Karnataka High Court
Kashinath S/O Maruti Yamale vs Anand S/O Rayappa Pujari on 11 March, 2025
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB
RFA No. 100115 of 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 100115 OF 2023 (DEC/INJ)
BETWEEN:
1. KASHINATH S/O. MARUTI YAMALE
AGE. 45 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG,
DIST. BELAGAVI, PIN 591317.
2. DHAREPPA S/O. BHUJAPPA PASANE
AGE. 67 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG,
DIST. BELAGAVI. PIN 591317
...APPELLANTS
(BY MISS SANJANA S. MUDHOL, ADV. FOR
SRI. SHIVARAJ P. MUDHOL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally
signed by
MALLIKARJUN
1. ANAND S/O. RAYAPPA PUJARI
RUDRAYYA
KALMATH
Location:
HIGH COURT
(SINCE DEAD, HIS LR ALREADY ON RECORD AS
OF
KARNATAKA RESPONDENT NO. 2)
2. SANTOSH S/O. RAYAPPA PUJARI
AGE. 20 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG,
DIST. BELAGAVI, PIN 591317.
3. VIVEK S/O. VASANT GHATAGE
(DIED, ON RELIEF IS CLAIMED AGAINST
HIM AND NO DECREE WAS PASSED AGAINST HIM)
4. VINOD S/O. VASANT GHATAGE
AGE. 42 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG,
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB
RFA No. 100115 of 2023
DIST. BELAGAVI, PIN 591317.
5. SMT. KASHAWWA W/O. VASANT GHATAGE
AGE. 63 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG,
DIST. BELAGAVI, PIN 591317.
6. SMT. SHRUTI W/O. AMMANNA HEGADE
AGE. 29 YEARS, OCC. HOUSE HOLD WORK,
R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG,
DIST. BELAGAVI, PIN 591317.
7. SMT. KALPANA W/O. VINOD GHATAGE
AGE. 37 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. NIDAGUNDI, TALUK. RAIBAG,
DIST. BELAGAVI, PIN 591317.
(NOTE: THE DEFENDANT NO.6 WAS DIED DURING
PENDENCY OF THE SUIT I.E., 24.05.2021, HER
LEGAL HEIRS ARE ALREADY ON RECORD)
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. RAMACHANDRA A. MALI AND
SRI. SUNIL KHOT, ADVOCATES FOR R4, R5 AND R7;
SRI. SHRIHARSH A. NEELOPANT, ADVOCATE FOR R2;
R1-DECEASED; R2 IS LR OF DECEASED R1; R3-DECEASED;
V/O. DATED 24.11.2023 THERE IS NO NEED FOR BRINGING
LR'S OF DECEASED R3; NOTICE TO R5 SERVED)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF CPC.,
PRAYING TO, SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
28.06.2022 PASSED IN O.S. NO.42/2017 ON THE FILE OF THE
SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE FIRST
CLASS AT RAIBAG, AND DISMISS THE SUIT FILED BY THE
RESPONDENT NOS.1 AND 2 BY ALLOWING THIS APPEAL, IN
THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS
DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA
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RFA No. 100115 of 2023
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM)
Captioned appeal is by the defendant Nos.4 and 5
assailing the judgment and decree dated 28.06.2022 passed in
O.S. No.45/2017 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC,
Raibag [for brevity, 'the trial Court'].
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are
referred to as per their rank before the trial Court.
3. Before we delve into the case on hand, we deem it
fit to cull out the family tree of plaintiffs which is as under:
Siddappa (propositus; grandfather)
Tangewwa
(D6; grandmother, now deceased)
Rayappa (deceased; father of the plaintiffs)
Anand Shruti Santosh
(Pltff.No.1) (Deft.No.7) (Pltff.No.2)
4. The plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 are sons of one
Sri.Rayappa. The plaintiffs herein have filed a suit seeking a
declaration that they are the absolute owners of the suit
schedule properties. They trace title over these properties
based on the compromise decree recorded in O.S.
NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB
No.142/2010. Under the said compromise decree, plaintiffs
assert that suit land is allotted to the plaintiffs' share.
5. Defendant Nos.4 and 5 dispute the plaintiffs' title
and, instead, assert ownership based on a registered sale deed
executed by defendant No.5, who acted as the General Power
of Attorney (GPA) for defendant No.6. According to defendant
Nos.4 and 5, defendant No.6 was the absolute owner of the suit
lands bearing Nos. 46/1B and 53/A and had lawfully executed a
GPA in favor of defendant No.5, authorizing the sale of the
property. They argue that, since their title is derived from a
registered sale deed, these lands could not have been included
in the compromise petition. Additionally, they contend that the
compromise decree was never implemented, demonstrating a
clear intent on the part of the plaintiffs, defendant Nos.6 and 7,
and the deceased Sri Rayappa. Furthermore, they assert that
the decree passed in O.S. No.142/2010 is null and void.
