Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 3160 Kant
Judgement Date : 10 April, 2026
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RFA No. 254 of 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.254 OF 2013 (PAR)
BETWEEN:
1. SMT.UMA RAMAIAH,
D/O LATE SRI.B.R.RAM,
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS,
R/AT NO.27/2, 1ST MAIN ROAD,
JAYAMAHAL, BANGALORE-560 046.
2. SMT.RAJANI RAMAIAH,
D/O LATE B.R.RAM,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
R/AT NO.27/2, 1ST MAIN ROAD,
JAYAMAHAL, BANGALORE-560 046.
3. SMT.PRABHA,
W/O SRI L.VISHWANATHAN,
AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS,
R/AT 1ST BLOCK, JAYANAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 011.
4. MRS.VEENA KUPPALI,
W/O SRI HEMACHANDRA,
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
R/AT NO.3785, GROVE AVENUE,
PALO, CA 94303, USA.
REP. BY POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER,
SMT.UMA RAMAIAH, (APPELLANT NO.1),
D/O LATE SRI.B.R.RAM,
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS,
R/AT NO.27/2, 1ST MAIN ROAD,
JAYA MAHAL, BANGALORE-560 046.
5. SRI.S.T.SUBBU,
S/O LATE THAMMAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 81 YEARS,
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RFA No. 254 of 2013
R/AT BULL TEMPLE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 018.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI.M.S.VARADARAJAN, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SMT.SARASWATHI GOPINATH,
W/O LATE SRI.B.G.GOPINATH,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
2. SRI.ROHITH,
S/O LATE SRI.B.R.GOPINATH,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
3. SMT.SUSHMA,
D/O LATE SRI.B.R.GOPINATH,
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
ALL ARE R/AT NO.27/2, 1ST MAIN ROAD,
JAYAMAHAL, BANGALORE-560 046.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.C.M.NAGABHUSHANA, ADVOCATE FOR R1 AND R2;
SRI.K.P.ASOKUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR R3)
THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF
CPC, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
07.11.2012 PASSED IN O.S.No.6732/2006 ON THE FILE OF THE XXII
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL JUDGE, BENGALURU, DISMISSING THE SUIT
FOR PARTITION, SEPARATE POSSESSION AND DECLARATION.
THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, JAYANT BANERJI J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI)
This plaintiffs' appeal is filed seeking to set aside the
judgment and order dated 07.11.2012 passed by XXII
Additional City Civil Judge, Bengaluru in O.S.No.6732/2006
whereby, while deciding issue No.11 which is "Whether the suit
is barred by time?", the trial Court observed that the suit is
barred by time and consequently the suit was dismissed.
2. It appears from the record that earlier, by means of
an order dated 22.09.2011, the trial Court had decided the
aforesaid issue No.11 holding that the suit is not barred by time
and answered issue No.11 in negative. The order dated
22.09.2011 was challenged in an appeal by the defendants
successfully before this Court and the matter was remanded to
the trial Court to decide the issue afresh. Thereafter, by the
impugned order dated 07.11.2012, it was held that the suit was
barred by time and the suit was accordingly dismissed.
3. The plaintiffs filed a suit seeking a decree of
partition by metes and bounds and for separate possession of
the plaintiffs' 17/24th share in the suit schedule property, by
holding that the alleged Will dated 03.03.1956 is not binding on
the plaintiffs. Further prayer was made for granting mandatory
injunction to render accounts, to pay money after reconciling
the accounts, to deposit the rents in respect of the schedule
property before the Court, prohibitory injunction for restraining
the defendants from alienating, altering, encumbering or
creating any third party rights in respect of the suit schedule
property and for award of costs of the suit. The suit schedule
property is described as follows:
"SCHEDULE PROPERTY
All that piece and parcel of the Immovable property bearing Municipal No.495, situated at Jamma Masjid Road also called as Old Poor House Road, Bangalore within the limits of Ward No.79 of Bangalore Mahanagara Palike, Bangalore, comprising of site dimension as per the Sketch and in all measuring 735.4 Sq.,mts., in area and is bounded on:-
East By : Private Property
West By : O.P.H. Road
North By : Private Property, and
South By : private Property.
