(SRI ABHISHEK MALIPATIL, HCGP FOR R1;
SRI RAJNEET M. PAWAR, ADV. FOR R2)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 528
OF BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, 2023, PRAYING
TO QUASH THE FIRST INFORMATION REPORT IN CRIME
NO.0146/2024 REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT, ON 29TH
OCTOBER 2024 FOR ALLEGED OFFENCES, UNDER SECTION 504
AND 584 OF IPC AND SECTION 3(1)(R), 3(1)(S) OF SC AND ST
ACT, 1989, AS THE SAME IS ARBITRARY, BASELESS, AND DOES
NOT DISCLOSE ANY PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER/ACCUSED NOS.1 TO 3 ON THE FILE OF II
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, DHARWAD,
SITTING AT: HUBBALLI REGISTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER
BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT PROCEDUED AT ANNEXURE-A AND
ETC.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
ORDERS AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS
THIS DAY, THIS COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
D. Pass any other appropriate order/direction as the
Hon'ble Court may deem fit to grant under the
present facts and circumstances of the case, in the
interest of justice and equity."
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2. It is the brief case of prosecution as per the FIR
and complaint averments that the complainant and another
person, namely Hanumanth Gurugunti, belong to the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Community and
were working for 20 years in the "SWIMS TECHNOLOGY
PRIVATE LIMITED FACTORY" ('the factory' for short). On
06.02.2024, at about 3.30 p.m. to 4.45 p.m., the owners of
the factory, who are accused Nos.1 to 3 arrived at the main
gate of the dispatch section of the factory.
3. During this interaction, the petitioners/accused
Nos.1 to 3 attempted to put pressure on the complainant
and one Hanumanth Gurugunti to file a complaint against
one Mahadev Khandekar, but they refused to comply with
the request of the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3.
Therefore, they abused the complainant and Hanumanth
Gurugunti in filthy language, specifically using derogatory
terms with reference to caste, by saying that even if we
directed to lodge a complaint before the Police Station,
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nothing had happened; hence, they abused, insulted and
humiliated the complainant and Hanumanth Gurugunti in
public view and threatened to dismiss them from
employment. Hence, with these allegations, the complaint is
lodged and the crime is registered for the offences as above
stated.
4. Heard the arguments of learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3,
learned HCGP appearing on behalf of respondent No.1/State
and learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent
No.2.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners/accused
Nos.1 to 3 submitted that filing of the complaint by invoking
the provisions of offences under the Scheduled Caste and
the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
('the SC and ST Act, 1989') is nothing but abuse of process
of the Court. It is submitted that even as per the complaint
averments, the alleged incident took place on 06.04.2024,
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but the complaint was lodged on 29.10.2024; therefore,
there is enormous delay in lodging the complaint, which
itself goes to show that the entire complaint averments are
false.
6. Furthermore, the complainant and Hanumanth
Gurugunti are working in the factory as workmen and there
is a trade union dispute between the management and the
workmen of the factory; thus, lodging of the complaint is
only to threaten the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3, who are
the owners of the factory. Therefore, there is a labour
dispute pending and in order to achieve their oblique
motive, such false complaint has been filed. Further, it is
submitted that the alleged incident as per the complaint
averments occurred inside the factory premises and there is
no access to the public nor is there any possibility of it
being viewed by the public. Therefore, the entire complaint
averments are false.
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7. Further submitted that on 16.10.2024, the WEIR
BDK VALVES WORKERS UNION had given notice to
accused No.2 (who is the president of the factory) for strike
and the contents of the strike show that the complaint
lodged is in the background of a trade union dispute with
the management of the factory; hence, a false complaint
has been lodged. Therefore, it is prayed to allow the petition
and quash the entire proceedings initiated against the
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3.
8. In support of the arguments, the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3
places reliance on the following judgments:
i. LAKSHMI DEVI AND ORS. VS. STATE OF
KARNATAKA AND ORS. (LAKSHMI DEVI AND
ORS. CASE)
ii. AROKIA SWAMY AND ORS. VS. THE STATE OF
KARNATAKA2 (AROKIA SWAMY AND ORS.
