18.07.2017 and discharged
on 19.07.2017 but there is no explanation whatsoever for
the delay from 02.07.2012 till the appellant was
hospitalized. It is to be noticed that the appellant was
hospitalized only for a period of 2 days and that cannot be
a ground to condone the delay of more than 9 years. The
documents further produced by the appellant along with
the memo would not help him in seeking in condoning the
enormous delay. The assertion of the appellant at
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the affidavit that the appellant
approached the counsel in the year 2020 with an intention
to file an appeal and when the counsel informed him to
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arrange for payment of Rs.5,00,000/- as the Court fee, he
returned back to arrange funds but however, due to
Covid-19 pandemic, the appeal could not be filed, is also a
vague assertion. This Court can take note of the fact that
the lockdown was imposed in the month of March 2020
but there is no cause shown in the affidavit as to why the
appeal could not be presented within the period of
limitation without even depositing the Court fee which is
permissible under the law. The appellant would have
sought time to deposit the Court fee in the appeal if he
would have preferred the appeal within time. In our
considered view, the cause shown in the affidavit is not at
all sufficient to condone the delay of more than 9 years in
filing the appeal.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant has
placed reliance on the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court RANGAMMA @ KAMALAMMA Vs. SPECIAL
LAND ACQUISITON OFFICER, UPPERTUNGA PROJECT
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AND ANR.2 A perusal of the judgment at paragraphs 12
and 14 makes it clear that the appellant in the said case,
has shown sufficient cause by pleading and placing the
material on record which was accepted by the Court and
the delay was condoned. In the case on hand, the
affidavit accompanying the application for condonation of
delay is bereft of details and the supporting material. It is
to be noticed that the Co-ordinate Bench in the case of
ESHWARAPPA AND ORS. Vs. THE SPECIAL LAND
ACQUISITION OFFICER, UTP, SHIMOGA AND ANR.3
has enhanced the market value of the land acquired
therein at Rs.105/- per sq. ft. and taking clue from the
said judgment, the present appeal is filed. This Court is of
the view that higher compensation awarded to the similar
land loser cannot be the sole basis to condone the delay
and grant similar benefit. The decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of URBAN IMPROVEMENT
TRUST, referred supra, has no application to the case on
MFA No.1189/21 dt. 12.8.25
MFA No.8200/15 and con. matter dt. 13.1.20
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hand. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
taken note of the fact that there is clear violation of the
statutory provision and the amount of compensation was
not deposited and paid to the land losers within the time
line specified under the law. Hence, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that the delay is required to be condoned
when there is violation of fundamental rights. The entire
case on hand is that similarly placed land loser has got
higher compensation and hence, appellant is also entitled
for the same. We are of the clear opinion that appellant
being a fence-sitter cannot seek for condonation of delay.
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following
cases has laid down the law with regard to consideration
of the application for condonation of delay. In the
judgment in BASAWARAJ AND ANOTHER Vs. SPECIAL
LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER4, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in paragraph Nos.11 to 15 held as under:
(2013) 14 SCC 81
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"11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be
given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned,
whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished,
can be decided on the facts of a particular case and
no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v.
Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100]
and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC
195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when
the statute so prescribes. The court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a
statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its operation." The
statutory provision may cause hardship or
inconvenience to a particular party but the court has
no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the
same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means
"the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in
such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
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"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks
to bury all acts of the past which have not been
agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time
become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of
England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts
have expressed at least three differing reasons
supporting the existence of statutes of
limitations namely, (1) that long dormant
claims have more of cruelty than justice in
them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the
evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that
persons with good causes of actions should
pursue them with reasonable diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore,
limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation
of what may have been acquired in equity and
justice by long enjoyment or what may have
been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence
or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v.
SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR
1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v.
Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 :
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka
[(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002
SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting
principles of limitation amounts to legislating and
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would fly in the face of law laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR
1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the
court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain
the court as to what was the "sufficient cause"
which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or
found to have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by this
Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case
there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation
of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the legislature."
(Emphasis supplied)
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10. In the case of SHEO RAJ SINGH Vs. UNION
OF INDIA AND OTHERS5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held in paragraph Nos.30 to 36 as under:
"30. Considering the aforementioned decisions,
there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has
stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of
private parties and the State are not defeated at the
threshold simply due to technical considerations of
delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we
reiterate that condonation of delay being a
discretionary power available to courts, exercise of
discretion must necessarily depend upon the
sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of
acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay
being immaterial.
