[Cites 26, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Sri K Kiran vs The State Of Karnataka on 28 November, 2025
Author: S Sunil Dutt Yadav
Bench: S Sunil Dutt Yadav
-1-
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 15186 OF 2025
C/W
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 15187 OF 2025
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 15216 OF 2025
IN CRL.P No. 15186/2025
BETWEEN:
1. SRI K. KIRAN
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS
S/O P C KRISHNA
NO.2009, ASHA TOWNSHIP
DODDAGUBBI, 14TH CROSS
NEAR BRITS CLUB
BENGALURU - 560 077.
2. SRI VIMAL RAJ B.
Digitally signed
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS
by PRAKASH N S/O BABU RAJ
Location: HIGH
COURT OF NO.10, VMV HOUSE 5TH CROSS
KARNATAKA OLD YUKO BANK ROAD
VIJANAPURA, BENGALURU - 560 016.
3. SRI MADAN R.
AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS
S/O LATE RAJAN
NO.327, RAMAIAH BUILDING
1ST CROSS, RAMMURTHYNAGAR
K.R. PURAM, BENGALURU - 560 036.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI ARUN SHYAM, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI SUYOG HERELE E., ADVOCATE)
-2-
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
AND:
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH CID
REPRESENTED BY SPP
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BUILDING
BENGALURU - 560 001.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI B.N. JAGADEESH, ADDL. SPP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 528
OF BHARATIYA NAGARIKA SURAKSHA SANHITHA, 2023,
PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORDS AND ALLOW THIS CRIMINAL
PETITION AND QUASH THE ORDER DATED 17.10.2025
THEREBY REJECTING THE APPLICATION FILED BY THE
PETITIONERS UNDER SECTION 187(3) OF BHARATHIYA
NAGARIKA SURAKSHA SANHITHA, 2023 IN CRIME NO.73/2025
FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 103, 190,
61, 189(2) & (4), 109 R/W 3(5) OF BNS 2023 AND 25(1B)(b)
OF ARMS ACT, 1959 AND SECTION 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii), 3(2), 3(3),
3(4), 3(5) AND 4 OF THE KARNATAKA CONTROL OF
ORGANIZED CRIMES ACT, 2000 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE
LEARNED LXXXI ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS
JUDGE, BENGALURU (PRODUCED AT DOCUMENT NO.1
RESPECTIVELY) AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE
APPLICATION FILED BY THE PETITIONERS UNDER SECTION
187(3) OF BNSS, 2023 AS PRAYED FOR, IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE AND EQUITY (PRODUCED AT DOCUMENT NO.9).
-3-
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN CRL.P NO. 15187/2025
BETWEEN:
1. SRI K. KIRAN
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS
S/O P C KRISHNA
NO.2009, ASHA TOWNSHIP
DODDAGUBBI, 14TH CROSS
NEAR BRITS CLUB
BENGALURU - 560 077.
2. SRI VIMAL RAJ B.
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS
S/O BABU RAJ
NO.10, VMV HOUSE 5TH CROSS
OLD YUKO BANK ROAD
VIJANAPURA
BENGALURU - 560 016.
3. SRI MADAN R.
AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS
S/O LATE RAJAN
NO.327, RAMAIAH BUILDING
1ST CROSS, RAMMURTHYNAGAR
K.R. PURAM, BENGALURU - 560 036.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI ARUN SHYAM, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI SUYOG HERELE E., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH CID
REPRESENTED BY SPP
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BUILDING
BENGALURU - 560 001.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI B.N. JAGADEESH, ADDL. SPP)
-4-
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
528 OF BHARATIYA NAGARIKA SURAKSHA SANHITHA,
2023, PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORDS AND ALLOW THIS
CRIMINAL PETITION AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
17.10.2025 THEREBY ALLOWING THE APPLICATION FILED
BY SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR UNDER SECTION
22(2)(b) OF KCOCA, 2000 AND PERMITTING THE
INVESTING AGENCY TO FILE A FINAL REPORT BY
GRANTING FURTHER PERIOD OF 45 DAYS IN CRIME
NO.73/2025 FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER
SECTION 103, 190, 61, 189(2) & (4), 109 R/W 3(5) OF
BNS 2023 AND 25(1B)(b) OF ARMS ACT, 1959 AND
SECTION 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii), 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 3(5) AND 4 OF
THE KARNATAKA CONTROL OF ORGANIZED CRIMES ACT,
2000 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE LEARNED LXXXI
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
BENGALURU (PRODUCED AT DOCUMENT NO.1
RESPECTIVELY).
IN CRL.P NO. 15216/2025
BETWEEN:
1. PRADEEP
S/O KAMARAJ
AGE: - 28 YEARS
OCC: NIL
ADD: - FCI MAIN ROAD
VIJINAPURA, BANGALORE NORTH
BANGALORE - 16.
-5-
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
2. V. SAMUVEL
S/O VICTOR
AGE:- 21 YEARS, OCC: NIL
ADD:- NO.134/1, 6TH CROSS
T C PALYA, BANGALORE NORTH
BANGALORE - 94.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI VENKATESH DALAWAI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY CRIME INVESTIGATION DEPT
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU - 560 001.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI B.N. JAGADEESH, ADDL. SPP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
528 OF BHARATIYA NAGARIKA SURAKSHA SANHITHA,
2023, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE ORDER DATED 17.10.2025
PASSED BY THE LEARNED LXXXI ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND
SESSIONS JUDGE AT BENGALURU (CCH-82) IN CRIME
NO.73/2025 PRODUCED AT DOCUMENT NO.1 AND
CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE APPLICATION FILED BY THE
PETITIONERS UNDER SECTION 187(3) OF BNSS, 2023 IN
THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THESE CRIMINAL PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD
AND RESERVED ON 24.11.2025 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, THIS DAY, THE COURT
MADE THE FOLLOWING:
-6-
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV
C.A.V. ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV)
This Order has been Divided into following sections
to facilitate analysis:
I. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE 8
II. ANALYSIS:
A. CONTENTION REGARDING NON-ENCLOSING
COPY OF THE REPORT OF THE 10
INVESTIGATING OFFICER.
B. FULFILLMENT OF CONDITIONS FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME FOR INVESTIGATION
37
BEYOND 90 DAYS AS IS PERMISSIBLE IN
TERMS OF PROVISO TO SECTION 22(2)(b)
OF THE KCOCA.
C. APPLICATION OF MIND BY PUBLIC 48
PROSECUTOR.
D. SATISFACTION OF THE DESIGNATED JUDGE. 50
E. PRODUCTION OF ACCUSED WHILST 55
CONSIDERING APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME FOR INVESTIGATION WHILE
ACCUSED STILL REMAINS IN CUSTODY.
III. CONCLUSION 60
-7-
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
Crl.P No.15186/2025 has been filed by accused
nos.2, 3 and 7 calling in question the correctness of the
order dated 17.10.2025 passed rejecting the application
seeking to be enlarged on default bail, while extending
time for investigation and for filing of final report under
Section 187(3) of Bharatiya Nagarika Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 ("BNSS", for short) in Crime No.73/2025 for the
offences under Sections 103, 190, 61, 189(2) & (4), 109
r/w 3 (5) of BNS, 2023 and Section 25 (1B) (b) of the
Arms Act, 1959 and Section 3 (i) (ii) 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 3(5)
and 4 of the Karnataka Control of Organised Crimes Act,
2000 ("KCOCA", for short) pending on the file of learned
LXXXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru
and allow the application filed by the petitioners under
Section and etc.
2. Crl.P No.15187/2025 has been filed by accused
nos.2, 3 and 7 calling in question the correctness of the
order dated 17.10.2025 in Crime No.73/2025, allowing the
application filed by the Special Public Prosecutor under
-8-
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
Section 22 (2) (b) of KCOCA Act permitting the
Investigating Agency to file a Final Report by granting
further period of 45 days.
3. Crl.P 15216/2025 has been filed by accused nos.6
and 8 calling in question the correctness of the order
dated 17.10.2025 passed under Section 187 (3) of BNSS,
2023 in Crime No.73/2025 for the offences under Sections
103, 190, 61, 189(2) & (4) , 109 r/w 3 (5) of BNS, 2023
and Section 25 (1B) (b) of the Arms Act, 1959 and Section
3 (i) (ii) 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 3(5) and 4 of the KCOCA,
pending on the file of learned LXXXI Additional City Civil
and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru.
I. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:-
4. Smt. Vijayalakshmi, mother of deceased, is
stated to have filed a complaint to Bharathinagar Police
Station on 15.07.2025 alleging that her son was murdered
by certain persons and accordingly, First Information
-9-
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
Report was registered in Crime No.73/2025 for the
offences under Sections 103 and 190 of BNS.
5. The State of Karnataka had transferred the
investigation to the CID subsequently and the said Agency
has invoked the provisions of KCOCA against all the
accused.
6. The accused no.6 and 8 are stated to have
surrendered on 16.07.2025 and the said accused have
filed an application on 15.10.2025 claiming that they are
entitled to be considered for grant of Bail for failure to file
investigation report within the stipulated time.
7. It is further made out from the facts that the
Public Prosecutor had filed an application on 09.10.2025
for extension of time to file Final Report which application
was filed under Section 22 (2) (b) of the KCOCA Act.
8. It is submitted that the Trial Court had granted
extension of 45 days to file the final report and
- 10 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
consequently has rejected the bail application as having
become infructuous. Being aggrieved by the said order,
the present petition is filed.
II. ANALYSIS:
A. CONTENTION REGARDING NON-ENCLOSING COPY OF THE
REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER.
9. Learned Counsel appearing for accused nos.6
and 8 Sri. Venkatesh Dalwai has placed strong reliance on
the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Hitendra
Vishnu Thakur and Others v. State of Maharashtra
and Others1 to contend that the report of the
Investigation Officer ought to have been a part of the
report of the Public Prosecutor submitted to the Court.
It is contended that unless the report of the Investigation
Officer is referred to in the report of the Public Prosecutor,
the application of mind by the Public Prosecutor as regards
the report of the Investigation Officer cannot be discerned.
1
(1994) 4 SCC 602
- 11 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
Reliance is placed on the observations of the Apex Court in
para 23 which is extracted as bellow:
"23. We may at this stage, also on a plain
reading of clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of
Section 20, point out that the Legislature has
provided for seeking extension of time for
completion of investigation on a report of the
public prosecutor. The Legislature did not
purposely leave it to an investigating officer to
make an application for seeking extension of
time from the court. This provision is in tune
with the legislative intent to have the
investigations completed expeditiously and not
to allow an accused to be kept in continued
detention during unnecessary prolonged
investigation at the whims of the police. The
Legislature expects that the investigation must
be completed with utmost promptitude but
where it becomes necessary to seek some more
time for completion of the investigation, the
investigating agency must submit itself to the
scrutiny of the public prosecutor in the first
instance and satisfy him about the progress of
the investigation and furnish reasons for
seeking further custody of an accused. A public
- 12 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
prosecutor is an important officer of the State
Government and is appointed by the State
under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He is not
a part of the investigating agency. He is an
independent statutory authority. The public
prosecutor is expected to independently apply
his mind to the request of the investigating
agency before submitting a report to the court
for extension of time with a view to enable the
investigating agency to complete the
investigation. He is not merely a post office or a
forwarding agency. A public prosecutor may or
may not agree with the reasons given by the
investigating officer for seeking extension of
time and may find that the investigation had
not progressed in the proper manner or that
there has been unnecessary, deliberate or
avoidable delay in completing the investigation.
