Karnataka High Court
Sri. Hiriyanna Gowda vs Karnataka Power Transformer ... on 15 September, 2025
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WP No. 52205 of 2019
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH
R
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
WRIT PETITION NO.52205 OF 2019 (GM-KLA)
BETWEEN:
SRI HIRIYANNA GOWDA
S/O. K. KUNJAPPA GOWDA
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
JUNIOR ENGINEER (RTD.)
LAKSHMI NILAYA
SHIVANAGAR
MANNAKADU, KAVOOR
MANGALORE - 575 015.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI STEEPHEN MATHEW, FOR SRI KARUNAKARA P., ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. KARNATAKA POWER TRANSFORMER
Digitally signed by CORPORATION LTD.
MOUNESHWARAPPA
NAGARATHNA (DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY)
Location: High Court
of Karnataka CAUVERY BHAVAN
BENGALURU - 560 001
BY ITS DIRECTOR.
2. MANGALURU ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY
KONAJE
MANGALURU
D.K. DISTRICT-575 015.
BY ITS EXECUTIVE ENGINEER.
3. KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA
M.S. BUILDING
DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU - 560 001
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WP No. 52205 of 2019
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BY ITS REGISTRAR.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. VARSHINI R., ADVOCATE FOR
SRI B.L. SANJEEV, ADVOCATE FOR R-1 AND R-2;
SRI VENKATESH S. ARABATTI, ADVOCATE FOR R-3)
***
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER
DATED 24-7-2019 PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 THEREBY
ORDERING FOR WITHHOLDING OF 50 PERCENT OF PENSION
PERMANENTLY AND ALSO TO HOLD THE SUSPENSION PERIOD AS
PERIOD LEAVE WITHOUT PAY AT ANNEXURE-A AND QUASH THE
ENQUIRY REPORT DATED 28-2-2019 AT ANNEXURE-B AND ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
ORAL ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH)
The present Writ Petition has been filed impugning the
order of punishment dated 24.07.2019, wherein the petitioner
had been inflicted with the punishment of withholding 50% of
his pension permanently and to treat the suspension period as
'leave without pay' after conclusion of the domestic enquiry
against him. The petitioner has also challenged the enquiry
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report dated 28.02.2019 (Annexure-B), as well as the
recommendation of the Lokayukta for withholding 50% of the
pension permanently vide the recommendation dated
05.03.2019.
The petitioner faced domestic enquiry conducted by
learned Lokayukta for the following charges:
"Charge:
That you, Sri. R. Hiriyanna Gowda, (here in after
referred to as Delinquent Government Official, in
short DGO), while working as the Junior Engineer
(Elcl.), MESCOM, Konaje Branch, Mangalore,
Dakshina Kannada District demanded and accepted
a bribe of Rs. 1500/-on 05/03/2010 from
complainant Sri. G.Ajmal Khan S/o Sri. K. Abdul
Gafar Khan, R/o Chamlapura Hundi, behind BDO
01Office at Nanjanagudu Town in Mysore District
for line clearance and giving electrical connection
to the building of Nishara Public School in Harekala
Village of Mangalore Taluk that is for doing an
official act, and thereby you failed to maintain
absolute integrity and devotion to duty and
committed an act which is unbecoming of a Board
Employee and thus you are guilty of misconduct
under Rule 3 (1) of Karnataka Electricity Board
Employees (Conduct) Regulations 1988."
2. Thus, the charge was for demanding and accepting a
bribe of Rs.1,500/- on 05.03.2010 from the complainant, Sri.
G.Ajmal Khan, for line clearance and to give electrical
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connection to the school Building of Nishara Public School in
Harekala village of Mangaluru Taluk.
3. The petitioner was issued the notice by the Enquiry
Officer to file his defence to the aforesaid charge, and he
accordingly filed his defence. After considering the defence,
the Enquiry Officer proceeded with the enquiry against the
petitioner (DGO).
4. An FIR was also lodged against the petitioner on the
same day, i.e., on 05.03.2010, under Sections 7, 13 (1)(d),
read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988. In the said FIR, the Investigating Officer after
investigation of the offence submitted the charge sheet against
the petitioner under Sections 7, 13 (1)(d) read with Section 13
(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
5. In his defence statement filed in response to the
notice issued by the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner denied the
charges.
6. During the enquiry, three witnesses were examined
as PW1 to PW3 and 14 documents came to be marked as Exs.