Comprising of Multi Storied commercial building containing tenements used for Restaurants and lodging."
4. The plaint case to the extent it is relevant for
purpose of decision of the instant appeal is as follows:
That plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 are the children of late
Sri B.R.Ram, son of late B.C.Ramalingam. Plaintiff Nos.1 and 2
are stated to be unmarried. The said Sri B.R.Ram had a son by
the name of Sri Gopinath, who had died leaving behind him
defendant Nos.1 to 3 as his heirs. The said Sri B.R.Ram had
one more daughter by the name of Smt.Shara Subbu, who
expired on 13.02.2002, leaving behind her husband- plaintiff
No.5. It was stated that late Sri B.C.Ramalingam had acquired
an immovable property bearing No.495, Old Poor House Road,
also called as Jamma Masjid Road, Bangalore, which is the suit
schedule property through a registered partition deed dated
04.07.1940. Sri B.C.Ramalingam died intestate, leaving behind
his only son Sri.B.R.Ram. Sri B.R.Ram inherited the suit
schedule property and he died intestate on 30.09.2001 leaving
behind the plaintiffs and the defendants as heirs in respect of
the properties.
5. It is stated that the suit schedule property had been
let out during the lifetime of Sri B.R.Ram to one
Sri V.Ramamurthy for a period of thirty seven years. It is
stated that the scheduled property is occupied by the tenant
whose leasehold right would expire on 31.12.2010. It is stated
that the suit schedule property continues to be in the lawful
and joint possession of the plaintiffs and the defendants as on
that date.
6. It is stated that plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 filed a suit
bearing O.S.No.9264/1997 which is pending in the file of the
City Civil Judge, Bangalore (CCH-07) against their father and
defendant Nos.1 and 2 herein for the relief of partition of
another immovable property in respect of which the defendants
contended that there existed a settlement deed; that for the
relief of partition in O.S.No.9264/1997, plaintiff Nos.1 and 2
had not included the suit schedule property as they were made
to believe that during subsistency of the leasehold rights, the
property cannot be partitioned; that during the year 2000, the
father of the plaintiffs filed a suit for partition in respect of the
suit schedule property, bearing O.S.No.990/2000 against
plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 with the deceased daughter Smt.
Sharasubbu, and against defendant Nos.1 and 2 seeking
partition of the suit schedule property. The said suit came to be
dismissed on 18.08.2005 for not taking steps to bring the legal
representatives of the deceased plaintiff therein on record.
7. In paragraph 11 of the plaint, it is stated that the
cause of action to file the suit arose when the suit schedule
property devolved on the father of plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 during
the year 1957 and the father of plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 filed
O.S.No.990/2000 in the year 2000 for partition of the suit
schedule property; when their father Sri B.R.Ram died intestate
on 30.09.2001; on 18.08.2005 when O.S.No.990/2000 was
dismissed for not taking steps to bring the legal representatives
of Sri B.R.Ram on record and on all subsequent dates when
defendant Nos.1 to 3 have failed to concur with the plaintiff's
demand for partitioning the scheduled property.
8. A written statement was filed by the defendants-
respondents which was amended. It is stated therein that in
O.S.No.9264/1997, which was filed for an identical relief of
partition, the plaintiffs had specifically stated that the cause of
action accrued to them on 11.11.1997, and even according to
that, the present suit filed after a long lapse of nine years, is
barred by limitation. It is stated that even otherwise, the
plaintiffs have, in paragraph No.11 of the plaint, alleged that
the cause of action arose on 30.09.2001, when their father
Sri B.R.Ram died and from that date also, the suit is not within
time, as such, it deserves to be dismissed on the ground of
limitation.