CASE)
iii. SHAJAN SKARIA VS. THE STATE OF KERALA
AND ORS.3 (SHAJAN SKARIA CASE)
Criminal Petition No.3824 of 2021 dated 28.03.2022
MANU/KA/0459/2018
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iv. CHANCHALPATI DAS VS. THE STATE OF WEST
BENGAL & ANR.4 (CHANCHALPATI DAS CASE)
v. SUJOY GHOSH VS. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND
& ANR.5 (SUJOY GHOSH CASE)
vi. HITESH VERMA VS. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
AND ANOTHER6 (HITESH VERMA CASE)
vii. B. VENKATESWARAN AND ORS. VS. P.
BAKTHAVATCHALAM7 (B. VENKATESWARAN
AND ORS. CASE)
viii. RAJU VS. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH8
(RAJU's CASE)
ix. KHUMAN SINGH VS. STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH9 (KHUMAN SINGH CASE)
x. VILAS BHORMALJI OSWAL VS. STATE OF
KARNATAKA AND ORS.10 (VILAS BHORMALJI
OSWAL CASE)
9. With reference to the above cited cases, the
learned counsel for the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3
submitted that the complaint is suffering from inordinate
delay in lodging the complaint making baseless and vague
allegations and criminal offences are not made out. The
MANU/SC/0936/2024
(2023) 20 SCC 120
SLP (Crl.) No.9452 of 2025 dated 20.06.2026
(2020) 10 SCC 710
MANU/SC/0009/2023
MANU/SC/0619/2025
MANU/SC/1161/2019
MANU/KA/1745/2025
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lodging of the complaint is motivated by union strike and
there is no evidence of caste-based discrimination;
therefore, only with an oblique motive to threaten the
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3, who are the owners of the
factory, such a baseless complaint is filed and submitted
that this is nothing but abuse of process of Court.
10. On the other hand, learned HCGP appearing on
behalf of respondent No.1/State and learned counsel
appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 submitted that the
complaint averments prima facie disclose that offences
under the provisions of SC and ST Act, 1989, are made out
and when such prima facie case is made out, the
truthfulness of the complaint averments are to be decided
during the course of trial, but not at this stage while
exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C./528 of BNSS.
Hence, pray to dismiss the petition.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down
principle of law in various judgments upon exercising the
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inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and one
among them is extracted in the judgment of GULAM
MUSTAFA VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER11
at Paragraph Nos.26 and 30, it is held as follows:
"26. Although we are not for verbosity in our
judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial
precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v Bhajan
Lal12, this Court held: (SCC pp. 378-79, paras 102-
103)
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
(2023) 18 SCC 265
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
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accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only
a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
or the Act concerned (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act
concerned, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect
that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding
should be exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
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cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking
upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the
complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent
powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the
court to act according to its whim or caprice."
(emphasis supplied)
30. The law on the subject was also examined in Parbatbhai
Aahir v. State of Gujarat13. In Habib Abdullah Jeelani14, it was
opined: (Habib Abdullah Jeelani Case, SCC p. 788, para 13)
"13. ......inherent power in a matter of quashment of FIR
has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and when
and only when such exercise is justified by the test
specifically laid down in the provision itself. There is no
denial of the fact that the power under Section 482 CrPC is
very wide but it needs no special emphasis to state that
conferment of wide power requires the Court to be more
cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the
Court."
(emphasis supplied)
12. Upon considering the FIR and complaint
averments, no doubt that there is a delay about six months
in lodging the complaint. As per the FIR material, the
occurrence of the offence is on 06.04.2024 and the First
Information Statement (FIS) was lodged on 29.10.2024.
Though there is a mention regarding the delay in lodging
the complaint, the circumstances surrounding the events
are to be considered. Just because there is delay in lodging
(2017) 9SCC 641
(2017) 2 SCC 779
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the complaint that always cannot be made a ground to
suspect the prosecution case and complaint averments are
false; the delay can always be considered during the trial to
decide whether the complaint was lodged is with a mala fide
intention or not. The delay is not a ground that fits the
ingredients mentioned in Section 482 of Cr.P.C. so as to say
that there is abuse of process of the Court. If the
complainant desired to lodge a false complaint, he could
have mentioned the occurrence of the incident as having
taken place just one or two days prior to the date of lodging
the FIS; there would have been no necessity for the
complainant to mention the date of events as 06.04.2024.
