[Cites 16, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Mareppa vs The State Of Karnataka on 11 February, 2026

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                                                      CRL.P No. 201824 of 2025


                      HC-KAR




                                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
                                        KALABURAGI BENCH
                           DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
                                             BEFORE
                               THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K


                               CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 201824 OF 2025
                                     (482(Cr.PC)/528(BNSS))

                      BETWEEN:

                      MAREPPA S/O CHANDRASHYA DANDIN
                      AGE: 35 YEARS,
                      OCC: PRIVATE WORK,
                      R/O KALAGURTHI, TQ. KALAGI
                      KALABURAGI - 585312
                                                                 ...PETITIONER
                      (BY MS. NILUFARHANAZ, ADVOCATE)
                      AND:

                      1.   THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
                           THROUGH MADBOOL POLICE STATION,
Digitally signed by        KALAGI CIRCLE, KALAGI
SHIVALEELA
DATTATRAYA                 DIST. KALABURAGI-585317
UDAGI
                           REPRESENTED BY ADDL. SPP
Location: HIGH
COURT OF                   HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
KARNATAKA
                           KALABURAGI-585103

                      2.   SMT MANDAKINI W/O NARASAPPA DANDINKAR
                           AGE: 30 YEARS, OCC: LABOUR,
                           R/O PALA VILLAGE,
                           AP KORAWAR VILLAGE,
                           TQ KALAGI, DIST: KALABURAGI-585107
                                                              ...RESPONDENTS
                      (BY SRI GOPAL KRISHNA B YADAV, HCGP FOR R1;
                      R2 SERVED)
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                                           NC: 2026:KHC-K:1346
                                   CRL.P No. 201824 of 2025


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     THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S.482 OF CR.P.C.
(OLD), U/SEC. 528 OF BNSS (NEW), PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS
PETITION AND TO QUASH THE FIR, COMPLAINT, CHARGE
SHEET AND FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN C.C.NO.904/2025
(ARISING OUT OF CRIME NO.74/2025 FROM THE MADBOOL
POLICE STATION, KALAGI CIRCLE) ON THE FILE OF CIVIL
JUDGE AND JMFC AT CHITTAPUR KALABURAGI FOR ALLEGED
OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 64(2)(M), 332(B),
351(2)(3) OF BNS-2023, THE CERTIFIED COPY OF THE FIR,
COMPLAINT AND CHARGE SHEET ARE AT ANNEXURE-B, A AND
C RESPECTIVELY AND TO PASS ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE
ORDERS.

    THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K

                       ORAL ORDER

This petition is filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking to quash

proceedings against the petitioner/accused No.1 in C.C.

No.904/2025, arising out of Crime No.74/2025, registered

by Madbool Police Station, for the offences punishable

under Sections 64(2)(M), 332(B), 351(2)(3) of Bharatiya

Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [for brevity, 'the BNS, 2023'], ,

pending on the file Civil Judge and JMFC, Chittapur,

2. The abridged facts of the case are that,

respondent No.2 lodged the complaint before respondent

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No.1 - Police alleging that she is residing along with her

husband and two children at Pala village and doing coolie

work. The petitioner got acquainted to respondent No.2 in

the year 2018. After exchange of the mobile numbers, he

used to call her through mobile and expressed his love

towards her. Thereafter, he started visiting her house and

they both were sexually active from the year 2018 till

2025. Thereafter, the petitioner got engaged with some

other girl and the said aspect was came to the knowledge

of respondent No.2. As such, she insisted him not to

continue the relationship with her. Despite that, on

16.06.2025 petitioner met her and had sexual intercourse

with her.

3. Things stood thus, on 12.07.2025 at about 8.00

p.m. when respondent No.2 was in her house along with

her husband, the petitioner along with his brother been to

her house and scolded her. She lodged the complaint

before respondent No.1 - Police against the petitioner that

he had committed forcible sexual intercourse with her by

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promising to marry her. On the strength of the said

complaint, respondent No.1 - Police registered the case

against the petitioner and others in Crime No.74/2025 for

the aforementioned offences. Subsequently, respondent

No.1 - Police investigated the matter and laid charge

sheet against the petitioner and others for the said

offences and the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the

offences. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner/accused

No.1 preferred this petition to quash the proceedings.