9. In the written statement, it is stated that
O.S.No.990/2000 which was filed by their father was dismissed
on 18.08.2005 for not taking steps to bring the legal
representatives on record and therefore, the present suit is not
maintainable under Order XXII Rule 9 of CPC.
10. It is also stated, inter alia, that in 1958 the husband
of defendant No.1, got the khata of the suit schedule property
made in his name when his grandfather Sri B.C.Ramalingam
died and ever since then was exclusively enjoying the same as
absolute owner of the property, continuously adverse to the
interest of the plaintiffs to their knowledge which had the effect
of repudiating their rights, paying the municipal taxes till
11.06.1987 when he died and thereafter, his wife
Smt. Saraswati Gopinath continues to enjoy the suit schedule
property as absolute owner, adverse to the interest of the
plaintiffs to their knowledge, paying municipal taxes and got
the khata made in her name on 17.07.1989.
11. It is stated that it is false to say that suit property
was leased out by Sri B.R.Ram as the karta of the family.
Sri Gopinath claimed to be the owner on the basis of the Will
dated 03.03.1956 made by Sri B.C.Ramalingam in favour of his
only grandson Sri Gopinath. Since Sri Gopinath was the owner
of the schedule property and a high ranking personnel in the
Defence Sector and was working at a far off place, he had
executed a Power of Attorney in favour of his father
Sri B.R.Ram to manage the schedule property and on the
strength of the same, Sri B.R.Ram leased the schedule property
on behalf of his son and was managing it. It is stated that the
plaintiffs were aware of the legal position at the time of filing of
O.S.No.9264/1997.
12. The point for determination that arises in this
appeal is "whether the suit is barred by limitation?".
13. By an order dated 22.09.2011, it was held by the
trial Court that recording of khata in the name of anybody
would not result in denial of title or right of the real holder. It
was observed that there is no plea raised by the defendants
that plaintiffs were at any time ousted from suit property. It
was held that Article 113 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act
would apply in the case. There being no denial of title of the
plaintiffs, the suit was held to be well within time and the
plaintiffs got the right to sue only on the death of Sri B.C.Ram
on 30.09.2001.
14. Against the aforesaid order dated 22.09.2011,
C.R.P.No.282/2011 was filed before this Court which came to
be allowed by means of an order dated 16.04.2012 whereby
the order of the trial Court dated 22.09.2011 was set aside
and the matter was remanded to the trial Court for
reconsideration in accordance with law, leaving all contentions
of both parties open.
15. It is thereafter, after remand, that the impugned
order dated 07.11.2012 came to be passed. Issue No.11 being
"whether the suit is barred by time?" which was answered in
the affirmative by the trial Court. It was noted that the
plaintiffs admitted the earlier proceedings in O.S.No.9264/1997
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filed by plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 herein against their father Sri
B.R.Ram as well as defendant Nos.1 and 2 herein seeking
partition in which the present suit property was not included. It
was also not disputed by the plaintiffs that their father in the
year 2000 had filed a suit for partition in O.S.No.990/2000
against plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 herein and his daughter Smt.Shara
Subbu as well as defendant Nos.1 and 2 herein and that the
father of the plaintiffs died during pendency of the suit and the
suit came to be dismissed on 18.08.2005. It is stated in the
order that it is also not in dispute that defendant Nos.1 and 2 in
the said suit of O.S.No.990/2000 had set up the Will dated
03.03.1956 in their written statement whereby the suit
property was bequeathed by Sri B.C.Ramalingam in favour of
his grandson Sri Gopinath. It was held that therefore the
plaintiffs were very much aware of denial of their title by these
defendants over the suit schedule property. It was further
noted that in paragraph 11 of the plaint wherein the cause of
action is shown by the plaintiffs, they had stated that the cause
of action arose on 30.09.2001 when their father Sri B.R.Ram
died and since infringement continued even after Sri B.R.Ram's
demise, as such, the present suit was filed on 27.07.2006. The
suit in O.S.No.990/2000 came to be abated in the month of
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February 2002 itself, after the death of Sri B.R.Ram on
30.09.2001 during pendency of the suit. It was further noted
that even in the prayer made, the plaintiffs have prayed for
decree of partition by metes and bound and sought for
declaration to hold that the alleged Will dated 03.03.1956 is not
binding on them.