In that event, he may not submit any report to
the court under clause (bb) to seek extension
of time. Thus, for seeking extension of time
under clause (bb), the public prosecutor after
an independent application of his mind to the
request of the investigating agency is required
to make a report to the Designated Court
- 13 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
indicating therein the progress of the
investigation and disclosing justification for
keeping the accused in further custody to
enable the investigating agency to complete the
investigation. The public prosecutor may attach
the request of the investigating officer along
with his request or application and report, but
his report, as envisaged under clause (bb),
must disclose on the face of it that he has
applied his mind and was satisfied with the
progress of the investigation and considered
grant of further time to complete the
investigation necessary. The use of the
expression "on the report of the public
prosecutor indicating the progress of the
investigation and the specific reasons for the
detention of the accused beyond the said
period" as occurring in clause (bb) in sub-
section (2) of Section 167 as amended by
Section 20(4) are important and indicative of
the legislative intent not to keep an accused in
custody unreasonably and to grant extension
only on the report of the public prosecutor.
The report of the public prosecutor, therefore,
is not merely a formality but a very vital report,
- 14 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
because the consequence of its acceptance
affects the liberty of an accused and it must,
therefore, strictly comply with the requirements
as contained in clause (bb). The request of an
investigating officer for extension of time is no
substitute for the report of the public
prosecutor. Where either no report as is
envisaged by clause (bb) is filed or
the report filed by the public prosecutor is not
accepted by the Designated Court, since the
grant of extension of time under clause (bb) is
neither a formality nor automatic, the
necessary corollary would be that an
accused would be entitled to seek bail and the
court 'shall' release him on bail if he furnishes
bail as required by the Designated Court. It is
not merely the question of form in which the
request for extension under clause (bb) is made
but one of substance. The contents of
the report to be submitted by the public
prosecutor, after proper application of his mind,
are designed to assist the Designated Court to
independently decide whether or not extension
should be granted in a given case. Keeping in
view the consequences of the grant of
- 15 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
extension i.e. keeping an accused in further
custody, the Designated Court must be satisfied
for the justification, from the report of the
public prosecutor, to grant extension of time to
complete the investigation. Where the
Designated Court declines to grant such an
extension, the right to be released on bail on
account of the 'default' of the prosecution
becomes indefeasible and cannot be defeated
by reasons other than those contemplated by
sub-section (4) of Section 20 as discussed in
the earlier part of this judgment. We are unable
to agree with Mr Madhava Reddy or the
Additional Solicitor General Mr Tulsi that even if
the public prosecutor 'presents' the request of
the investigating officer to the court or
'forwards' the request of the investigating
officer to the court, it should be construed to be
the report of the public prosecutor. There is no
scope for such a construction when we are
dealing with the liberty of a citizen. The courts
are expected to zealously safeguard his liberty.
Clause (bb) has to be read and interpreted on
its plain language without addition or
substitution of any expression in it. We have
- 16 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
already dealt with the importance of
the report of the public prosecutor and
emphasised that he is neither a 'post office' of
the investigating agency nor its 'forwarding
agency' but is charged with a statutory duty.
He must apply his mind to the facts and
circumstances of the case and his report must
disclose on the face of it that he had applied his
mind to the twin conditions contained in clause
(bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20. Since the
law requires him to submit the report as
envisaged by the section, he must act in the
manner as provided by the section and in no
other manner. A Designated Court which
overlooks and ignores the requirements of a
valid report fails in the performance of one of
its essential duties and renders its order under
clause (bb) vulnerable. Whether the public
prosecutor labels his report as a report or as
an application for extension, would not be of
much consequence so long as it demonstrates
on the face of it that he has applied his mind
and is satisfied with the progress of the
investigation and the genuineness of the
reasons for grant of extension to keep an
- 17 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
accused in further custody as envisaged by
clause (bb) (supra). Even the mere
reproduction of the application or request of the
investigating officer by the public prosecutor in
his report, without demonstration of the
application of his mind and recording his own
satisfaction, would not render his report as the
one envisaged by clause (bb) and it would not
be a proper report to seek extension of time. In
the absence of an appropriate report the
Designated Court would have no jurisdiction to
deny to an accused his indefeasible right to be
released on bail on account of the default of the
prosecution to file the challan within the
prescribed time if an accused seeks and is
prepared to furnish the bail bonds as directed
by the court. Moreover, no extension can be
granted to keep an accused in custody beyond
the prescribed period except to enable the
investigation to be completed and as already
stated before any extension is granted under
clause (bb), the accused must be put on notice
and permitted to have his say so as to be able
to object to the grant of extension."
- 18 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
10. Accordingly, it is submitted that Investigation
Officer's report not being made available to the court as it
was not part of the report of the Public Prosecutor, the
Special Court was deprived of relevant material to arrive
at a conclusion to extend the period of investigation to file
Final Report by accepting the reasons made out.
11. At the outset, it would be necessary to extract
the relevant statutory provisions.
Relevant extracts of Section 167 (2) of Cr.P.C.,
reads as follows:
"(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused
person is forwarded under this section may,
whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the
case, from time to time authorise the detention
of the accused in such custody as such
Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding
fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no
jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial,
and considers further detention unnecessary,
he may order the accused to be forwarded to a
Magistrate having such jurisdiction:
- 19 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
Provided that:
(a) [the Magistrate may authorise the
detention of the accused person, otherwise
than in the custody of the police, beyond the
period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that
adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no
Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the
accused person in custody under this paragraph
for a total period exceeding, -
(i) ninety days, where the investigation
relates to an offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a
term of not less than ten years;
(ii) sixty days, where the investigation
relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry
of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days,
as the case may be, the accused person shall
be released on bail if he is prepared to and
does furnish bail, and every person released on
bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to
be so released under the provisions of Chapter
XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;]
- 20 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
[(b) no Magistrate shall authorise
detention of the accused in custody of the
police under this Section unless the accused is
produced before him in person for the first time
and subsequently every time till the accused
remains in the custody of the police, but the
Magistrate may extend further detention in
judicial custody on production of the accused
either in person or through the medium of
electronic video linkage.]
(c) no Magistrate of the second class, not
specially empowered in this behalf by the High
Court, shall authorise detention in the custody
of the police.
[Explanation I - For the avoidance of
doubts, it is hereby declared that,
notwithstanding the expiry of the period
specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be
detained in custody so long as he does not
furnish bail.]
Relevant extracts of Section 187 (3) of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 reads as follows:
- 21 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
(1) XXX
(2) XXX
(3)"The Magistrate may authorise the detention
of the accused person, beyond the period of
fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate
grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate
shall authorise the detention of the accused
person in custody under this sub-section for a
total period exceeding-
(i) ninety days, where the investigation
relates to an offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a
term of ten years or more;
(ii) sixty days, where the investigation
relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry
of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days,
as the case may be, the accused person shall
be released on bail if he is prepared to and
does furnish bail, and every person released on
bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to
be so released under the provisions of Chapter
XXXV for the purposes of that Chapter."
- 22 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
Relevant extracts of Section 22 (2) of KCOCA reads
as follows:
"22. Modified application of certain
provisions of the Code. -
(1) XXXX
(2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in
relation to a case involving an offence
punishable under this Act subject to the
modifications that, in sub-section (2), -
(a) The references to "fifteen days" and
"Sixty days" wherever they occur, shall be
constructed as references to "Thirty days" and
"ninety days" respectively;
(b) After the proviso, the following proviso
shall be inserted namely:- "Provided further
that if it is not possible to complete the
investigation within the said period of ninety
days, the Special Court shall extend the said
period up to one hundred and eighty days on
the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating
the progress of the investigation and the
- 23 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
specific reasons for the detention of the
accused beyond the said period of ninety days."
12. As rightly pointed out by the Additional State
Public Prosecutor, the power of the court to extend time
for filing the Final Report, is premised on acceptance of
the reasons assigned by way of "report of the Public
Prosecutor indicating the progress of investigation and
specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond
the period of Ninety days".
13. The plain language of proviso to Section 22 (2)
(b) would indicate that the Special Court is to take an
appropriate decision on the "report of the Public
Prosecutor".
14. No doubt, in para 23 in Hitendra Vishnu
Thakur (supra) the Apex Court has in extenso refered
the importance of the Public Prosecutor applying his mind
to the requisition of the Investigating Officer. However, a
careful reading of the observations of the Apex Court
- 24 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
would reveal that the Apex Court has infact in para 23
remarked that, ".... the Public Prosecutor may attach the
request of the Investigating Officer along with his request
or application and report..." (emphasis supplied)
15. The Apex Court has reiterated that the report of
the Public Prosecutor is not a mere formality. However,
the discussion touching upon the importance of the report
of the Investigating Officer which is to be subjected to
scrutiny by the Public Prosecutor does not have the effect
rendering the report of the Public Prosecutor vitiated if the
same does not contain the report of the Investigating
Officer as an Annexure.
16. The observations of the Apex Court cannot be
read without referring to the factual matrix that was under
consideration. The factual matrix is reflected in Para 36,
37 and 38 of the judgment in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur
(supra).
- 25 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
17. The Apex Court has noticed that what was
before the designated Judge was an application filed by
the Sub-Divisional Police Officer and addressed to the
designated Judge. Para 36 and 37 are extracted for
reference and would throw light on the factual matrix.
"36. The application for extension which
was treated as a report of the Public Prosecutor
by the Designated Court and on which
extension of time for completion of
investigation and filing of charge-sheet was
granted has been filed by the appellant as an
Annexure P-5 which is available at page 110 of
the paper-book and reads thus:
"OUT WARD NO. 90/89-P-1993
SUB-DIVISIONAL POLICE OFFICER,
WESTERN RAILWAY,
CHURCHGATE, BOMBAY.
Date : June 29, 1993
To,
Hon'ble Designated Judge,
Designated Court,
Pune.
Sub: Regarding progress of investigation
and request for extension of period to file the
charge-sheet under CR No. 90 of 1989 under
- 26 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
Sections 302, 338, 114, 120(b), 147, 148, 149
of IPC and under Sections 3/25(1)(c) of Indian
Arms Act and under Section 3 of TADA
registered at Palghar Police Railway Station.
Respected Sir,
With regard to the above, I have to state
that with permission of District and Sessions
Judge of Thane the investigation of the above
case is continued from 23-9-1992....
Received on 12-7-1993 Respectfully submitted
Sd/-- Date: 29-6-1993
Judge. Sd/--
(M.V. Deshmukh)
Sub-Divisional Police Officer
D.R.
Churchgate, Bombay.
Submitted to:
Shri Vijay Sawant,
Specially appointed Government Pleader,
Designated Court, Pune."
37. As would be seen from the application
itself, it is not a report of the Public Prosecutor
but an application filed by the Sub-Divisional
Police Officer and is addressed to the
Designated Judge of the Designated Court.
- 27 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
Even if it be assumed from the endorsement at
the bottom of the letter which reads thus:
"Submitted to:
Shri Vijay Sawant,
Specially appointed Government Pleader,
Designated Court, Pune."]
that the application was submitted to the Public
Prosecutor and not directly to the Designated
Court, in vain have we searched for any
material on the record to show that the Public
Prosecutor filed any report along with this
application before the Designated Court. In fact
learned counsel for the respondents admitted
that besides the application, extracted above,
no other report was filed by the Public
Prosecutor to seek extension of time for
completion of the investigation as envisaged by
clause (bb) of Section 20(4) of TADA though
the Public Prosecutor had filed his objections to
the bail application filed under Section 20(4) of
TADA read with Section 167(2) of the Code.