6. In support of their respective claims, both the
plaintiffs and defendant No.4 have presented oral and
documentary evidence. The plaintiffs examined one of the
plaintiffs as PW1 and submitted nine documents, marked as
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Exs.P1 to P9. Defendant No.4, in turn, testified as DW1 and
introduced an additional witness as DW2, producing ten
documents, marked as Exs.D1 to D10. The trial Court, after
considering the compromise decree recorded in O.S.
No.142/2010 on 13.12.2010, rejected the assertions of
defendant Nos.4 and 5. The Court held that, unless defendant
Nos.4 and 5 formally challenge the compromise decree, they
lack the legal standing to dispute the plaintiffs' title to the suit
lands as per the terms of the compromise in O.S. No.142/2010.
Aggrieved by this judgment and decree, defendant Nos.4 and 5
have now challenged the decision.
7. We have heard the arguments of the learned
counsel representing defendant Nos.4 and 5 as well as the
learned counsel for the plaintiffs. After carefully considering the
pleadings of both parties, we have also conducted an
independent assessment of the oral and documentary evidence
presented. The key issue that arises for our consideration is as
follows:
"Whether the finding of the trial Court while
answering issue No.1 in the affirmative that the
plaintiffs have succeeded in proving the title and
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lawful possession of the suit schedule property is
perverse and palpably erroneous."
8. Before proceeding with an analysis of the present
case, it is essential to consider the pleadings in the written
statement, particularly paragraph 4. Notably, the defendants
have acknowledged their awareness of the compromise decree
recorded in O.S. No.142/2010. Given the significance of this
admission, we find it necessary to take cognizance of the
pleadings in paragraph 4, which is reproduced below:
"4) The allegations made in par no.2 of the
plaint regarding O.S. No.142/2010, the filing of the
compromise petition and the passing of the decree
in Lok Adalat appears to be correct on the basis of
the copy of the decree and compromise petition
produced by the plaintiffs. This defendant submits
he had no knowledge of the said decree until he
received the summons of this suit and only after
going through the copy of the decree produced by
the plaintiffs he has come to know of the same.
This defendant submits that the compromise
entered into in O.S. No 142/2010 is not legal and
valid and it is a collusive in nature and the decree
passed on the basis of the said compromise is
illegal and null and void and it is got by the present
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plaintiffs, defendant 6 and 7 and deceased Rayappa
by playing fraud on the court and suppressing the
true facts."
9. We are also inclined to take cognizance of the
cross-examination of defendant No.4, who is examined as
D.W.1. The same is extracted, which reads as under:
"£À£ÀUÉ ªÁ¢ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¥ÀæwªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀ UÉÆvÀÄÛ. ªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀÄ, ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ £ÀA.6,7
ªÀÄvÀÄÛ MªÀð ¥ÁgÀªÀé EzÉà £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è C.zÁ.£ÀA.142/2010 gÀ°è
¨sÁUÀPÁÌV zÁªÉ ¸À°è¹zÀÝgÀÄ JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. D zÁªÉAiÀÄ°è CªÀgÀÄ gÁf rQæ
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w½¬ÄvÀÄ JAzÀÄ £ÀÄrAiÀÄÄvÁÛgÉ. zÁªÁ D¹ÛUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀ ºÉ¸ÀjUÉ §A¢ªÉ JAzÀgÉ
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vÀAUɪÀé ¥Àæw¤¢ü¸ÀÄwÛzÀÝgÀÄ JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. ¸ÀzÀj gÁf rQæ EzÀĪÀgÉUÆ
À gÀzÁÝV®è
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gÁAiÀÄ¥Àà ©lÄÖ PÉÆnÖgÀÄvÁÛgÉ JAzÀÄ £ÀÄrAiÀÄÄvÁÛgÉ. vÀAUɪÀé AiÀiÁªÀvÀÄÛ LzÀ£ÉÃ
¥ÀæwªÁ¢UÉ C¢üPÁgÀ ¥ÀvÀæ §gÉzÀÄPÉÆnÖ®è JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. vÀAUɪÀé¤UÁUÀ°, LzÀ£ÉÃ
¥ÀæwªÁ¢UÁ°Ã zÁªÁ D¹ÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ªÀiÁgÁl ªÀiÁqÀĪÀ ºÀPÀÄÌ EgÀ°®è JAzÀgÉ
¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. zÁªÁ ¸ÀévÀÄÛUÀ¼ÀÄ FUÀ®Ä ªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀ ¸Áé¢üãÀzÀ°è EªÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è.