16. Therefore, the conclusion was drawn that the suit
filed by the plaintiffs is barred by time. It was held that the
plaintiffs have slept over the matter much after abatement till
the year 2006 when they filed the present suit long after the
expiry of three years from the date of accrual of the cause of
action. Therefore under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
the plaintiff should have filed the suit within three years from
the date of accrual of cause of action which was not done by
them. Accordingly, it was ordered that the suit is barred by
time and the suit was dismissed.
17. The appellants have relied upon the judgment of a
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in S.K.Lakshminarasappa,
since deceased by his L.Rs., vs. Sri B.Rudraiah and others1 to
contend that for a suit for partition filed by co-sharers and
coparceners, no period of limitation is prescribed for filing of
ILR 2012 KAR 4129
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such a suit and another judgment in the case of K.Laxmanan v.
Thekkayil Padmini2.
18. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the
respondents have relied upon the judgment in Krishna Pillai
Rajasekharan v. Padmanabha Pillai3 to contend that the
Supreme Court has held that where the suit for partition is
primarily and predominantly filed for that relief and the relief of
redemption being sought for only pursuant to the direction
made by the High Court in its order of remand, the limitation
for the suit would be governed by Article 120 of the Limitation
Act, 1908. It is contented that Article 120 of Limitation Act,
1908 is pari materia Article 113 of Limitation Act, 1963. It is
contented that in the said judgment, it is also held that the
starting point of limitation for a suit of partition is when the
plaintiff has notice of his entitlement to partition being denied.
Further, a three-judge bench decision of the Supreme Court in
Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India is
relied on to contend that if the limitation for filing a suit is not
covered by any specific Article of the Limitation Act, 1963, then
it would fall within the residuary Article 113.
AIR 2009 SC 951
AIR 2004 SC 1206
(2020) 17 SCC 260
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19. The other judgments relied on by learned Counsel
for the respondents are:
(i) Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Chander Sen
(ii) Mrs. Mallika & Ors. vs Mr. Chandrappa & Ors.
(iii) Makhan Singh v. Kulwant Singh . (iv) Sri Y.S Gurunanjappa & Ors. v. Smt. Sunanda & Ors. . (v) State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh (vi) Bhubaneswari Bewa v. State of Orissa (vii) Lachmi Narain v. Muhammad Yusuf11 (viii) Churya v. Baneshwar12 (ix) Puthyia Purayil Kanan's Widow Kozipurath Chemmarathi v. Potinhare Koyattan Balan 20(i). The limitation for filing a suit for partitiondoes not begin to run unless and until a cause of action arises.
In the case of Krishna Pillai Rajasekharan Nair the Supreme
Court was considering a matter arising out of a suit filed by the
appellant-plaintiff, who was an assignee from certain non-
redeeming co-mortgagors of a share in 'C' schedule property,
seeking relief of declaration of title with recovery of possession
and in the alternative, the relief of partition. The trial Court
AIR 1986 SC 1753
ILR 2007 KAR 3216
AIR 2007 SC 1808
RSA No.394/2005 DD 29.05.2008
AIR 1992 SC 111
AIR 1979 Orissa 171
ILR 1920 Volume XLII Allahabad 540
ILR 1926 Volume XLVIII Allahabad 334
AIR 1997 SC 2440
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decreed the suit on 07.12.1973 upholding the plaintiff's
entitlement to 9/12th shares in the suit property but subject to
payment of ₹208/- to reimburse the first defendant by way of
contribution towards the amount spent by him in redeeming
the property. A preliminary decree determining the share of the
plaintiff and his entitlement to partition was passed. The trial
Court's decree was upheld by the first appellate Court
dismissing the appeal preferred by defendant No.1. In the
second appeal preferred by defendant No.1, the High Court
allowed the appeal and set aside the decrees of the first
appellate Court and the trial Court.