The Designated Court treated the application of
the investigating officer as a report from the
Public Prosecutor as is obvious from the
following observations of the Designated Court:
- 28 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
"It is pertinent to note that in these
applications the Investigating Officer had
forwarded the report indicating the progress of
the investigation on 29-6-1993 and in the said
progress report he prayed for extension of two
months' time for submitting the charge-sheet
on the ground that the prosecution wants to
seek sanction of the Inspector General of
Police. It may be noted that as per the
Amendment Act, 1993, Section 20-A has been
added and as per this provision, the previous
sanction of the Inspector General of Police
would be necessary. Similarly, it is mentioned
in the said report that in this matter four police
officers have also been involved and prior
sanction of the Government for prosecuting the
government servants as per the provisions of
Section 197 CrPC (is required). Thus, the
investigating officer wants time for making
compliance of law. Taking into consideration
very serious and complicated nature of the
offence the prayer for extension of two months'
time from 29-6-1993 appears reasonable for
seeking sanction to file charge-sheet. It is
contended on behalf of the applicant-accused
- 29 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
that a report of the Public Prosecutor is
necessary. It may be noted that the Public
Prosecutor while giving his reply has referred to
this report of the investigating officer and
prayed for extension of time. The Public
Prosecutor is also required to obtain the report
from the investigating officer and on the basis
of that report the Public Prosecutor files the
reply in the court. The reply of the Public
Prosecutor, read with the report dated 29-6-
1993 of the investigating officer, is sufficient
compliance of the report contemplated under
the proviso (bb) indicating the progress of the
investigation. Therefore the extension will have
to be granted to the investigating machinery for
two months from 29-6-1993. In the result the
bail cannot be granted."
18. The Apex Court then proceeds to specifically
observe that the request of the Investigating Agency
cannot be treated as report of the Public Prosecutor. The
observations at Para 38 reads as follows:
"38. We are unable to persuade ourselves
to accept the view of the Designated Court that
- 30 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
since the application of the investigating officer
was supported by the Public Prosecutor, the
request of the investigating agency could be
treated as the report of the Public Prosecutor
when read with the objections filed by the
Public Prosecutor to the bail application. The
observations of the Designated Court show that
the said court lost sight of the importance of
the report and treated the whole thing in a
rather casual manner. The application of the
investigating officer dated 29-6-1993,
reproduced above, can by no stretch of
imagination be construed as a report of the
Public Prosecutor as envisaged by Section
20(4)(bb) of TADA and therefore no extension
under clause (bb) could have been granted by
the Designated Court without the receipt of
the report of the Public Prosecutor. That apart,
even if we ignore the discrepancy in the various
dates regarding the presentation of the
application in the court it appears from a bare
perusal of the application of the investigating
officer that the Public Prosecutor did not even
endorse the application with any comments to
indicate as to whether or not he was agreeing
- 31 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
with the statements contained in the
application. The Public Prosecutor obviously did
not apply his mind to the request of the
investigating agency and merely acted as its
'post office'. The Designated Court was
deprived of the opportunity of scrutinising
the report of the Public Prosecutor before
granting extension. We need not, therefore,
even comment upon the reasons given by the
investigating officer in the application to test
their correctness or otherwise because we are
firmly of the view that the said
letter/application of the investigating officer
cannot be construed or treated as a substitute
for the report of the Public Prosecutor as
contemplated by clause (bb) of Section 20(4) of
TADA. Faced with this situation, learned counsel
for the respondents submitted that the
objections filed by the Public Prosecutor to the
bail application read with the application of the
investigating officer may be held to be
substantial compliance with the requirements of
clause (bb). We cannot agree."
- 32 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
19. The observations made by the court must be
read in context and the judgment is not an authority for
what it lays down in the abstract but is an authority for
what it lays down in the context of a particular factual
matrix. It would be relevant to notice observations of the
Apex Court in Deepak Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra,2
which reads as follows:
"7. It is well settled that the judgment of a court is not
to be read mechanically as a Euclid's theorem nor as if it
were a statute....
....17. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R.
Vairamani [(2004) 8 SCC 579: AIR 2004 SC 4778] a
decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the
factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also
observed: (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12)
9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions
without discussing as to how the factual situation fits
in with the fact situation of the decision on which
reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither
to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a
statute and that too taken out of their context.
(emphasis in original) These observations must be
read in the context in which they appear to have
been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be
construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases
2
(2008) 16 SCC 14
- 33 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
CRL.P No. 15186 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 15187 of 2025
CRL.P No. 15216 of 2025
HC-KAR
and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary
for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the
discussion is meant to explain and not to define.
Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret
judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their
words are not to be interpreted as statutes.
(emphasis supplied) In London Graving Dock Co.
Ltd. v. Horton [1951 AC 737: (1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL)]
(AC at p. 761), Lord MacDermott observed: (All ER p.
14 C-D)
"... The matter cannot, of course, be settled
merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J.
as though they were part of an Act of Parliament
and applying the rules of interpretation
appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the
great weight to be given to the language actually
used by that most distinguished Judge, ..."
10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [1970
AC 1004: (1970) 2 WLR 1140: (1970) 2 All ER 294
(HL)] Lord Reid said:
"... Lord Atkin's speech ... is not to be treated as
if it were a statutory definition. It will require
qualification in new circumstances."
Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No.
2) [(1971) 1 WLR 1062: (1971) 2 All ER 1267]
observed: (All ER p. 1274 d)
- 34 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
"... One must not, of course, construe even a
reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it
were an Act of Parliament;"
And, in British Railways Board v. Herrington [1972
AC 877: (1972) 2 WLR 537: (1972) 1 All ER 749
(HL)] Lord Morris said: (All ER p. 761 c)
"... There is always peril in treating the words of
a speech or a judgment as though they were
words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be
remembered that judicial utterances are made in
the setting of the facts of a particular case."
11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or
different fact may make a world of difference
between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases
by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not
proper.
12. The following words of Lord Denning in the
matter of applying precedents have become locus
classicus:
"Each case depends on its own facts and a close
similarity between one case and another is not
enough because even a single significant detail
may alter the entire aspect; in deciding such
cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide
cases (as said by Cardozo [, J.]) by matching the
colour of one case against the colour of another.
To decide therefore, on which side of the line a
- 35 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
case falls, the broad resemblance to another case
is not at all decisive.
***
Precedent should be followed only so far as it
marks the path of justice, but you must cut the
dead wood and trim off the side branches else you
will find yourself lost in thickets and branches.
(emphasis in original) My plea is to keep the path
of justice clear of obstructions which could impede
it.
(emphasis supplied)"' "
The same view was taken by this Court in Sarva
Shramik Sanghatana (KV) v. State of Maharashtra [(2008)
1 SCC 494: (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 215: AIR 2008 SC 946]
(SCC pp. 499-501, paras 14-17) and in Govt. of
Karnataka v. Gowramma [(2007) 13 SCC 482: AIR 2008
SC 863]."
20. The observation of the Apex Court in Hitendra
Vishnu Thakur (supra) at Para 23 throwing light on the
distinction between the inputs of the Investigating Officer
vis-à-vis report of the Public Prosecutor is in the context of
a report of the Investigating Officer being presented to the
court without a separate report of the Public Prosecutor.
It is in such context, that the Apex Court has emphasised
the distinction between the inputs of the Investigating
- 36 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
Officer and the role of the Public Prosecutor in submitting
a report to the Court after applying his mind.
21. If the observations of the Apex Court are
understood in such context, there is no ambiguity. In fact,
the Apex Court has specifically observed that the Public
Prosecutor may attach the request of the Investigating
Officer. Accordingly, even a reading of the plain language
would not admit of a mandatory requirement to attach the
report of the Investigating Officer along with the report of
the Public Prosecutor.
22. It is necessary to be cognizant of the legal
position that unless the Final Report is submitted by the
Investigating Agency to the Court the prosecution cannot
be compelled to divulge the extent and stage of
investigation. Though if in the opinion of the Investigating
Officer they are entitled to waive such privilege, which is
the prerogative of the prosecution.
- 37 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
23. The absence of annexing the report of the
Investigating Officer would not denude the legal value to
be attached to the report of the Public Prosecutor.
B. FULFILLMENT OF CONDITIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
FOR INVESTIGATION BEYOND 90 DAYS AS IS
PERMISSIBLE IN TERMS OF PROVISO TO SECTION
22(2)(b) OF THE KCOCA.
24. In terms of the proviso inserted as specified
under Section 22 (2) (b) the detention of the accused may
be further extended beyond the period of 90 days as
provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure up to a
period of 180 days.
25. The proviso which provides for such extension as
inserted by Section 22 (2) (b) of KCOCA, reads as follows:
22. (2) (b) After the proviso, the following proviso shall
be inserted namely:- "Provided further that if it is not possible
to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety
days, the Special Court shall extend the said period up to one
hundred and eighty days on the report of the Public
Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the
specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the
said period of ninety days."
- 38 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
26. What becomes clear is that such extension
beyond 90 days would be permissible where:
i) On the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating
progress of investigation.
ii) Assigning specific reasons for detention of accused
beyond the period of 90 days.
