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Smt Uma Ramaiah vs Smt Saraswathi Gopinath
2026 Latest Caselaw 3160 Kant

Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 3160 Kant
Judgement Date : 10 April, 2026

[Cites 23, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Smt Uma Ramaiah vs Smt Saraswathi Gopinath on 10 April, 2026

                              -1-
                                           RFA No. 254 of 2013



     IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

         DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026

                           PRESENT
        THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
                              AND
          THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND
      REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.254 OF 2013 (PAR)
BETWEEN:

1.    SMT.UMA RAMAIAH,
      D/O LATE SRI.B.R.RAM,
      AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS,
      R/AT NO.27/2, 1ST MAIN ROAD,
      JAYAMAHAL, BANGALORE-560 046.

2.    SMT.RAJANI RAMAIAH,
      D/O LATE B.R.RAM,
      AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
      R/AT NO.27/2, 1ST MAIN ROAD,
      JAYAMAHAL, BANGALORE-560 046.

3.    SMT.PRABHA,
      W/O SRI L.VISHWANATHAN,
      AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS,
      R/AT 1ST BLOCK, JAYANAGAR,
      BANGALORE-560 011.

4.    MRS.VEENA KUPPALI,
      W/O SRI HEMACHANDRA,
      AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
      R/AT NO.3785, GROVE AVENUE,
      PALO, CA 94303, USA.
      REP. BY POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER,
      SMT.UMA RAMAIAH, (APPELLANT NO.1),
      D/O LATE SRI.B.R.RAM,
      AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS,
      R/AT NO.27/2, 1ST MAIN ROAD,
      JAYA MAHAL, BANGALORE-560 046.

5.    SRI.S.T.SUBBU,
      S/O LATE THAMMAIAH,
      AGED ABOUT 81 YEARS,
                               -2-
                                            RFA No. 254 of 2013



     R/AT BULL TEMPLE ROAD,
     BANGALORE-560 018.
                                                   ...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI.M.S.VARADARAJAN, ADVOCATE)
AND:

1.   SMT.SARASWATHI GOPINATH,
     W/O LATE SRI.B.G.GOPINATH,
     AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS

2.   SRI.ROHITH,
     S/O LATE SRI.B.R.GOPINATH,
     AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS

3.   SMT.SUSHMA,
     D/O LATE SRI.B.R.GOPINATH,
     AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS

     ALL ARE R/AT NO.27/2, 1ST MAIN ROAD,
     JAYAMAHAL, BANGALORE-560 046.
                                                 ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.C.M.NAGABHUSHANA, ADVOCATE FOR R1 AND R2;
    SRI.K.P.ASOKUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR R3)

      THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF
CPC, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
07.11.2012 PASSED IN O.S.No.6732/2006 ON THE FILE OF THE XXII
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL JUDGE, BENGALURU, DISMISSING THE SUIT
FOR PARTITION, SEPARATE POSSESSION AND DECLARATION.

      THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, JAYANT BANERJI J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM:     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
           and
           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND

                          CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI)

This plaintiffs' appeal is filed seeking to set aside the

judgment and order dated 07.11.2012 passed by XXII

Additional City Civil Judge, Bengaluru in O.S.No.6732/2006

whereby, while deciding issue No.11 which is "Whether the suit

is barred by time?", the trial Court observed that the suit is

barred by time and consequently the suit was dismissed.

2. It appears from the record that earlier, by means of

an order dated 22.09.2011, the trial Court had decided the

aforesaid issue No.11 holding that the suit is not barred by time

and answered issue No.11 in negative. The order dated

22.09.2011 was challenged in an appeal by the defendants

successfully before this Court and the matter was remanded to

the trial Court to decide the issue afresh. Thereafter, by the

impugned order dated 07.11.2012, it was held that the suit was

barred by time and the suit was accordingly dismissed.

