Therefore the detaining authority has disabled the
detenue from making an effective representation
and also the detaining authority has not applied his
mind in passing the detention order dated
26/9/2025. Hence, the subjective satisfaction
arrived at by the detaining authority suffers from
complete non-application of mind.
• 2025: JKLHC-JMU: 276, Mohd. Jaffer Sheikh
vs Union Territory of J & K, dated
10.09.2025, Paragraph Nos.8, 9 and 10.
• (2004) Cr LJ 2967, Jitendra Nath Mishra vs
District Magistrate & Another, Paragraph
Nos.9 and 10.
The detention order has been passed without
considering the lack of proximity, there being a gap
of two months from the date of registration of the
last crime. The last crime registered against the
detenue is dated 18.06.2025, whereas the
detention order has been passed on 26.09.2025."
Authority Relied Upon: WP(H.C.) No.111/2024,
Sivakumar vs State of Karanataka & Others, Page
No.20, Paragraph No.23."
4. The learned counsel appearing for the writ
petitioner placed reliance on the following decisions:-
• Suresh B. Shetty v. State of Karnataka by its
Secretary reported in (2019) 1 Kant,LJ 552;
• Jitendra Nath Mishra v. Dist. Magistrate &
Ors., reported in (2004) ALL.LJ 1829;
• Mohd Jaffer Sheikh v. Union Territory of J & K
& Ors., reported in 2025: JKLHC-JMU:276;
• G. Jyothi v. State of Telangana, reported in
(2017) 3 ALT 585;
• Shamas Din v. UT of J&K and Ors., passed in
HCP No.62/2025 by order dated 01.09.2025;
• Mohammad Shafiulla v. The D.G. & I.G.P. of
Police and Others passed in WPHC No.75/2023
by order dated 07.12.2023;
• The State of Manipur & Ors. v. Buyamayum
Abdul Hanan @ Anand & Anr., reported in 2022
LiveLaw (SC) 862;
• Motilal Jain v. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in
(1968) AIR (SC) 1509, and
• Ameena Begum v. The State of Telangana &
Ors., reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587.
It is contended that for the grounds mentioned above, the
Order of Detention passed on 26.09.2025 is illegal and is
liable to be set aside.
5. The learned State Public Prosecutor-1 appearing
for the respondents, on the other hand, has placed a
detailed statement of objections on record. It is contended
that the petitioner's husband, Shri. Babu @ Chittibabu @
Kullababu @ Abhi son of Venkataswamy is a habitual,
hardened and dangerous offender, who has been
continuously indulging in grave and violent crimes since the
year 2011. The consolidated statement of the criminal cases
registered against the detenue is given below:-
Sl. Police Sections Short Description Stage / Status
No. Station & of Law of Incident
Crime No.
1. Bangarpet Sec. During Ganesh Convicted;
PS Cr. No. 302 r/w Visarjan on sentenced to
248/2011 34 IPC 01.09.2011, the life
detenue, in an imprisonment
intoxicated state, on
picked a quarrel 29.08.2013 in
and fatally SC
Venkatesh with a
knife.
2. Bangarpet Secs. Unprovoked Compromised;
PS Cr. No. 341, assault and disposed on
262/2012 504, criminal 09.10.2014 in
506 r/w intimidation at CC No.
Bangarpet Bus
Stand,
threatening the
complainant with
death citing his
criminal
background.
3. Bangarpet Secs. Group assault Acquitted in
PS Cr. No. 143, during a dispute CC No.
346/2012 144, at a school 590/2013
323, playground;
324 r/w detenue attacked
149 IPC victim with a
cricket bat
causing injuries.
4. V. Kota PS Secs. Involved in a Acquitted on
(A.P.) Cr. 341, gang dacoity; 22.09.2022 in
No. 342, complainant SC No.
121/2019 506, abducted, 86/2020
395 r/w confined and
34 IPC threatened for
ransom of ₹20
lakhs.
5. Robertsonpet Sec. Found Bond
PS Cr. No. 109 suspiciously executed;
26/2020 Cr.P.C. loitering at released on
midnight; failed bail
to give
explanation;
preventive
security
proceedings
initiated.
6. Chintamani Secs. House-breaking Charge Sheet
Town PS Cr. 457, theft involving filed; Pending
No.168/2021 380 IPC cash and gold trial in CC
complainant was
away from home
7. Chintamani Secs. Night house- Charge Sheet
Town PS Cr. 457, breaking and filed; Pending
No. 380 IPC theft of gold trial in CC No.
