Karnataka High Court
National Highway Authority Of India ... vs Chandrashekarappa Basappa Mattur on 19 November, 2025
Author: S G Pandit
Bench: S G Pandit
-1-
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
MFA No.104751/2024
MFA NO.104752/2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B.
MFA NO.104750/2024 (AA) C/W
MFA NO.104751/2024 (AA)
MFA NO.104752/2024(AA)
IN MFA NO.104750/2024:
BETWEEN:
1. THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
THROUGH ITS PROJECT DIRECTOR,
MR.M. SHIVAKUMAR S/O B. MADAIAH
AGE. 54 YEARS, PIU, CHITRADURGA,
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT PIU,
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA, (NHAI)
NEAR JMIT, NH-48, CHITRADURGA.
2. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
NH-48(OLD NH-4) NEAR CHAMUNDESHWARI TEMPLE,
KSRTC DEPOT ROAD, CHITRADURGA-577501.
...APPELLANTS
Digitally signed by
(BY SRI. SAGAR LADDA, ADVOCATE)
BHARATHI H M
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
Date: 2025.11.20
AND
14:25:38 +0530
1. CHANDRASHEKHARAPPA BASAPPA MATTUR
R/O. ALDHAKATTI, TAL. AND DIST. HAVERI.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND ARBITRATOR,
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
HAVERI DISTRICT, HAVERI.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. S.N. BANAKAR, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SMT. KIRTI PATIL, HCGP FOR R2)
THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 37(1) OF THE
ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996, PRAYING TO ALLOW
-2-
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
MFA No.104751/2024
MFA NO.104752/2024
THIS MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL AND SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT
DATED 02.03.2023 PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND
SESSIONS JUDGE AT HAVERI IN ARBITRATION PETITION NO.73/2022
AS THIS ENHANCED RATE OF RS.1291.68/SQ.MTR IS NOT ONLY VERY
EXORBITANT BUT ALSO THERE IS A STAY FROM THE HON'BLE APEX
COURT ON THIS RATE IN 7 OTHER SIMILAR CASES & ETC.
IN MFA NO.104751/2024:
BETWEEN
1. THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
THROUGH ITS PROJECT DIRECTOR,
MR.M. SHIVAKUMAR S/O B. MADAIAH
AGE. 54 YEARS, PIU, CHITRADURGA,
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT PIU,
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA, (NHAI)
NEAR JMIT, NH-48, CHITRADURGA.
2. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
NH-48(OLD NH-4) NEAR CHAMUNDESHWARI TEMPLE,
KSRTC DEPOT ROAD, CHITRADURGA-577501.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. SAGAR LADDA, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. BHARAMAPPA TIRAKAPPA KULI
R/O. ALADHAKATTI, TAL. AND DIST. HAVERI.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND ARBITRATOR,
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
HAVERI DISTRICT, HAVERI.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. S.N. BANAKAR, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SMT. KIRTI PATIL, HCGP FOR R2)
THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 37(1) OF THE
ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996, PRAYING TO ALLOW
THIS MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL AND SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT
DATED 02.03.2023 PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND
SESSIONS JUDGE AT HAVERI IN ARBITRATION PETITION NO.74/2022
AS THIS ENHANCED RATE OF RS.1291.68/SQ.MTR IS NOT ONLY VERY
EXORBITANT BUT ALSO HAS A STAY ACCORDED BY HON'BLE APEX
COURT IN 7 OTHER SIMILAR CASES & ETC.
-3-
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
MFA No.104751/2024
MFA NO.104752/2024
IN MFA NO.104752/2024:
BETWEEN
1. THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
THROUGH ITS PROJECT DIRECTOR,
MR.M. SHIVAKUMAR S/O B. MADAIAH
AGE. 54 YEARS, PIU, CHITRADURGA,
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT PIU,
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA, (NHAI)
NEAR JMIT, NH-48, CHITRADURGA.
2. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA,
NH-48(OLD NH-4) NEAR CHAMUNDESHWARI TEMPLE,
KSRTC DEPOT ROAD, CHITRADURGA-577501.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. SAGAR LADDA, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. KODIBASAPPA BASAPPA MATTUR
R/O. ALADHAKATTI, TAL. AND DIST. HAVERI.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND ARBITRATOR,
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
HAVERI DISTRICT, HAVERI.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. S.N. BANAKAR, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SMT. KIRTI PATIL, HCGP FOR R2)
THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 37(1) OF THE
ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996, PRAYING TO ALLOW
THIS MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL AND SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT
DATED 02.03.2023 PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND
SESSIONS JUDGE AT HAVERI IN ARBITRATION PETITION NO.72/2022
AS THE SAID ENHANCED RATE OF RS.1,291.68 IS NOT ONLY VERY
EXORBITANT BUT ALSO STAYED BY THE HON'BLE APEX COURT IN 7
OTHER SIMILAR CASES & ETC.
THESE APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
ON 29.10.2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT THIS DAY, S G PANDIT J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B.
-4-
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
MFA No.104751/2024
MFA NO.104752/2024
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S G PANDIT)
The above batch of appeals are filed under Section 37(1)
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961 by the National
Highway Authority of India2, questioning the common
judgment dated 2.3.2023 passed in Arbitration Petition
Nos.72, 73 & 74 of 2022, on the file of learned Prl. District and
Sessions Judge, Haveri, whereunder the appellants'
challenge to the awards dated 12.01.2022 passed by the
learned Arbitrator/Deputy Commissioner, Haveri in
LAQ/ARBT/NH/CR/No.185/2004-05,
LAQ/ARBT/NH/CR/No.77/2004-05,
LAQ/ARBT/NH/CR/No.79/2004-05 and
LAQ/ARBT/NH/CR/No.186/2004-05, is rejected by confirming
the said awards.
2. Along with the above appeals, IA No.1/2025 is filed
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 praying to
condone the delay of 441 days in preferring the appeals.
For short 'Act, 1996'
For short 'NHAI'
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
3. Heard the learned counsel Sri. Sagar Ladda for the
appellants in all the above appeals, learned counsel Sri. S.N.
Banakar for respondent No.1 as well as Smt. Kirti Lata Patil,
learned HCGP for respondent No.2/State on IA No.1/2025.
4. Learned counsel Sri. Sagar Ladda for the
appellants/NHAI would submit that impugned common
judgment was passed on 2.3.2023 and the present appeals
were filed before this Court on 14.08.2024. He submits that
there is delay of 441 days, which is not deliberate and as the
delay is bonafide, he prays for condoning the delay in
preferring the appeals. Learned counsel would submit that
there are number of connected/identical matters, which made
it difficult for the appellants to keep a track at all times.
Further, learned counsel would submit that the appellants are
the government public exchequer authorities, who are dealing
with hundreds of such matters on a daily basis. As such, he
submits that the delay in approaching this Court is the result
of handling such excessive matters among other reasons.
However, he submits that mere reason of delay cannot be a
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
ground to reject the appeals, since the impugned judgments
would have far reaching implications on the public exchequer.
5. Per contra, learned counsel Sri. S.N. Banakar for
respondent No.1 would submit that there is inordinate delay of
441 days in approaching this Court by NHAI and in the
affidavit accompanying the application for condonation of
delay, no acceptable reasons are forthcoming to condone the
delay. He submits that there is no bonafide and as there is no
acceptable cause is shown, IA No.1/2025 requires to be
rejected, consequently appeals also.
6. Learned counsel Sri. S.N. Banakar would further
submit that the acquisition proceedings under NHAI were
commenced by issuing preliminary notification dated
19.3.2001 and final notification dated 3.1.2002, until this
date, the claimant has not received entire compensation.
Learned counsel referring to the objections filed to IA
No.1/2025, prays for dismissal of IA No.1/2025 for
condonation of delay.