3. The plaintiffs filed a suit seeking a decree of

partition by metes and bounds and for separate possession of

the plaintiffs' 17/24th share in the suit schedule property, by

holding that the alleged Will dated 03.03.1956 is not binding on

the plaintiffs. Further prayer was made for granting mandatory

injunction to render accounts, to pay money after reconciling

the accounts, to deposit the rents in respect of the schedule

property before the Court, prohibitory injunction for restraining

the defendants from alienating, altering, encumbering or

creating any third party rights in respect of the suit schedule

property and for award of costs of the suit. The suit schedule

property is described as follows:

"SCHEDULE PROPERTY

All that piece and parcel of the Immovable property bearing Municipal No.495, situated at Jamma Masjid Road also called as Old Poor House Road, Bangalore within the limits of Ward No.79 of Bangalore Mahanagara Palike, Bangalore, comprising of site dimension as per the Sketch and in all measuring 735.4 Sq.,mts., in area and is bounded on:-

            East By       : Private Property
            West By       : O.P.H. Road
            North By      : Private Property, and
            South By      : private Property.

Comprising of Multi Storied commercial building containing tenements used for Restaurants and lodging."

4. The plaint case to the extent it is relevant for

purpose of decision of the instant appeal is as follows:

That plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 are the children of late

Sri B.R.Ram, son of late B.C.Ramalingam. Plaintiff Nos.1 and 2

are stated to be unmarried. The said Sri B.R.Ram had a son by

the name of Sri Gopinath, who had died leaving behind him

defendant Nos.1 to 3 as his heirs. The said Sri B.R.Ram had

one more daughter by the name of Smt.Shara Subbu, who

expired on 13.02.2002, leaving behind her husband- plaintiff

No.5. It was stated that late Sri B.C.Ramalingam had acquired

an immovable property bearing No.495, Old Poor House Road,

also called as Jamma Masjid Road, Bangalore, which is the suit

schedule property through a registered partition deed dated

04.07.1940. Sri B.C.Ramalingam died intestate, leaving behind

his only son Sri.B.R.Ram. Sri B.R.Ram inherited the suit

schedule property and he died intestate on 30.09.2001 leaving

behind the plaintiffs and the defendants as heirs in respect of

the properties.

5. It is stated that the suit schedule property had been

let out during the lifetime of Sri B.R.Ram to one

Sri V.Ramamurthy for a period of thirty seven years. It is

stated that the scheduled property is occupied by the tenant

whose leasehold right would expire on 31.12.2010. It is stated

that the suit schedule property continues to be in the lawful

and joint possession of the plaintiffs and the defendants as on

that date.

6. It is stated that plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 filed a suit

bearing O.S.No.9264/1997 which is pending in the file of the

City Civil Judge, Bangalore (CCH-07) against their father and

defendant Nos.1 and 2 herein for the relief of partition of

another immovable property in respect of which the defendants

contended that there existed a settlement deed; that for the

relief of partition in O.S.No.9264/1997, plaintiff Nos.1 and 2

had not included the suit schedule property as they were made

to believe that during subsistency of the leasehold rights, the

property cannot be partitioned; that during the year 2000, the

father of the plaintiffs filed a suit for partition in respect of the

suit schedule property, bearing O.S.No.990/2000 against

plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 with the deceased daughter Smt.

Sharasubbu, and against defendant Nos.1 and 2 seeking

partition of the suit schedule property. The said suit came to be

dismissed on 18.08.2005 for not taking steps to bring the legal

representatives of the deceased plaintiff therein on record.

7. In paragraph 11 of the plaint, it is stated that the

cause of action to file the suit arose when the suit schedule

property devolved on the father of plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 during

the year 1957 and the father of plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 filed

O.S.No.990/2000 in the year 2000 for partition of the suit

schedule property; when their father Sri B.R.Ram died intestate

on 30.09.2001; on 18.08.2005 when O.S.No.990/2000 was

dismissed for not taking steps to bring the legal representatives

of Sri B.R.Ram on record and on all subsequent dates when

defendant Nos.1 to 3 have failed to concur with the plaintiff's

demand for partitioning the scheduled property.