188/2021 ornaments and 956/2022
silver articles
worth 1.5 lakhs
8. Gulpet PS, Secs. Armed gang Pending trial
Kolar Cr. No. 395, attack, robbery in CC No.
70/2022 397 IPC and attempt to 780/2022
murder; victim
abducted and
assaulted with
deadly weapons.
9. Oorgaum PS Secs. Gang assault Acquitted on
Cr. No. 143, resulting in 06.04.2024 in
07/2023 144, murder due to SC No.
147, previous enmity; 95/2023
148, victim
504, succumbed to
307, injuries
302 r/w
149 IPC
10. Marathahalli Secs. Criminal Under trial in
PS, 120B, conspiracy and No. SC
Bengaluru 302 IPC contract killing of 969/2023;
Cr. No. Narayanaswamy; released on
30/2023 detenue directly bail on
involved in 10.04.2025
execution of
murder
11. Bangarpet Secs. Attempt to Charge sheet
PS Cr. No. 118(1), murder using filed; Pending
179/2025 109, 49, deadly weapons; trial in CC No.
61(2), politically 4066/2025
3(5) motivated attack
BNS r/w planned and
Sec.27 executed by
Arms hired assailants.
Act
6. It is submitted that the detenue is a Goonda as
defined under Section 2(g) of the 1985 Act and the Order of
Detention is passed after considering all relevant aspects in
detail. It is further submitted that the Detention Order
along with the Grounds of Detention was duly served and
communicated to the detenue on the same day and the
order along with all relevant records was forwarded to the
State Government on 29.09.2025 for approval. The
detention was approved on 03.10.2025 and the Order was
communicated to the detenue on 04.10.2025. The Detention
Order and connected records were placed before the
Advisory Board on 08.10.2025. The detenue submitted a
representation to the Advisory Board on 10.10.2025. The
representation was considered by the Advisory Board in its
Sitting held on 14.10.2025. The opinion of the Advisory
Board was made available on 04.11.2025, opining that there
was sufficient cause for the continued detention of the
detenue. It is submitted that the representation submitted
by the detenue was considered and rejected by the State
Government on 14.10.2025 and the Order of Detention was
confirmed on 12.11.2025.
7. Further, as regards the grounds raised by the
petitioner, it is contended that the serving of a few
documents in Telugu to the detenue is of no significance
whatsoever because the Telugu documents were in respect
to Crime No.121/2019 of V. Kota Police Station, Chittoor
District, Andhra Pradesh and the said crime had ended in the
acquittal of the detenue on 22.09.2022. It is submitted that
the said crime is only mentioned to show the number of
criminal cases as against the detenue and is not relied on as
one of the pending cases as against the detenue. Reliance is
placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Gautam Jain v.
Union of India reported in (2017) 3 SCC 133.
8. In reply to the contention that the Detaining
Authority had not mentioned the next hearing date in three
of the cases registered against the detenue, it is contended
that since it is not disputed that the criminal cases are
pending, the non-mentioning of the next hearing date would
make no difference to the subjective satisfaction entered by
the Detaining Authority. In reply to the contention that the
activities of the detenue are not prejudicial to public order,
the learned SPP-1 would contend that the continuous
offences committed by the detenue have created a
pervasive atmosphere of fear, panic and insecurity among
the general public and the offences committed would
definitely affect the community and the public at large.
9. Further, the contention that the Detaining
Authority had failed to inform the detenue of the time period
available to him to make a representation to the
Government under Section 3(3) of the 1985 Act, is a
completely untenable argument, since the detenue had a
right to submit representations before the Detaining
Authority, the Advisory Board and the Government and
there is absolutely no limitation on the time within which
such a representation ought to have been filed. It is
submitted that any mention in the decisions relied on to the
effect that a representation before the Detaining Authority
can be made only within the time prescribed is factually
incorrect and is rendered per incuriam.
10. Relying on the decision in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi
and B.L. Abdul Khader v. Union of India and others
reported in (1991) 1 SCC 476, it is contended that the
detenue had all the opportunity to make the representations
he wanted before all the three authorities and even if the
representation before the Detaining Authority was received
after the files were forwarded to the Government, the
representation would have been forwarded to the
Government and would have been considered by the
Government at the time of consideration of the issue of
confirmation of the order.