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the affidavit accompanying the application
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
(IA No.1/2025) for condonation of delay as well as objections
filed opposing the said IA, the only question, which falls for
consideration is, whether the appellants have shown sufficient
cause for condoning the inordinate delay of 441 days in
preferring the appeals filed under Section 37(1) of the Act,
1996.
8. Answer to the above point would be in the
"negative" for the following reasons:
9. The first respondent's lands were acquired for
formation of national highway by issuing preliminary
notification under Section 3(A) of the National Highways Act,
19563, dated 19.3.2001 and final notification under Section
3(D) of the NH Act, dated 3.1.2002. The award determining
the compensation in respect of acquired lands was passed on
28.8.2004, fixing the market value for non-agricultural land at
Rs.47.33/- per sq.mtr. Not being satisfied with the market
value determined in the award, the 1st respondent-land loser
preferred reference before the learned Arbitrator. The learned
Arbitrator under award dated 12.01.2022, enhanced the
For short, 'NH Act'
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
market value of the acquired land at Rs.1,291.68 per sq.mtr.
with statutory benefits. Questioning the said awards passed
by the learned Arbitrator, the NHAI approached the learned
Prl. District and Sessions Judge, Haveri in the aforesaid
arbitration petitions, which were dismissed under impugned
common judgment dated 2.3.2023, confirming the awards
passed by the learned Arbitrator dated 12.1.2022.
10. Though the impugned common judgment was
passed on 2.3.2023, but the above appeals were presented
before this Court on 14.8.2024. Admittedly, there is delay of
441 days in preferring the appeals. Along with the appeals, IA
No.1/2025 is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
to condone the delay of 441 days in preferring the appeals.
Along with IA No.1/2025, an affidavit of Project Director, NHAI
Project Implementation Unit, Chitradurga, dated 19.3.2025 is
filed, whereunder the averments are with regard to merit of
the appeal and the relevant paragraphs with regard to delay
are, paragraphs-10, 13, 14 and 15, which read as under:
"10. Furthermore, the number of matters
connected/identical with the impugned proceedings
are numerous which has made it difficulty for the
Appellants entity to keep a track at all the times.
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
That the primary responsibility of the Appellants is to
ensure swift and smooth planning and execution of
the National Highways within its jurisdiction.
13. The Appellants submit that although the award was
passed on 2nd March 2023, the Appellants got the
knowledge of the same in the year 2024 itself at
which time, the Appellants rushed to apply for a
certified copy of the order which was received in the
month of July 2024.
14. That the Appellants have attempted to approach this
Hon'ble Court at the earliest possible and the delay
accruing is inadvertent.
15. That the Appellants are government public exchequer
authorities who are dealing with hundreds of such
matters on a daily basis along with ensuring swift
execution of their statutorily mandated duties. The
delay of 408 days in approaching this Hon'ble Court
was a result of handling such excessive matters
among other reasons as mentioned herein. However,
mere reason of delay be not considered material
since the gross violation of law undertaken by
Respondent No.2 has far reaching implications for the
public exchequer which would severely impact its
statutory public oriented functioning."
11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Maharashtra Vs. Borse Bros. Engineers & Contractors
(P) Ltd.4, has held that by virtue of Section 37 read with
Section 43 of the Act, 1996, the Limitation Act would apply to
the appeals that are filed under Section 37 of the Act, 1996.
The Hon'ble Apex Court has also made it clear that Articles
116 and 117 of the Limitation Act, as the case may be, would
(2021) 6 SCC 460
- 10 -
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
apply. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the same decision at
paragraph-55 has observed that, it is necessary to discover as
to what the expression "sufficient cause" means in the context
of condoning the delay in filing appeals under Section 37 of
the Act, 1996. The relevant paragraphs are 55, 58 and 63,
which read as under:
"55. Reading the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act as a whole, it is clear that when Section 37 of
the Arbitration Act is read with either Article 116 or 117 of
the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial
Courts Act, the object and context provided by the
aforesaid statutes, read as a whole, is the speedy disposal
of appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. To
read Section 5 of the Limitation Act consistently with the
aforesaid object, it is necessary to discover as to what the
expression "sufficient cause" means in the context of
condoning delay in filing appeals under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act.