27. At the outset, the uncontroverted facts would
reveal that the application seeking extension is filed well
within the period of 90 days. The report of the Public
Prosecutor is detailed. A perusal of the report would
reveal:
(a) Progress of investigation at Point 1 to 17 which is
self-explanatory is extracted as below:
"ಸ ೕಯ ೕಸರ ತ ೆ"
1. vÀ¤SÉ PÉÊUÉÆAqÀ ¥Éǰøï E£ïì¥ÉPÀÖgï, ¨sÁgÀw £ÀUÀgÀ ¥Éǰøï oÁuÉ
gÀªÀgÀÄ PÀÈvÀå £ÀqÉzÀ ¸ÀܼÀPÉÌ ¸ÉÆÃPÉÆà C¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÉÆA¢UÉ ¨sÉÃn ¤Ãr 1) Control
swab collected from the road. 2) Supsected (sic) blood stained
swab collected from the road at the place of incident. 3)
Suspected blood stained Right shoe collected from the road at
the place of incident ¸ÀAUÀ滹 ¥sÉÇÃmÉÆÃUÀ¼À£ÀÄß vÉUÉ¢gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ¸ÀzÀj
ªÀ¸ÀÄÛUÀ¼À£ÀÄß J¥sï.J¸ï.J¯ï. vÀdÕgÀ ¥ÀjÃPÉëUÉ gÀªÁ¤¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
- 39 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
2. ªÀÄÈvÀ£À ±ÀªÀ ¥ÀAZÀ£ÁªÀÄ PÉÊUÉÆAqÀÄ, ¨ËjAUï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¯ÉÃr PÀdð£ï
D¸ÀàvÉæ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼Æ
À gÀÄ qÁ।। £ÁUÉñï PÀÄ¥Àà¸ïÖ, ¸ÀºÁAiÀÄPÀ ¥ÁæzsÁå¥ÀPÀgÀÄ, «¢ü ªÉÊzÀå
«¨sÁUÀ gÀªÀgÀÄ ªÀÄÈvÀ£À zÉúÀªÀ£ÀÄß ¢£ÁAPÀ:16.07.2025 gÀAzÀÄ ±ÀªÀ¥ÀjÃPÉë
ªÀiÁr¹zÀÄÝ, ªÉÊzÁå¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÀÄÈvÀ zÉúÀzÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É 45 UÁAiÀÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹
ªÀÄÈvÀ£À ¸Á«UÉ "DEATH IS DUE TO NEUROGENIC SHOCK DUE
TO INJURIES SUSTAINED OVER THE HEAD. FACE, NECK
AND THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGION JAzÀÄ C©ü¥ÁæAiÀÄ
¤ÃrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
3. ªÀÄÈvÀ£À «¸ÉgÁ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ §mÉÖUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¸ÀAUÀ滹zÀÄÝ J¥sï.J¸ï.J¯ï. vÀdÕgÀ
¥ÀjÃPÉëUÉ M¼À¥Àr¹ ¥ÀævÀåPÀë ¸ÁQëzÁgÀgÁzÀ ²æà EªÀiÁæ£ïSÁ£ï (qÉÊæªÀgï) ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ²æÃ
¯ÉÆÃPÉñï (qÉʪ
æ Àgï) gÀªÀgÀÄUÀ¼À ºÉýPÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß zÁR°¹PÉÆArgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
4. PÀÈvÀå £ÀqÉzÀ ¸ÀܼÀzÀ ºÁUÀÆ EvÀgÉ ¸ÀܼÀUÀ¼À ¹¹n« zÀȱÁåªÀ½UÀ¼À£ÀÄß
ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÉƨÉÊ¯ï £ÉléPÀÎð¼À lªÀgï qÀA¥ï zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¸ÀAUÀ滹, ¥ÀævÀåPÀë
¸ÁQëzÁgÀ£ÁzÀ ²æà ¯ÉÆÃPÉñï (qÉÊæªÀgï) FvÀ£ÀÄ vÀ£Àß N¥ÉÆà PÀA¥À¤ J¥sï-27
ªÉƨÉÊ¯ï ¥sÉÇãÀ£ÀÄß d¥ÀÅÛ¥Àr¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
5. ¢£ÁAPÀ 16.07.2025 gÀAzÀÄ J-2 QgÀuï PÉ., J-3 «ªÀįï gÁeï,
J-6 ¥Àæ¢Ã¥ï, J-7 ªÀÄzÀ£ï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ J-8 ¸ÁåªÀÄÄAiÀįï gÀªÀgÀÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß, ºÁUÀÆ
¢£ÁAPÀ: 19.07.2025 gÀAzÀÄ J-9 CgÀÄuï PÀĪÀiÁgï @ mɪÉÆÃ. J-10 £À«Ã£ï
PÀĪÀiÁgï @ £À«Ã£ï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¢£ÁAPÀ: 22.07.2025 gÀAzÀÄ J-11 ²ªÀ @ DmÉÆÃ
²ªÀ, J-12 ªÀÄ£ÉÆÃeï PÉ @ ªÀÄ£ÀÄ, J-13 J ¥Àæ¸Ázï. J-14 £ÀgÀ¹AºÀªÀÄÆwð
@ ¹AºÀ, J-16 ªÀÄÄgÀÄUÉñï PÉ. J-17 ¸ÀÄzÀ±Àð£ï @ aPÀÄÌ, J-18 C«£Á±ï
JA @ C©. J-18 ¥ÁånæPï, ºÁUÀÆ ¢£ÁAPÀ: 25/07/2025 gÀAzÀÄ J-19 QgÀt
@ qÉrè QgÀt FvÀ£À£ÀÄß zÀ¸ÀÛVj ªÀiÁr vÀ¤SÉUÉ M¼À¥Àr¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
6. PÀÈvÀåPÉÌ §¼À¹zÀ ¸Á̦ðAiÉÆà ªÁºÀ£À ¸ÀASÉå: PÉ-53¦-7193 d¥ÀÅÛ¥Àr¹
¸ÉÆÃPÉÆà C¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ ¥Àj²Ã°¹ ªÁºÀ£ÀzÀ°èzÀÝ MAzÀÄ ªÀÄZÀÄÑ, gÀPÀÛzÀ ¸ÁåA¥À¯ï,
PÀÆzÀ®Ä, 3 ºÉ¯ÉämïUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß d¥ÀÅÛ¥Àr¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
7. vÀ¤SÁ PÁ®zÀ°è DgÉÆæ-2 PÉ. QgÀuï vÉÆÃj¹ UÀÄgÀÄw¹zÀ PÉJ-03
PÉqÀ§Æèå-9424 DQì¸ï ¢éZPÀ Àæ ªÁºÀ£À, PÉJ-17 E¦-9608 gÁAiÀįï J£ï ¦üïïØ
§Ä¯Émï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÉJ-03 PÉJA-4393 ¨ÁèPï J£ÁÖPÀð ¢éZPÀ Àæ ªÁºÀ£À ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 02
ºÉ¯ÉämïU¼ÀÄÀ ºÁUÀÆ DgÉÆæ-3 «ªÀįï gÁeï, DgÉÆæ-6 ¥Àæ¢Ã¥ï, DgÉÆæ-7
- 40 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
ªÀÄzÀ£ï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆæ-8 ¸ÁåªÀÄÄAiÀįï gÀªÀgÀÄ vÉÆÃj¹zÀ PÀÈvÀå £ÀqÉzÀ
¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄzÀ°è zsÀj¹zÀÝ §mÉÖUÀ¼À£ÀÄß §zÀ¯Á¬Ä¹zÀ ¸ÀܼÀªÀ£ÀÄß ºÁUÀÆ gÀPÀÛ ºÀwÛzÀ
§mÉÖUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¸ÀÄlÖ ¸ÀܼÀzÀ ªÀĺÀdgï PÀæªÀÄ dgÀÄV¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
8. ¢£ÁAPÀ: 21 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 22.07.2025 gÀAzÀÄ DgÉÆæ-2 QgÀuï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ
DgÉÆæ-3 «ªÀįï gÀªÀgÀ ªÁ¸ÀzÀ ªÀÄ£É DAf£À¥Àà ¯ÉÃOmï, 6£Éà PÁæ¸ï£À,
ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ ªÀÄÄA¨sÁUÀ ªÀgÁAqÀzÀ°è 2025gÀ K¦æ¯ï wAUÀ¼À°è M¼À¸ÀAZÀÄ gÀƦ¹zÀ
¸ÀܼÀªÀ£ÀÄß ºÁUÀÆ DgÉÆæ-2 PÉ. QgÀuï, DgÉÆæ-3 «ªÀįï, DgÉÆæ-4
ªÀÄzÀ£ï, DgÉÆæ-5 ¸ÁªÀÄÄåAiÀįï, DgÉÆæ-15 ¥ÁånæPï, DgÉÆæ-10 ¥Àæ¸Ázï
ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆæ-9 ªÀÄ£ÉÆÃd @ ªÀÄ£ÀÄ gÀªÀgÉÆA¢UÉ 8 jAzÀ 10 ¨Áj M¼À¸ÀAZÀÄ
gÀƦ¹zÀ ¸ÀܼÀªÁzÀ «f£Á¥ÀÅgÀ DlzÀ ªÉÄÊzÁ£ÀzÀ ªÀÄzsÀåzÀ ¸ÀܼÀªÀ£ÀÄß ¥ÀAZÀ£ÁªÉÄ
PÉÊUÉÆArgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
9. DgÉÆæ-2 PÉ.QgÀuï, DgÉÆæ-3 «ªÀįï, DgÉÆæ-6 ¥Àæ¢Ã¥ï,
DgÉÆæ-7 ªÀÄzÀ£ï. DgÉÆæ-8 ¸ÁªÀÄÄåAiÀįï gÀªÀgÀÄ ²ªÀ¥ÀæPÁ±ï£À£ÀÄß PÉƯÉ
ªÀiÁrzÀ ¸ÀܼÀªÀ£ÀÄß vÉÆÃj¹zÀÄÝ ¸ÀzÀj ¸ÀܼÀzÀ ¥ÀAZÀ£ÁªÉÄ PÉÊUÉÆArgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
10. DgÉÆæ-2 PÉ QgÀuï FvÀ£ÀÄ ºÉýPÉAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀzÀj PÀÈvÀå J¸ÀUÀ®Ä
FvÀ£ÀÄ PÀÈvÀåPÉÌ §¼À¹zÀÝ ªÀiÁgÁPÁ¸ÀÛæ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ vÀ£Àß ªÉƨÉʯï¥sÉÆãï C£ÀÄß QvÀÛUÀ£ÀÆgÀÄ
PÉgÉUÉ ©¸ÁrgÀĪÀÅzÁV w½¹zÀÄÝ, ¸ÀzÀj ¸ÀܼÀzÀ ¥ÀAZÀ£ÁªÉÄ PÉÊUÉÆAqÀÄ PÀÈvÀåPÉÌ
G¥ÀAiÉÆÃV¹zÀÝ 01 ªÀiÁgÁPÁ¸ÀÛçªÀ£ÀÄß d¦Û¥Àr¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÉƨÉʯï¥sÉÇãï
C£ÀÄß ¥ÀvÉÛ ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä PÀæªÀĪÀ»¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. DgÉÆæ-3 «ªÀįï, DgÉÆæ-7 ªÀÄzÀ£ï,
DgÉÆæ-9 CgÀÄuï PÀĪÀiÁgï gÀªÀgÀÄ PÀÈvÀå J¸ÀUÀ®Ä G¥ÀAiÉÆÃV¹zÀÝ 03
ªÀiÁgÁPÁ¸ÀÛçUÀ¼À£ÀÄß QvÀÛUÀ£ÆÀ gÀÄ PÉgÉAiÀÄ ¥ÀPÀÌzÀ°è vÉÆÃj¹ ºÁdgÀÄ¥Àr¹zÀÄÝ MlÄÖ-4
ªÀiÁgÀPÁ¸ÀÛçUÀ¼À£ÀÄß d¥ÀÅÛ¥Àr¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
11. ¢£ÁAPÀ: 24.07.2025 gÀAzÀÄ DgÉÆæ-6 ¥Àæ¢Ã¥ï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆæ-
7 ªÀÄzÀ£ï gÀªÀgÀ ªÀÄ£ÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥Àj²Ã°¹ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°èzÀÝ ¹.¹.n.«. PÀÄjvÀÄ r.«.Dgï
C£ÀÄß d¥ÀÅÛ¥Àr¹ £ÀAvÀgÀ DgÉÆæ dUÀ¢Ã±ï @dUÀÎ FvÀ£ÀÄ L¹L¹L ¨ÁåAPï
CPËAmï £ÀA. 029801525916 gÀ°è£À gÀÆ.1.10,79,977/- UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¢£ÁAPÀ
23.07.2025 gÀAzÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ Lr©L ¨ÁåAPï CPËAmï £ÀA. 10233461666 gÀ°è£À
gÀÆ.33,51,103/- UÀ¼£À ÄÀ ß ¢£ÁAPÀ 23.07.2025 gÀAzÀÄ ¦üæÃeï ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
12. ¥ÉÆ°Ã¸ï ¥ÀæzsÁ£À PÀbÉÃj ¥sÁåPïì ¸ÀAzÉñÀ ¸ÀA: J¯ï & N
(6)/111/2025, ¢£ÁAPÀ: 24.07.2025 gÀ CzÉñÀzÀAvÉ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß
¹.L.rUÉ ªÀ»¹zÀÄÝ ²æÃ.JA.ºÉZï.GªÉÄñïÀ, rªÉÊ.J¸ï.¦. ºÉZï & © «¨sÁUÀ,
- 41 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
¹.L.r ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ gÀªÀgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ 26.07.2025 gÀAzÀÄ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÉÊUÉÆAqÀÄ
vÀ¤SÁ PÁ®zÀ°è ºÉZÀÄѪÀj PÀ®AUÀ¼ÁzÀ 61, 189(2) & (4), 109 ¸À»vÀ 3(5)
©.J£ï.J¸ï. DPïÖ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 25(1B)(b) DªÀiïìð DPïÖ 1959 UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÁUÀÆ ¢£ÁAPÀ
12/08/2025 PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀAWÀnvÀ C¥ÀgÁzsÀ ¤AiÀÄAvÀæt PÁAiÉÄÝ-2000gÀ
C¼ÀªÀr¹PÉƼÀî¯ÁVzÉ JAzÀÄ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄPÉÌ ¸À°è¸À¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
13. DgÉÆæ-4 C¤¯ï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆæ-5 ¨sÉÊgÀw §¸ÀªÀgÁeï gÀªÀgÀ
ªÀÄ£É/PÀbÉÃj ©lÄÖ ¸ÀA±ÀAiÀiÁ¸ÀàzÀ ªÀåQÛ Cfvï gÀªÀgÀ ªÀÄ£É ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀbÉÃjUÀ¼À ºÁUÀÆ
J¯Áè DgÉÆæUÀ¼À ªÀÄ£ÉUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£ÉUÉƼÀ¥Àr¸À¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
14. ¢£ÁAPÀ: 20/08/2025 jAzÀ ²æà r.¹. £ÀAzÀPÀĪÀiÁgï, ¥Éǰøï
G¥Á¢üÃPÀëPÀgÀÄ, ºÉZï&© «¨sÁUÀ gÀªÀgÀÄ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ vÀ¤SÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÁV
£ÉêÀÄPÀUÉÆAqÀÄ, ¢£ÁAPÀ: 24/25.08.2025 gÀAzÀÄ DgÉÆæ-1 dUÀ¢Ã±À @ dUÀÎ
FvÀ£À£ÀÄß EA¢gÁUÁA¢ü CAvÀgÀgÁ¶ÖæÃAiÀÄ «ªÀiÁ£À ¤¯ÁÝt E«ÄäUÉæõÀ£ï
C¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ vÀªÀÄä ªÀ±ÀPÉÌ ¥ÀqÉ¢zÀÄÝ, ¢£ÁAPÀ:26/08/2025 gÀAzÀÄ zÀ¸ÀÛVj
ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
15. DgÉÆæ dUÀ¢Ã±ï FvÀ£À ªÀ±À¢AzÀ DvÀ£À ªÀ±ÀzÀ°èzÀÝ «zÉò
PÀgɤìUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆæ dUÀ¢Ã±À FvÀ£À Passport NO.9555432
EªÀÅUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÁUÀÆ DgÉÆæ FvÀ£ÀÄ vÀ¯ÉªÀÄgɹPÉƼÀî®Ä G¥ÀAiÉÆÃVzÀÝ Dr PÁgï
£ÀA§gï KA 01 MQ 0272 d¥ÀÅÛ ¥Àr¸À¯ÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
16. DgÉÆæ-1 dUÀ¢Ã±ï @ dUÀÎ FvÀ£ÀÄ vÀ¯ÉªÀÄgɹPÉÆAqÀÄ ZÉ£ÉßöÊ£À°è
vÀAVzÀÝ ZÉ£ÉßöÊ£À CrAiÀiÁgï ¨Éù£ï ¸ÀܼÀzÀ ¥ÀAZÀ£ÁªÉÄAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÉÊUÉÆAqÀÄ ¥ÀævÀåPÀë
¸ÁQëzÁgÀgÁzÀ ¦üAiÀiÁ𢠲æêÀÄw «dAiÀÄ®Qëä PÉÆÃA ¯ÉÃmï UÀeÉÃAzÀæ£ï, 67
ªÀµÀð, ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀÄÈvÀ£À ¥Àwß ²æêÀÄw gÁeÉñÀéj PÉÆÃA ¯ÉÃmï ²ªÀ¥ÀæPÁ±ï 40 ªÀµÀð,
EªÀgÀÄUÀ¼À ºÉýPÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÀ®A:183 ©.J£ï.J¸ï.J¸ï. CrAiÀÄ°è WÀ£À 4£ÉÃ
J.¹.eÉ.JA. £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ £ÀUÀgÀgÀªÀgÀÄ zÁR°¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
17. ¥Éưøï C©ügÀPÉëUÉ ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀ DgÉÆæUÀ¼ÁzÀ 1) DgÉÆæ- 2
QgÀuï 2) DgÉÆæ-3 «ªÀįïgÁeï 3) DgÉÆæ-8 ¸ÁåªÀÄAiÀÄįï 4)
DgÉÆæ-11 ²ªÀ 5) DgÉÆæ-9 CgÀÄuïPÀĪÀiÁgï @ mɪÉÆÃ, 6) DgÉÆæ-12
ªÀÄ£ÉÆÃeï PÉ @ ªÀÄ£ÀÄ, 7) DgÉÆæ-13 J. ¥Àæ¸Ázï, 8) DgÉÆæ-14
£ÀgÀ¹AºÀªÀÄÆwð @ ¹AºÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 9) DgÉÆæ-19 QgÀt @ qÉrè QgÀt PÉ.
EªÀgÀÄUÀ¼À rfl¯ï ¥sÉÆÃmÉÆÃUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉAiÀįÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
- 42 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
Accordingly, the requirement of progress of
investigation being appraised is satisfied.
(b) The report of the Public Prosecutor also enumerates
the details of the further investigation from point 1 to 30
under caption "¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è ¨ÁQ EgÀĪÀ vÀ¤SÁ CA±ÀUÀ¼À «ªÀgÀ." The
content of the report is self-explanatory and is extracted
as below:
"¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è ¨ÁQ EgÀĪÀ vÀ¤SÁ CA±ÀUÀ¼À «ªÀgÀ"
1. F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è ¨sÁVAiÀiÁV ºÁ° £ÁåAiÀiÁAUÀ §AzsÀ£ÀzÀ°ègÀĪÀ 16
d£À DgÉÆæUÀ¼À zsÀé¤ ªÀiÁzÀjAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ªÀiÁ£Àå £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ DzÉñÀzÀ ªÉÄÃgÉUÉ
J¥sï.J¸ï.J¯ï vÀdÕgÀ ºÁUÀÆ ¥ÀAZÀgÀ ¸ÀªÀÄPÀëªÀÄ ¥ÀqÉAiÀĨÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. F ¥ÀæQæAiÉÄ
PÉÊUÉƼÀî®Ä WÀ£À £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄPÉÌ ªÀÄ£À« ¸À°è¹zÀÄÝ, DzÉñÀ ¨ÁQ¬ÄgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
2. DgÉÆæUÀ¼À zsÀé¤ ªÀiÁzÀjAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀÈvÀåzÀ°è §¼ÀPÉAiÀiÁVgÀĪÀ
¥ÀzÀUÀ¼ÉÆA¢UÉ ºÉÆðPÉ ªÀiÁr J¥sï.J¸ï.J¯ï vÀdÕgÀ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ£ÀÄß
¸ÀAUÀ滸À¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
3. ²ªÀ¥æPÀ Á±ï @ ©PÀ貪À FvÀ£À PÉÆ¯É WÀl£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥ÀævÀåPÀë ¸ÁQëzÁgÀgÀÄ
£ÉÆÃrzÀÄÝ, ¸ÀzÀjgÀªÀgÀÄUÀ½AzÀ DgÉÆæUÀ¼À UÀÄgÀÄvÀÄ ¥ÀvÉÛ ºÀZÀÄѪÀ PÀªÁAiÀÄvÀÄ
ªÀiÁr¸ÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ¨ÁQ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. F ¥ÀæQæAiÉÄ PÉÊUÉƼÀî®Ä WÀ£À £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄPÉÌ ªÀÄ£À«
¸À°è¹zÀÄÝ, £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ DzÉñÀ ¨ÁQ¬ÄgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
4. ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ ¥ÀæªÀÄÄR ¸ÁQëzÁgÀgÀ£ÀÄß UÀÄgÀÄw¹ CªÀgÀÄUÀ¼À ºÉýPÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß
zÁR°¸ÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ¨ÁQ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
5. FUÁUÀ¯Éà zÁR°¹PÉÆArgÀĪÀ ¸ÁQëzÁgÀgÀ ºÉýPÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÀ®A:183
©.J£ï.J¸ï.J¸ï.CrAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀPÀëªÀÄ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ WÀ£À 4£Éà J.¹.eÉ.
- 43 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
£ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄ ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ gÀªÀgÀ°è zÁR°¸À®Ä ªÀÄ£À« ¤ÃrzÀÄÝ, £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀĪÀÅ
ºÉýPÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß zÁR°¸ÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ¨ÁQ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
6. £ÁåAiÀiÁAUÀ §AzsÀ£ÀzÀ°ègÀĪÀ ªÀÄÆgÀÄ DgÉÆæUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀAZÀgÀ
¸ÀªÀÄPÀëªÀÄ rfl¯ï ¥ÉÇÃmÉÆÃUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉAiÀĨÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛz.É F ¥ÀæQæAiÉÄAiÀÄ£ÀÄß
ªÀiÁ£Àå £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ C£ÀĪÀÄw ªÉÄÃgÉUÉ PÉÃAzÀæ PÁgÁUÀȺÀ ¥ÀgÀ¥Àà£À CUÀæºÁgÀPÉÌ
¨sÉÃn ¤Ãr PÉÊUÉƼÀî®Ä ªÀiÁ£Àå £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄPÉÌ Cfð ¸À°è¹zÀÄÝ, £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀĪÀÅ
C£ÀĪÀÄw¹zÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ PÉÊUÉƼÀî¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
7. DgÉÆæUÀ¼À rfl¯ï ¥sÉÇÃmÉÆÃUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¹.¹.n.«AiÀÄ°è ºÁUÀÆ
ªÉƨÉʯï£À°è zÁR¯ÁVgÀĪÀ zÀȱÁåªÀ½UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÉÆðPÉ ªÀiÁr J¥sï.J¸ï.J¯ï.