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P1 to P14 on behalf of the disciplinary authority. After closure
of the evidence of the disciplinary authority, second oral
statement of the petitioner (DGO) was recorded. The DGO
examined himself as DW.1 and he produced three documents,
which were marked as Exs.D1 to D3 in support of his defence.
7. The enquiry officer framed following two points for
consideration:
"1. Whether the charge framed against the DGO is
proved by the disciplinary authority?
2. What order?"
8. The petitioner was working as Junior Engineer
(Electrical)/Section officer in MESCOM, Konaje Sub-division,
Mangaluru during the relevant period. The complainant, who
was running the school, requested the DGO to clear the line
and to provide electrical connection to the said school building.
According to the complainant, the DGO demanded a bribe of
Rs.2,000/-. Out of the demanded bribe of Rs.2,000/-, the
petitioner (DGO) received Rs.500/- as part payment on
04.03.2010, insisting the complainant to pay the balance
amount of Rs.1,500/- on the next day i.e., on 05.03.2010.
This conversation with the DGO was recorded by the
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complainant on a mobile phone belonging to one Sri. Sripal.
The said conversation was transferred to a Compact Disk.
Since the complainant was unwilling to pay the bribe to the
DGO to get the work done, he lodged a complaint with the
Lokayukta Police, Mangaluru, on 05.03.2010, producing the CD
containing the recorded conversation along with his complaint.
9. An entrustment proceeding was conducted in the
Lokayukta Police Station, Mangaluru, on 05.03.2010 in the
presence of two panch witnesses, viz., Sri. Omkarappa S.G.,
Commercial Tax Inspector, Commercial Tax Office, Mangalore
and Sri. Charles Oswald Monis, FDA, PWD Department,
Mangaluru. In the said proceedings, the bribe money of
Rs.1,500/-, consisting of three currency notes of Rs.500/-
denomination each, given by the complainant, was smeared
with phenolphthalein powder and treated as tainted money. In
the trap proceedings, the said amount was recovered from the
complainant, which he kept in the right-side pocket. To prove
the charge, the complainant and Omkarappa (PW1) supported
the charge of demand and acceptance of the bribe amounts
and the trap proceedings. The Enquiry Officer, after
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conducting the detailed enquiry, submitted the enquiry report
dated 28.02.2019, holding that the charge of demanding and
accepting the bribe money from the complainant was proved
against the DGO.
10. The learned Lokayukta issued notice to the
petitioner calling for his response to the enquiry report. After
considering the response, the learned Lokayukta was of the
opinion that the charge of demanding and accepting bribe was
proved against the petitioner. Accordingly, the Lokayukta
recommended the Government to impose penalty of
permanently withholding 50% of the pension of the petitioner,
vide the order dated 05.03.2019.
11. The disciplinary authority, after considering the
recommendation of the Lokayukta, imposed the punishment of
withholding 50% of the pension amount and directed that the
suspension period not be treated as spent on duty but instead
as 'leave without pay'.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has
vehemently submitted that the petitioner has been acquitted in
the special case No. 12/2011 arising out of the same incident
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for the offences under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section
13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, vide
judgment and order dated 26.02.2021 passed in
S.C.NO.12/2011. He, therefore, submits that if the petitioner
had been acquitted of the criminal offences, which were also
based on the same evidence and same set of facts, the
punishment order passed in the domestic enquiry would be
liable to be quashed and set aside. In support of this
submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed
reliance on the judgment in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan,
reported in (2024) 1 SCC 175.
13. On the other hand, Sri. Venkatesh S. Arabatti,
learned counsel appearing for the Lokayukta, has submitted
that the scope and ambit of departmental proceedings and the
criminal proceedings are different and distinct. In the
departmental proceedings, the charge has to be proved on the
basis of the preponderance of probabilities, whereas in the
criminal case, the charge has to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. He further submits that the complainant and shadow
witness, who supported the charge in the domestic enquiry,
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turned hostile in the criminal case for the reasons best known
to them as they might have been won over by the petitioner.
It is further submitted that the acquittal on the ground of
witnesses turning hostile or on technical grounds is not an
honourable acquittal; the petitioner cannot take the benefit of
the judgments in the criminal case. He further submitted that
the domestic enquiry was concluded in the year 2019, whereas
the judgment of the trial Court in the criminal case is of the
year 2021. Therefore, according to him, the acquittal in the
criminal case, where the very prosecution witnesses turned
hostile, will not have any bearing on the domestic enquiry.