(ii) It was urged before the High Court on behalf of
defendant No.1 that the property being subject to mortgage
and defendant No.1 having subrogated himself in place of the
original mortgagee, the suit filed by the plaintiff barely for
declaration, partition and recovery of possession, was not
maintainable and it was necessary for the plaintiff to have
sought for the relief of redemption. It was submitted on behalf
of defendant No.1 that even if the relief of redemption of
mortgage was not specifically sought for, the suit in substance
was one for redemption and so it was barred by time under
Article 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The appeal was allowed
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by the High Court, the decree was set aside and the case was
remanded to the trial Court with a direction to allow the parties
an opportunity of amending the pleadings so that the plaintiff
could seek the relief of redemption and the defendant could
raise the plea as to bar of limitation.
(iii) Pursuant to the order of remand, the pleadings
were amended. The suit was once again decreed by the trial
Court and the first appellate Court. In the second appeal
preferred by defendant No.1, the High Court formed an opinion
that defendant No.1 had redeemed the property on behalf of
the entire family and therefore, after the payment of mortgage
money and recovering back the possession from the
mortgagee, nothing had remained to be redeemed. The plaintiff
was entitled to declaration of title and other reliefs prayed for
by him.
(iv) The learned Judge of the High Court, in the second
appeal, entertained serious doubts about the correctness of the
view taken by the learned Single Judge in the earlier order of
the High Court remanding the case to the trial Court, but felt
bound and helpless by the observations and directions made in
the earlier judgment. He allowed the appeal and dismissed the
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suit while setting aside the judgments and decrees of the two
Courts.
(v) Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the High
Court, a Special Leave Petition was filed by the plaintiff before
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court proceeded on the
factual premise that out of the co-mortgagors, all having
entitlement to a share each in the suit property, one of them
had redeemed the property by paying the entire mortgage
money and had singularly entered into possession over the
entire mortgage property. Consequent upon redemption, it is
the other co-owner of the property that is the plaintiff who was
then asking for partition of the property commensurate with his
share. The Supreme Court proceeded to examine inter alia
whether a suit for partition filed by the plaintiff was
maintainable and noted that it would determine the question of
limitation as well.
(vi) After considering a catena of its decisions, it was
observed by the Supreme Court that the limitation for a suit for
contribution would become relevant only when the redeeming
co-mortgagor sues the non-redeeming co-mortgagor for
enforcing the latter's obligation to make contribution. A suit
filed by a co-owner cum co-mortgagor for partition and
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separate possession against the redeeming co-mortgagor and
subject to payment of contribution would remain a suit for
partition though the defendant in possession of the property
would be justified in insisting that the property was not liable to
be partitioned unless the plaintiff contributed his share of the
money paid for redemption and incidental expenses. To the
latter case, wherein the suit has been filed not by the party
claiming contribution, but the right to claim partition was being
set up only as a defence in equity, the limitation provided for
filing a suit for contribution cannot apply. Thereafter, the
doctrine of subrogation was considered and it was held that the
suit filed in that case being a suit for partition primarily and
predominantly and the relief of redemption having been sought
only pursuant to the direction made by the High Court in its
order of remand, the limitation of the suit would be governed
by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 with the starting
point of the suit for partition, being when the plaintiff has
notice of his entitlement to partition being denied.
21. It is noted from the above judgment in the case of
Krishna Pillai Rajasekharan Nair that the issue with regard to
exclusion from joint family property of a person did not arise
therein. Therefore, the provision of Article 127 of the Limitation
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Act, 1908 did not arise for consideration. It could be pertinent
to quote Articles 120 and 127 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which
are as follows:
Description of suit Period of Time from which Limitation period begins to run 120 Suit for which no Six years When the right to period of limitation sue accrues is provided elsewhere in this schedule 127 By a person Twelve When the exclusion excluded from joint years becomes known to family property to the plaintiff enforce a right to share therein
22(i). In the case of Shakti Bhog Food Industries
Ltd. the appellant had filed suit on 23.02.2005 for a decree for
rendition of true and correct accounts in respect of the
interest/commission charged and deducted by the respondent
bank for the specified period and also for recovery of the
excess amount charged by the respondent bank with interest.