31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being
shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered,
delay of the shortest range may not be condoned
whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods
can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory
and acceptable. Of course, the courts must
distinguish between an "explanation" and an
"excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give
someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for
(2023) 10 SCC 531
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something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a
particular event and allows the person to point out
that something that has happened is not his fault, if
it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be
taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an
"excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation"
and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find
out the difference between the two, there is a
distinction which, though fine, is real.
32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny
responsibility and consequences when under attack.
It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as
just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation
proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there
is no formula that caters to all situations and,
therefore, each case for condonation of delay based
on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be
decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot
but lament that it is only excuses, and not
explanations, that are more often accepted for
condonation of long delays to safeguard public
interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda
is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach
the higher courts for adjudication.
33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind
that we are not hearing an application for
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condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a
discretionary order of the High Court granting the
prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the
former, whether to condone or not would be the only
question whereas in the latter, whether there has
been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant
of the prayer for condonation would be the question.
Law is fairly well-settled that "a court of appeal
should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion
exercised by the courts below". If any authority is
required, we can profitably refer to the decision in
Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa [Manjunath
Anandappa v. Tammanasa, (2003) 10 SCC 390] ,
which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel
Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha
[Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes
Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980 SCC (L&S)
197] where it has been held that:
"an appellate power interferes not when the
order appealed is not right but only when it is
clearly wrong".
34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated
21-12-2011 [Union of India v. Sheo Raj, 2011 SCC
OnLine Del 5511] . It was rendered at a point of time
when the decisions in Katiji [Collector (LA) v. Katiji,
(1987) 2 SCC 107] , Ramegowda [G. Ramegowda v.
LAO, (1988) 2 SCC 142] , Chandra Mani [State of
Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132] , K.V.
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Ayisumma [Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996)
10 SCC 634] and Lipok AO [State of Nagaland v.
Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906]
were holding the field. It is not that the said
decisions do not hold the field now, having been
overruled by any subsequent decision. Although
there have been some decisions in the recent past
[State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal,
(2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 :
(2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] is
one such decision apart from University of Delhi
[University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC
745] ] which have not accepted governmental
lethargy, tardiness and indolence in presenting
appeals within time as sufficient cause for
condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of discretion
by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the
liberal and justice oriented approach expounded in
the aforesaid decisions which have been referred to
above.
35. We find that the High Court in the present case
assigned the following reasons in support of its
order:
35.1. The law of limitation was founded on public
policy, and that some lapse on the part of a litigant,
by itself, would not be sufficient to deny condonation
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of delay as the same could cause miscarriage of
justice.
35.2. The expression "sufficient cause" is elastic
enough for courts to do substantial justice. Further,
when substantial justice and technical considerations
are pitted against one another, the former would
prevail.
35.3. It is upon the courts to consider the sufficiency
of cause shown for the delay, and the length of delay
is not always decisive while exercising discretion in
such matters if the delay is properly explained.
Further, the merits of a claim were also to be
considered when deciding such applications for
condonation of delay.
35.4. Further, a distinction should be drawn between
inordinate unexplained delay and explained delay,
where in the present case, the first respondent had
sufficiently explained the delay on account of
negligence on part of the government functionaries
and the government counsel on record before the
Reference Court.
35.5. The officer responsible for the negligence
would be liable to suffer and not public interest
through the State. The High Court felt inclined to
take a pragmatic view since the negligence therein
did not border on callousness.
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36. Given these reasons, we do not consider
discretion to have been exercised by the High Court
in an arbitrary manner. The order under challenge
had to be a clearly wrong order so as to be liable for
interference, which it is not."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid
judgments has taken note of its earlier Judgment in the
case of KATIJI referred to supra and held that the
approach of the Courts in condoning the delay should be
pragmatic when sufficient cause is shown. In the instant
case, the cause shown by the appellants is not sufficient to
condone the enormous delay of nine years.
12. It would also be useful to refer to the recent
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
PATHAPATI SUBBA REDDY Vs. SPECIAL DEPUTY
COLLECTOR (LA)6, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held in paragraph Nos.15, 16, 17 and 26 as under:
2024 SCCOnline SC 513
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"15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which
law of limitation is based, the object behind the law
of limitation and the mandatory and the directory
nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation
Act that we have to examine and strike a balance
between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation
Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very
liberal approach in construing the phrase 'sufficient
cause' used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in
order to condone the delay to enable the courts to
do substantial justice and to apply law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the ends of
justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v.
