Karnataka High Court
Bangalore Electricity Supply Company ... vs State Of Karnataka on 31 October, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 31ST DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C M JOSHI
WRIT APPEAL NO. 1274 OF 2024 (GM-KEB)
C/W
WRIT APPEAL NO. 1562 OF 2024 (GM-KEB)
IN WA NO. 1274/2024
BETWEEN:
1. BANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY
COMPANY LIMITED,
(WHOLLY OWNED BY THE GOVT. OF KARNATAKA),
BENGALURU- 560 028,
REPTD. BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER,
(ON BEHALF OF MANAGING DIRECTOR).
2. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (EI),
O AND M DIVISION, BESCOM,
HARIHAR, DHAVANAGERE DISTRICT- 577 601.
3. ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
BESCOM LTD., DHAVANAGERE-577 001.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SMT. THARANGINI M.S, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
VIKASA SOUDHA, BENGALURU -560 200.
2. KARNATAKA POWER TRANSMISSION
CORPORATION LTD.,
FIRST FLOOR KAVERY BHAVAN,
BENGALURU-560 028,
RPTD. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR.
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3. T. KARIBASAPPA,
S/O LATE BASAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS.
4. LOLAKSHAMMA,
W/O P KARIBASAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS.
5. T S ANITHA,
W/O LATE T K SHIVAKUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS.
6. ARSHITHA,
D/O LATE T K SHIVKUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 16 YEARS.
7. YASHASVINI,
D/O LATE T K SHIVKUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 13 YEARS.
THE RESPONDENT NO.6 & 7 ARE
MINORS REP. BY 5TH RESPONDENT WHO IS
THE MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN.
THE RESPONDENTS NO. 3 TO 7 ARE
R/AT EKKEGONDI VILLAGE, HARIHARA TALUK,
DHAVANAGERE DISTRICT, KARNATAKA-577 601.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. NAMITHA MAHESH B.G, AGA FOR R-1;
NOTICE TO R-2 IS DISPENSED WITH V/O DATED 23.06.2025;
SRI MARUTHI G.B, ADVOCATE FOR R-3 & 4;
SRI MAHESH R UPPIN, ADVOCATE FOR R-5 TO 7)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORDS FROM THE
WP No-72/2023(GM-KEB) AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
24.01.2024 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WP No-
72/2023 (GM-KEB) BY ALLOWING THIS WRIT APPEAL,
b) TO AWARD THE COST OF THIS APPEAL.
IN WA NO 1562 OF 2024:
BETWEEN:
1. T. S. ANITHA,
W/O. LATE T.K. SHIVAKUMARA,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS.
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2. ARSHITHA,
D/O. LATE T.K. SHIVAKUMARA,
AGED ABOUT 16 YEARS.
3. YASHASVINI,
D/O. LATE T.K. SHIVAKUMARA,
AGED ABOUT 13 YEARS.
APPELLANT NOS. 2 & 3 ARE MINORS
REP. BY FIRST APPELLANT
WHO IS THE MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN.
ALL ARE R/O EKKEGONDI VILLAGE, HARIHARA TALUK,
DAVANAGERE DIST. -577 601.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI MAHESH R UPPIN, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
VIKASA SOUDHA, BENGALURU-560 020.
2. KARNATAKA POWER TRANSMISSION
CORPORATION LTD.,
1ST FLOOR, KAVERY BHAVAN,
BENGALURU-560 028.
3. BANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY LTD.,
(WHOLLY OWNED BY GOVT. OF KARNATAKA),
BENGALURU-560 028,
BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR.
4. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER (EI),
O AND M DIVISION, BESCOM, HARIHAR,
DAVANAGERE DISTRICT-577 601.
5. THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
BESCOM LTD,
DAVANAGERE-577 001.
6. T. KARIBASAPPA,
S/O. LATE BASAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS.
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7. LOLAKSHAMMA,
W/O. T. KARIBASAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS.