The plaint came to be rejected by the trial Court under Order
VII Rule 11(d) of CPC on the ground that it was barred by a law
of limitation as it was filed beyond the period of three years
prescribed in Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The trial
Court adverted to a decision of the High Court of 2012 wherein
it was held that exchange of correspondence between the
parties cannot extend the limitation period for institution of a
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suit, once the right to sue had accrued, which in that case had
accrued in October 2000, which was also asserted in the plaint.
The view taken by the trial Court commended to the District
Court in the first appeal and also the High Court in the second
appeal, which was challenged before the Supreme Court.
(ii) The Supreme Court considered the expression used
in Article 113 of the Limitation Act 1963, "when the right to sue
accrues". It was noted that the Article 113 of the Limitation Act
1963 being a residuary clause which had been invoked by all
the three Courts in that case did not specify happening of a
particular event, but merely referred to the accrual of cause of
action on the basis of which the right to sue would accrue. It
was further observed that it is well established position that the
cause of action for filing a suit would consist of the bundle of
facts and that, further, the factum of the suit being barred by
limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact and
law. The Supreme Court noted the distinction in Articles 58 and
113 of the Limitation Act 1963 with regard to the 'time from
which period begins to run'. In Article 58 it was, "when the
right to sue first accrues", whereas in Article 113 it is "when the
right to sue accrues". After noting several decisions of the
Supreme Court as well as of the Privy Council, particularly in
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the case of Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan14 wherein it was
observed that whether a particular threat gives rise to a
compulsory cause of action depends upon the question whether
that threat effectively invades or jeopardises the said right. The
Supreme Court held that the principle underlying the dictum
"when the right to sue accrues" must apply proprio vigore to
Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963.15
(iii) The Supreme Court considered the background of
the correspondence between the appellant and the respondent
bank and observed that they were also invoked as giving rise to
cause of action. Whether that plea taken by the appellant was
genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and
law, depending on the response of the respondents. It is
relevant to refer to paras 22 and 23 of the said judgment,
which read as follows:
"22. It is well-established position that the cause of action for filing a suit would consist of bundle of facts. Further, the factum of the suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact and law. Even for that reason, invoking Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is ruled out. In the present case, the assertion in the plaint is that the appellant verily believed that its claim was being processed by the regional office and the regional
AIR 1960 SC 335
The expression "when the right to sue accrues" is also used in Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908.
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office would be taking appropriate decision at the earliest. That belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the Senior Manager of the Bank, dated 8-5-2002 followed by another letter dated 19-9-2002 to the effect that the action taken by the Bank was in accordance with the rules and the appellant need not correspond with the Bank in that regard any further. This firm response from the respondent Bank could trigger the right of the appellant to sue the respondent Bank. Moreover, the fact that the appellant had eventually sent a legal notice on 28-11- 2003 and again on 7-1-2005 and then filed the suit on 23-2-2005, is also invoked as giving rise to cause of action. Whether this plea taken by the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law, depending on the response of the respondents.
23. Reverting to the argument that exchange of letters or correspondence between the parties cannot be the basis to extend the period of limitation, in our opinion, for the view taken by us hitherto, the same need not be dilated further. Inasmuch as, having noticed from the averments in the plaint that the right to sue accrued to the appellant on receiving letter from the Senior Manager, dated 8-5-2002, and in the particular letter dated 19-9- 2002, and again on firm refusal by the respondents vide advocate's letter dated 23-12-2003 in response to the legal notice sent by the appellant on 28-11-2003; and once again on the follow-up legal notice on 7-1-2005, the plaint filed in February 2005 would be well within limitation. Considering the former events of firm response by the respondents on 8-5-2002 and in particular, 19-9- 2002, the correspondence ensued thereafter, including the two legal notices sent by the appellant, even if
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disregarded, the plaint/suit filed on 23-2-2005 would be within limitation in terms of Article 113."
