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Sidaray M. Biradar vs Basavaraj
2025 Latest Caselaw 8183 Kant

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 8183 Kant
Judgement Date : 10 September, 2025

Karnataka High Court

Sidaray M. Biradar vs Basavaraj on 10 September, 2025

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                                                   CRL.A No. 200003 of 2021


                   HC-KAR




                             IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,

                                    KALABURAGI BENCH

                       DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025

                                          BEFORE
                             THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE M G UMA


                            CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.200003 OF 2021
                                  (378(Cr.PC)/419(BNSS))
                   BETWEEN:

                   SRI SIDARAY M. BIRADAR,
                   AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS, OCC:BMTC RTD. EMPLOYEE,
                   R/O. MURANKERI, VIJAYAPUR-586 101
                                                             ...APPELLANT

                   (BY SRI S. S. MAMADAPUR, ADVOCATE)

                   AND:

                   SRI BASAVARAJ
Digitally signed   S/O MALLAPPA YADAVANNAVAR,
by RAMESH          AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS, OCC:BUSINESS,
MATHAPATI          R/O NEAR TEKADE GALLI,
Location: HIGH     YADAVANNAVAR CHAWL, VIJAYAPUR-586 101.
COURT OF                                                     ...RESPONDENT
KARNATAKA
                   (BY SRI SHIVANAND V. PATTANASHETTI, ADVOCATE)

                        THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS   FILED UNDER SECTION
                   378(4) OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT
                   DATED 09.10.2020 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE II ADDL. CIVIL
                   JUDGE AND JMFC-II, VIJAYPUR IN CC NO.5324/2018 AND
                   CONSEQUENTLY CONVICT THE RESPONDENT FOR THE
                   OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 138 OF NI ACT.
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                                         CRL.A No. 200003 of 2021


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     THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS
DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM:      HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE M G UMA


                         ORAL JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE M G UMA)

The complainant in C.C.No.5324/2018 on the file of

learned II Additional Civil Judge and JMFC-II Vijayapur (for

short 'Trial Court'), registered for the offence punishable

under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

(for short 'N.I.Act'), is impugning the judgment of

acquittal dated 09.10.2020, acquitting the

respondent/accused for the above said offence.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are

referred to as per their rank before the Trial Court.

3. The complainant has filed the private complaint

in P.C.No.624/2018 before the Trial Court against the

accused alleging commission of the offence punishable

under Section 138 of N.I.Act. It is the contention of the

complainant that, he was having cordial relationship with

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the accused since 2014. During February, 2018 the

accused approached the complainant and sought for loan

of Rs.10,00,000/- to meet his family necessities. The

complainant and his son have promised to arrange for the

same and accordingly, gave Rs.10,00,000/- to the accused

who agreed to repay the same. When the complainant

insisted for returning the amount, the accused issued the

cheque as per Ex.P1 dated 08.08.2018 for Rs.10,00,000/-.

When the cheque was presented for encashment, the

same was dishonoured for 'insufficient funds' in the

account of the accused. Legal notice as per Ex.P3 was

issued to the accused, calling upon him to repay the

cheque amount. Instead of repaying the cheque amount,

the accused has issued reply as per Ex.P6 by taking

untenable defence. Thereby, he has committed the

offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I.Act.

Therefore, the complainant requested the Trial Court to

take cognizance of the offence and to initiate legal action

against the accused.

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4. The Trial Court took cognizance of the offence,

registered the criminal case and summoned the accused.

The accused appeared before the Trial Court, pleaded not

guilty and claimed to be tried. The complainant examined

himself as PW.1 and got marked Exs.P1 to P6 in support

his contention. The accused has denied all the

incriminatory materials in his statement under Section 313

of Cr.P.C. and examined himself as DW.1. The Trial Court

after taking into consideration all these materials on

record came to the conclusion that, the complainant is not

successful in proving the guilt of the accused beyond

reasonable doubt and therefore, passed the impugned

judgment of acquittal. Being aggrieved by the same, the

complainant is before this Court.

5. Heard Sri S.S.Mamadapur, learned counsel for

the appellant and Sri Shivanand V. Pattanashetti, learned

counsel for the respondent. Perused the materials on

record including the Trial Court records.

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6. In view of the rival contentions urged by

learned counsel for the parties, the point that would arise

for my consideration is:

           "Whether    the    judgment       of   acquittal
      passed    by   the   Trial     Court   suffers   from

infirmities and calls for interference by this Court?"

My answer to the above point is in the 'Affirmative',

for the following:

REASONS

7. It is the contention of the complainant that, the

accused had availed loan of Rs.10,00,000/- promising to

repay the same within a short period. Towards repayment

of the said amount, the accused had issued cheque as per

Ex.P1, which came to be dishonoured as there was

insufficient funds in the account of the accused. In spite

of service of legal notice, the accused has not repaid the

cheque amount. On the other hand, he has issued reply

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notice as per Ex.P6 by taking untenable defence. Thereby,

the accused has committed the offence punishable under

Section 138 of N.I.Act.