If the complainant had mala fide intention to lodge the
complaint, the date of occurrence of the incident could have
been mentioned just one or two days prior to 29.10.2024 so
as to cover the delay, but the very fact that the date of
occurrence is mentioned in the complaint as 06.04.2024
and lodging of complaint on 29.10.2024 is to be considered
in the surrounding circumstances.
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13. The circumstances, prima facie, are that the
complainant was working as a workman in the factory under
the employment of the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 and
there was a trade union dispute prevailing at that point of
time. One of the grievances in the trade union dispute is
that 41 workmen have been transferred to the State of
Gujarat; this is one of the grounds mentioned in the notice
intimating the management about going on strike. Under
these circumstances, the complainant being a poor
workman might not have been in a position to face the
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3, who are the owners of the
factory and if a complaint had been lodged at that moment,
there would have been chances of termination from the
employment. Under these circumstances, the complainant
would have been deprived of his livelihood.
14. Considering these circumstances, the delay
cannot be a ground to suspect the prosecution case, much
less to label the complaint averments are false. Hence, the
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delay is to be considered during the course of the trial, in
light of the circumstances under which the delay in lodging
the complaint occurred. If the complainant had intended to
manipulate the things, he could have mentioned dates prior
one or two days prior to the date of lodging the complaint
dated 29.10.2024, but that is not found. Hence, prima facie
the date of occurrence of the incident appears to have been
mentioned promptly. Thus, the delay in lodging the
complaint considering the facts and circumstances
surrounding the incidents cannot be made a ground to
quash the proceedings.
15. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused
Nos.1 to 3 places reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of SUJOY GHOSH (Supra),
wherein it is held at Paragraph No.14, as follows:
"14. When an accused seeks quashing of either
the FIR or criminal proceedings on the
ground that such proceedings are
manifestly frivolous, vexatious or malicious,
the Court is duty bound to examine the
matter with greater care. It will not be just
enough for the Court to look into the
averments made in the FIR/complaint alone
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for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
necessary ingredients to constitute the
alleged offence are disclosed or not. In
frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the
Court owes a duty to look into many other
attending circumstances emerging from the
record of the case, over and above the
averments and, if need be, with due care
and circumspection, and try to read in
between the lines. The Court while
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code or Article 226 of the
Constitution need not restrict itself only to
the stage of a case but is empowered to
take into account the overall circumstances
leading to the initiation/registration of the
case as well as the materials collected in
the course of investigation."
16. It is discussed in the paragraph that when the
accused seeks quashing of the FIR or criminal proceedings,
the surrounding circumstances are also to be considered
and are equally applicable to the complaint. When a case
for quashing is initiated by the accused, the surrounding
circumstances are to be taken into account. In the same
way, the surrounding circumstances are also to be gathered
for the complainant; therefore, the surrounding
circumstances are to be considered equally on both the
accused and complainant to find out whether a prima facie
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case exists and whether there are materials to proceed with
the trial. Once it is found that prima facie materials exist in
the prosecution case, the matter would be adjudicated only
during the trial.
17. It is another submission made by the learned
counsel for the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 that
admittedly, as per the averments in the complaint, the
alleged incident took place at the door of the dispatch
section of the factory and is not a public place; therefore,
there could not have been any occasion for the public to
view the incident. Hence, the offences under the provisions
of the SC and ST Act, 1989, are not attracted.
18. There is difference between Public Place and
Public View. Section 3 of the SC and ST Act, 1989, defines
that offences occurring in public view are attracted. Public
view does not necessarily mean a public place. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court has interpreted the difference between
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public view and public place in the context of Section 3 of
the SC and ST Act, in the following decisions.
19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
KARUPPUDAYAR VS. STATE REP. BY THE DEPUTY
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, LALGUDI TRICHY AND
OTHERS15, at Paragraph Nos.9, 10 and 11, it is held as
under:
"9. A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-ST Act
would reveal that for constituting an offence thereunder,
it has to be established that the accused intentionally
insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of
a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place
within public view. Similarly, for constituting an offence
under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, it will be
necessary that the accused abuses any member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in
any place within public view.