Hence, the punishment order passed against the petitioner
cannot be said to be bad in law.
14. The learned counsel for the Lokayukta, has further
submitted that if the trial Court judgment dated 26.02.2021
passed in Special Case No. 12/2011 is analyzed, the acquittal
is based on the following seven points:
1. Discrepancies in the evidence of PW1;
2. Material contradictions in the evidence of PW1;
3. Material evidence (Primary evidence - mobile phone)
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withheld by the prosecution;
4. Material witness (CW4 though named in the charge
sheet), not examined, but he is examined as DW1 by
the accused;
5. Section 65B Certificate not produced;
6. Demand not proved;
7. Acceptance proved;
15. The submission is that the acquittal of the petitioner
is only on technical grounds and it is not an honourable
acquittal. He has also placed reliance on the judgment in
Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn. Ltd. v. C.
Nagaraju, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 367 and
Mehiboobsab v. Upalokayukta, reported in 2002 SCC
OnLine Kar 259.
16. Learned counsel for the Lokayukta further submitted
that the standard of proof in a domestic enquiry is not based
on the strict rules of Evidence Act. What is required in a
domestic enquiry is fair play and observance of the principles
of natural justice. If there is total absence of evidence to
support the charge, then only the enquiry and the punishment
order can be held to be invalid. But if there is some evidence,
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though it may not be sufficient evidence that cannot be a
ground for interference. Insufficiency of the evidence cannot
by itself be a ground for interference with the punishment
order. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the
judgment in the State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, reported
in (1977) 2 SCC 491and State of Karnataka v. Umesh,
reported in (2022) 6 SCC 563.
17. We have considered the submissions and also gone
through the enquiry report and the order passed by the
Lokayukta. The domestic enquiry was completed on
28.02.2019, and the punishment order is dated 24.07.2019.
However, the trial Court judgment came only in the year 2021,
i.e., 26.02.2021. The two witnesses i.e., the complainant and
the shadow witness, fully supported the case of the disciplinary
authority before the Enquiry Officer in the domestic enquiry.
However, they turned hostile in the criminal case.
18. We have gone through the judgment passed by the
learned trial Court and we are of the opinion that the
petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case is not a clean and
honourable acquittal, but it is based on the witnesses turning
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hostile and on some technical grounds such as not producing of
a Certificate under Section 65B.
19. The strict rules of evidence are not applicable in a
domestic enquiry, as held in the case of Ram Lal v. State of
Rajasthan (Supra) and State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh
(Supra). Paragraph 4 of the said judgment is extracted herein,
which would read as under:
"4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry
the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the
Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which
are logically probative for a prudent mind are
permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence
provided it has reason able nexus and credibility. It is
true that departmental authorities and administrative
tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material
and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking
not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this
proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text
books, although we have been taken through case law
and other authorities by counsel on both sides approach
is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or
considerations and observance of rules of natural
justice. basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or
surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the
conclusions reached, such finding, even though of
However, the courts below a domestic tribunal, cannot
be held good misdirected themselves, perhaps, in
insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out
should be chased and brought before the tribunal before
a valid finding could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to
which counsel for the respondent referred based upon
certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not
go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury
insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is,
was there some evidence or was there no evidence not
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in the sense of the technical rules governing regular
court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as
men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept.
Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of
the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny.
Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is
certainly available for the court to look into because it
amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We
find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal,
Inspector of the flying squad, is some evidence which
has relevance to the charge levelled against the
respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the
order is invalid on that ground."
20. A similar view has been taken in State of
Karnataka v. Umesh (Supra), wherein, after relying on the
judgment in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh (Supra), it
has been held in paragraph Nos. 18 to 21 as under:
18. In the course of the submissions, the respondents
placed reliance on the decision in Union of India v. Gyan
Chand Chattar [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar,
(2009) 12 SCC 78 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129] . In that
case, six charges were framed against the respondent.
One of the charges was that he demanded a commission
of 1% for paying the railway staff. The enquiry officer
found all the six charges proved. The disciplinary
authority agreed with those findings and imposed the
punishment of reversion to a lower rank. Allowing the
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High
Court observed that there was no evidence to hold that
he was guilty of the charge of bribery since the witnesses
only said that the motive/reason for not making the
payment could be the expectation of a commission
amount. The respondent placed reliance on the following
passages from the decision: (paras 21 & 31)
"21. Such a serious charge of corruption requires
to be proved to the hilt as it brings both civil and
criminal consequences upon the employee
concerned. He would be liable to be prosecuted and
would also be liable to suffer severest penalty
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awardable in such cases. Therefore, such a grave
charge of quasi-criminal nature was required to be
proved beyond the shadow of doubt and to the hilt.