8. To prove his contention, the complainant

examined himself as PW.1 and has reiterated the

contention as taken in the private complaint. The witness

was cross-examined by the learned counsel for the

accused. The tenor of cross-examination discloses that,

the accused has disputed availing of loan from the

complainant. On the other hand, it is his contention that

he was in need of loan of Rs.1,00,000/- and therefore, he

has approached Siddhasiri Souharda Sahakari Limited,

Vijayapur and got sanctioned the loan through the

daughter of the complainant, who was working there and

as security, he has issued the blank cheque - Ex.P1. The

same was misused by the complainant with the help of his

daughter. Thus, it is his contention that, there is no

legally recoverable debt but the cheque - Ex.P1, which

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was blank has been misused by the complainant and

therefore, he is entitled to be acquitted.

9. Ex.P6 is the reply notice issued by the accused

at the earliest point of time. As per the defence taken by

the accused in Ex.P6, he had approached the daughter of

the complainant, who was working in Siddhasiri Souharda

Sahakari Limited, Vijayapur and requested her for hand-

loan. She lent the amount of Rs.1,00,000/- and took the

signed blank cheque bearing No.034166 i.e., Ex.P1. Even

when the accused approached the daughter of the

complainant and expressed his willingness to repay the

loan amount and asked her to return the said cheque, she

had not returned the same. The cheque in question was

misused by handing it over to the complainant and

therefore, he has not repaid the cheque amount.

10. The accused has stepped into the witness box

and deposed as DW.1. He has reiterated his contention

taken during the cross-examination of the complainant

that, he was in need of Rs.1,00,000/- during April, 2015

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and went to Siddhasiri Souharda Sahakari Limited,

Vijayapur where Shobha Biradar - the daughter of the

complainant was working. He applied for loan in the Bank

and the said loan was sanctioned. The Bank as per its

procedure obtained the blank cheque. Within three

months, he went to the said Bank to repay the loan

amount, but said Shobha Biradar stated that, she has not

brought the blank cheque. In the mean time, he has

received the notice from the complainant.

11. During cross-examination, the witness admitted

that, if a person wants to avail loan from the Bank, he

should be the member of the said Bank and has to provide

surety. The application for loan should be placed before

the Board of Directors and after his approval, the loan will

be sanctioned. He also admits that, on sanction of the

loan, it will be credited to his Bank account and he has to

withdraw the same from his Bank account only. He

further admits that, if the cheque is given as security, the

same has to be handed over to the Manager of the Bank.

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The witness further admits that, if there was any misuse of

the cheque, complaint should be lodged with the Board of

Director, but he had not filed any complaint either with the

Board of Director or with the police. Even after receipt of

the legal notice as per Ex.P3, he has not filed any

complaint.

12. The reply notice - Ex.P6, cross-examination of

PW.1 and evidence of DW.1 disclose that, the accused has

admitted that Ex.P1 belongs to his Bank account and he

has signed the same. When the accused admits issuance

of the cheque with his signature, the presumption under

Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I.Act would arise and the

burden shifts on the accused to rebut the legal

presumption.

13. To highlight the position of law on the subject, I

may refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bir

Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar1, wherein the Apex Court by

(2019) 4 SCC 197

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referring to its earlier decision held in paragraph Nos.34

and 36 as under:

"34. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.

36. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt."

14. I may also refer to the decision of the Hon'ble

Apex Court in M/s.Kalamani Tex and Another Vs. P

Balasubramanian2, wherein the three Judges Bench of

the Apex Court discussed at length about the position of

law with regard to the burden of proof in the offence

punishable under Section 138 of N.I.Act. It referred to its

(2021) 5 SCC 283

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earlier decision in Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa3, and

held in paragraph Nos.14, 15, 16 and 18 as under:

"14. Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these 'reverse onus' clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. This point of law has been crystalized by this Court in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat in the following words:

                           "In     the   case      at    hand,        even    after
                purportedly         drawing      the     presumption         under

Section 139 of the NI Act, the trial court proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part of the complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused and want of examination of relevant witnesses who allegedly extended him money for advancing it to the accused. This approach of the trial court had been at variance with the principles of presumption in law. After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the accused had discharged the onus by bringing record such facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his favour, any doubt on the

AIR 2019 SC 1983

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complainant's case could not have been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to the appellant- accused....."

15. Once the 2nd Appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the Deed, the trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The trial Court fell in error when it called upon the Complainant-Respondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay. Such approach of the trial Court was directly in the teeth of the established legal position as discussed above, and amounts to a patent error of law.