10. The term "any place within public view" initially
came up for consideration before this Court in the case of
Swaran Singh V. State through Standing Counsel. This
Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand
referred to Swaran Singh (supra) and reiterated the legal
position as under:
"14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or
intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to
be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for
consideration before this Court in the judgment reported
as Swaran Singh V. State (Swaran Singh V. State, (2008)
8 CC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (cri) 527). The Court had drawn
2025 SCC OnLine SC 215
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distinction between the expression "public place" and "in
any place within public view". It was held that if an
offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn
outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone
from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the
lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On
the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but
some members of the public are there (not merely
relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since
it is not in the public view (sic) (ED. : This sentence
appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the
extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p.
736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15,
below:"Also, even if the remark is made inside a building,
but some members of the public are there (not merely
relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since
it is in the public view."] . The Court held as under : (SCC
pp. 443-44, para 28)
"28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar,
the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3
(by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car
which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our
opinion, this was certainly a place within public view,
since the gate of a house is certainly a place within
public view. It could have been a different matter had
the alleged offence been committed inside a building,
and also was not in the public view. However, if the
offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn
outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone
from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the
lawn would certainly be a place within the public view.
Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but
some members of the public are there (not merely
relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence
since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not
confuse the expression "place within public view" with
the expression "public place". A place can be a private
place but yet within the public view. On the other hand,
a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is
owned or leased by the Government or the municipality
(or other local body) or gaon sabha or an
instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons
or private bodies."
(emphasis in original)
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11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place
'within public view', the place should be open where the
members of the public can witness or hear the utterance
made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence
takes place within the four corners of the wall where
members of the public are not present, then it cannot be
said that it has taken place at a place within public view."
20. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
HITESH VERMA VS. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND
ANOTHER16 at Paragraph Nos.8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14,
has observed as follows:
"8. Against the backdrop of these facts, it is pertinent
to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
enactment of the Act. It is provided as under:
"Statement of Objects and Reasons.- Despite various
measures to improve the socio-economic conditions of
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, they
remain vulnerable. They are denied number of civil
rights. They are subjected to various offences,
indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have, in
several brutal incidents, been deprived of their life and
property. Serious crimes are committed against them for
various historical, social and economic reasons.
2. Because of the awareness created amongst the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes through
spread of education, etc., they are trying to assert their
rights and this is not being taken very kindly by the
others. When they assert their rights and resist practices
of untouchability against them or demand statutory
minimum wages or refuse to do any bonded and forced
labour, the vested interests try to cow them down and
terrorise them. When the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes try to preserve their self-respect or
honour of their women, they become irritants for the
(2020) 10 SCC 710
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dominant and the mighty. Occupation and cultivation of
even the Government allotted land by the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes is resented and more
often these people become victims of attacks by the
vested interests. Of late, there has been an increase in
the disturbing trend of commission of certain atrocities
like making the Scheduled Castes persons eat inedible
substances like human excreta and attacks on and mass
killings of helpless Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes and rape of women belonging to the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Under the
circumstances, the existing laws like the Protection of
Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the normal provisions of
the Penal Code, 1860 have been found to be inadequate
to check these crimes. A special Legislation to check and
deter crimes against them committed by non-Scheduled
Castes and non-Scheduled Tribes has, therefore,
become necessary."
9. The long title of the Act is to prevent the
commission of offences of atrocities against the members
of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, to
provide for Special Courts and Exclusive Special Courts
for the trial of such offences and for the relief and
rehabilitation of the victims of such offences and for
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
10. The Act was enacted to improve the social
economic conditions of the vulnerable sections of the
society as they have been subjected to various offences
such as indignities, humiliations and harassment. They
have been deprived of life and property as well. The
object of the Act is thus to punish the violators who inflict
indignities, humiliations and harassment and commit the
offence as defined under Section 3 of the Act. The Act is
thus intended to punish the acts of the upper caste
against the vulnerable section of the society for the
reason that they belong to a particular community.
11. It may be stated that the charge-sheet filed is for
an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The said
section stands substituted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f.
26.1.2016. The substituted corresponding provision
is Section 3(1)(r) which reads as under:
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"3. (1)(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with
intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;"
12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section
3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as "(1) intentionally
insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of
a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and (2) in any
place within public view".
13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would
indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and
intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or
intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the
Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of
victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.