R/O EKKEGONDI VILLAGE,
HARIHARA TALUK,
DAVANAGERE DIST.- 577 601.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. NAMITHA MAHESH B.G, AGA FOR R-1 )
THIS WRIT APPEAL FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS WRIT APPEAL BY
MODIFYING THE ORDER DATED 24.1.2024 PASSED BY THE
LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WP No. 72/2023 (GM-KEB) BY
GRANTING INTEREST AND COST AS PRAYED IN THE WRIT
PETITION IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THESE APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR JUDGMENT ON 21.08.2025 AND COMING ON FOR
'PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT', THIS DAY, C M JOSHI J.,
PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C M JOSHI
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C M JOSHI)
1. For the reasons stated in the affidavits accompanying the
applications, IA No.1/2024 in WA No.1274/2024 and IA No.2/2025
in W.A.No.1562/2024 are allowed. Delay of 178 and 241 days in
filing both the appeals is condoned.
2. Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 24.01.2024
[impugned order] passed by the learned Single Judge of this
Court in Writ Petition No.72/2023 (GM-KEB), respondent Nos. 3 to
5 in the writ petition [the Bangalore Electricity Supply Company
Limited, and two others] have approached this Court in W.A.No.
1274/2024 seeking to set aside the impugned order and the writ
petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 [T.S. Anitha and two others] have
approached this Court in Writ Appeal No.1562/2024 seeking to
modify the same, under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act,
1961.
3. The writ petitioners, are the wife and children of deceased
T.K.Shivakumar, who died on 13.07.2014 due to electrocution on
account of an overhead LT Power Lines snapping and falling on
his back while he was cutting the grass in the land bearing
Sy.No.56/7, measuring 5.08 guntas situated at Byaladahalli,
Kasaba Hobli, Harihar Taluk. The petitioners came to know about
the incident since the deceased did not return to his home and
therefore, his relatives went in search of him to his field. A case
was registered by the Harihara Rural P.S. in Crime No.144/2014
for offence under Section 304(A) of IPC. The criminal trial before
the learned Principal Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.), and JMFC Harihara,
Davanagere, on the basis of the chargesheet filed by the police
ended in an acquittal of the officials of the appellants herein. The
writ petitioners sought compensation from the appellants/
respondent Nos. 3 to 5 since they did not respond, they filed the
writ petition in Writ Petition No.55489/2016, which came to be
disposed of with a direction to appellants/ respondent Nos. 3 to 5 to
consider the legal notice issued by the writ petitioners.
4. Despite such directions, the appellants/ respondent Nos. 3 to
5 rejected the notice and directed the writ petitioners to approach
the Civil Court. Therefore, the writ petitioners once again,
approached this Court in Writ Petition No.72/2023 and by the
impugned order, the learned Single Judge directed the appellants/
respondent Nos. 3 to 5 to pay compensation of `19,66,600/- to the
writ petitioners and the parents of the deceased (respondent Nos. 6
and 7 in the writ petition) which is challenged in these appeals.
5. The learned counsel appearing for appellants /respondent
Nos. 3 to 5 submits that the Criminal Court, which tried the officials
of the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 304(A)
of IPC has ruled that the negligence has not been proved and
therefore, the writ Court could not have come to the conclusion that
there was negligence on the part of the appellants in maintaining
the electrical lines. Secondly, she contends that the actions in tort
and negligence was to be established by the writ petitioners, which
being a factual aspect, the writ Court could not have exercised its
power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it is
canvassed that the learned Single Judge erred in directing the
appellants/ respondent Nos. 3 to 5 to pay the compensation to the
writ petitioners.
6. In this regard, she places reliance on the judgments in the
case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board V. Sumathi and others1;
Chairman Grid Corporation of Orissa Limited (GRIDCO) and
others V. Smt. Sukamani Das and another2 and N.
Adhinarayana Reddy V. KPTCL and others 3.
7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners
contend that when the negligence to maintain the electrical lines in
good condition, has been established by the report of the Electrical
Inspector, there was no need for the petitioners to approach a Civil
Court to establish such fact. The Criminal Court can only consider
the negligence for the purpose of punitive action, which entails
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, he submits that the
impugned order cannot be faulted in fastening liability upon the
appellants. He relies on the judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in the case of Karnataka Power Transmission
Corporation Limited (KPTCL) Vs. Mrs.Rekha and others4 and
connected matters.
2000(4) SCC 543
1999 AIR SCW 3383
WA No.5886/2001 DD 29.10.2001
W.A.No. 861/2022 Decided on 23-01-2025 & connected matters
8. Sofar as the appeal filed by the writ petitioners in WA
No.1562/2024 is concerned, he submits that the learned Single
Judge should have granted interest on the compensation amount
from the date of the petition and not from a date eight weeks after
the date of the impugned order.