16. No doubt, and as correctly argued by senior counsel for the appellants, the presumptions raised under Section 118 and Section 139 are rebuttable in nature. As held in MS Narayana Menon v. State of Kerela, which was relied upon in Basalingappa (supra), a probable defence needs to be raised, which must meet the standard of "preponderance of probability", and not mere possibility. These principles were also affirmed in the case of Kumar Exports (supra), wherein it was further held that a bare denial of passing of consideration would not aid the case of accused.

18. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, where this court held that:

"Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract

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presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt."

(Emphasis supplied)

15. I may also refer to the decision of the Hon'ble

Apex Court in APS Forex Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shakti

International Fashion Linkers and Others4, wherein it

is held in paragraph No.7 as under:

"7. Coming back to the facts in the present case and considering the fact that the accused has admitted the issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was issued for the second time, after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even according to the accused some amount was due and payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. Of course such presumption is rebuttable in nature. However, to rebut the presumption the accused was required to lead the evidence that full amount due and payable to the complain-ant has been paid. In the present case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The story put forward by the accused that the cheques were given by way of security is not believable in absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption and more particularly the cheque in question was is-sued for the

AIR 2020 SC 945

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second time, after the earlier cheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in not properly appreciating and considering the presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the N.I. Act. It appears that both, the Learned Trial Court as well as the High Court, have committed error in shifting the burden upon the complain-ant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act. As observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example of reverse onus - clause and therefore once the issuance of the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability and thereafter it is for the accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence.

16. Thus, the position of law on the subject is very

well settled. If the same are applied to the facts and

circumstances of the present case, I am of the opinion

that, the complainant has discharged his initial burden of

proving existence of legally recoverable debt since the

accused has admitted issuance of cheque with his

signature. The burden then shifts on the accused to rebut

the said presumption.

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17. The accused has taken inconsistent defences.

As per Ex.P6, it is his contention that, he had availed

hand-loan of Rs.1,00,000/- from Shobha Biradar - the

daughter of the complainant and handed over the blank

cheque to her as security. But during cross-examination

of PW.1, the accused contends that, he had availed loan

from Siddhasiri Souharda Sahakari Limited, Vijayapur

where Shobha Biradar is an employee. The accused when

stepped into the witness box and deposed as DW.1 has

further stated that, he had submitted an application to

Siddhasiri Souharda Sahakari Limited, Vijayapur for grant

of loan. The same was accepted and the loan was

sanctioned by the Bank. The amount was credited to his

Bank account. No scrap of paper is produced by the

accused to substantiate his contention in that regard. He

could have summoned the manager of the Bank or he

could have produced his cheque book to show that he has

availed loan of Rs.1,00,000/- from the said Bank.

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18. Interestingly, the accused had not complained

to the Board of Director or to the police against Shobha

Biradar for having received the cheque - Ex.P1. The

accused has not instructed the Bank to stop payment

when Shobha Birader has refused to return the blank

cheque said to have been issued by him as security. The

conduct of the accused in taking inconsistent pleas and his

failure to probablise his defence, makes him liable for

conviction.

19. I have gone through the impugned judgment of

acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The Trial Court has

proceeded to acquit the accused solely on the ground that,

the complainant has not produced any document to show

that he has lent Rs.10,00,000/- to the accused and also

payment of the said amount by the complainant is in

violation of Section 269(S.S.) of the Income Tax Act.

Thus, the Trial Court formed an opinion that, reverse

burden lies on the complainant to prove the existence of

legally recoverable debt. The Trial Court wholly misleads

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itself in forming such opinion ignoring the settled position

of law. When the accused has taken inconsistent defence,

after admitting issuance of the cheque with his signature

and fails to probablise the same, the burden will never

shift on the complainant, as that will not amount to

rebutting the legal presumption. Hence, the impugned

judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is liable to

be set aside.

20. Heard learned counsel for the respondent on

sentence.

21. Learned counsel for the respondent submits

that instead of imposing substantive sentence, reasonable

fine may be imposed on the accused.

22. In view of the above, I answer the above point

in the affirmative and proceed to pass the following:

ORDER

(i) The criminal appeal is allowed.

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(ii) The impugned judgment of acquittal dated

09.10.2020 passed in Criminal Case

No.5324/2018 by the learned II Additional

Civil Judge and JMFC-II, Vijayapur, is

hereby set aside.

(iii) Consequently, the respondent/accused is

convicted for the offence punishable under

Section 138 of the N.I.Act. He is sentenced

to pay fine of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees

Fifteen Lakhs Only) within a period of three

months from today and in default of

payment of fine, he shall undergo simple

imprisonment for a period of one year.

(iv) Out of the fine amount to be deposited by

the respondent/accused, a sum of

Rs.14,90,000/- is ordered to be paid to the

appellant/complainant as compensation.

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Registry to send back the Trial Court records along

with copy of this judgment for information and needful

action.

Sd/-

(M G UMA) JUDGE

SRT

CT:PK

 
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