vÀdÕgÀ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉƼÀî®Ä vÀdÕgÀ ¥ÀjÃPÉëUÉ PÀ¼ÀÄ»¹ vÀdÕgÀ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ£ÀÄß
¸ÀAUÀ滸À¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
8. ¥ÀæPg À ÀtzÀ vÀ¤SÁ PÁ®zÀ°è CªÀiÁ£ÀvÀÄÛ¥Àr¹gÀĪÀ ¹.¹.n«
zÀȱÁåªÀ½UÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß, ªÉƨÉÊ¯ï ºÁUÀÆ EvÀgÉ ¸ÀévÀÄÛUÀ¼À£ÀÄß £ÉÊdvÉ PÀÄjvÀÄ
J¥sï.J¸ï.J¯ï. vÀdÕgÀ ¥ÀjÃPÉëUÉ PÀ¼ÄÀ »¹ ªÀgÀ¢ ¸ÀAUÀ滸À¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
9. PÀÈvÀåPÉÌ G¥ÀAiÉÆÃV¹gÀĪÀ ªÁºÀ£U À À¼À£ÀÄß «¢ü «eÁÕ£À vÀdÕjAzÀ
¥Àj²Ã®£É ªÀiÁr¹zÀÄÝ, CªÀÅUÀ½AzÀ ¸ÀAUÀ滹gÀĪÀ gÀPÀÛzÀ ªÀiÁzÀjUÀ¼À£ÀÄß r.J£ï.J
C£Á°¹¸ïUÉ J¥sï.J¸ï.J¯ï vÀdÕgÀ ¥ÀjÃPÉëUÉ PÀ¼ÀÄ»¸ÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ¨ÁQ¬ÄgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
10. ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ DgÉÆæ-2 QgÀt ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀÄÈvÀ ²ªÀ¥ÀæPÁ±À EªÀgÀÄUÀ¼À
£ÀqÄÀ ªÉ d«ÄãÀÄ «ZÁgÀzÀ°è £ÀqÉ¢gÀĪÀ UÀ¯ÁmÉAiÀÄ «rAiÉÆà zÀȱÁåªÀ½UÀ¼ÀÄ
¸ÁªÀiÁfPÀ eÁ®vÁtzÀ°è ªÉÊgÀ¯ï DVzÀÄÝ, ¸ÀzjÀ «rAiÉÆÃUÀ¼À£ÀÄß
CªÀiÁ£ÀvÀÄÛ¥Àr¹PÉÆArzÀÄÝ, J¥sï.J¸ï.J¯ï. vÀdÕgÀ ¥ÀjÃPÉëUÉ PÀ¼ÀÄ»¹ ªÀgÀ¢
¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉƼÀî¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
11. DgÉÆæUÀ¼À ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀÄÈvÀ ªÀåQÛAiÀÄ ªÉƨÉʯï PÀgÉUÀ¼À «ªÀgÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß
«±ÉèõÀuÉUÉ M¼À¥Àr¹ vÀ¤SÉ PÉÊUÉƼÀî¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
12. F PÀÈvÀåzÀ°è ¨sÁVAiÀiÁVgÀĪÀ DgÉÆæUÀ¼ÀÄ ¨ÉÃgÉ ¨ÉÃgÉ ªÀåQÛUÀ¼À
ºÉ¸Àj£À°è ¹ªÀÄμÀ£ÀÄß Rjâ¹, D ¹ªÀiï UÀ¼À ªÀÄÄSÁAvÀgÀ ¸ÀA¨sÁµÀuÉ £Àqɹ
PÀÈvÀåªÀ£ÀÄß J¸ÀVzÀÄÝ, ¹ªÀiïUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ªÀiÁgÁl ªÀiÁrzÀ ¸ÀA¸ÉÜUÀ¼ÀÄ, ¹ªÀiï
Rjâ¹gÀĪÀ UÁæºÀPÀgÀ£ÄÀ ß ¥ÀvÉÛ ªÀiÁr ºÉýPÉ zÁR°¸À¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
- 44 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
13. vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ°è zÉÆgÀAiÀÄĪÀ ¸ÁPÀëåzÁgÀU¼ À À ªÉÄÃgÉUÉ F PÀÈvÀåzÀ°è
¨sÁVAiÀiÁzÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀÈvÀåPÉÌ ¸ÀºÀPÀj¹gÀĪÀ ºÁUÀÆ ¸ÀAWÀnvÀ DgÉÆæUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß ¥ÀvÉÛ
ªÀiÁr vÀ¤SÉUÉ M¼À¥Àr¸ÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ¨ÁQ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
14. ªÀÄÈvÀ£ÀÄ G¥ÀAiÉÆÃV¸ÀÄwÛzÀÝ ¸ÁåªÀĸÀAUï PÀA¥À¤AiÀÄ ªÉƨÉÊ¯ï ¥sÉÇãï
C£ÀÄß d¥ÀÅÛ¥Àr¹zÀÄÝ, ¸ÀzÀj ¥sÉÇãÀC£ÀÄß «ÄgÀgï EªÉÄÃeïUÉ M¼À¥r À ¸À®Ä CzÀÄ
j¥ÉÃj EzÀÄÝ, CzÀ£ÀÄß ¸Àj¥Àr¹zÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ J¥sï.J¸ï.J¯ï. vÀdÕgÀ ¥ÀjÃPÉëUÉ ¸À°è¹
ªÀgÀ¢ ¥ÀqÉAiÀĨÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
15. F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ DgÉÆæ CgÀÄuï PÀĪÀiÁgï FvÀ£À ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ ±ÉÆÃzsÀ£Á
PÁ®zÀ°è PÀÈvÀåzÀ ¸ÀÀªÀÄAiÀÄzÀ°è zsÀj¹zÀÝ ±ÀÆUÀ¼À£ÀÄß MvÀÄÛ¥Àr¹zÀÄÝ, ¸ÀzÀj ±ÀÆUÀ¼£
À ÀÄß
r.J£ï.J ¥ÀjÃPÉëUÉ M¼À¥Àr¹ vÀdÕgÀ ªÀgÀ¢ ¸ÀAUÀ滸À¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
16. ¥ÀæPg À t
À zÀ DgÉÆæ DmÉÆà ²ªÀ FvÀ£ÀÄ ªÀÄÈvÀ£À ZÀ®£ÀªÀ®£À
UÀªÀĤ¸À®Ä ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÉÆ¯É J¸ÀUÀ®Ä DmÉÆêÀ£ÀÄß G¥ÀAiÉÆÃV¹zÀÄÝ, ¸ÀzÀj
DmÉÆêÀ£ÄÀ ß UÀÄgÀÄw¹, d¥ÀÄÛ¥Àr¸À ¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
17. DmÉÆêÀ£ÀÄß d¥ÀÅÛ¥Àr¹zÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ CzÀ£ÀÄß J¥sï.J¸ï.J¯ï vÀdÕgÀ
¸ÀªÀÄPÀëªÀÄ ®Æ«Ä£Á¯ï mɸïÖUÉ M¼ÀªÀr¹ vÀdÕgÀ ªÀgÀ¢ ¸ÀAUÀ滸À¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
18. F WÀl£ÉAiÀÄÄ d«Ää£À «ªÁzÀzÀ §UÉÎ ¸ÀA¨sÀ«¹zÀÄÝ, F PÀÄjvÀÄ
£Àq¢
É gÀĪÀ ºÀtPÁ¹£À ªÀåªÀºÁgÀzÀ §UÉÎ vÀ¤SÉ PÉÊUÉƼÀî¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
19. F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ DgÉÆæ-1 dUÀ¢Ã±ï @ dUÀÎ FvÀ£ÀÄ PÀÈvÀå £ÀqÉzÀ
£ÀAvÀgÀ «zÉñÀPÉÌ ¥ÀæAiÀiÁt¹ vÀ¯ÉªÀÄgɹPÉÆArzÀÄÝ, FvÀ£À eÉÆvÉ «zÉñÀPÉÌ
¥ÀæAiÀiÁt¹ ¸ÀºÀZg
À ÀgÀ£ÀÄß UÀÄgÀÄw¹ vÀ¤SÉUÉ M¼À¥r
À ¸À¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
20. DgÉÆæ-1 dUÀ¢Ã±ï @ dUÀÎ FvÀ£ÀÄ «zÉñÀPÉÌ ¥ÀæAiÀiÁt¸À®Ä
ºÀtPÁ¹£À ¸ÀºÁAiÀÄ ªÀiÁrzÀ ªÀåQÛUÀ¼À£ÀÄß UÀÄgÀÄw¹ vÀ¤SÉUÉ M¼À¥Àr¸À¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
21. DgÉÆæUÀ¼ÀÄ PÀÈvÀåPÉÌ G¥ÀAiÉÆÃV¹zÀÝ ¸Á̦ðAiÉÆà ªÁºÀ£ÀªÀ£ÀÄß
¤ÃrzÀ ªÀÄzsÀåªÀwðUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß UÀÄgÀÄw¹ vÀ¤SÉUÉ M¼À¥Àr¸À¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
22. F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ ¥ÀæxÀªÄÀ ªÀvÀðªÀiÁ£À ªÀg¢
À DgÉÆæ-4 C¤¯ï
FvÀ£À£ÀÄß vÀ¤SÉUÉ M¼À¥Àr¸À¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
- 45 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
23. F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ°è PÀ®A 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) 3(2), 3(3),
3(4), 3(5) ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀ®A 4 PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀAWÀnvÀ C¥ÀgÁzsÀ ¤AiÀÄAvÀæt PÁAiÉÄÝ
2000 gÀ£ÀÄß C¼ÀªÀr¹PÉÆAqÀÄ vÀ¤SÉ PÉÊUÉÆArzÀÄÝ, DgÉÆævÀgÀÄ ¸ÀAWÀnvÀgÁV
F WÀl£ÉAiÀÄ°è ¨sÁVAiÀiÁVgÀĪÀ PÀÄjvÀÄ E¤ßvÀgÉ DgÉÆævÀgÀÄUÀ¼£
À ÀÄß UÀÄgÀÄw¹
CªÀgÀ£ÀÄß vÀ¤SÉUÉ M¼À¥Àr¸À ¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
24. PÉƯÉVÃqÁzÀ ²ªÀ¥ÀæPÁ±ï @ ©PÀè ²ªÀ FvÀ£À ZÀ®£ÀªÀ®£À
UÀÄgÀÄw¸À®Ä ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÉÆ¯É J¸ÀUÀ®Ä ºÀt ¤ÃrzÀÄÝ, F ¸ÀA§AzsÀ ºÀtzÀ ªÀÄÆ®
ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¨ÁåAPï zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÁUÀÆ AiÀÄÄ.¦.L zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥Àqz É ÀÄ
¸ÁPÁëöåzsÁgÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¸ÀAUÀ滸À¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
25. PÉÆ¯É J¸ÀUÀ®Ä G¥ÀAiÉÆÃV¹zÀÝ ªÀÄaѤAzÀ PÀÈvÀåzÀ°è ¨sÁVAiÀiÁzÀ
DgÉÆæ-3 «ªÀįïgÁeï FvÀ¤UÀÆ ¸ÀºÀ UÁAiÀĪÁVzÀÄÝ, ¸ÀzÀj ªÀÄaѤAzÀ
DgÉÆævÀ¤UÉ UÁAiÀÄ DVgÀÄvÀÛzÉAiÉÄà JA§ §UÉÎ ªÉÊzÁå¢üPÁjUÀ½AzÀ ªÀgÀ¢
¥ÀqÉAiÀĨÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
26. F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ J¥sï.L.Dgï DgÉÆæ-5 ¨sÉÊgÀw §¸ÀªÀgÁdÄ gÀªÀgÀÄ
vÀ£Àß «gÀÄzÀÞ zÁR°¹gÀĪÀ zÀÆgÀ£ÀÄß gÀzÀÄÝ¥Àr¸À®Ä UËgÀªÁ¤évÀ PÀ£ÁðlPÀ GZÀÑ
£ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è Qæ«Ä£À¯ï ¦nµÀ£ï £ÀA:10290/2025 jÃvÁå ¦nµÀ£ï
¸À°è¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. C®èzÉ ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÑ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀĪÀÅ DgÉÆævÀ£À «gÀÄzÀÞ AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉÃ
§®ªÀAvÀzÀ PÀæªÀÄ PÉÊUÉƼÀîzÀAvÉ DzÉñÀ ¤Ãr¢ÝgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. F PÁgÀtPÁÌV ¥ÀæxÀªÀÄ
ªÀvÀðªÀiÁ£À ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è£À DgÉÆæ-5 ¨sÉÊgÀw §¸ÀªÀgÁdÄ ºÁ°
±Á¸ÀPÀ£ÁVgÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ ªÀiÁ£Àå GZÀÑ£ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ ªÀÄzsÀåAvÀgÀ DzÉñÀzÀ vÉgÀ«UÁV
PÀæªÀÄPÉÊUÉÆArzÀÄÝ, F ¥ÀæQæAiÉÄAiÀÄ£ÀÄß M¼ÀUÉÆAqÀAvÉ ªÀÄÄAzÉ PÀÆ®APÀĵÀ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ
CUÀvÀå EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
27. F ¥ÀæPÀgt À zÀ°è ªÀÄÈvÀ ªÀåQÛ DgÉÆævÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÞ 2 ¨Áj
fêÀ¨ÀA
s iÀÄ¢AzÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ gÀPÀëuÉ PÉÆÃj ¥ÉǰøÀgÀ°è ªÀÄ£À« ¸À°è¹zÀÄÝ, F PÀÄjvÀÄ
PÀÆ®APÀĵÀ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ CUÀvÀå EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
28. ªÀÄÈvÀ ªÀåQÛ ¥sɧæªÀj 2025 gÀ°è ¥ÉǰøÀjUÉ ¸À°è¹zÀ zÀÆj£À°è EªÀgÀ
ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆævÀgÀ £ÀqÀÄ«£À jAiÀįïJ¸ÉÖÃmï ªÀåªÀºÁgÀzÀ PÀÄjvÀÄ
G¯ÉèÃT¸À¯ÁVzÀÄÝ, D »£À߯ÉAiÀÄ°è ªÀÄÈvÀ£À fêÀPÉÌ C¥ÁAiÀÄ«gÀĪÀÅzÁV
ºÉýPÉÆArgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. EzÀPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ ¸ÀàµÀÖ ¸ÁPÁëåzsÁgÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß zÁR¯É gÀÆ¥Àz°À è
¸ÀAUÀ滸ÀĪÀ CUÀvÀå EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
- 46 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
29. F »AzÉ ªÀÄÈvÀ ªÀåQÛ ¥ÉǰøÀgÀ°è ¸À°è¹zÀ zÀÆgÀÄUÀ¼À°è ¥Àæxª À ÀÄ
ªÀvÀðªÀiÁ£À ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ 5£Éà DgÉÆæAiÀÄ PÀÄjvÀÄ G¯ÉèÃT¸À¯ÁVzÀÄÝ, 5£ÉÃ
DgÉÆævÀgÀÄ ±Á¸ÀPÀgÁV C¢üPÁgÀ §®¢AzÀ jAiÀįï J¸ÉÖÃmï CªÀåªÀºÁgÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ
jAiÀįï J¸ÉÖÃmï ªÀåªÀºÁgÀ ªÀiÁqÀÄwÛzÀÝ ªÀÄÈvÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DvÀ£À PÀqÉAiÀĪÀªÀ£ÀÄß
PÀÄVθÀ®Ä ¥ÀæAiÀÄwß¹zÀ §UÉÎ PÀAqÀħgÀÄvÀÛzÉ, EzÀgÀ PÀÄjvÀÄ ¸ÀºÀ PÀÆ®APÀĵÀ
vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ CUÀvÀå«gÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
30. ¥ÀæxÀªÀÄ ªÀvÀðªÀiÁ£À ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°èAiÀÄ 5£Éà DgÉÆæ ±Á¸ÀPÀgÀÄ ªÀÄÈvÀ£À
PÉƯÉAiÀÄ ¦vÀÆjAiÀÄ°è ¨sÁVAiÀiÁzÀ §UÉÎ ¸ÁPÁëöåzsÁgÀ ¸ÀAUÀ滸À¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. F
PÀÄjvÀÄ 5£Éà DgÉÆævÀgÀ C©ügÀPÉë «ZÁgÀuÉAiÀÄ CUÀvÀå EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
31. F ¥ÀæPg
À ÀtzÀ "¸ÀAWÀnvÀ C¥ÀgÁzsÀ" DVgÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ FUÁUÀ¯ÉÃ
PÉÆÃPÁ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ C£Àé¬Ä¹gÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ PÀÆ®APÀĵÀ vÀ¤SÉ CUÀvÀå EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
This enumeration in the report would indicate the
remaining investigation.