9. The fact that deceased T.K.Shivakumar, died due to
electrocution on 13.07.2014 and such death was investigated by
the jurisdictional police, which culminated in filing of the
chargesheet against the officials of the appellants is not disputed.
The Criminal Court, finding insufficient evidence to impute criminal
negligence to the officials of the appellants, acquitted them. The
report of the Electrical Inspector, which is produced at Annexure-H
dated 31.07.2014, indisputably notes that the low tension [LT]
electrical line was dilapidated and it had three joints and also that
appropriate fuses were not installed, the snapping of the electrical
line was due to heavy rains and wind. It also notes that if the
electrical lines were kept as per Rule No.29 of Indian Electricity
Rules, 1956, the incident could have been avoided.
10. The question, whether the Court could exercise powers
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been elaborately
dealt by this Court in the case Karnataka Power Transmission
Corporation Limited (KPTCL) Vs. Mrs.Rekha and others &
connected matters referred supra. Regarding maintainability of
the writ petition, the Division Bench of this Court has elaborately
dealt the same and came to the conclusion that a writ petition is
maintainable. In paragraph Nos.66 to 69 of the above said
judgment, the Division Bench stated as below:
"66. According to learned Single Judge, once the liability of
State entity is established by virtue of principle of absolute
liability, the quantification is also made by the Courts in
exercise of writ jurisdiction by relying upon the judgment of this
Court in the case of Bhagyabai (supra) and Nagappa
Manneppa Naik (supra), he held that the writ petitions are
maintainable. On the issue of maintainability of writ petition,
the issue need to be looked from the perspective that the
Constitution provides for procedure to seek protection of
fundamental rights as guaranteed under part-III of the
Constitution. In State of Madras -Vs.- V.G. Row [(1952) 1
SCC 410], the Supreme Court recognized itself as a guardian
of fundamental rights. In Nilabati Behera -Vs.- State of
Orissa [(1993) 2 SCC 746], the Supreme Court evolved the
concept of invoking public law remedy in cases of violation of
fundamental rights. The Supreme Court held, the State cannot
plead the defence of sovereign immunity available to it in
private law. It held that, the Constitutional Courts while
exercising powers under Articles 32 and 226 of the
Constitution of India, are justified and are obligated to pass
orders directing compensation in case of proven violation of
fundamental rights. The Supreme Court in the case of MCD -
Vs.- Uphaar Tragedy Victims Assn. [(2011) 14 SCC 481]
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after considering the judgment in the case of D.K. Basu -Vs.-
State of W.B. [(1997) 1 SCC 416] held that, a claim made for
compensation in public law is for compensating the claimants
for deprivation of life and personal liberty which has nothing to
do with claim in talk in an ordinary Civil Court. In Hindustan
Paper Corpn. Ltd. -Vs.- Ananta Bhattacharjee [(2004) 6
SCC 213], the Supreme Court held that public law remedy for
the purpose of grant of compensation can be resorted to only
when the fundamental rights of citizen under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India are violated and not otherwise. The
contuse of the above constitutional guarantees expounded to
not only to the protection against arbitrary deprivation of life,
but also to ensure a minimum threshold standard of living. In
view of the decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that public
law remedy can be resorted to and a monetary compensation
can also be awarded in cases of violation of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
67. The connected question would be, what should be the
standard of proof seeking compensation under public law
remedy? The Supreme Court in the case of Sukamani Das
(supra) on which reliance has been placed by Sri. Sriranga
was considering the issue whether the High Court was justified
in awarding compensation in a case of death on account of
electrocution. It was held, where disputed questions of facts
are involved, a petition under Article 226 is not the appropriate
remedy.
68. In the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has, on
the maintainability of the writ petitions, in paragraphs No.7 to
10, stated as under:
"7. There are instances also where the State Entities
commit torts giving rise to claims for compensation
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which is sought to be asserted by way of a Writ Petition.