11. Further, with regard to the fifth ground that the
Detention Order has been passed without considering the
lack of proximity from the date of registration of the last
crime, it is submitted that the last crime was registered
against the detenue on 18.06.2025 as Crime No.179/2025
of Bangarpet Police Station and the impugned order has
been passed on 26.09.2025. There is no delay involved. It
is contended that there is no merit in the challenge raised
against the order of detention.
12. We have considered the contentions advanced.
We notice that the first ground is with regard to the supply
of documents in Telugu language, which admittedly is not a
language known to the detenue. The Detention Order itself
says the detenue can read only Kannada, Tamil and English.
However, page No.99 of the documents supplied to the
detenue is in Telugu. We notice that the Telugu documents
supplied is the FIR filed by V. Kota Police Station, Chittoor
District, Andhra Pradesh for the offences were under
Sections 341, 342, 506, 395 read with Section 34 of Indian
Penal Code, 1860. However, in the Detention Order itself, it
is clearly stated that the trial was held in the said case as
Sessions Case No.86/2020 and the detenue was acquitted
on 22.09.2022.
13. The learned SPP-1 clearly contends that the said
document is not relied upon to arrive at the subjective
satisfaction that the detenue has to be detained under the
provisions of the 1985 Act. It is contended that reference
was made to the said case only to show the number of
criminal cases which had been registered against the
detenue from the year 2011 onwards and since the detenue
was acquitted in the Sessions Case, there is no reliance
placed on the said case at all. It is therefore stated that the
supply of the FIR in Crime No.121/2019 in Telugu is totally
irrelevant since the detenue was acquitted and no reliance
was placed on the said case.
14. The Apex Court in Gautam Jain's case (supra),
has clearly held at paragraph No.22, which reads as
follows:-
"22. From the abovenoted judgments, some
guidance as to what constitutes "grounds", forming the
basis of detention order, can be easily discerned. In the
first instance, it is to be mentioned that these grounds
are the "basic facts" on which conclusions are founded
and these are different from subsidiary facts or further
particulars of these basic facts. From the aforesaid, it is
clear that each "basic fact" would constitute a ground
and particulars in support thereof or the details would
be subsidiary facts or further particulars of the said
basic facts which will be integral part of the "grounds".
Section 3 of the Act does not use the term "grounds".
No other provision in the Act defines "grounds". Section
3(3) deals with communication of the detention order
and states that "grounds" on which the order has been
made shall be communicated to the detenue as soon as
the order of detention is passed and fixes the time-limit
within which such detention order is to be passed. It is
here the expression "grounds" is used and it is for this
reason that detailed grounds on which the detention
order is passed are supplied to the detenue. Various
circumstances which are given under sub-section (1) of
Section 3 of the Act, on the basis of which detention
order can be passed, cannot be treated as "grounds".
On the contrary, Chamanlal Manjibhai Soni case clarifies
that there is only one purpose of the Act, namely,
preventing smuggling and all other grounds, whether
there are one or more would be relatable to the various
activities of smuggling. This shows that different
instances would be treated as different "grounds" as
they constitute basic facts making them essentially
factual constituents of the "grounds" and the further
particulars which are given in respect of those instances
are the subsidiary details. This view of ours gets
strengthened from the discussion in Vakil Singh case
where "grounds" are referred to as "materials on which
the order of detention is primarily based". The Court
also pointed out that these "grounds" must contain the
pith and substance of primary facts but not subsidiary
facts or evidential details."
15. The decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of
Kamrunnisa Badrunnisa Sithya Aysha v. Union of India
reported in (1991) 1 SCC 128 and Union of India v.
Mohammed Ahmed Ibrahim reported in 1993 Supp (1)
SCC 405, are authorities on the point that the illegibility of
certain documents by itself will not render a detention order
invalid. The extent and nature of the illegibility and its
effect on the right of representation has to be considered
taking note of the nature of the material as well. A co-equal
Bench of this Court relying on the said judgments of the
Apex Court has held at paragraph No.6 in Vijaya v.
Commissioner of Police and Others reported in 2018
SCC OnLine Kar 3200 as follows:-
"6. Therefore, in view of the above said decisions
cited on both the side what is relevant is that, whether
the illegible portions supplied to the accused was so
relevant and because of that particular portion alone the
accused/detenue could not able to make proper
representation before the Advisory Board or to the
Government. Such explanation is conspicuously absent in
this particular case. As we have seen the illegible portion
in the copies, they are all bail orders passed by the
competent authorities to the accused. The other grounds
on which the detention order was passed relying upon the
conduct of detenue with reference to the pendency of the
cases against the accused which are the main grounds
taken for the purpose of passing the order of detention.