(c) The report also contains the reasons for continuing
the detention of accused in judicial custody beyond 90
days. This would relate to the requirement of assigning
"the specific reasons for the detention of the accused
beyond the said period of 90 days."
The relevant extracts of the report at point 1 to 7
under the caption "£ÁåAiÀiÁAUÀ §AzsÀ£ÀzÀ°ègÀĪÀ DgÉÆævÀgÀ£ÀÄß £ÁåAiÀiÁAUÀ
§AzsÀ£Àz°
À èAiÉÄà ªÀÄÄAzÀĪÀgɸÀĪÀ PÀÄjvÀÄ"
- 47 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
1. F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è£À FªÀgÉV£À vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄAvÉ jAiÀįï J¸ÉÖÃmï ªÀåªÀºÁgÀPÉÌ
¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ ºÀtPÁ¹£À ºÉaÑ£À/CPÀæªÀÄ ¯Á¨sÀPÁÌV Qæ«Ä£À¯ï »£À߯ÉAiÀÄļÀîªgÀ ÀÄ
jAiÀįï J¸ÉÖÃmï ªÀåªÀºÁgÀzÀ°è vÉÆqÀV¹PÉÆAqÀÄ gÁdQÃAiÀÄ ¥Àæ¨sÁ«UÀ¼À
¨ÉA§®¢AzÀ ªÀåªÀºÁgÀ ¤ªÀð»¸ÀÄwÛgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ PÀAqÀħgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. F »£À߯ÉAiÀÄ°è
DgÉÆævÀgÀÄUÀ¼À £ÁåAiÀiÁAUÀ §AzsÀ£ÀªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀÄÄAzÀĪÀgɸÀzÉ EzÀÝ°è ªÀÄÄA¢£À
vÀ¤SÉUÉ CrØ DvÀAPÀ GAlÄ ªÀiÁqÀĪÀ ¸ÁzsÀåvÉUÀ½gÀÄvÀÛªÉ.
2. F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è «±ÉõÀ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ PÉÆÃPÁ C£Àé¬Ä¹gÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ
¥ÀæPÀgÀtPÉÌ ¸ÀA§AzsÀ¥ÀlÖ ¸ÁQëzÁgÀgÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀºPÀ Àj¹zÀªÀgÀÄ ªÀÄÄAzÉ
DgÉÆævÀgÀ MvÀÛqÀPÉÌ ªÀÄtÂzÀÄ ¥ÀæwPÀÆ® ¥Àjt«Ä¸ÀĪÀ ¸ÁzsÀåvÉ EgÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ
DgÉÆævÀgÀ £ÁåAiÀiÁAUÀ §AzsÀ£À ªÀÄÄAzÀĪÀgɸÀĪÀ CUÀvÀå«gÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
3. ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è 5£Éà DgÉÆæ ±Á¸ÀPÀgÀÄ ¨sÁVAiÀiÁzÀ §UÉÎ vÀ¤SÉ
£ÀqA
É iÀÄÄwÛzÀÄÝ, CªÀgÀ ¥Àæ¨sÁªÀ¢AzÁV vÀ¤SÉUÉ CqÀZÀuÉ GAmÁUÀĪÀ ¸ÁzsÀåvÉ
EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
4. F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è PÉƯÉUÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ ªÀÄÈvÀ£À vÁ¬Ä ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀÄÈvÀ£À
D¥ÀÛgÀÄ ¥ÀæªÀÄÄR ¸ÁQëzÁgÀgÁVzÀÄÝ, CªÀgÀÄUÀ¼À fêÀPÉÌ C¥ÁAiÀĪÀÅAmÁUÀĪÀ ¸ÁzsÀåvÉ
EgÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ DgÉÆævÀgÀ §AzsÀ£ÀªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀÄÄAzÀĪÀgɸÀĪÀÅzÀgÀ CUÀvÀå«gÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
5. ºÉaÑ£À DgÉÆævÀgÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ Qæ«Ä£À¯ï »£À߯ÉAiÀÄļÀîªÀgÁVzÀÄÝ, ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ
¨sÀ«µÀåzÀ zÀȶ֬ÄAzÀ DgÉÆævÀgÀ §AzsÀ£ÀªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀÄÄAzÀĪÀgɸÀĪÀ CUÀvÀå«gÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
6. PÀÈvÀåzÀ £ÀqÉzÀ £ÀAvÀgÀ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ ¥ÀæªÀÄÄR DgÉÆæ-1 dUÀ¢Ã±À @ dUÀÎ
EªÀgÀÄ «zÉñÀPÉÌ ºÉÆÃV vÀ¯ÉªÀÄgɹPÉÆAqÀÄ £ÀAvÀgÀzÀ°è §Æè PÁ£Àðgï £ÉÆÃn¸ï
ªÉÄÃgÉUÉ ªÀÄgÀ½ ¨sÁgÀvÀPÉÌ §A¢gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. DzÀÝjAzÀ EªÀjUÉ eÁ«ÄãÀÄ ªÀÄAdÆgÀÄ
ªÀiÁrzÀÝ°è EªÀgÀÄ ¥ÀÄ£À: vÀ¯ÉªÀÄgɹPÉƼÀÄîªÀ ¸ÁzsÀåvÉ §ºÀ¼À EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
7. F WÀl£ÉAiÀÄ°è ¨sÁVAiÀiÁVgÀĪÀ DgÉÆæUÀ¼ÀÄ gÀÆrüUÀvÀ
C¥ÀgÁ¢üUÀ¼ÁVzÀÄÝ, eÁ«Ää£À ªÉÄÃ¯É ©lÖ°è ¥ÀÄ£ÀB EªÀgÀÄ EzÉà £ÀªÀÄÆ£ÉAiÀÄ
PÀÈvÀåzÀ°è ¨sÁVAiÀiÁV ¸ÀªÀiÁdzÀ°è ±ÁAwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß £Á±À¥Àr¸ÀĪÀ ¸ÁzsÀåvÉ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ
28. Accordingly, it can be stated that the report
does satisfy the requirement of the proviso insofar as (i)
- 48 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
the progress of investigation is detailed; (ii) the specific
reasons for detention of the accused beyond 90 days is
also enumerated.
C. APPLICATION OF MIND OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
29. What needs to be seen as regards the report of
the Public Prosecutor is that there has to be application of
mind when the prosecutor is forwarding his report to the
court. The report even if it were to endorse in entirety
the report of the Investigating Officer by a separate report
of the Public Prosecutor and the entirety of the report of
the Investigating Officer is adopted, it could stand legal
scrutiny if the reliance is on the reacquisition by the
Investigating Officer which itself is detailed. However,
while adopting the report of the public prosecutor in its
entirety the report should also expressly contain the
independent application of mind of the Public Prosecutor.
It would be appropriate to extract the concluding Para of
the report of the Public Prosecutor which reads as follows:
- 49 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
"F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è vÀ¤SÁ ªÉÃ¼É FªÀgÉUÉ 40PÀÆÌ «ÄQÌ ¸ÁQëzÁgÀgÀ
ºÉýPÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉAiÀįÁVzÀÄÝ, CªÀgÀ ¸ÀÄgÀPÀëvÉAiÀÄ zÀȶ֬ÄAzÀ F ªÀÄ£À«AiÀÄ°è
CªÀgÀ ºÉ¸ÀgÀÄUÀ¼À£ÄÀ ß §»gÀAUÀ¥Àr¹gÀĪÀÅ¢®è F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è FªÀgÉUÉ
¸ÀAUÀ滸À¯ÁzÀ ¸ÁPÁëzsÁgÀUÀ¼À ¥Àj²Ã®£É¬ÄAzÀ ªÉÄð£À CA±ÀUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÉÄïÉÆßÃlPÉÌ
PÀAqÀħA¢zÀÄÝ, vÀ¤SÁ ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄ «¸ÀÛj¸ÀĪÀÅzÀgÀ CUÀvÀå«gÀĪÀÅzÁV
C©ü¥ÁæAiÀÄ¥ÀnÖgÀÄvÉÛãÉ. F »£À߯ÉAiÀÄ°è F ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è vÀ¤SÁ ¥ÀæQæAiÉÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß
¥ÀÇtðUÉƽ¹ WÀ£À £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄPÉÌ ¤UÀ¢vÀ 90 ¢£ÀUÀ¼À°è
(¢£ÁAPÀ:14/09/2025 PÉÌ C£ÀéAiÀĪÁUÀĪÀAvÉ) DgÉÆæUÀ¼À «gÀÄzÀÞ
zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥ÀuÁ ¥ÀnÖ ¸À°è¸À®Ä ¸ÁzsÀåªÁUÀÄwÛ®èªÁzÀÄzÀjAzÀ ºÁUÀÆ F ªÉÄïÉ
«ªÀj¹zÀ PÁgÀtUÀ½UÁV vÀ¤SÉ ¥ÀÇgÉʸÀ®Ä PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀAWÀnvÀ C¥ÀgÁzsÀUÀ¼À
¤AiÀÄAvÀæt PÁAiÉÄÝ 2000 gÀ PÀ®: 22(2)(b) C£ÀéAiÀÄ ºÉZÄÀ ѪÀj 90 ¢£ÀUÀ¼À
PÁ¯ÁªÀ¢üAiÀÄ «¸ÀÛgÀuÉ DUÀvÀå«gÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ 180 ¢£ÀUÀ¼ÀªÀgÉUÉ vÀ¤SÁ CªÀ¢ü
«¸ÀÛj¸ÀĪÀAvÉ PÉÆÃj ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ºÁ° £ÁåAiÀiÁAUÀ §AzsÀ£ÀzÀ°ègÀĪÀ DgÉÆæUÀ¼À£ÀÄß
£ÁåAiÀiÁAUÀ §AzsÀ£ÀzÀ°èAiÉÄà ªÀÄÄAzÀĪÀgɸÀĪÀAvÉ WÀ£À £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è
¥Áæyð¹PÉƼÀÄîvÉÛãÉ."