The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic
conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an
offence under the Act would be made out when a member
of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to
indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of
title over the land by either of the parties is not due to
either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every
citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance
with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family
members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or
that respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the
civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in
accordance with the procedure established by law. Such
action is not for the reason that respondent No.2 is
member of Scheduled Caste.
14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or
intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to
be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for
consideration before this Court in the judgment reported
as Swaran Singh V. State17. The Court had drawn
distinction between the expression "public place" and "in
any place within public view". It was held that if an
offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn
outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone
(2008) 8 SCC 435: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527
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from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the
lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On
the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but
some members of the public are there (not merely
relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since
it is not in the public view (sic). The Court held as under:
(SCC pp. 443-44, para 28).
"28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar,
the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3
(by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car
which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our
opinion, this was certainly a place within public view,
since the gate of a house is certainly a place within
public view. It could have been a different matter had
the alleged offence been committed inside a building,
and also was not in the public view. However, if the
offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn
outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone
from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the
lawn would certainly be a place within the public view.
Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but
some members of the public are there (not merely
relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence
since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not
confuse the expression "place within public view" with
the expression "public place". A place can be a private
place but yet within the public view. On the other hand,
a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is
owned or leased by the Government or the municipality
(or other local body) or gaon sabha or an
instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons
or private bodies."
(emphasis in original)
21. This Court, by considering the above stated
judgments, extracted the principle of law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the above cited cases, the facts
substantiated are that in the back ground of a civil dispute
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regarding immovable property, offences under the
provisions of SC and ST Act, 1989, were foisted. Therefore,
since there was a civil dispute between the parties over the
property, it was held that the criminal proceedings were
found to be abuse of process of the Court. Thus, the
proceedings were quashed and the present case is
considered on the facts and circumstances involved in the
case. Hence, the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the above cited cases are to be applied.
22. Upon a dispute arising between the
complainant/respondent No.2 and the owners, who are the
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3, the complainant/respondent
