State Of Karnataka vs P M Srikanth
2026 Latest Caselaw 930 Kant

ANOTHER v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND reported in (2025)5 SCC

433; BABU SAHEBGOUDA RUDRAGOUDAR AND OTHERS v.

STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in (2024)8 SCC 149;

CHANDRAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in (2007)4

SCC 415; and H.D. SUNDARA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

reported in (2023)9 SCC 581.

10. In the case of H D SUNDARA (supra), the Apex

Court has summarized the principles governing exercise of

appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against

judgment of acquittal under section 378 of Code of Criminal

Procedure as under:

"8. ...8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;

8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible."

11. In the case of BABU SAHEBGOUDA RUDRAGOUDAR

AND OTHERS (supra) it is observed that it is beyond the pale of

doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for

reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court

in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four

corners of the following principles. The same are:

1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and

3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."

12. It is the Case of the prosecution that Inspector of

Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, submitted charge-sheet against

the accused for offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)

and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It is alleged

by the prosecution that one Krishnappa, the father of the

complainant-K.Manjunatha had filed revision petition in RP

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No.116 of 2007-08 before the Special Deputy Commissioner,

Bangalore District against S.Krishnamurthy Katti and others

challenging and order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of

Bangalore South Sub-division on 30th May, 2007. The Special

Deputy Commissioner dismissed the Revision Petition by order

dated 19th April, 2010. Since the father of the complainant was

not able to move about, the complainant gave an application on

26th July, 2010 in the office of the Special Deputy

Commissioner for issuing copy of above order. It is alleged by

the complainant in the complaint lodged by him before the local

police that the accused who was working as a First Division

Assistant in the office of the Deputy Commissioner at

Bangalore, was postponing the issuance of copy and demanded

a bribe of Rs.600/- and on 4th August, 2010, a sum of Rs.100/-

was received by the accused and he asked the complainant to

pay the balance amount of Rs.500/- the next day and then

receive the copy. To prove the guilt of the accused, five

witnesses were examined by prosecution as PWs 1 to 5,

eighteen documents were marked as Exhibits P1 to P18 and

eleven material objects were marked as MOs1 to 11. Copy of

the order dated 19th April, 2010 passed in Revision Petition

No.116 of 2018 is marked as Exhibit D1.

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13. It is not in dispute that the accused was working as

First Division Assistant in the office of the Deputy

Commissioner Bangalore. The trial Court has discussed the

oral evidence of PWs1 to 5 and has given its opinion in the

course of judgment, at paragraphs 23 to 41. The same reads

as under:

"23. The best person to speak to the fact that it is the accused who was the concerned official required to process the applications for issue of copies was the investigating officer. We will see what P.W.5 has got to say in this regard. He has stated in para 15 of his cross- examination (vide page 11) that he did not examine anyone in the office of the Deputy Commissioner to ascertain how copies are furnished to a person who is not a party to the proceeding. There is no dispute that the complainant in this case was not a party to the revision petition referred to above and on the other hand it was his father who was the revision petitioner. He has specifically stated that he did not ascertain the procedure about issue of copies to third parties. Then he has stated that it did not occur to him that he should have made an investigation in that regard.

24. In para 20 of his cross-examination (vide page

14) he has deposed as follows: -

              "ಕ ೇ ಯ     ಆ ೋ   ೆ ವ ಸಲ ದ ಜ ಾ ಾ ಯ ಬ ೆ
              ಆ ೋ ಯ ಕ ೇ ಯ           ಾವ ೇ ಅ!"ಾ ಯನು% &ಾನು
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       '(ಾರ*ೆ     +ಾಡ ಲ     ಮತು/     ಅದ"ೆ0   ಸಂಬಂ!2ದ
        ಾಖ4ೆಗಳನು% "ೊ ಲ."

25. It is therefore clear from the evidence of the investigating officer that no investigation was made by him to ascertain as to what actually was the work entrusted to the accused in the office of the Deputy Commissioner. The failure on the part of the investigating officer in this regard assumes importance in view of the specific suggestion made to the complainant in the cross-

examination that no work connected with him was pending with the accused. It is true that lapse in investigation cannot be made a ground to acquit the accused. This is not a case of such a lapse in investigation which can be ignored. On the other hand it is a case where necessary evidence was not collected. At the time when the case is still under investigation certainly the investigating officer would not be knowing what the defence of the accused would be. Therefore he is required to collect all material.

26. What has been collected from the office of the Deputy Commissioner by the investigating officer is copies of various papers available in the case file pertaining to the father of the complainant. That file only goes to show that an application was given for issue of a copy of the order referred to above. That does not give the slightest indication that the accused had dealt with the file at any point of time and he was the person who was required to process the copy applications.

27. I may now refer to the evidence of the complainant. In the cross-examination at para 4, page 12

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he has stated that the investigating officer made an enquiry in the office of the Deputy Commissioner after the trap as to who was in charge of the copying branch and statement of the concerned was recorded in his presence. Then he has stated that the investigating officer also took the signature of the particular officer whose statement was recorded. But the evidence of the investigating officer is otherwise.