8. A written statement was filed by the defendants-

respondents which was amended. It is stated therein that in

O.S.No.9264/1997, which was filed for an identical relief of

partition, the plaintiffs had specifically stated that the cause of

action accrued to them on 11.11.1997, and even according to

that, the present suit filed after a long lapse of nine years, is

barred by limitation. It is stated that even otherwise, the

plaintiffs have, in paragraph No.11 of the plaint, alleged that

the cause of action arose on 30.09.2001, when their father

Sri B.R.Ram died and from that date also, the suit is not within

time, as such, it deserves to be dismissed on the ground of

limitation.

9. In the written statement, it is stated that

O.S.No.990/2000 which was filed by their father was dismissed

on 18.08.2005 for not taking steps to bring the legal

representatives on record and therefore, the present suit is not

maintainable under Order XXII Rule 9 of CPC.

10. It is also stated, inter alia, that in 1958 the husband

of defendant No.1, got the khata of the suit schedule property

made in his name when his grandfather Sri B.C.Ramalingam

died and ever since then was exclusively enjoying the same as

absolute owner of the property, continuously adverse to the

interest of the plaintiffs to their knowledge which had the effect

of repudiating their rights, paying the municipal taxes till

11.06.1987 when he died and thereafter, his wife

Smt. Saraswati Gopinath continues to enjoy the suit schedule

property as absolute owner, adverse to the interest of the

plaintiffs to their knowledge, paying municipal taxes and got

the khata made in her name on 17.07.1989.

11. It is stated that it is false to say that suit property

was leased out by Sri B.R.Ram as the karta of the family.

Sri Gopinath claimed to be the owner on the basis of the Will

dated 03.03.1956 made by Sri B.C.Ramalingam in favour of his

only grandson Sri Gopinath. Since Sri Gopinath was the owner

of the schedule property and a high ranking personnel in the

Defence Sector and was working at a far off place, he had

executed a Power of Attorney in favour of his father

Sri B.R.Ram to manage the schedule property and on the

strength of the same, Sri B.R.Ram leased the schedule property

on behalf of his son and was managing it. It is stated that the

plaintiffs were aware of the legal position at the time of filing of

O.S.No.9264/1997.

12. The point for determination that arises in this

appeal is "whether the suit is barred by limitation?".

13. By an order dated 22.09.2011, it was held by the

trial Court that recording of khata in the name of anybody

would not result in denial of title or right of the real holder. It

was observed that there is no plea raised by the defendants

that plaintiffs were at any time ousted from suit property. It

was held that Article 113 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act

would apply in the case. There being no denial of title of the

plaintiffs, the suit was held to be well within time and the

plaintiffs got the right to sue only on the death of Sri B.C.Ram

on 30.09.2001.

14. Against the aforesaid order dated 22.09.2011,

C.R.P.No.282/2011 was filed before this Court which came to

be allowed by means of an order dated 16.04.2012 whereby

the order of the trial Court dated 22.09.2011 was set aside

and the matter was remanded to the trial Court for

reconsideration in accordance with law, leaving all contentions

of both parties open.

15. It is thereafter, after remand, that the impugned

order dated 07.11.2012 came to be passed. Issue No.11 being

"whether the suit is barred by time?" which was answered in

the affirmative by the trial Court. It was noted that the

plaintiffs admitted the earlier proceedings in O.S.No.9264/1997

- 10 -

filed by plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 herein against their father Sri

B.R.Ram as well as defendant Nos.1 and 2 herein seeking

partition in which the present suit property was not included. It

was also not disputed by the plaintiffs that their father in the

year 2000 had filed a suit for partition in O.S.No.990/2000

against plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 herein and his daughter Smt.Shara