(iv) The Supreme Court noted that the trial Court and
the High Court had failed to advert and analyze the averments
in the plaint. But selectively took notice of the assertions in the
plaint in question and then proceeded to reject the plaint being
barred by law of limitation. It was therefore held that rejection
of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(b) of CPC could not be
sustained.
23(i). In the case of Mohinder Kumar Mehra v. Roop
Rani Mehra16 before the Supreme Court, the facts were that the
appellant's father, late Sri O.P. Mehra, along with his wife
(respondent No.1) and three minor sons came to Delhi from
Lahore after partition. Sri O.P.Mehra died in 1951. Respondent
No.1 and her sons were held entitled to compensation under
the order of the Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi dated
14.08.1956. Respondent No.1 was declared as highest bidder in
a public auction for a house in Lajpat Nagar, area measuring
300 square yards, which amount was adjusted from the claim
to which respondent No.1 and her sons were held entitled.
Another property was also allotted in the name of respondent
(2018) 2 SCC 132
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No.1 of area measuring 200 square yards at Nizamuddin, New
Delhi. The property at Nizamuddin was sold by respondent No.1
in the year 2000. On 04.11.2009 the appellant filed suit
No.2082/2009 against the respondents seeking partition of the
suit property, described in Appendix A. In Appendix A, only
property mentioned was that of Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. The
written statement was filed by the respondent and issues were
framed by the Court. 10.08.2010 was fixed for recording the
evidence of the plaintiff. However the plaintiff prayed for time
for producing evidence. On 17.01.2011, the plaintiff filed an
application under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC praying for
amendment of the plaint. By the application, the plaintiff
sought to add certain pleadings and prayer claiming share in
the sale proceeds received by defendant No.1 from sale of the
property of Nizamuddin.
(ii) The application filed by the plaintiff was objected to
by the defendants stating that several opportunities was given
to the plaintiff to lead evidence and last opportunity was given
on 08.12.2010 to file his evidence by 28.01.2011. It was
further pleaded that in the sale document of Nizamuddin
property, the plaintiff himself was a witness. It was also stated
- 24 -
that the relief sought to be amended is barred by time and is
altogether a separate cause of action.
(iii) The plaintiff filed a rejoinder stating that he came to
know that the plaintiff had undivided share in the property at
Nizamuddin only in November 2010. On 14.02.2014, an order
was passed directing that amendment application shall be
considered at the time of final hearing of the suit. However,
pursuant to an order passed by the Division Bench of the High
Court, the learned Single Judge was directed to decide the
amendment application. In the meantime on account of
pecuniary jurisdiction of the case, the suit was transferred to
the Court of Additional District Judge, Saket. The Additional
District Judge took up the amendment application and vide
order dated 24.10.2016 rejected the amendment application.
The trial Court took the view that the suit for recovery of
money of his share could have been filed by the plaintiff within
three years from the date of sale. The trial Court held that the
amendment sought was barred by time, hence the application
was rejected.