28. P.W.1 was recalled for further cross-

examination on 26.03.2013. In the further cross- examination recorded on that day (vide para 6, page 15) he has stated that the police made enquiries with RR Sheristedar in the office of the Deputy Commissioner. Had any such enquiry been made certainly the concerned person would have been shown as a witness and the investigating officer would have deposed to that effect. On the other hand he has clearly stated that he did not make any enquiry in that regard. Therefore the basic thing that is required to be established by the prosecution namely that the accused had something to do with the work of the complainant's father is not established at all.

29. Now about the demand prior to the complaint. In Ex.P.1 it is stated that an application for issue of copy was given on 26.07.2010 and since then he was asked to come the next day whenever he went to the office for obtaining the copies and a demand for a sum of Rs.600/- as bribe was made by the accused and he received a sum of Rs.100/- on 04.08.2010 and the accused asked him to come the next day with the balance amount of Rs.500/- and then take the copy. In the cross-examination the complainant has stated that on 04.08.2010 the accused

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demanded Rs.600/- from him and since he did not have so much money he paid only Rs.100/- and the accused asked him to bring the balance amount of Rs.500/- on the next day. In the cross-examination at page 10 the complainant has stated that he first met the accused on 16.07.2010. It is pertinent to state here that the copy application was given only on 26.07.2010. Therefore there was no occasion for the complainant to meet the accused on 16.07.2010.

30. Then how much amount was demanded is also in doubt. The complaint Ex.P.1 discloses that demand was for a sum of Rs.600/- and that on 04.08.2010 a sum of Rs.100/- was received. In the chief-examination also the complainant says so. But in the cross-examination at page 11 the complainant has stated that the accused received from him a sum of Rs.100/- as advance saying that he himself would remit the copying fee. Therefore whether Rs.100/- paid by him on 04.08.2010 was towards copying fee or it was part of the bribe money is in doubt. In this regard the learned counsel for the accused has relied upon two decisions one of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1977 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 516 Hari Dev Sharma and another of Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh reported in 1981 CRI.L.J. NOC 63 - M/s. Ganga Electricals v. State.

31. In Hari Dev Sharma's case the allegation was that the accused had demanded bribe of Rs.100/-. The complainant paid a sum of Rs.20/-and he had agreed to pay the balance of Rs.80/-. However on the date of trap he paid only Rs.70/-. The trial court convicted the accused. The Hon'ble High Court did not accept the

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charge against the accused that he had accepted bribe of Rs.20/- in advance. But however, accepted the charge that at the time of trap Rs.70/- was accepted. The Hon'ble Supreme Court reversing the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court observed as follows at para 3: -

"But the main difficulty we feel in accepting the prosecution case arises out of the fact that the High Court disbelieved the part of it which, according to the prosecution, was the genesis of the case. Having disbelieved the story that the appellant had asked for a bribe of Rs. 100 of which Rs.20 was paid in advance, we do not think the High Court could reasonably proceed on what was left of the prosecution case to affirm the order of the conviction passed by the trial court. The prosecution case was one integrated story which the trial court had accepted. If the High Court did not find it possible to accept a vital part of the story, it is difficult to see how the other part, which did not stand by itself, could be accepted. It was not the prosecution case that Rs.70 which was recovered from the appellant was the amount that the appellant had asked for from the complainant."

32. The full text of the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh cited before me is not placed and what is placed is Notes of Cases. That would show that the Hon'ble High Court noticed that the vital parts of the case were demand, part payment and the trap incident which were dependant upon each other. It was held that all the three vital parts had to be proved and if demand and part payment had been disbelieved then the trap incident though proved did not stand by itself. These two clear decisions would aptly apply to this case also.

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33. The investigating officer P.W.5 in para 18 of his cross-examination has stated that the complainant at the time of lodging the complaint did not tell him that he had paid Rs.100/- for issue of certified copy, but had given Rs.100/- for obtaining a copy of the order and copies of the records. To me it appears that it is distinction without a difference. Anyway according to the investigating officer also a sum of Rs.100/- was paid by the complainant towards fee. Therefore as already stated how much money was demanded and paid towards bribe is in doubt.

34. There are certain other circumstances which cast a doubt about the case of the prosecution. The complainant in para 11 of his cross-examination has stated that he knew that copying fee had to be paid at the time of giving copy application, but however, he had not given the same and he did not also pay the fee when he received the copy. The records disclose that copy was issued to him only after the trap. Therefore when the complainant had not even paid the copying fee when he gave the application there was no occasion either for the accused or anyone in his office to process the application.