58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the
Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the
speedy resolution of disputes, the expression "sufficient
cause" is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond
the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides,
the expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose
panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims.
This Court, in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013)
14 SCC 81], has held : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence.
The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate"
or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
"sufficient" embraces no more than that which
provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the
- 11 -
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly
examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context,
"sufficient cause" means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be
alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or
"remained inactive". However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court
that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court
should not allow the application for condonation of
delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to
cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land &
Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [Manindra
Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR
1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [Mata
Din v. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770] , Parimal
v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545 :
(2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] and Maniben Devraj Shah v.
Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [Maniben
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ)
24] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [Arjun
Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a "good
cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that
every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice
versa. However, if any difference exists it can only
be that the requirement of good cause is complied
with on a lesser degree of proof than that of
"sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be
given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only [Ed. : The
matter between two asterisks has been
emphasised in original.] so long as negligence,
- 12 -
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to
the party concerned [Ed. : The matter between
two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] ,
whether or not sufficient cause has been
furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [Madanlal v.
Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao
v. Gobardhan Sao [Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan
Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but
it has to be applied with all its rigour when the
statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. 'A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to
ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.' The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to
a particular party but the court has no choice but
to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The
legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the
law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in
such a situation. It has consistently been held
that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse
of time become stale. According to Halsbury's
Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266:
'605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts
have expressed at least three differing reasons
supporting the existence of statutes of limitation,
namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more
of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a
defendant might have lost the evidence to
disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with
good causes of actions should pursue them with
reasonable diligence.'
- 13 -
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore,
limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of
what may have been acquired in equity and justice
by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by
a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See
Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [Popat
& Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., (2005) 7
SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh
[Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC
705] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project [Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ)
907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka
[P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka,
(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830] this
Court held that judicially engrafting principles of
limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in
the face of law laid down by the Constitution
Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
[Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1
SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented in
the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to
explain the court as to what was the "sufficient
cause" which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in
the facts and circumstances of the case, or found
to have not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning
such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by
this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In
case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning
the delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an
order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
- 14 -
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature." (emphasis supplied)
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy
disposal sought to be achieved both under the
Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for
appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that
are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation
Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a
delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively,
is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of
rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted
bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay
beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court,
be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side
of the picture is that the opposite party may have
acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be
lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches.
12. In the light of above principles laid down by
the Hon'ble Apex Court and on perusal of the averments
made in the affidavit filed in support of the application
for condonation of delay, we are of the considered
opinion that the appellants/NHAI have failed to provide
sufficient cause for condoning the delay. Except stating
that it was handling the numerous and identical cases
and it would affect the public exchequer, it has failed to
explain as to why the delay has occurred in preferring
the appeal. In the absence of cogent or acceptable
reasons or cause, the delay cannot be condoned in a
routine manner. The appellants/NHAI have failed to
- 15 -
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
satisfy that they were prevented by any cause from filing
the appeals. Further, the appellants have also failed to
explain as to why NHAI could not prefer an appeal in
time or why there was inordinate delay of 441 days in
preferring the appeal. In the absence of satisfactory
explanation for condonation of delay, this Court could
not condone the delay.
13. In the affidavit in support of the application
for condonation of delay, it is stated that the award was
passed on 2.3.2023, but it came to the knowledge of the
appellants in the year 2024 and immediately thereafter,
they have rushed to obtain certified copy and file the
above appeals. On careful perusal of the affidavit, it
would not give the details as to why it did not come to
the knowledge of the appellants and exactly, when it
came to the knowledge of the appellants. The date of
applying for certified copy and when certified copy was
obtained is also not forthcoming in the affidavit.