Subbu as well as defendant Nos.1 and 2 herein and that the

father of the plaintiffs died during pendency of the suit and the

suit came to be dismissed on 18.08.2005. It is stated in the

order that it is also not in dispute that defendant Nos.1 and 2 in

the said suit of O.S.No.990/2000 had set up the Will dated

03.03.1956 in their written statement whereby the suit

property was bequeathed by Sri B.C.Ramalingam in favour of

his grandson Sri Gopinath. It was held that therefore the

plaintiffs were very much aware of denial of their title by these

defendants over the suit schedule property. It was further

noted that in paragraph 11 of the plaint wherein the cause of

action is shown by the plaintiffs, they had stated that the cause

of action arose on 30.09.2001 when their father Sri B.R.Ram

died and since infringement continued even after Sri B.R.Ram's

demise, as such, the present suit was filed on 27.07.2006. The

suit in O.S.No.990/2000 came to be abated in the month of

- 11 -

February 2002 itself, after the death of Sri B.R.Ram on

30.09.2001 during pendency of the suit. It was further noted

that even in the prayer made, the plaintiffs have prayed for

decree of partition by metes and bound and sought for

declaration to hold that the alleged Will dated 03.03.1956 is not

binding on them.

16. Therefore, the conclusion was drawn that the suit

filed by the plaintiffs is barred by time. It was held that the

plaintiffs have slept over the matter much after abatement till

the year 2006 when they filed the present suit long after the

expiry of three years from the date of accrual of the cause of

action. Therefore under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963,

the plaintiff should have filed the suit within three years from

the date of accrual of cause of action which was not done by

them. Accordingly, it was ordered that the suit is barred by

time and the suit was dismissed.

17. The appellants have relied upon the judgment of a

Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in S.K.Lakshminarasappa,

since deceased by his L.Rs., vs. Sri B.Rudraiah and others1 to

contend that for a suit for partition filed by co-sharers and

coparceners, no period of limitation is prescribed for filing of

ILR 2012 KAR 4129

- 12 -

such a suit and another judgment in the case of K.Laxmanan v.

Thekkayil Padmini2.

18. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the

respondents have relied upon the judgment in Krishna Pillai

Rajasekharan v. Padmanabha Pillai3 to contend that the

Supreme Court has held that where the suit for partition is

primarily and predominantly filed for that relief and the relief of

redemption being sought for only pursuant to the direction

made by the High Court in its order of remand, the limitation

for the suit would be governed by Article 120 of the Limitation

Act, 1908. It is contented that Article 120 of Limitation Act,

1908 is pari materia Article 113 of Limitation Act, 1963. It is

contented that in the said judgment, it is also held that the

starting point of limitation for a suit of partition is when the

plaintiff has notice of his entitlement to partition being denied.

Further, a three-judge bench decision of the Supreme Court in

Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India is

relied on to contend that if the limitation for filing a suit is not

covered by any specific Article of the Limitation Act, 1963, then

it would fall within the residuary Article 113.

AIR 2009 SC 951

AIR 2004 SC 1206

(2020) 17 SCC 260

- 13 -

19. The other judgments relied on by learned Counsel

for the respondents are:

(i) Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Chander Sen

(ii) Mrs. Mallika & Ors. vs Mr. Chandrappa & Ors.

      (iii)    Makhan Singh v. Kulwant Singh .

      (iv)     Sri Y.S Gurunanjappa & Ors. v. Smt. Sunanda & Ors. .

      (v)      State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh

      (vi)     Bhubaneswari Bewa v. State of Orissa

      (vii) Lachmi Narain v. Muhammad Yusuf11
      (viii) Churya v. Baneshwar12
      (ix)     Puthyia  Purayil     Kanan's    Widow      Kozipurath

               Chemmarathi v. Potinhare Koyattan Balan


      20(i).         The limitation for filing a suit for partition

does not begin to run unless and until a cause of action arises.

In the case of Krishna Pillai Rajasekharan Nair the Supreme

Court was considering a matter arising out of a suit filed by the

appellant-plaintiff, who was an assignee from certain non-

redeeming co-mortgagors of a share in 'C' schedule property,

seeking relief of declaration of title with recovery of possession

and in the alternative, the relief of partition. The trial Court

AIR 1986 SC 1753

ILR 2007 KAR 3216

AIR 2007 SC 1808

RSA No.394/2005 DD 29.05.2008

AIR 1992 SC 111

AIR 1979 Orissa 171

ILR 1920 Volume XLII Allahabad 540

ILR 1926 Volume XLVIII Allahabad 334

AIR 1997 SC 2440

- 14 -

decreed the suit on 07.12.1973 upholding the plaintiff's

entitlement to 9/12th shares in the suit property but subject to

payment of ₹208/- to reimburse the first defendant by way of

contribution towards the amount spent by him in redeeming

the property. A preliminary decree determining the share of the

plaintiff and his entitlement to partition was passed. The trial

Court's decree was upheld by the first appellate Court

dismissing the appeal preferred by defendant No.1. In the

second appeal preferred by defendant No.1, the High Court

allowed the appeal and set aside the decrees of the first

appellate Court and the trial Court.