Liability for torts committed by the agents of the State
being an accepted principle, question whether a litigant
is to be driven to avail of the remedy before the Civil
Court is not a necessity. Once the liability of the State
Entity is established as in the present case in light of
discussion, by virtue of principle of absolute liability the
quantification is also an aspect that has been made by
the courts even in exercise of writ jurisdiction by resort
to settled principles to monetarily quantify loss of life or
injury to a person as is applied in motor vehicle
accidents which is the methodology adopted by the
Division Bench of this court in Baghyabhai (supra). The
Co-ordinate Bench of this court has also adopted similar
principles to calculate compensation and grant relief in
case of death or injury due to electrocution in Shri
Nagappa Manneppa Naik and Others (supra).
8. Accordingly, even in case of concurrent remedies
being available for claim of compensation by tortious
acts committed by State Entities, the invocation of writ
jurisdiction cannot be objected to as the tort-feasor
being State under Article 12 of Constitution of India,
remedy against such tort-feasor is open to be asserted
by invoking such jurisdiction.
9. In the present case it must be noticed that there is
absolute liability as regards the activity of the
corporation as accordingly under common law liability,
State being liable, remedy to enforce compensation as a
result of consequences following from such tortious acts
is being asserted by the petitioners. That apart claim of
compensation would also be construed to be
consequences of breach of statutory obligation.
10. In an action for compensation arising out of
wrongs by the State and if on available facts there is
clarity regarding liability and quantification though
partial, then to such extent, there is no reason for denial
of remedy to claim compensation in writ proceedings."
(emphasis supplied)
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69. We agree with the aforesaid conclusion of the learned
Single Judge on the maintainability of the writ petitions. Sri.
Sriranga has, in support of his submission that a writ petition in
respect of prayer for compensation shall not be maintainable,
had relied upon the judgments in the cases of Sukamani Das
(supra) and Timudu Oram (supra). The said judgments have
been distinguished by the learned Single Judge by holding
that, as there were disputed questions of fact, the same were
not entertained. But, in H.S.E.B. and others -Vs.- Ram Nath
[(2004) 5 SCC 793], the Supreme Court has distinguished the
judgment in the case of Sukamani Das (supra) and has
granted compensation."
11. While coming to such conclusion, the Division Bench had
referred to several other judgments, including the case of Rylands
V/s Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330] and M.C. Mehta and another
vs Union of India and Others [(1987) 1 SCC 395] and came to the
conclusion that the judgment in the case of Madhya Pradesh
Electricity Board vs Shail Kumari and others [AIR 2002 SC 551]
is applicable. In paragraph Nos.72 and 73, this Court observed as
below:
"72. The submission of Sri. Sriranga was, the principle of
absolute liability has no applicability to the facts in as much as
the owner of the building was negligent against whom the
proceedings have been initiated; even the BBMP was clearly
negligent in its action. The aforesaid submission of Sri.
Sriranga is unmerited because, the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of M.C. Mehta (supra) on which reliance has
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been placed by the learned Single Judge more particularly
paragraph No.31 which is reproduced as under, is very clear
that the principles of absolute liability shall be applicable in as
much as any enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or
inherently dangerous activity and the accident is caused, then
such enterprise is absolutely liable to compensate all those
who are affected by the accident and such liability is not
subject to any of the exceptions:
"31. We must also deal with one other question
which was seriously debated before us and that
question is as to what is the measure of liability of an
enterprise which is engaged in an hazardous or
inherently dangerous industry, if by reason of an
accident occurring in such industry, persons die or are
injured. Does the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR
3 HL 330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] apply or
is there any other principle on which the liability can be
determined. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3
HL 330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] was
evolved in the year 1866 and it provides that a person
who for his own purposes brings on to his land and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if
it escapes must keep it at his peril and, if he fails to do
so, is prima facie liable for the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape. The liability under
this rule is strict and it is no defence that the thing
escaped without that person's wilful act, default or
neglect or even that he had no knowledge of its
existence. This rule laid down a principle of liability that
if a person who brings on to his land and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do harm and such thing
escapes and does damage to another, he is liable to
compensate for the damage caused. Of course, this rule
applies only to non-natural user of the land and it does
not apply to things naturally on the land or where the
escape is due to an act of God and an act of a stranger
or the default of the person injured or where the thing
which escapes is present by the consent of the person
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injured or in certain cases where there is statutory
authority. Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 45,
para 1305. Considerable case law has developed in
England as to what is natural and what is non-natural
use of land and what are precisely the circumstances in
which this rule may be displaced. But it is not necessary
for us to consider these decisions laying down the
parameters of this rule because in a modern industrial
society with highly developed scientific knowledge and
technology where hazardous or inherently dangerous
industries are necessary to carry as part of the
developmental programme, this rule evolved in the 19th
century at a time when all these developments of
science and technology had not taken place cannot
afford any guidance in evolving any standard of liability
consistent with the constitutional norms and the needs
of the present day economy and social structure. We
need not feel inhibited by this rule which was evolved in
the context of a totally different kind of economy. Law
has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast
changing society and keep abreast with the economic
developments taking place in the country. As new
situations arise the law has to be evolved in order to
meet the challenge of such new situations. Law cannot
afford to remain static. We have to evolve new
principles and lay down new norms which would
adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a
highly industrialised economy. We cannot allow our
judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law
as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any
other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches
of a foreign legal order. We are certainly prepared to
receive light from whatever source it comes but we have
to build our own jurisprudence and we cannot
countenance an argument that merely because the law
in England does not recognise the rule of strict and
absolute liability in cases of hazardous or inherently
dangerous activities or the rule laid down in Rylands v.
Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All
ER Rep 1] as developed in England recognises certain
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limitations and exceptions, we in India must hold back
our hands and not venture to evolve a new principle of
liability since English courts have not done so. We have
to develop our own law and if we find that it is necessary
to construct a new principle of liability to deal with an
unusual situation which has arisen and which is likely to
arise in future on account of hazardous or inherently
dangerous industries which are concommitant to an
industrial economy, there is no reason why we should
hesitate to evolve such principle of liability merely
because it has not been so done in England. We are of
the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a
hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which
poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the
persons working in the factory and residing in the
surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable
duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to
anyone on account of hazardous or inherently
dangerous nature of the activity which it has
undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be under an
obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently
dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be
conducted with the highest standards of safety and if
any harm results on account of such activity, the
enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for
such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise
to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the
harm occurred without any negligence on its part. Since
the persons harmed on account of the hazardous or
inherently dangerous activity carried on by the
enterprise would not be in a position to isolate the
process of operation from the hazardous preparation of
substance or any other related element that caused the
harm the enterprise must be held strictly liable for
causing such harm as a part of the social cost of
carrying on the hazardous or inherently dangerous
activity. If the enterprise is permitted to carry on an
hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for its profit,
the law must presume that such permission is
conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any
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accident arising on account of such hazardous or
inherently dangerous activity as an appropriate item of
its overheads. Such hazardous or inherently dangerous
activity for private profit can be tolerated only on
condition that the enterprise engaged in such hazardous
or inherently dangerous activity indemnifies all those
who suffer on account of the carrying on of such
hazardous or inherently dangerous activity regardless of
whether it is carried on carefully or not. This principle is
also sustainable on the ground that the enterprise alone
has the resource to discover and guard against hazards
or dangers and to provide warning against potential
hazards. We would therefore hold that where in
enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently
dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on
account of an accident in the operation of such
hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for
example, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly
and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are
affected by the accident and such liability is not subject
to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the
tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : 19 LT 220 :
(1861-73) All ER Rep 1] ."
(emphasis supplied)
73. We are also of the view that the learned Single Judge is
justified in relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of Shail Kumari (supra) wherein in paragraph No.7, 8
and 13, the Court held as under:
"7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to
supply electric energy in the particular locality was
statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so
transmitted causes injury or death of a human being,
who gets unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability
to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the
electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity
transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous
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dimension the managers of its supply have the added
duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of
such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not
remain live on the road as users of such road would be
under peril. It is no defence on the part of the
management of the Board that somebody committed
mischief by siphoning such energy to his private
property and that the electrocution was from such
diverted line. It is the lookout of the managers of the
supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing
necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got
snapped and fell on the public road the electric current
thereon should automatically have been disrupted.
Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have
extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such
mishaps.