No.2 has lodged a complainant, which reads as under:
"EzÀgÀ°è ¦üAiÀiÁ𢠲æà AiÀÄ®è¥àÀ vÀAzÉ PÀjAiÀÄ¥Àà ºÀjd£À gÀªÀgÄÀ vÀªÄÀ ä zÀÆgÀÄ
¤ÃrzÀÄÝ, CzÀgÀ°è vÁªÀÅ ºÁUÀÆ ºÀ£ÄÀ ªÀÄAvÀ UÀÄgÀÄUÀÄAmÉ E§âgÄÀ PÀ¼ÉzÀ 20 ªÀµÀð¢AzÀ
ºÀħâ½î UÉÆÃPÀÄ® gÀ¸ÛÉAiÀÄ°ègÄÀ ªÀ ¹éªÀiïì mÉPÁß®f ¥ÉæöÊ.°. PÁSÁð£ÉAiÀÄ°è PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁqÀÄvÁÛ
§A¢gÀÄvÉÛêÉ. ¢£ÁAPÀ: 06/04/2024 gÀAzÀÄ ªÀÄzÁåºÀß 3-30 jAzÀ 4-45 gÀ ¸ÀĪÀiÁjUÉ
PÁSÁð£ÉAiÀÄ r¸ï ¥ÁåZï «¨sÁUÀzÀ zÁégÀzÀ §½ PÁSÁð£ÉAiÀÄ ªÀiÁ°ÃPÀgÁzÀ ±ÁåªÀÄ
ªÉÄúÁÛ ©ÃªÀÄ¯ï ªÉÄúÁÛ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¤Ã¥Á ªÉÄúÁÛ gÀªÀgÄÀ DUÀ«Ä¹ ¦üAiÀiÁð¢zÁgÀjUÉ
ºÁUÀÆ ºÀ£ÀĪÀÄAvÀ UÀÄgÀÄUÀÄAmÉ gÀªÀjUÉ PÀgÉzÄÀ ªÀiÁ°ÃPÀgÁzÀ ±ÁåªÀÄ ªÉÄúÁÛ gÀªÀgÄÀ
E§âjUÀÆ ªÀÄÄAzÉ ¤°è¹PÉÆAqÀÄ ªÀĺÀzÃÉ ªÀ RAqÉÃPÀgÀ gÀªÀgÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É PÀA¥ÉèÃl §gÉzÀÄPÉÆr
JAzÀÄ MvÁ۬Ĺ §gÉzÄÀ PÉÆqÀ®Ä ¤gÁPÀj¹zÀÝjAzÀ CªÀj§âjUÀÆ "¯Éà ªÉÆ£Éß £À£Àß ªÉÄïÉ
ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £À£Àß vÀAzÉAiÀĪÀgÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É ¥ÉÆðøÀ oÁuÉAiÀÄ°è PÀA¥ÉèÃl PÉÆnÖ¢Ýj ¤ÃªÉãÀÄ
ºÀgÀPÉÆAræ, CªÀgÉãÀ ºÀgÀPÉÆÃqÀÄæ ¯Éà ¤ÃªÀÅ £Á ºÁQzÀ C£Áß wAwj¯ÉÃ, £À£Àß PÉÊAiÀÄ°è£À
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D¼ÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ ¤ÃªÀÅ. £À£ßÀ ªÉÄïɣÀ PÀA¥ÉèÃl PÉÆqÀÄwÛj ¤ªÉÃ°è ºÉÆQÌj ¤ªÀÄä ªÀÄ£É J¯Éè Lw,
¤ÃªÀÅ JµÀÄÖ UÀAmÉÃPÀ ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ ºÉÆQÌÃj ¤ÃªÀÅ AiÀiÁªï eÁwAiÀĪÀgÀÄ ¤ÃªÀÅ PÀA¥À¤UÉ
§gÀĪÁUÀ J£ÀAvÀ §A¢Ãj FUÉãÀ PÉ®¸Á ªÀiÁqÀPÀwÛÃj £ÀªÄÀ UɯÁè UÉÆÃvÉÛöÊw JAzÀÄ £ÀªÀÄUÉ
£ÀªÀÄä PÉ®¸ÀPÉÌ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £ÀªÄÀ ä eÁwUÉ ¤A¢¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ¤ÃªÀÅ PÀ¼ÀªÅÀ ªÀiÁr¢Ýj JAzÀÄ PÀÆqÀ¯ÉÃ
¤ªÀÄä£ÀÄß PÉ®¸À¢AzÀ vÉUÉzÄÀ ºÁPÀÄvÉÛÃ£É JAzÀÄ ¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁQzÁÝgÉ CAvÁ PÉÆlÖ zÀÆj£À §UÉÎ
¥ÀæPÀgÀt zÁR°¸ÀPÉÆAqÀÄ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÉÊPÉÆArzÉ."
23. Considering this, admittedly the alleged offences
occurred at a place inside the factory premises. More
particularly, the place is at the door of the dispatch section
of the factory. The dispatch section is not a remote place in
the factory. The dispatch section and its door are accessible
to employees working in the factory and are not isolated
places; therefore, the said place is easily accessible and
amenable for employees for ingress and egress. Hence,
when the alleged incident took place at the said place, it
was easily amenable to public view. Public view does not
necessity mean public view by any passer by public but if
employees are at that place such employees are also to be
considered as members of public. Therefore, this prima
facie case is made out for prosecution that the alleged
incident is amenable to public view; hence, the ingredients
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of Section 3 of the SC and ST Act, 1989, regarding public
view are attracted. Thus, for this reason, when this is a
matter for trial at this stage, the proceedings cannot be
quashed.
24. Another argument canvassed by the learned
counsel for the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 that the
present complaint is offshoot of the strike called for by the
trade union and the learned counsel for the
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 has tried to make a
connection between the strike and the complaint with the
alleged incident. Learned counsel for the
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 has produced a notice issued
by the Weir BDK Valves Workers Union addressed to
accused No.2, who is the president of the factory, which is
dated 16.10.2024 and the complaint is lodged on
29.10.2024.
25. It is argued that the trade union had issued a
notice calling for strike if the demands stated therein are
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not honoured by giving 15 days' notice and after completion
of the 15 days of the notice, the complaint is lodged; hence,
the learned counsel for the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3
tried to make a connection between the complaint and the
strike. Calling for strike by the trade union is different
aspect. The complainant belongs to a member of the
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.