(ii) It was urged before the High Court on behalf of

defendant No.1 that the property being subject to mortgage

and defendant No.1 having subrogated himself in place of the

original mortgagee, the suit filed by the plaintiff barely for

declaration, partition and recovery of possession, was not

maintainable and it was necessary for the plaintiff to have

sought for the relief of redemption. It was submitted on behalf

of defendant No.1 that even if the relief of redemption of

mortgage was not specifically sought for, the suit in substance

was one for redemption and so it was barred by time under

Article 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The appeal was allowed

- 15 -

by the High Court, the decree was set aside and the case was

remanded to the trial Court with a direction to allow the parties

an opportunity of amending the pleadings so that the plaintiff

could seek the relief of redemption and the defendant could

raise the plea as to bar of limitation.

(iii) Pursuant to the order of remand, the pleadings

were amended. The suit was once again decreed by the trial

Court and the first appellate Court. In the second appeal

preferred by defendant No.1, the High Court formed an opinion

that defendant No.1 had redeemed the property on behalf of

the entire family and therefore, after the payment of mortgage

money and recovering back the possession from the

mortgagee, nothing had remained to be redeemed. The plaintiff

was entitled to declaration of title and other reliefs prayed for

by him.

(iv) The learned Judge of the High Court, in the second

appeal, entertained serious doubts about the correctness of the

view taken by the learned Single Judge in the earlier order of

the High Court remanding the case to the trial Court, but felt

bound and helpless by the observations and directions made in

the earlier judgment. He allowed the appeal and dismissed the

- 16 -

suit while setting aside the judgments and decrees of the two

Courts.

(v) Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the High

Court, a Special Leave Petition was filed by the plaintiff before

the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court proceeded on the

factual premise that out of the co-mortgagors, all having

entitlement to a share each in the suit property, one of them

had redeemed the property by paying the entire mortgage

money and had singularly entered into possession over the

entire mortgage property. Consequent upon redemption, it is

the other co-owner of the property that is the plaintiff who was

then asking for partition of the property commensurate with his

share. The Supreme Court proceeded to examine inter alia

whether a suit for partition filed by the plaintiff was

maintainable and noted that it would determine the question of

limitation as well.

(vi) After considering a catena of its decisions, it was

observed by the Supreme Court that the limitation for a suit for

contribution would become relevant only when the redeeming

co-mortgagor sues the non-redeeming co-mortgagor for

enforcing the latter's obligation to make contribution. A suit

filed by a co-owner cum co-mortgagor for partition and

- 17 -

separate possession against the redeeming co-mortgagor and

subject to payment of contribution would remain a suit for

partition though the defendant in possession of the property

would be justified in insisting that the property was not liable to

be partitioned unless the plaintiff contributed his share of the

money paid for redemption and incidental expenses. To the

latter case, wherein the suit has been filed not by the party

claiming contribution, but the right to claim partition was being

set up only as a defence in equity, the limitation provided for

filing a suit for contribution cannot apply. Thereafter, the

doctrine of subrogation was considered and it was held that the

suit filed in that case being a suit for partition primarily and

predominantly and the relief of redemption having been sought

only pursuant to the direction made by the High Court in its

order of remand, the limitation of the suit would be governed

by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 with the starting

point of the suit for partition, being when the plaintiff has

notice of his entitlement to partition being denied.