14. The main contention of the learned counsel
for the appellants was that the appellants/NHAI is a
- 16 -
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
government authority and if the appeal is not
entertained, it would affect the public exchequer. That
contention cannot be a ground to condone the delay.
Such contention is raised only to cover up the lack sided
approach of the officials. It appears that the officials,
who were careless in filing the appeals before this Court,
on the ground that it affects the exchequer, are seeking
special treatment.
15. In an identical circumstance, the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs.
Vs. Karnataka Housing Board5, has observed that the
State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded
preferential treatment in matters concerning
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment read
thus:
"212. The law as it presently stands, post the
decision of Postmaster General (supra), is
unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to
remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental
litigants, no less than private parties, must
demonstrate bona fide, sufficient, and cogent cause
2025 SCC Online SC 531
- 17 -
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be
condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the
applicant.
213. From a combined reading of Bal Kishan Mathur
(supra) and Sheo Raj Singh (supra) it is equally
manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra)
is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its
instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential
treatment in matters concerning condonation of
delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The
State must be judged by the same standards as any
private litigant. To do otherwise would not only
compromise the sanctity of limitation. The earlier
view, insofar as it favoured a liberal approach
towards the State or any of its instrumentality is no
more the correct position of law. Secondly, that the
habitual reliance of Government departments on
bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or
administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking
condonation of delay cannot always, invariably
accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were
to be accepted as a matter of course, the very
discipline sought to be introduced by the law of
limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless
uncertainty in litigation."
216. In this regard, the vital test that has to be
employed, wherever "sufficient cause" is sought to
be demonstrated on the ground of bureaucratic
inefficiencies is to distinguish between whether the
same is an "explanation" or an "excuse". Although
the two may appear to be one and the same, yet
there exists a fine but pertinent distinction between
an "excuse" and an "explanation".
229. Public interest is best served by ensuring
efficiency and diligence in governmental functioning,
rather than by condoning its lapses as a matter of
course. Thus, a liberal inclination towards the State
or any of its instrumentalities, in matters of
condonation of delay, cannot be adopted, merely on
the presumption that, if the delay is not condoned,
public interest runs the risk of suffering, by a
meritorious matter being thrown out. Public interest
lies not in condoning governmental indifference, but
- 18 -
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
in compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely
action.
230. To permit condonation of delay to become a
matter of course for the Government would have the
deleterious effect of institutionalising inefficiency. It
would, in substance, incentivise indolence and foster
a culture where accountability for delay is eroded. If
the State is assured that its lapses will invariably be
excused under the rubric of "public interest," there
would remain little incentive for its officers to act
with vigilance or for its instrumentalities to
streamline procedures for timely action. The
consequence would not be the advancement of public
interest but rather its betrayal.
231. Public interest, therefore, does not lie in
condoning governmental negligence, but in
compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely
decision-making. This Court has time and again
emphasised that liberal condonation of delay on
behalf of the State, merely on the ground that
refusal might cause the dismissal of a potentially
meritorious matter, is a misplaced proposition. Public
interest is not synonymous with the cause of the
Government; it is, instead, synonymous with the
enforcement of rule of law, certainty in legal rights,
and an administrative machinery that functions with
diligence and accountability.
16. From the affidavit accompanying the
application (IA No.1/2025) for condonation of delay, we
are of the considered view that the appellant is negligent
and it lacks bonafide or it failed to act diligently and
remained inactive in the matter of filing the appeals. In
such circumstances and in the absence of sufficient
cause for condoning the delay, IA No.1/2025 deserves to
- 19 -
MFA No.104750/2024 C/W
be rejected. Accordingly, IA No.1/2025 filed in the
above appeals stand rejected. Consequently, the
appeals are rejected.
Pending applications, if any, are disposed of as not
surviving for consideration.
Sd/-
(S G PANDIT)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(GEETHA K.B.)
JUDGE
JTR