26. Just because a notice for strike is issued and a
complaint is lodged, linking these two events is nothing but
appears to be coincidence. Whether trade union has
instigated the complainant to lodge complaint against the
petitioners is a question of disputed fact is triable issue in
the trial, but cannot be decided at this stage. The complaint
lodged by the complainant is his private affair with the
accused. There is nothing in the notice dated 16.10.2024
that the accused have abused the complainant or any
members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes with
reference to the caste. The notice for strike is given making
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some demands by the trade union on the dispute between
management and union and because the date of notice is
issued on 16.10.2024 and the complaint is lodged on
29.10.2024, it cannot be said that the lodging of complaint
is linked with the strike. The complaint allegations are to be
considered on their prima facie value, apparently on the
face of the complaint. The complainant being one of the
workmen might have also inevitably joined with the trade
union, but the issue of strike cannot be linked with the
allegations made in the complaint, which can be tried in the
trial. Since the complainant is also an employee of the
factory and his grievance cannot be washed away when the
notice for strike is issued by the trade union. The issue of
strike and the complaint are to be considered
independently.
27. It is quite natural that everyone has
apprehension if any workman/employee goes against the
wish of the owner of the factory, then there is apprehension
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in the mind of employee/workman that he would be
terminated; therefore, this is a question of livelihood.
Hence, there might be delay, though it is not explained in
the complaint. Therefore, in this context, the delay is a
question of fact for trial to verify whether the complaint
averments are genuine or not. Under these circumstances,
the proceedings cannot be quashed as lodging of the
complaint does not amount to abuse of the process of Court
as prima facie case is made out to proceed with the trial.
28. The averments in the complaint are to be taken
at their face value considering the surrounding
circumstances. The abusive words used by the accused are
that even though a complaint has been lodged before the
Police against the complainant himself and his father "what
did you do and what did you achieve" and abused with
reference to caste in filthy language and also threatened by
lodging a false complaint of theft and terminating him from
the employment. These prima facie averments in the
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complaint constitute offences to be triable during the trial.
The genuineness and veracity of the averments of the
complaint cannot be decided at this stage.
29. It is argued that the present complaint is lodged
in the backdrop of an industrial dispute between the
management and the employees. Here, the petitioners are
part of the management and have filed a list of cases of
industrial dispute, but upon considering this fact of pending
industrial disputes, how far it has any connection to the
present case, considering the face value of the complaint
averments, is to be looked into is not made out. There may
be industrial dispute, but upon perusal of the complaint
averments extracted above, there is not even a whisper
that the complaint has been lodged in the background of
pending industrial dispute. Raising an industrial dispute is
different; it is done collectively by all the employees in the
factory. Therefore, merely because an employee, being a
member of trade union, who incidentally happens to belong
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to the SC/ST community, lodges a complaint as in the
present case alleging that an offence has been committed
by abusing him with reference to caste, is not a ground to
connect this case with industrial dispute cases.
30. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel for
the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 are found to be
distinguishable on the facts and circumstances involved in
the cited cases and in the present case on hand.
31. In the case of B. VENKATESWARAN AND ORS.
(supra), the facts are that there was a conspiracy and
unlawfully encroached the pathway adjacent to the house of
the accused and started to construct temple. It was alleged
that the said temple was built on the complainant's water
pipeline, sewage pipeline and EB cable thereby causing
obstruction to the complainant to enjoy his property. In this
background of a civil dispute between the parties, FIR was
registered for offences under the provisions of the SC and
ST Act, 1989. Hence, there was a property dispute and it
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was of the opinion that the civil dispute is given the color of
criminal proceedings; thus, it was quashed.
32. Considering the difference in facts and
circumstances involved in the above cited case, it is not
applicable to the present case on hand.
33. Further, in the case of RAJU (supra), the facts
are that there was a judgment of conviction and it is upheld
by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
and the accused is sentenced and one of the offences
alleged is under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)
and Section 3 (2) (V) of the SC and ST Act, 1989. The
Hon'ble Apex Court upheld the conviction under Sections
366, 342, 376(2)(g) of IPC and set aside the conviction
made under Section 3(2)(V) of the SC and ST Act, 1989, on
the reason that offence was made with reference to caste.
Therefore, in this background of the factual matrix, the
offences under the SC and ST Act, 1989, was set aside.
Hence, due to the difference in the factual matrix between
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the present case and the above cited case, the above cited
judgment is not applicable.