21. It is noted from the above judgment in the case of

Krishna Pillai Rajasekharan Nair that the issue with regard to

exclusion from joint family property of a person did not arise

therein. Therefore, the provision of Article 127 of the Limitation

- 18 -

Act, 1908 did not arise for consideration. It could be pertinent

to quote Articles 120 and 127 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which

are as follows:

Description of suit Period of Time from which Limitation period begins to run 120 Suit for which no Six years When the right to period of limitation sue accrues is provided elsewhere in this schedule 127 By a person Twelve When the exclusion excluded from joint years becomes known to family property to the plaintiff enforce a right to share therein

22(i). In the case of Shakti Bhog Food Industries

Ltd. the appellant had filed suit on 23.02.2005 for a decree for

rendition of true and correct accounts in respect of the

interest/commission charged and deducted by the respondent

bank for the specified period and also for recovery of the

excess amount charged by the respondent bank with interest.

The plaint came to be rejected by the trial Court under Order

VII Rule 11(d) of CPC on the ground that it was barred by a law

of limitation as it was filed beyond the period of three years

prescribed in Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The trial

Court adverted to a decision of the High Court of 2012 wherein

it was held that exchange of correspondence between the

parties cannot extend the limitation period for institution of a

- 19 -

suit, once the right to sue had accrued, which in that case had

accrued in October 2000, which was also asserted in the plaint.

The view taken by the trial Court commended to the District

Court in the first appeal and also the High Court in the second

appeal, which was challenged before the Supreme Court.

(ii) The Supreme Court considered the expression used

in Article 113 of the Limitation Act 1963, "when the right to sue

accrues". It was noted that the Article 113 of the Limitation Act

1963 being a residuary clause which had been invoked by all

the three Courts in that case did not specify happening of a

particular event, but merely referred to the accrual of cause of

action on the basis of which the right to sue would accrue. It

was further observed that it is well established position that the

cause of action for filing a suit would consist of the bundle of

facts and that, further, the factum of the suit being barred by

limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact and

law. The Supreme Court noted the distinction in Articles 58 and

113 of the Limitation Act 1963 with regard to the 'time from

which period begins to run'. In Article 58 it was, "when the

right to sue first accrues", whereas in Article 113 it is "when the

right to sue accrues". After noting several decisions of the

Supreme Court as well as of the Privy Council, particularly in

- 20 -

the case of Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan14 wherein it was

observed that whether a particular threat gives rise to a

compulsory cause of action depends upon the question whether

that threat effectively invades or jeopardises the said right. The

Supreme Court held that the principle underlying the dictum

"when the right to sue accrues" must apply proprio vigore to

Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963.15

(iii) The Supreme Court considered the background of

the correspondence between the appellant and the respondent

bank and observed that they were also invoked as giving rise to

cause of action. Whether that plea taken by the appellant was

genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and

law, depending on the response of the respondents. It is

relevant to refer to paras 22 and 23 of the said judgment,

which read as follows:

"22. It is well-established position that the cause of action for filing a suit would consist of bundle of facts. Further, the factum of the suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact and law. Even for that reason, invoking Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is ruled out. In the present case, the assertion in the plaint is that the appellant verily believed that its claim was being processed by the regional office and the regional

AIR 1960 SC 335

The expression "when the right to sue accrues" is also used in Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

- 21 -

office would be taking appropriate decision at the earliest. That belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the Senior Manager of the Bank, dated 8-5-2002 followed by another letter dated 19-9-2002 to the effect that the action taken by the Bank was in accordance with the rules and the appellant need not correspond with the Bank in that regard any further. This firm response from the respondent Bank could trigger the right of the appellant to sue the respondent Bank. Moreover, the fact that the appellant had eventually sent a legal notice on 28-11- 2003 and again on 7-1-2005 and then filed the suit on 23-2-2005, is also invoked as giving rise to cause of action. Whether this plea taken by the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law, depending on the response of the respondents.