Further added to the above, when the detenue was
produced before the Advisory Board he would have
atleast made a representation with regard to non-
furnishing of legible copies to him so that he was
prevented from making any representation. The Advisory
Board would get opportunity to deal with the matter for a
period of four weeks from the date of representation by
the Government to the Advisory Board. Therefore, in this
context also, we find no such strong material to give a
definite conclusion here that the illegible portion in the
document is the only reason for the detenue not to make
effective representation before the Advisory Board or to
the Government. Therefore, in view of the above said
facts and circumstances, we do not find any strong
reasons to interfere with the detention order. Hence, the
petition is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be
dismissed. Accordingly, dismissed."
16. We notice that the order of detention gives the
details of all the cases registered against the detenue from
2011 onwards. The first of the cases is one in which the
detenue was sentenced to life imprisonment on 29.08.2013.
The second case is one which has been compromised
between the parties. The third, fourth and ninth cases are
where the detenue has been acquitted after trial. Therefore,
pending cases are fifth to eighth and tenth and eleven.
Therefore, it is clear that all the cases registered against the
detenue are mentioned in the order of detention. The cases,
which have ended in acquittal, cannot be relied on for the
purpose of arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the
detention is necessary. Therefore, the fact that the cases
where the detenue has been acquitted are also mentioned in
the order of detention and the FIRs in the said cases have
also been included in the supporting documents cannot, by
itself, be a reason to state that any deficiency in those
materials would vitiate the order of detention. The fact that
the FIR in a case where the detenue has already been
acquitted is in Telugu or that the supporting document in
another case, which has also ended in acquittal, is not fully
legible, may not be a reason to set aside an order of
detention, which is otherwise legal. The Apex Court in the
case of Jaseela Shaji v. Union of India and others
reported in (2024) 9 SCC 53, has also held that it is not
necessary to furnish copies of each and every document to
which a casual or passing reference may be made in the
narration of facts and which are not relied upon by the
detaining authority in making the order of detention.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that the non-grant of
translated version of FIR in one of the cases in which the
detenue has been acquitted would not invalidate the order of
detention.
17. Further, with regard to the contention that the
Detaining Authority has not mentioned the next date of
hearing in three of the relied on cases, the learned SPP-1
would contend that since all the details with regard to the
criminal cases have been mentioned in the grounds of
detention and the fact that the criminal cases are pending
trial has also been correctly recorded, nothing turns on the
next date of hearing in those cases and the order suffers no
infirmity. We notice that the details of all the criminal cases
registered against the detenue from 2011 onwards had been
stated in the grounds of detention. All supporting documents
have also been served on the detenue. In respect of the
three cases referred to by the petitioner also, the fact that
the cases are pending trial has been clearly mentioned in
the grounds of detention. In the above circumstances, we
are of the opinion that the Order of Detention cannot be said
to be wanting an application of mind only because the next
date of hearing in three of the criminal cases is not
mentioned. The mentioning of the next stage of the case in
Crime No.26/2020 of Robertsonpet Police Station as written
arguments also cannot be a ground to invalidate an Order of
Detention, which is otherwise validly issued.
18. Further, the contention with regard to lack of
proximity is also not borne out by the records since the last
crime committed by the detenue is admittedly on
18.06.2025. The Order of Detention came to be passed on
26.09.2025, since a reasonable time would be taken to
collect the details of all the cases registered against the
detenue and to get required reports as to the stages of their
pendency and for application of mind by the Detaining
Authority, we are of the opinion that the three months time
taken to pass an Order of Detention from the commission of
the last offence cannot be said to be excessive in any
circumstances.
19. The final contention raised is with regard to non-
mentioning of the time limit for submission of a
representation before the Detaining Authority. The specific
contention of the writ petitioner is that on account of the
fact that the Detention Order does not mention the time
period available to the detenue to make a representation to
the Detaining Authority, the order is vitiated. The contention
is that Section 3(3) of the 1985 Act mandates that the
Detention Order must be approved by the Government
within 12 days and therefore the 12 days time has to be
stated in the Detention Order as the time period within
which the detenue can make a representation before the
Detaining Authority. We are unable to agree with this
proposition.