35. The tenor of cross-examination gives an indication that it is the defence of the accused that copies of the order are despatched to the parties free of charge. Such a suggestion is made to the complainant in the cross-examination (vide page 10) and he has denied the suggestion. The investigating officer in page 11 of his cross-examination has admitted that the Deputy Commissioner had passed an order that copy of the same should be furnished to the revision petitioner and the respondents. Of course he has stated that copy of the

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order dated 19.10.2010 was ordered to be furnished. It appears to be a typographical mistake. The order was passed on 19.04.2010. At page 53 of Ex.P.7 we find an endorsement issued by the Special Deputy Commissioner which discloses that a copy of it was marked to the revision petitioner and the respondents. At Ex.D.1 a copy of that order is produced and marked on behalf of the accused. Towards the end of the order it is written as follows -"Endorse the parties". By that the Special Deputy Commissioner meant that the parties should be informed of the order. Therefore there is some indication from the records that copies were sent to the parties. Therefore it could be inferred that the father of the complainant received the copy. He has not been cited as a witness in this case. The investigating officer has also not examined him. Had he been examined probably whether a copy was sent to him or not would have been known. This may not be a very strong circumstance but it would cast some doubt about the case of the prosecution.

36. Now about sanction, the learned counsel for the accused has relied upon a few decisions which give an indication that when the amount of bribe is a meagre sum, the Sanctioning Authority should examine whether departmental enquiry would meet the ends of justice instead of prosecuting the accused. One of those decisions is reported in 2001 (3) Crimes 171 Ameer Jan v. State. In that case the bribe amount was Rs.300/-. While allowing the appeal preferred by the accused against the judgment of conviction passed by the trial court dealing with the question of sanction, the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka has observed as follows, at para 6, page 175: -

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"The additional reason for this view is because there is an entirely different aspect of the law which applies to case of this category insofar as the Courts have now held that if the amount involved is relatively small if it is a single isolated instance and there is no evidence of habitual bribe taking or assets disproportionate to the known sources of income that the Authority will have to carefully evaluate as to whether the interest of justice will not be adequately disciplinary action rather than by the Court; with full fledged prosecution in a case of relatively trivial fact. These are all areas of deep seated evaluation which can only be truly justified through a proper perusal of the records."

Another decision is the one reported in 2001 (3) KCCR 1905 State by Police Inspector, Karnataka Lokayuktha, Bangalore v. M. Nanjunda in which case at para 4, the Hon'ble High Court has observed as follows:

"There is another aspect of the law which this Court has laid down recently viz., that there are a class of misconducts which could be adequately dealt with through disciplinary or departmental proceedings and it is this class of small cases wherein it would be inappropriate to grant sanction if adequate punishment could be awarded through disciplinary or departmental proceedings."

37. Now in this case, P.W.4, the Sanctioning Authority has stated in the cross-examination that he did not verify whether any case of disproportionate assets having been acquired by the accused was pending against him and he did not find any other allegation against the accused apart from this.

38. Therefore from the evidence on record it must be said that it is not established by the prosecution that

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the accused was entrusted with the work of processing copy applications. It is brought on record that the complainant had not even paid the copying fee when the application was given. What exactly was the amount demanded by the accused and how much was paid towards bribe is itself in doubt.

39. The learned counsel for the accused has relied upon a number of decisions which are oft cited for the proposition that mere recovery of money is not sufficient to establish a charge under the Act and what is required to be established is demand and voluntary acceptance. Following are those decisions:-

1) 2012 (1) KCCR 414- R. Malini v. State of Karnataka.

2) 2012 (2) KCCR 1157- Hanumanthappa V. State of Karnataka.

3) 2010 (3) KCCR 1851 State of Karnataka v.

M. Gopalakrishnaiah and others.

4) 2000(2) Kar.L.J. 419 S. Suryanarayana Rao v. State by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha, Mangalore.

5) 2008 (2) KCCR 985 State by Lokayuktha Police, Mandya v. K.M. Gangadhar.

6) 2000 (7) Kar.L.J. 114 State by Police Inspector, Bureau of Investigation, Karnataka Lokayuktha, City Division, Bangalore v. H. Manjunatha.

7) 2000 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 878 Meena v. State of Maharashtra.

8) 2010 AIAR (Criminal) 495 Banarsi Dass v. State of Haryana.

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40. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has relied upon a decision reported in 2013 SAR (Criminal) 487 K.S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka in which there is a reference to presumption under Section 20 of the Act. That was a case where demand and acceptance had been proved beyond all reasonable doubts and therefore the judgment of conviction was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The situation in this case is altogether different.

41. Therefore in the light of the legal position referred to above and having regard to the evidence on record it cannot be said that the prosecution has established the charges beyond all reasonable doubts. Accordingly I answer both the points raised in the negative."

14. With above observation, the trial court has

acquitted the accused. I have independently re-examined and

re-appreciated the entire evidence on record, keeping in mind

the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the

respondent. On perusal of the entire material placed on record,

I do not find any factual or legal error in the impugned

judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court. Accordingly,

the trial court is justified in acquitting the accused for the

offences alleged. Hence, I answer the point that arose for

consideration in the affirmative.

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15. In the result, I proceed to pass the following:

ORDER

Appeal is dismissed.

Sd/-

(G BASAVARAJA) JUDGE

lnn