Katiji2, this Court in advocating the liberal approach
in condoning the delay for 'sufficient cause' held
that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by
lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain
every day's delay in filing the appeal; and since
sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in
throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in
the interest of justice that cause of substantial
justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical
considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it
ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above,
howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning
the delay, existence of 'sufficient cause' for not filing
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the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for
exercising the discretionary power to condone the
delay. The phrases 'liberal approach', 'justice-
oriented approach' and cause for the advancement
of 'substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat
the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or
as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and
re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while
construing 'sufficient cause' in deciding application
under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the
period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal,
substantive right in favour of a decree-holder
accrues and this right ought not to be lightly
disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be
binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on
such assumption creating new rights.
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions
of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by
this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon
public policy that there should be an
end to litigation by forfeiting the
right to remedy rather than the right
itself;
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(ii) A right or the remedy that has
not been exercised or availed of for a
long time must come to an end or
cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act
have to be construed differently, such as
Section 3 has to be construed in a strict
sense whereas Section 5 has to be
construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial
justice, though liberal approach,
justice-oriented approach or cause of
substantial justice may be kept in
mind but the same cannot be used to
defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of
the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise
discretion to condone the delay if
sufficient cause had been explained, but
that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not
be exercised even if sufficient cause
is established for various factors
such as, where there is inordinate
delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
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(vi) Merely some persons obtained
relief in similar matter, it does not
mean that others are also entitled to
the same benefit if the court is not
satisfied with the cause shown for
the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not
required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has
to be decided on the parameters laid
down for condoning the delay and
condoning the delay for the reason that
the conditions have been imposed,
tantamounts to disregarding the statutory
provision."
(emphasis supplied)
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid
judgments has considered it's earlier Judgments in the
case of KATIJI and BASAWARAJ AND ANOTHER Vs.
SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER referred to
supra and held that the phrases 'liberal approach', 'justice
oriented approach' and 'cause for advancement of
substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law
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HC-KAR
of limitation so as to allow the stale matter to be revived
and reopened by taking shelter under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. Further, it has been held that no Courts
would be justified in condoning such inordinate delay by
imposing any condition whatsoever.
14. Keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to supra, we
are of the considered view that the appellants have failed
to show sufficient cause to condone the enormous delay of
3311 days. The averments made in the affidavit
accompanying the application for condonation of delay are
extremely vague and do not provide a satisfactory
explanation to condone such an enormous delay. Merely
because a higher compensation is awarded to the lands
situated in the same village subsequently, cannot be the
ground to condone the enormous delay. The condoning of
enormous delay as sought by the appellants is nothing but
a revival of the dead right of the appellants. If such an
application for condonation of delay is entertained, without
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any sufficient cause, it would confer a right in favour of
the litigant who is a fence sitter, lacks bonafides and is not
diligent about his rights. That would defeat the object of
law of limitation. In other words, the appellants and
similarly placed persons cannot be allowed to reopen or
revive their right to prefer the appeal seeking
enhancement of compensation on the ground of parity
after a period of nearly 9 years. Allowing the application
would run contrary to the public policy and cause great
injustice to the respondents and it also creates an avenue
for similarly placed persons to approach the Court as per
their whims and fancies. The Court is also required to
keep in mind the finality of the lis between the parties
while condoning the delay. If Courts start interpreting the
word 'sufficient cause' in an unduly liberal way even
without there being any acceptable explanation for
condoning enormous delay, it would lead to unsettling the
rights of the parties which were settled by the reference
Court long ago. This Court would have definitely
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sympathized with the appellants - land losers in
considering their appeal on merits, if they had filed the
appeal within the period of limitation or sufficient cause
was shown for the delay. In the instant case, the
appellants have failed to show sufficient cause to condone
the delay.
15. For the aforementioned reasons, we are of the
considered view that the appellants have failed to show
the sufficient cause to condone the delay of 3311 days in
preferring the appeal. Hence, we proceed to pass the
following:
ORDER
I.A.No.1/2021 is dismissed. Consequently, the
appeal and other pending applications are dismissed.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
RV
List No.: 4 Sl No.: 2