(iv) A writ petition under Article 227 was filed by the
plaintiff against that order which was dismissed by the High
Court against which the appeal was filed before the Supreme
- 25 -
Court. Before the Supreme Court, learned Counsel for appellant
relied on Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to submit that
the limitation for enforcing a right to share in a joint family
property is twelve years, hence the claim was not barred by
time. The Supreme Court noted that the amendment
application was filed before the evidence in the trial was led by
the plaintiff. It was held that looking to the object and purpose
by which limitation was put on permitting amendment of the
pleadings, in substance, in that case, no prejudice could be said
to have been caused to the defendant since the evidence in the
trial was led subsequent to the filing of the amendment
application. It was observed that it cannot be held that
amendment application filed by the plaintiff could not be
considered due to bar of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of
CPC. Thereafter, the Supreme Court considered one of the main
reasons given by the trial Court in rejecting the amendment
application that the claim was barred by limitation. The
provision of Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which is
pari materia Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1908, was
considered. It was noted that the case before the Supreme
Court was not simply a case of recovery of money. The
plaintiff's claim was to enforce a right to share in the
- 26 -
Nizamuddin property which was sold in the year 2000 and
according to the plaintiff the limitation was twelve years as per
Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court
observed as follows:
"27. In the facts of the present case, final determination as to whether the claim could be held to be barred by time could have been decided only after considering the evidence led by the parties. Whether the plaintiff had any share in the property, which was sold in the year 2000 and what was the nature of his share and whether he can claim recovery of his share within twelve years, were all the questions on which final adjudication could have been made after considering the evidence and at the stage of considering the amendment in the facts of the present case, it was too early to come to a conclusion that limitation was only three years and not twelve years as claimed by the plaintiff. The High Court on the one hand refrained from expressing any opinion and on the other hand, has expressed his agreement with the view taken by the Additional District Judge rejecting the application as barred by time."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. From perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the
Supreme Court, it is clear that the question of limitation is a
mixed question of fact and law.
25. The question involved in Shakti Bhog Food
Industries Ltd. was whether under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of
CPC, could the plaint be rejected on the ground of suit being
barred by limitation. However in the instant case, a separate
- 27 -
issue was framed after exchange of pleadings between the
parties as to whether the suit is barred by limitation. This issue
was decided as a preliminary issue after remand by the High
Court and before evidence was led. However, we note that the
learned Judge of the trial Court, in the impugned order, has
relied only upon the admitted and undisputed case between the
parties as has been noted above. The trial Court has referred to
the Will dated 03.03.1956 set up by defendant Nos.1 and 2 in
the previous suit bearing O.S.No.990/2000, whereby the suit
property was stated to have been bequeathed in favour of the
grandson of Sri B.C.Ramalingam to one Sri Gopinath. Late
Sri Gopinath was the husband and father of defendant Nos.1
and 2 respectively. Thus, it was held that the right to sue of the
plaintiffs would accrue on the date when the written statement
of the defendants was filed. Admittedly, the suit has been filed
beyond the limitation of three years provided in Article 113 of
the Limitation Act, 1963.
26. The plaintiffs claim to be the coparceners of the
defendants. They base their claim on the fact that way back in
the year 1940, a partition took place between the aforesaid
Sri Ramalingam and others on the basis of which a partition
deed, which was duly registered. The fact that the suit schedule
- 28 -
property came to the share of Sri Ramalingam under the
registered partition deed of 1940 is not denied by the
defendants. Therefore the aspect whether Article 110 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 would apply in the facts and circumstances
of the present case, which provision provides the period of
limitation of twelve years, would require adjudication by the
trial Court while deciding issue No.11, as it is a mixed question
of law and fact, and which would require evidence to be led.
The issue No.11 could not have been decided by the trial Court
prior to the evidence having been led in the trial. The point for
determination is accordingly answered. We find support from
the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Mohinder Kumar
Mehra.
27. For the reasons aforesaid, we allow the appeal, set
aside the impugned order of the trial Court dated 07.11.2012 in
O.S.No.6732/2006 and remand the matter to the trial Court.
The parties shall appear before the jurisdictional trial Court on
04.06.2026. If the Court is not available on that day, they shall
appear on the next working day. The issues have been framed,
so the trial Court is required to fix a date to proceed with
recording of evidence of the parties. Thereafter, the trial Court,
- 29 -
after due consideration would proceed to decide the aforesaid
issue No.11 pertaining to limitation along with the other issues.
Pending IAs, if any stand disposed of, accordingly.
Sd/-
(JAYANT BANERJI) JUDGE
Sd/-
(K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE
KSR
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