£ÁªÀÅ AiÀiÁªÀvÀÄÛ F ¸ÀévÀÄÛUÀ¼À°è ¸Áé¢üãÀ E®è JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. £ÁªÀÅ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ LzÀ£ÉÃ
¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ±ÀjSÁV ¸ÀļÀÄî PÀæAiÀÄ ¥ÀvÀæ ¸À馅 ªÀiÁrzÉÝÃªÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. vÀAUɪÀé
£ÀªÉÆäA¢UÉ AiÀiÁªÀvÀÄÛ ªÀåªÀºÁgÀ ªÀiÁr®è JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. LzÀ£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢
AiÀiÁªÁUÀ®Æ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è EgÀÄvÁÛgÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. £Á£ÀÄ ªÁnß ¥ÀvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß
£ÉÆÃr®è. D §UÉÎ £Á£ÀÄ w½zÀÄPÉƼÀî®Ä ¥ÀæAiÀÄvÀß ªÀiÁr®è. £Á£ÀÄ zÁªÁ ¸ÀévÀÄÛUÀ¼ÀÄ
vÀAUɪÀé¤UÉ ªÁnß ¥ÀæPÁgÀ §A¢gÀĪÀÅzÁV ¸ÀļÀÄî ºÉüÀÄwÛzÉÝÃ£É JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è.
NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB
£Á£ÀÄ ºÁdgÀÄ ¥Àr¹gÀĪÀ Rjâ ¥ÀvÀæUÀ¼À°è ªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀÄ, ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ 6 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 7
gÀªÀgÀ ¸À»UÀ¼ÀÄ E®è. 7 £Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ £À£Àß «gÀÄzÀÞ G¥À «¨sÁUÁ¢üPÁjUÀ½UÉ
ªÉÄîä£À« ¸À°è¹zÁÝgÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. C.zÁ £ÀA.678/2012 gÀ°è ªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀÄ
C.zÀ.£ÀA.142/2010 gÀ §UÉÎ ¥Àæ¸ÁÛ¥À ªÀiÁrzÁÝgÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. C.zÁ
£ÀA.678/2012 gÀ ªÁzÀ ¥ÀvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß £Á£Éà ºÁdgÀÄ ¥Àr¹zÉÝÃ£É JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj.
CzÀgÀ°è ªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀÄ C.zÀ.£ÀA 142/2010 gÀ §UÉÎ ¥Àæ¸ÁÛ¥À ªÀiÁrzÁÝgÉ JAzÀgÉ
¸Àj, C.zÁ £ÀA.678/2012 ªÁ¢AiÀÄgÀÄ ºÁdgÁUÀ¢zÀÝ PÁgÀtPÉÌ ªÀeÁ DVzÉ
JAzÀgÉ UÉÆwÛ®è. ¤r-1 gÀ°è vÀAUɪÀé£À ºÉ§ânÖ£À UÀÄgÀÄvÀ£ÀÄß AiÀiÁgÀÆ PÀÆqÀ
UÀÄgÀÄw¹®è JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. C¢üPÁgÀ ¥ÀvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß LzÀ£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ¸Àȶ֪ÀiÁr ºÁdgÀÄ
¥Àr¹zÁÝgÉ JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è. ¤r-5 gÀ°è ªÁnß §UÉÎ ¥Àæ¸ÁÛ¥À E®è JAzÀgÉ £À£ÀUÉ
UÉÆwÛ®è. C.zÀ.£ÀA 142/2010 gÀ §UÉÎ 7 £Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ ¸À°è¹zÀ jmï Cfð
ªÀeÁ DVzÉ JAzÀgÉ £À£ÀUÉ UÉÆwÛ®è. J¯Áè zÁR¯ÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß £ÁªÀÅ £ÀªÀÄä EZÉÑAiÀÄAvÉ
¸ÀÈ¶× ªÀiÁr ºÁdgÀÄ ¥Àr¹ ¸ÀļÀÄî ¸ÁPÀëå £ÀÄrAiÀÄÄwÛzÉÝÃ£É JAzÀgÉ ¸ÀjAiÀÄ®è."
10. In the light of the stand taken by defendant Nos.4
and 5 in paragraph 4 of the written statement, it is clearly
evident that defendant Nos.4 and 5 were clearly aware of the
pendency of the suit in O.S. No.142/2010. The suit instituted in
O.S. No.142/2010 ended in a compromise and accordingly,
compromise decree was drawn on 13.12.2010. In view of the
compromise decree, the suit lands are allotted to the plaintiffs.