20. Section 3(3) of the 1985 Act specifically provides
that when an order is made by an Officer exercising the
powers conferred under sub-section 3(2) of the 1985 Act, he
shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government and
the order shall not remain in force for more than 12 days
after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has
been approved by the State Government.
21. The Apex Court in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas
Patel v. Union of India and others reported in (1995) 4
SCC 51, has clearly held that the time period of 12 days is
only provided for the Detaining Authority to obtain the
approval of the State Government, failing which, the Order
of Detention would not be operative. We find that the 12
days time period does not apply for the making of a
representation by the detenue. The detenue is free to make
the representation at any time before the order of detention
is confirmed. If the representation is received by the
Detaining Authority after a period of 12 days, then, the
representation has to be forwarded to the State Government
for its consideration. Moreover, if a representation is made
to the Advisory Board or to the Government, the same also
have to be independently considered. In the case of the
Advisory Board, no order will be passed on the
representation. But, it has to be placed before the Advisory
Board who will consider the representation while giving the
opinion as to whether the detention is liable to be continued
or not. The representation preferred before the State
Government also has to be independently considered.
22. The Apex Court in K. M. Abdulla Kunhi's case
(supra), has clearly held at paragraph No.12, which reads as
follows:-
"12. The representation relates to the liberty of the
individual, the highly cherished right enshrined in Article
21 of our Constitution. Clause (5) of Article 22 therefore,
casts a legal obligation on the government to consider the
representation as early as possible. It is a constitutional
mandate commanding the concerned authority to whom
the detenu submits his representation to consider the
representation and dispose of the same as expeditiously as
possible. The words "as soon as may be" occurring in
Clause (5) of Article 22 reflects the concern of the Framers
that the representation should be expeditiously considered
and disposed of with a sense of urgency without an
avoidable delay. However, there can be no hard and fast
rule in this regard. It depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. There is no period prescribed
either under the Constitution or under the concerned
detention law, within which the representation should be
dealt with. The requirement however, is that there should
not be supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude in
considering the representation. Any unexplained delay in
the disposal of representation would be a breach of the
constitutional imperative and it would render the continued
detention impermissible and illegal. This has been
emphasized and re-emphasised by a series of decisions of
this Court." (emphasis supplied)
23. In the instant case, the Detention Order
specifically recorded as under:-
"x x x x x
If you desire to make any representation
against the said order of detention to me you may
do so and submit it through the superintendent,
Central prison Bangalore.
If you deserve to make any representation
against the said order of detention to the
Government of Karnataka, you may do so under
address it to the superintendent, Hindalaga Central
prison, Belagavi District, Belagavi.
You are informed that the state government
shall within three weeks from the date of your
detention make a reference to and place the
requisite material before the Advisory Board,
constituted under section 9 of the Karnataka
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers,
Drug-Offenders, Gamblers, GOONDAS, Immortal
Traffic Offenders, Slum Grabbers, Act 1985
(Karnataka Act No.12 of 1985), to enable the
advisory board to make a report weather in its
opinion there is sufficient cause for your detention.
You are also here by informed that if you
want to submit any representation to the Advisory
Board against the detention order you may do so
and address it to the Chairman Advisory Board
Constituted under the said Act, and submit it
through the superintendent, Hindalaga Central
prison, Belagavi District, Belagavi, where you are
detained.
x x x x x"
24. The fact that the detenue was not told that the
Order would be placed for approval before the State
Government within a period 12 days, cannot make any
difference to the situation. In the instant case, the detenue
did not choose to file a representation before the detaining
authority even though the order of detention specifically
informed him that he had the right to make such a
representation. He filed a representation only before the
Advisory Board. The learned SPP-1 submits that the
representation preferred by him was placed before the
Advisory Board and had been considered.
25. In the above circumstances, we are of the opinion
that the contentions raised in the writ petition are devoid of
merits. We find that the Detaining Authority has considered
the relevant aspects of the matter and has come to an
informed decision that the detenue is to be kept under
detention for the reasons stated. We are of the opinion that
the order has been passed after complying with legal
procedure. The Writ Petition (Habeas Corpus) therefore fails
and the same is accordingly dismissed.
All pending interlocutory applications shall stand
disposed of.
Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(TARA VITASTA GANJU)
JUDGE
cp*