30. A reading of concluding paragraph clearly
reflects the independent application of mind of public
prosecutor which would be sufficient to stand legal
scrutiny. While the entirety of the report of the
Investigation officer forms a part of the report of the Public
Prosecutor, and the Public Prosecutor proceeds to state
that he has applied his mind and requests the Court for
- 50 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
extension of time to complete investigation. This would
constitute sufficient application of mind.
31. Though the report of the Investigating Officer
does not appear to have been produced before the
designated Judge, the same has been produced in the
present proceedings. The report of the Investigating
Officer is detailed and, on its basis, report is made to the
designated Court by the Public Prosecutor separately.
That by itself in the present facts would be sufficient.
D. SATISFACTION OF THE DESIGNATED JUDGE.
32. In terms of proviso inserted by Section 22 of
KCOCA, power is conferred on the Special Court to extend
the period of custody beyond the maximum period of 90
days is on the designated Judge who needless to state is
required to be satisfied about the report of the Public
Prosecutor being in compliance with the requirements of
indicating the progress of investigation and specifying
reasons for detention of accused.
- 51 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
33. While the first safeguard is that of application of
mind by the Public Prosecutor, the second tier of
safeguard is the decision to extend time to complete
investigation while accused continues to remain in
custody. Such power being exercised by the designated
Judge is decision which needless to state has to reflect
application of mind.
34. As noticed supra, this decision of extension
under proviso of Section 22 (2) (b) is intertwined with
power to extend custody in terms of Section 167 (2) (a) of
Cr.P.C. Every time extension of order of remand is passed
under Section 167 (2) (a) of Cr.P.C., there is a
requirement that the designated Judge "is satisfied that
adequate grounds exist for doing so".
35. In the present case, the reflection of application
of mind of the designated Judge can be found on a reading
of the order, the relevant extracts reproduced below:
- 52 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
"20. The main aspect which is submitted by the
prosecution indicates that genesis for commission of the
above case is the real estate dispute which was prevailing
between the parties. The learned SPP has submitted that
certain documents are required to be confronted to the
accused persons which can only be done only on the receipt of
the FSL and further the accused No.5 has obtained necessary
interim protection by the kind orders of the Hon'ble High
court. It is submitted that he was the main person at whose
instance the incident had taken place and hence his
interrogation was very much essential. That apart, I have also
bestowed my anxious reading to the reasons assigned by the
learned SPP and on considering the same, it seems to be
justifiable one. Further it is relevant to note that the
application was filed on 09.10.2025 which was much prior to
the completion of the stipulated period for completion of
investigation and also it is noticed that at the time of and
were filing the application the accused persons
secured/present before the court proper opportunity was
granted to them to file their statement of objections. Though
in strict parlance, they may not have any say on the manner
of investigation being conducted, but considering the fact that
allowing of application may in a way interfere with the
indefeasible right which may occur in favour of the accused if
the final report is not filed within the stipulated period, the
court had permitted the accused to filed necessary objections.
The accused had filed the objection and they were also
permitted to make submission in this regard. As such the
mandate of the act which is more fully enshrined in the
authority of the Hon'ble Apex court is complied with.
21. xxx
- 53 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
22. In the aforesaid authority it has been clearly held
that the grant of extension of period of investigation cannot
be made on mechanical grounds since it affects the liberty of
the citizen on extraneous grounds. Further it is held that, for
seeking extension of time, the public prosecutor after an
independent application of his mind to the request of the
investigating agency is required to make a report to the Court
indicating therein the progress of the investigation and
disclosing justification for keeping the accused in further
custody to enable the investigating agency to complete the
investigation. The public prosecutor may attach the request of
the investigating officer along with his request or application
and report, but his report, as envisaged under clause (bb),
must disclose on the face of it that he has applied his mind
and was satisfied with the progress of the investigation and
considered grant of further time to complete the investigation
necessary. In this regard the application filed by the learned
SPP itself is self-explanatory, wherein he has dealt in detail.
23. Further the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the
extension could be granted only on the Report of the Public
Prosecutor for completion of investigation and filing the
challan thereafter and for no other purpose. Even in the
aforesaid case, it is noticed from the records that extension of
period of limitation is sought only for the purpose of
continuing with the investigation and not for any
administrative defects. The reason assigned by the SPP seems
to be plausible ..."
36. Clearly the order reflects application of mind and
such satisfaction of the designated Judge would satisfy the
- 54 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
statutory mandate under Section 167 (2) (a) while
extending judicial remand as well as the order extending
time for investigation in terms of the proviso under 22 (2)
(b) of KCOCA.
37. So far as the challenge to order of the Court
extending investigation by 45 days it would be sufficient to
observe such extension is an exercise of judicial discretion
by the Court and we find no reason to interfere with such
exercise of judicial discretion.
38. Though, the counsel for the petitioner Venkatesh
Dalawai has contended that Sessions Judge has failed to
observe that the accused 6 and 8 have filed their
statement of objections, that would not be of any legal
significance as the said accused having filed statement of
objections indicate them being aware of the prosecution's
application for extension of time which would ipso facto
fulfil the legal requirement of keeping the accused
informed.
- 55 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
E. PRODUCTION OF ACCUSED WHILST CONSIDERING
APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR INVESTIGATION
WHILE ACCUSED STILL REMAINS IN CUSTODY .
39. One of the other contentions raised is as regards
accused not being produced during the relevant point of
time when their application for default bail was considered.
40. The following table would indicate the relevant
date on which application was filed and argued and the
date of presence of the accused.
SI Details of Date of Date of Date of Presence of
No
Accused Arrest Filing of Filing of Accused on
Application Objections the dates of
Hearing
1 K. KIRAN 16.07.2025 09.10.2025 14.10.2025 10.10.2025
(Accused No.2) (through VC)
2 VIMALRAJ. B 16.07.2025 09.10.2025 14.10.2025 10.10.2025
(Accused No.3) (through VC)
3 MADAN. R 16.07.2025 09.10.2025 14.10.2025 10.10.2025
(Accused No.7) (through VC)
4. PRADEEP 16.07.2025 09.10.2025 15.10.2025 10.10.2025
(Accused 6) (through VC)
5. V. SAMUAL 16.07.2025 09.10.2025 15.10.2025 10.10.2025
(Accused 8) (through VC
41. Undisputedly the application was filed before the
expiry of 90 days.
- 56 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
42. The petitioners have contended that there have
been procedural violations insofar as the petitioners were
not notified regarding the filing of application and were not
produced on all dates when the application was being
considered.
43. The Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt v.
State through CBI, Bombay (II)3 speaking through a
Constitution Bench after a detailed discussion as regards
production of accused before the Court has concluded at
Para 53 (2) (a) as follows:
"53 (2)(a) Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act only requires
production of the accused before the court in accordance with
Section 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and this is how the
requirement of notice to the accused before granting extension
beyond the prescribed period of 180 days in accordance with the
further proviso to clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the
TADA Act has to be understood in the judgment of the Division
Bench of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur [(1994) 4 SCC 602 :
1994 SCC (Cri) 1087 : JT (1994) 4 SC 255]. The requirement of
such notice to the accused before granting the extension for
completing the investigation is not a written notice to the accused
giving reasons therein. Production of the accused at that time in the
court informing him that the question of extension of the period for
(1994) 5 SCC 410
- 57 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
completing the investigation is being considered, is alone sufficient
for the purpose."
44. Accordingly, it becomes clear that as regards
notice to the accused before granting extension for
completing the investigation, production of the accused at
the relevant time in court informing him that extension of
period of completing the investigation is being considered
is sufficient. Such would be the legal position on a
meaningful reading of para 53(2)(a) of Sanjay Dutts
case(supra).
45. The matter was called out on 27.09.2025 and
adjourned to 10.10.2025. The case however was
advanced to 06.10.2025 and accused no.1 had filed
application under Section 346 of BNSS requesting the
court to direct the Central Prison Authorities to provide
accused no.1 with home cooked food. The matter was then
adjourned to 09.10.2025. On 09.10.2025, SPP had filed
application under Section 22 (2) (b) of KCOCA seeking
extension of time to complete investigation. The court had
- 58 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
adjourned the matter to 10.10.2025 on which date the
accused were produced from judicial custody through VC
and judicial custody was extended for a period of 15 days
in terms of the mandate under 167(2).
46. It is the submission of learned Additional SPP
that on 10.10.2025, copy was served to the counsel. The
matter was then adjourned to 14.10.2025. On such date,
learned counsel for accused nos.2, 3 and 7 had filed
objections to the application filed by the prosecution
seeking for extension of time. Hence it is clear that the
very filing of objections to the application filed by the
prosecution would indicate that the accused were notified
regarding application for extension of time to complete
investigation.
47. The application for extension of time was filed
on 09.10.2025 and came to be decided on 17.10.2025.
During this period, the accused were produced on
10.10.2025. They have filed objections to the application.
- 59 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
Their production on 10.10.2025 would be sufficient
compliance in terms of the observation of the Apex Court
in Sanjay Dutt (supra). If presence during the process of
consideration of application is in order to notify the
accused regarding such extension so that they could
object, then it can be stated that the purpose is served. As
in the present case, they were produced on 10.10.2025
after an application for extension was filed, and objections
were filed to such applications was filed on 14.10.2025
and they have been heard.
48. Insofar as their contention that they were not
produced on other dates, it must be noticed that in terms
of Section 187 of BNSS (section of 167 CRPC), every time
custody is extended for every period not exceeding 15
days, the accused is to be produced. This requirement has
been complied for the period during which application was
being considered i.e., between 09.10.2025 and
17.10.2025 when orders came to be passed. The accused
were produced on 10.10.2025 and subsequently on
- 60 -
NC: 2025:KHC:49636
HC-KAR
24.10.2025. The requirement of production on dates of
extension of remand has been complied with.
49. The contention that during the process of
consideration of application seeking extension of time for
investigation the petitioners were to be present on every
date of hearing is rejected, as there is no such legal
obligation.
II. CONCLUSION
50. This court considering a petition under Section
482 with its limited jurisdiction cannot sit in appeal over
the conclusion of the designated Judge and accordingly,
there are no grounds made out for interference with the
exercise of such judicial discretion conferred under the
statute.
51. Accordingly, in light of the discussion supra, the
petitions are dismissed.
Sd/-
(S SUNIL DUTT YADAV)
JUDGE
NP