4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and

learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent

No.1 - State. Though notice is served to respondent No.2,

she remained absent.

5. The primary contention of the learned counsel

for the petitioner is that on perusal of the entire complaint

and charge sheet materials, it is categorically forthcoming

that respondent No.2 being a married woman having two

children, had consensual sexual act with the petitioner.

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According to her, from the year 2018 till 2025 they both

were sexually active and this complaint is lodged against

the petitioner only for the reason that he had performed

his engagement with another girl. In such circumstance,

the offences charge sheeted against the petitioner do not

attract against him.

6. Per contra, learned High Court Government

Pleader appearing for respondent No.1-State opposed the

petition on the ground that now charge sheet has been

laid against the petitioner and there are prima facie

materials forthcoming against him, the proceedings cannot

be quashed. Hence, prays to dismiss the petition.

7. I have given my anxious consideration both on

the submissions made by the learned counsel for the

respective parties and the documents made available on

record.

8. As could be gathered from the complaint

averments, respondent No.2 is aged about 35 years and

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she is a married woman having two children. In the year

2018, she came in contact with the petitioner through

phone and they became intimate friends. She used to visit

the house of petitioner and in turn he also used to visit her

house. They both were sexually active for a period of

seven years. According to her, after his engagement with

another girl, she advised him not to continue the

relationship with her. Despite he continued the

relationship. The complaint averments further discloses

that this complaint is lodged by her for the reason that he

had committed forcible sexual intercourse with her on the

promise to marry her. Even the medical history produced

in the charge sheet clearly depicts that this complaint was

filed after the petitioner's engagement with another girl.

9. In such circumstance, the Hon'ble Apex Court in

the case of Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana

reported in 2013 Crl. Law Journal 2990, held in para

Nos.18 and 21 as under:

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"18. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;

and whether the consent involved was given after wholly, understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of mis-representation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

21. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e. at initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very

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clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance." Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her."

10. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

Rajneesh Singh v. State of U.P. reported in 2025 (4)

SCC 197 held that, when a women who willingly engages

in a long term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware

of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that

such relationship was induced by misconception of facts or

false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the

inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under

Section 376 of IPC. Thus, it is clear that accused can be

convicted for rape only if the Court reaches a conclusion

that the intention of the accused was malafide, and that

he had clandestine motives.

11. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra

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and Another in Crl.A.No.1165/2019 arising out of Special

Leave Petition (Criminal) No.2712 of 2019, held in para

Nos.16, 17 and 18 as under:

"16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact"

that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent" of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a "misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this Court observed:

"21. ... There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently.

...

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24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance".

Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her."

(Emphasis supplied)

17. In Uday v State of Karnataka12 the complainant was a college going student when the accused promised to marry her. In the complainant's statement, she admitted that she was aware that there would be significant opposition from both the complainant's and accused's families to the proposed marriage. She engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused but nonetheless kept the relationship secret from her family. The court observed that in these circumstances the accused's promise to marry the complainant was not of immediate relevance to the complainant's decision to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused, which was motivated by other factors:

"25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled for the

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application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. We have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff opposition from members of both families. There was therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the appellant. The question still remains whether even if it were so, the appellant knew, or had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had consented to having sexual intercourse with him only as a consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get married in due course. There is hardly any evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary, the circumstances of the case tend to support the conclusion that the appellant had reason to believe that the consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in love. They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, are permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love. It is also not without significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely place at 12 o'clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to each other several times that come what may, they will get married..."

(Emphasis supplied)

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18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.

12. Hence, on overall perusal of the entire charge

sheet materials, the same depicts that since the

relationship between the petitioner and respondent No.2 is

a consensual one and she was major at that time and the

said consent was not obtained by the petitioner with a

coercion or wanton undue influence, in such circumstance,

the offence punishable under Sections 376 or 417 does not

attract as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

Shiva Prathap Singh Rana V/s State of Madhya

Pradesh and Another reported in (2024) 8 SCC 313 in

paragraphs No.26 to 33 as under:

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"26. We have carefully gone through the definition of "rape" provided under Section 375IPC. We have also gone through the provisions of Section 376(2)(n)IPC, which deals with the offence of rape committed repeatedly on the same woman. Section 375 IPC defines "rape"

by a man if he does any of the acts in terms of clauses (a) to (d) under the seven descriptions mentioned therein. As per the second description, a man commits rape if he does any of the acts as mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) without the consent of the woman. Consent has been defined in Explanation 2 to mean an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or nonverbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act. However, the proviso thereto clarifies that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.