It cannot be proved on mere probabilities.
***
31. ... wherein it has been held that the
punishment should always be proportionate to the
gravity of the misconduct. However, in a case of
corruption, the only punishment is dismissal from
service. Therefore, the charge of corruption must
always be dealt with keeping in mind that it has both
civil and criminal consequences."
19. The observations in para 21 of Gyan Chand
Chattar case [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar,
supra] are not the ratio decidendi of the case. These
observations were made while discussing the judgment
of the High Court. The ratio of the judgment emerges in
the subsequent passages of the judgment, where the
test of relevant material and compliance with natural
justice as laid down in Rattan Singh was reiterated :
(Gyan Chand Chattar case SCC p. 88, paras 35-36)
"35. ... an enquiry is to be conducted against any
person giving strict adherence to the statutory
provisions and principles of natural justice. The
charges should be specific, definite and giving details
of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No
enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry
has to be conducted fairly, objectively and not
subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or
unreasonable, nor the same should be based on
conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction in
proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part
of the delinquent cannot be misconduct. The
authority must record reasons for arriving at the
finding of fact in the context of the statute defining
the misconduct.
36. In fact, initiation of the enquiry against the
respondent appears to be the outcome of anguish of
superior officers as there had been an agitation by
the railway staff demanding the payment of pay and
allowances and they detained the train illegally and
there has been too much hue and cry for several
hours on the railway station. The enquiry officer has
taken into consideration the non-existing material
and failed to consider the relevant material and
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finding of all facts recorded by him cannot be
sustained in the eye of the law."
(emphasis supplied)
On the charge of corruption, the Court observed in
the above decision that there was no relevant material
to sustain the conviction of the respondent since there
was only hearsay evidence where the witnesses
assumed that the motive for not paying the railway staff
"could be" corruption. Therefore, the standard that was
applied by the Court for determining the validity of the
departmental proceedings was whether (i) there was
relevant material for arriving at the finding; and (ii) the
principles of natural justice were complied with.
20. In Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn.
Ltd. v. C. Nagaraju , this Court has held : (SCC p. 371,
para 9)
"9. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar
an employer from exercising the power to conduct
departmental proceedings in accordance with the
rules and regulations. The two proceedings, criminal
and departmental, are entirely different. They
operate in different fields and have different
objectives. In the disciplinary proceedings, the
question is whether the respondent is guilty of such
conduct as would merit his removal from service or a
lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in
the criminal proceedings, the question is whether the
offences registered against him under the PC Act are
established, and if established, what sentence should
be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the
mode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry and
trial in both the cases are significantly distinct and
different.
21. The Court also held that : (C. Nagaraju case, SCC
p. 372, para 13)
"13. Having considered the submissions made on
behalf of the appellant and Respondent 1, we are of
the view that interference with the order of dismissal
by the High Court was unwarranted. It is settled law
that the acquittal by a criminal court does not
preclude a departmental inquiry against the
delinquent officer. The disciplinary authority is not
bound by the judgment of the criminal court if the
evidence that is produced in the departmental
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inquiry is different from that produced during the
criminal trial. The object of a departmental inquiry is
to find out whether the delinquent is guilty of
misconduct under the conduct rules for the purpose
of determining whether he should be continued in
service. The standard of proof in a departmental
inquiry is not strictly based on the rules of evidence.
The order of dismissal which is based on the
evidence before the enquiry officer in the disciplinary
proceedings, which is different from the evidence
available to the criminal court, is justified and
needed no interference by the High Court."
21. In exercise of the power of the judicial review under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court should
restrict its review to determine whether:
i) the principles of natural justice have been complied
with;
ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence;
iii) the statutory rules governing conduct of the
disciplinary proceedings have been observed;
iv) the findings of disciplinary authority suffers from any
perversity;
v) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven
misconduct;
22. Applying these tests/parameters, we find that
neither the principles of natural justice have been violated, nor
the finding of the misconduct is based on no evidence. The
statutory rules governing conduct of domestic enquiry have
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been fully complied with, and the finding of the disciplinary
authority does not suffer from any perversity. We are also of
the opinion that the penalty of withholding 50% of the pension
is not disproportionate to the misconduct of the petitioner, so
as to shock the conscience of this Court.