23. Reverting to the argument that exchange of letters or correspondence between the parties cannot be the basis to extend the period of limitation, in our opinion, for the view taken by us hitherto, the same need not be dilated further. Inasmuch as, having noticed from the averments in the plaint that the right to sue accrued to the appellant on receiving letter from the Senior Manager, dated 8-5-2002, and in the particular letter dated 19-9- 2002, and again on firm refusal by the respondents vide advocate's letter dated 23-12-2003 in response to the legal notice sent by the appellant on 28-11-2003; and once again on the follow-up legal notice on 7-1-2005, the plaint filed in February 2005 would be well within limitation. Considering the former events of firm response by the respondents on 8-5-2002 and in particular, 19-9- 2002, the correspondence ensued thereafter, including the two legal notices sent by the appellant, even if

- 22 -

disregarded, the plaint/suit filed on 23-2-2005 would be within limitation in terms of Article 113."

(iv) The Supreme Court noted that the trial Court and

the High Court had failed to advert and analyze the averments

in the plaint. But selectively took notice of the assertions in the

plaint in question and then proceeded to reject the plaint being

barred by law of limitation. It was therefore held that rejection

of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(b) of CPC could not be

sustained.

23(i). In the case of Mohinder Kumar Mehra v. Roop

Rani Mehra16 before the Supreme Court, the facts were that the

appellant's father, late Sri O.P. Mehra, along with his wife

(respondent No.1) and three minor sons came to Delhi from

Lahore after partition. Sri O.P.Mehra died in 1951. Respondent

No.1 and her sons were held entitled to compensation under

the order of the Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi dated

14.08.1956. Respondent No.1 was declared as highest bidder in

a public auction for a house in Lajpat Nagar, area measuring

300 square yards, which amount was adjusted from the claim

to which respondent No.1 and her sons were held entitled.

Another property was also allotted in the name of respondent

(2018) 2 SCC 132

- 23 -

No.1 of area measuring 200 square yards at Nizamuddin, New

Delhi. The property at Nizamuddin was sold by respondent No.1

in the year 2000. On 04.11.2009 the appellant filed suit

No.2082/2009 against the respondents seeking partition of the

suit property, described in Appendix A. In Appendix A, only

property mentioned was that of Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. The

written statement was filed by the respondent and issues were

framed by the Court. 10.08.2010 was fixed for recording the

evidence of the plaintiff. However the plaintiff prayed for time

for producing evidence. On 17.01.2011, the plaintiff filed an

application under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC praying for

amendment of the plaint. By the application, the plaintiff

sought to add certain pleadings and prayer claiming share in

the sale proceeds received by defendant No.1 from sale of the

property of Nizamuddin.

(ii) The application filed by the plaintiff was objected to

by the defendants stating that several opportunities was given

to the plaintiff to lead evidence and last opportunity was given

on 08.12.2010 to file his evidence by 28.01.2011. It was

further pleaded that in the sale document of Nizamuddin

property, the plaintiff himself was a witness. It was also stated

- 24 -

that the relief sought to be amended is barred by time and is

altogether a separate cause of action.

(iii) The plaintiff filed a rejoinder stating that he came to

know that the plaintiff had undivided share in the property at

Nizamuddin only in November 2010. On 14.02.2014, an order

was passed directing that amendment application shall be

considered at the time of final hearing of the suit. However,

pursuant to an order passed by the Division Bench of the High

Court, the learned Single Judge was directed to decide the

amendment application. In the meantime on account of

pecuniary jurisdiction of the case, the suit was transferred to

the Court of Additional District Judge, Saket. The Additional

District Judge took up the amendment application and vide

order dated 24.10.2016 rejected the amendment application.

The trial Court took the view that the suit for recovery of

money of his share could have been filed by the plaintiff within

three years from the date of sale. The trial Court held that the

amendment sought was barred by time, hence the application

was rejected.