27. Having regard to the above and in the overall conspectus of the case, we are of the view that the physical relationship between the prosecutrix and the appellant cannot be said to be against her will and without her consent. On the basis of the available materials, no case of rape or of criminal intimidation is made out.

28. The learned counsel for the respondents had placed considerable reliance on the provisions of Section 90IPC, particularly on the expression "under a misconception of fact". Section 90IPC reads thus:

"90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.--A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person

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under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person.--if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or Consent of child.--unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age."

29. Section 90 IPC says that a consent is not such a consent as it is intended by any section of IPC, if the consent is given by a person under the fear of injury or under a misconception of fact.

30. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra [Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 :

(2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 672] , this Court after examining Section 90IPC held as follows : (SCC p. 198, para 17) "17. Thus, Section 90 though does not define "consent", but describes what is not "consent". Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. If the consent is given by the complainant under misconception of fact, it is vitiated. Consent for the purpose of Section 375 requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act, but also after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was any consent or not is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances."

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31. This Court also examined the interplay between Section 375IPC and Section 90IPC in the context of consent in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 :

(2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , and held that consent with respect to Section 375IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action (or inaction), consents to such action. After deliberating upon the various case laws, this Court summed up the legal position as under :

(SCC p. 620, para 18)

"18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established.

The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given.

The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."

32. The learned counsel for the respondents had relied heavily on the expression "misconception of fact". However, according to

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us, there is no misconception of fact here. Right from the inception, it is the case of the prosecution that while the appellant was insisting on having a relationship with the prosecutrix, the later had turned down the same on the ground that the appellant was the friend of her younger brother and a distant relative of her jijaji. That apart, according to the prosecutrix, the appellant was younger to her. Nonetheless, the prosecutrix had accompanied the appellant to a temple, where she had voluntarily taken bath under a waterfall. Her allegation that the appellant had surreptitiously taken photographs of her while she was bathing and later on changing clothes and was blackmailing her with such photographs remain unfounded in the absence of seizure of such photographs or the mobile phone on which such photographs were taken by the appellant. If, indeed, she was under some kind of threat from the appellant, it defies any logic, when the prosecutrix accompanied the appellant to Gwalior from Dabra, a journey which they had made together by train. On reaching Gwalior, she accompanied the appellant on a scooter to a rented premises at Anupam Nagar, where she alleged that the appellant had forced himself upon her. But she did not raise any alarm or hue and cry at any point of time. Rather, she returned back to Dabra along with the appellant. The relationship did not terminate there. It continued even thereafter. It is the case of the prosecutrix herself that at one point of time the family members of the two had met to discuss about their marriage but nothing final could be reached regarding their marriage. It was only thereafter that the FIR was lodged.

33. As already pointed out above, neither the affidavit nor stamp papers have been recovered or seized by the police; so also the jewellery. The alleged cheque of the prosecutrix's mother given to the appellant or the bank

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statement to indicate transfer of such money have not been gathered by the police. In the absence of such materials, the entire substratum of the prosecutrix's case collapses. Thus, there is hardly any possibility of conviction of the appellant. As a matter of fact, it is not even a case which can stand trial. It appears to be a case of a consensual relationship which had gone sour leading to lodging of FIR. In the circumstances, the Court is of the view that compelling the appellant to face the criminal trial on these materials would be nothing but an abuse of the process of the court, result of the trial being a foregone conclusion."

13. Hence, in my considered view, continuation of

the proceedings against the petitioner is nothing but abuse

of process of Court. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the

following:

ORDER

i. The petition is allowed.

ii. The proceedings against the petitioner/

accused No.1 in C.C. No.904/2025

(arising out of Crime No.74/2025 of

Madbool Police Station), pending on the

file Civil Judge and JMFC, Chittapur, for