23. It may also be relevant to take note the judgment in
Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn. Ltd. v. C.
Nagaraju (Supra), wherein it was held that if prosecution
witnesses turn hostile in a criminal trial and the accused gets
acquittal, the same would not have any bearing if in the
domestic enquiry if the charge is otherwise proved against the
delinquent officer. Paragraph Nos. 10 and 11 of the said
judgment, which are relevant, are extracted hereunder:
"10. ........... In the present case, the prosecution
witnesses turned hostile in the criminal trial against
Respondent 1. He was acquitted by the criminal court
on the ground that the prosecution could not produce
any credible evidence to prove the charge. On the other
hand, the complainant and the other witnesses
appeared before the inquiry officer and deposed against
Respondent 1. The evidence available in the
departmental inquiry is completely different from that
led by the prosecution in criminal trial.
11. ............ On the basis that the evidence in both the
criminal trial and departmental inquiry is the same, the
order of dismissal of the appellant therein was set
aside. As stated earlier, the facts of this case are
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entirely different. The acquittal of Respondent 1 was
due to non-availability of any evidence before the
criminal court. The order of dismissal was on the basis
of a report of the inquiry officer before whom there was
ample evidence against Respondent 1."
24. A similar view has been taken by this Court in
Mehiboobsab v. Upalokayukta (Supra), paragraph Nos.17
and 18 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder:
"17. Therefore, the principle that emerges is that
an acquittal in a criminal proceedings does not take
away the right of the employer to initiate or continue
departmental proceedings against the employee, in
regard to the same charges. But, where the employee is
honourably acquitted by being completely exonerated,
then normally it would not be expedient or appropriate
to initiate or continue the departmental enquiry, on the
very same charges.
18. Where the Criminal Court acquits an accused
on a technical ground [for example on the ground of
failure to obtain requisite sanction for prosecution or on
the ground of limitation] or where the accused is
acquitted for want of sufficient evidence or non-
examination of material witnesses or on account of
material witnesses turning hostile or on account of
conflict in evidence or where the accused is acquitted by
extending the benefit of doubt on the ground that the
prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond
reasonable doubt, then such acquittal is not an
exoneration of the accused by an honourable acquittal.
In such cases, the management is at liberty to proceed
with the enquiry or initiate an enquiry on the very same
charges, even after the acquittal. The reasons are
evident."
25. Insofar as the decision in Ram Lal v. State of
Rajasthan (Supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the
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petitioner is concerned, paragraph 20 make it evident that the
acquittal of the accused in that criminal proceeding was after
full consideration of the prosecution evidence, which miserably
failed to prove the charge. Paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 of the
said judgment, which are relevant, are extracted hereunder:
28. Expressions like "benefit of doubt" and
"honourably acquitted", used in judgments are not to be
understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not
be carried away by the mere use of such terminology.
In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded
that Ext. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of
birth as 21-4-1972 and the same has also been proved
by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution.
The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal
proceeding was after full consideration of the
prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably
failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a
reading of the judgment in its entirety. The Court in
judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of
the judgment and not go by the form of expression
used.
29. We are satisfied that the findings of the
Appellate Judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that
the charge against the appellant was not just, "not
proved" in fact the charge even stood "disproved" by
the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a
fact is said to be "disproved" when, after considering
the matters before it, the court either believes that it
does not exist or considers its non-existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the
supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be
"not proved" when it is neither "proved" nor "disproved"
(see Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P.8).
30. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth
of the finding of the Appellate Judge, the disciplinary
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proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be
allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but
identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances
were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of
our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary
authority and the appellate authority as allowing them
to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case
is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M. Tank.
26. In the present case, it is not the findings of the trial
Court that the prosecution had failed miserably to prove the
charge against the petitioner / accused. But the acquittal of
the petitioner was on technical grounds, i.e., witnesses turning
hostile, non-production of the Section 65B Certificate, etc.
Therefore, the judgment in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan
(Supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is
not of much relevance, considering the facts and circumstances
of the present case. We therefore, find no ground to interfere
with the impugned punishment order. Accordingly, the Writ
Petition is dismissed, however, without costs.
Sd/-
(D K SINGH)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VENKATESH NAIK T)
JUDGE