34. Further, in the case of SHAJAN SKARIA
(supra), the facts are that the accused in his capacity as the
Editor of an online news channel named "Marunandan
Malayali" published a video on YouTube and an online video
sharing platform, leveling certain allegations against the
complainant. Therefore, considering the difference between
the present case and the above cited case, the said
judgment is not applicable to the present case. Moreover, it
was considering the scope of ground of the anticipatory bail
in the context of Section 18 and 18A of the SC and ST Act,
1989. Hence, the above cited case is not applicable to the
present case on hand.
35. Further, in the case of KHUMAN SINGH (supra),
the facts are that the complainant-Rajaram along with his
brother Raghuveer, the deceased Veer Singh and relative
Badam Singh had gone to cultivate the fields and graze
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their cattle. When the deceased Veer Singh was cultivating
the field and the others were grazing the cattle, the
deceased objected and drove the buffaloes of the accused
out of his field, on which the accused became furious and
started abusing and scolding the deceased, saying how the
deceased belonging to Khangar caste could drive away the
buffaloes of Thakurs out of his field. When the deceased
objected to it, it is alleged that the accused with an
intention to kill the deceased, attacked him with an axe,
due to which the deceased Veer Singh fell down. Thereafter,
the accused allegedly gave two-three blows on the head of
the deceased with the axe and the deceased died. In this
background, the complaint was filed and in criminal
proceedings, conviction was recorded and went up to the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, which held that the conviction of
the accused under Section 3(2)(V) of the SC and ST Act,
1989, is set aside, but the conviction of the accused was
modified under Section 302 of IPC as a conviction under
Section 304 Part II of IPC and the accused sentenced to
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undergo. Therefore, due to difference in factual matrix
between the above cited case and in the present case, the
above cited case is not helpful to the petitioners herein.
36. Further, in the case of VILAS BHORMALJI
OSWAL (supra), the facts are that the petitioner, the
complainant and two others are partners in the business of
real estate and there is an agreement between the
partners. It is stated that in the agreement there is a clause
that the complainant will be appointed as Managing Director
and the petitioner is nominated as Joint Signatory Authority.
After passing a decade of the said partnership firm, a
dispute arose between the partners, particularly between
the petitioner and the complainant on the score that the
petitioner did not sign some documents pertaining to the
firm, due to which the development of business was stalled.
In this background, the matter culminated into the filing of
a complaint. Hence, there is a difference in factual matrix
between the above said case and the present case on hand,
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as the facts in the cited case are regarding the business.
Therefore, the above cited judgment is not applicable to the
present case on hand.
37. Further, the case of CHANCHALPATI DAS
(supra) deals with laying down the principle of law
regarding use of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
38. Further, in the case of LAKSHMI DEVI AND
ORS. (supra), the facts are that the complainant is the
owner of the land, who sold the land for a consideration of
Rs.50,000/- per acre. Even after the sale of the land, the
complainant was still interfering with the said land, which by
then had belonged to the petitioners by virtue of the sale
deed dated 24.04.2002. This drove the petitioners to
institute a suit in O.S.No.105/2011, seeking an injunction
against the complainant. The complainant was defendant
No.1 in the said suit and the said suit was decreed. In this
backdrop of a civil dispute with some allegations, the
complainant lodged a complaint under the provisions of SC
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and ST Act, 1989. Hence, having found a difference in the
factual matrix in the above cited case, the said judgment is
not applicable to the present case on hand.
39. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court and High Courts of different States in the cases relied
upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners/accused
Nos.1 to 3 are on the basis of the facts, circumstances and
evidence in each case; therefore, they are found to be
distinguishable from the facts and circumstances involved in
this case. Hence, they are not applicable in the present
case.
40. Upon reading the complaint averments,
apparently on the face of the record as discussed above,
when it is clearly revealed the offences alleged and
considering the surrounding circumstances, the prosecution
has made out prima facie case for trial and not found to be
abuse of process of Court. Also, the petition fails to
demonstrate what is to give effect to code (BNSS) and also
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fails to what is in the petition to secure ends of justice.
Hence, the proceedings cannot be quashed at this stage.
Therefore, the criminal petition is liable to be dismissed.
41. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
(HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR)
JUDGE
SRA /CT-AN
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 64