(iv) A writ petition under Article 227 was filed by the

plaintiff against that order which was dismissed by the High

Court against which the appeal was filed before the Supreme

- 25 -

Court. Before the Supreme Court, learned Counsel for appellant

relied on Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to submit that

the limitation for enforcing a right to share in a joint family

property is twelve years, hence the claim was not barred by

time. The Supreme Court noted that the amendment

application was filed before the evidence in the trial was led by

the plaintiff. It was held that looking to the object and purpose

by which limitation was put on permitting amendment of the

pleadings, in substance, in that case, no prejudice could be said

to have been caused to the defendant since the evidence in the

trial was led subsequent to the filing of the amendment

application. It was observed that it cannot be held that

amendment application filed by the plaintiff could not be

considered due to bar of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of

CPC. Thereafter, the Supreme Court considered one of the main

reasons given by the trial Court in rejecting the amendment

application that the claim was barred by limitation. The

provision of Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which is

pari materia Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1908, was

considered. It was noted that the case before the Supreme

Court was not simply a case of recovery of money. The

plaintiff's claim was to enforce a right to share in the

- 26 -

Nizamuddin property which was sold in the year 2000 and

according to the plaintiff the limitation was twelve years as per

Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court

observed as follows:

"27. In the facts of the present case, final determination as to whether the claim could be held to be barred by time could have been decided only after considering the evidence led by the parties. Whether the plaintiff had any share in the property, which was sold in the year 2000 and what was the nature of his share and whether he can claim recovery of his share within twelve years, were all the questions on which final adjudication could have been made after considering the evidence and at the stage of considering the amendment in the facts of the present case, it was too early to come to a conclusion that limitation was only three years and not twelve years as claimed by the plaintiff. The High Court on the one hand refrained from expressing any opinion and on the other hand, has expressed his agreement with the view taken by the Additional District Judge rejecting the application as barred by time."

(Emphasis supplied)

24. From perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the

Supreme Court, it is clear that the question of limitation is a

mixed question of fact and law.

25. The question involved in Shakti Bhog Food

Industries Ltd. was whether under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of

CPC, could the plaint be rejected on the ground of suit being

barred by limitation. However in the instant case, a separate

- 27 -

issue was framed after exchange of pleadings between the

parties as to whether the suit is barred by limitation. This issue

was decided as a preliminary issue after remand by the High

Court and before evidence was led. However, we note that the

learned Judge of the trial Court, in the impugned order, has

relied only upon the admitted and undisputed case between the

parties as has been noted above. The trial Court has referred to

the Will dated 03.03.1956 set up by defendant Nos.1 and 2 in

the previous suit bearing O.S.No.990/2000, whereby the suit

property was stated to have been bequeathed in favour of the

grandson of Sri B.C.Ramalingam to one Sri Gopinath. Late

Sri Gopinath was the husband and father of defendant Nos.1

and 2 respectively. Thus, it was held that the right to sue of the

plaintiffs would accrue on the date when the written statement

of the defendants was filed. Admittedly, the suit has been filed

beyond the limitation of three years provided in Article 113 of

the Limitation Act, 1963.

26. The plaintiffs claim to be the coparceners of the

defendants. They base their claim on the fact that way back in

the year 1940, a partition took place between the aforesaid

Sri Ramalingam and others on the basis of which a partition

deed, which was duly registered. The fact that the suit schedule

- 28 -

property came to the share of Sri Ramalingam under the

registered partition deed of 1940 is not denied by the

defendants. Therefore the aspect whether Article 110 of the

Limitation Act, 1963 would apply in the facts and circumstances

of the present case, which provision provides the period of

limitation of twelve years, would require adjudication by the

trial Court while deciding issue No.11, as it is a mixed question

of law and fact, and which would require evidence to be led.

The issue No.11 could not have been decided by the trial Court

prior to the evidence having been led in the trial. The point for

determination is accordingly answered. We find support from

the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Mohinder Kumar

Mehra.

27. For the reasons aforesaid, we allow the appeal, set

aside the impugned order of the trial Court dated 07.11.2012 in

O.S.No.6732/2006 and remand the matter to the trial Court.

The parties shall appear before the jurisdictional trial Court on

04.06.2026. If the Court is not available on that day, they shall

appear on the next working day. The issues have been framed,

so the trial Court is required to fix a date to proceed with

recording of evidence of the parties. Thereafter, the trial Court,

- 29 -

after due consideration would proceed to decide the aforesaid

issue No.11 pertaining to limitation along with the other issues.

Pending IAs, if any stand disposed of, accordingly.

Sd/-

(JAYANT BANERJI) JUDGE

Sd/-

(K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE

KSR

 
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