8. Even assuming that all such measures have been
adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving
hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable
under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered
by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or
carelessness on the part of the managers of such
undertakings. The basis of such liability is the
foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such
activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in
law, as "strict liability". It differs from the liability which
arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way
i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the
foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking
reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that
which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be
held liable when the action is based on any negligence
attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in
cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable
irrespective of whether he could have avoided the
particular harm by taking precautions.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
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13. In the present case, the Board made an
endeavour to rely on the exception to the rule of strict
liability (Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-
73) All ER Rep 1] ) being "an act of stranger". The said
exception is not available to the Board as the act
attributed to the third respondent should reasonably
have been anticipated or at any rate its consequences
should have been prevented by the appellant-Board. In
Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. London Guarantee and
Accident Co. Ltd. [1936 AC 108 : 105 LJPC 18 : 154 LT
89] the Privy Council repelled the contention of the
defendant based on the aforecited exception. In that
case a hotel belonging to the plaintiffs was destroyed in
a fire caused by the escape and ignition of natural gas.
The gas had percolated into the hotel basement from a
fractured welded joint in an intermediate pressure main
situated below the street level and belonging to the
defendants which was a public utility company. The
fracture was caused during the construction involving
underground work by a third party. The Privy Council
held that the risk involved in the operation undertaken
by the defendant was so great that a high-degree care
was expected of him since the defendant ought to have
appreciated the possibility of such a leakage."
(emphasis supplied)
12. In the case of Sukamani Das, referred supra, the Apex
Court held that when there are disputed questions of fact, the High
Court was in error in entertaining the writ petitions. The said
observation was made in the light of specific defences raised by
the GRIDCO that the cause of death was a disputed question
before the Court. Therefore, the said judgment is not applicable in
the facts of this case.
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13. In the case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, referred supra,
the Apex Court relied on its own judgment in the case of Sukamani
Das and held as below:
"........However, it cannot be understood as laying a law that in
every case of tortuous liability recourse must be had to a suit.
When there is negligence on the face of it and infringement of
Article 21 is there it cannot be said that there will be any bar to
proceed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Right of life is
one of the basic human rights guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution. In U.P. State Co-operative Land Development
Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey & Ors., [(1999) 1 SCC 741
: 1999 SCC (L&S) 389] where one of us (Wadhwa, J.) was a
party, this Court after examining various decisions of the courts
on the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution observed that the language of Article 226 of the
Constitution does not admit of any limitation on the powers of
the High Court for the exercise of jurisdiction thereunder
though by various decisions of this Court with varying and
divergent views, it has been held that jurisdiction under Article
226 can be exercised only when a body or authority, the
decision of which is complained, was exercising its power in
the discharge of public duty and that writ is a public law
remedy."
14. Later a Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.5886/2001 in
the case of N. Adhinarayana Reddy, referred supra by relying on
the case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (supra), upheld the
dismissal of writ petition seeking compensation on the ground that
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the writ petitioner had sustained burn injuries by stepping on to an
electric wire which had fallen in the land of the appellant.
15. In the case in hand, the report of the Electrical Inspector
categorically holds that the electric wire which fell on the deceased
had three joints and therefore, there was negligence on the part of
officials of the appellants/ respondent Nos. 3 to 5. Further, the
Police, who investigated the matter had found prima facie case of
negligence and therefore, had prosecuted the officials of the
appellants/ respondent Nos. 3 to 5. The chargesheet filed by the
Police show that there were burn injuries on the back of the
deceased and there is no negligence that could be attributed to
him. The criminal Court, in its judgment, holds that the
panchanama was not established and as such, the culpability was
not proved beyond doubt. The report of the Electrical Inspector at
Annexure H would clinchingly show that there was negligence on
the part of the appellants/ respondent Nos. 3 to 5/Corporation in
maintaining the electrical lines. Obviously, there is no serious
dispute as to the material facts in the case. Therefore, we do not
find any merit in the appeal filed by the appellants/ respondent Nos.
3 to 5.
16. Insofar as the grievance of the writ petitioners regarding
interest is concerned, there is no reason to deny the interest from
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the date of the writ petition filed by them. It is pertinent to note that
the writ petitioners had approached respondent Nos. 3 to 5 with a
representation and such representation was rejected. Therefore,
they are entitled for interest from the date of the petition and as
such, the appellants/ respondent Nos. 3 to 5/Corporation is liable to
pay the interest at 6% p.a. on the compensation awarded, from the
date of writ petition till its payment.
17. In the result, the Writ Appeal No. 1274/2024 is dismissed
and the Writ Appeal No. 1562/2024 is allowed in above terms.
18. Pending applications in both the appeals are disposed of.
Sd/-
(VIBHU BAKHRU)
CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
(C M JOSHI)
JUDGE
tsn*