11. Defendant Nos.4 and 5 claim ownership of the suit
lands through a sale deed dated 01.12.2011, which was
executed by defendant No.5 in his capacity as the General
NC: 2025:KHC-D:4602-DB
Power of Attorney (GPA) of defendant No.6. However, the
validity of this transaction is in serious question, as the
compromise decree in O.S. No.142/2010 was already passed
on 13.12.2010. At the time of the sale deed execution, an
injunction was in force, restricting any alienation of the suit
lands. Despite this legal restraint, defendant No.5, acting under
the GPA executed by defendant No.6, proceeded with the sale
of the property after the compromise had been recorded and
the decree had been drawn. The crucial legal issue that arises
is whether defendant No.5, as a mere agent under a GPA, could
convey a valid title when defendant No.6 had already lost her
ownership rights under the compromise decree.
12. It is well settled in law that a person can only
transfer ownership of a property if they possess a valid title at
the time of execution. In the present case, by virtue of the
compromise decree in O.S. No.142/2010, the suit lands had
already been allotted to the plaintiffs as early as December
2010. Consequently, defendant No.6 no longer had any
saleable interest in the property as of 01.12.2011, the date of
the impugned sale deed. Since defendant No.6 had already
divested her rights in favor of the plaintiffs through the
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compromise decree, the GPA executed by her in favour of
defendant No.5 became ineffective for purposes of transferring
title. As an agent, defendant No.5 could not have conveyed a
better title than what his principal, defendant No.6, possessed.
Since defendant No.6 had no title to transfer after the
compromise decree, the subsequent sale made by defendant
No.5 on 01.12.2011 is legally inconsequential. In terms of
Section 7 of the Transfer of Property Act, a person must have
ownership and the legal right to transfer property both of which
were absent in the case of defendant No.6 at the time of the
sale. Consequently, the sale deed executed by defendant No.5
based on the GPA did not, and could not, confer any valid title
upon defendant Nos.4 and 5.
13. Defendant Nos.4 and 5 have also attempted to
challenge the validity of the compromise decree recorded in
O.S. No.142/2010 by claiming that it is null and void. However,
such a contention cannot be accepted in light of the legal
position explained above. As on the date of the sale deed,
defendant No.6 had already lost any saleable interest in the
property due to the compromise decree. Further, once the
principal (defendant No.6) had lost ownership, the agent
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(defendant No.5) automatically lost the authority to act on her
behalf in matters of alienation. The law is clear that an agent's
authority cannot extend beyond the rights of the principal.
Hence, defendant No.5 had no legal competence to execute a
valid sale deed in favor of defendant Nos.4 and 5.
14. Additionally, defendant Nos.4 and 5 have attempted
to rely on the dismissal of O.S. No.678/2012, a suit filed by the
plaintiffs seeking a declaration that the sale deed dated
01.12.2011 was not binding on them. They argue that since
this suit was dismissed for non-prosecution, the plaintiffs were
precluded from maintaining the present suit. However, this
argument lacks merit. Significantly, there are no specific
pleadings in the written statement to substantiate how the
dismissal of O.S. No.678/2012 would bar the plaintiffs' present
claim. Furthermore, upon examination of the documents
produced, particularly the order sheet in O.S. No.678/2012 and
a copy of the plaint (marked as Exs.D-9 and D-10), it is evident
that the earlier suit was filed when the plaintiffs were minors.
The suit was initiated through their guardian, defendant No.6,
and was later dismissed for non-prosecution. Importantly, the
present suit has been instituted by the plaintiffs after attaining
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the age of majority, thereby entitling them to seek an
independent adjudication of their title, unaffected by the
dismissal of the earlier suit.
15. Although defendant Nos.4 and 5 have produced
documents related to O.S. No.678/2012 as Exs.D-9 and D-10,
these documents do not contain any material to establish that
the plaintiffs are legally barred from asserting their rights in the
present proceedings. There are no specific averments in the
written statement that demonstrate how the plaintiffs' claim is
extinguished solely due to the dismissal of the earlier suit. In
the absence of any cogent legal basis, the reliance placed by
defendant Nos.4 and 5 on the dismissal of O.S. No.678/2012 is
wholly misplaced.
16. Given that the sale deed executed by defendant
No.5 on 01.12.2011 is subsequent to the compromise decree
recorded in O.S. No.142/2010, it holds no legal sanctity. Even if
defendant Nos.4 and 5 claim to have purchased the property
through defendant No.5, they have failed to establish how they
acquired a valid title over the suit lands. The trial Court was,
therefore, justified in holding that the plaintiffs are the absolute
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owners by recognizing the effect of the compromise decree
recorded in O.S. No.142/2010. The judgment and decree of the
trial Court correctly declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners,
in accordance with both law and factual circumstances.
Moreover, defendant Nos.4 and 5 have unequivocally admitted
in their written statement, as well as in cross-examination, that
the suit lands were allotted to the plaintiffs (who were minors
at the time) under the terms of the compromise decree. In
view of this clear admission and the established legal position,
defendant Nos.4 and 5 cannot claim any valid right or title over
the suit lands based on a sale deed that was executed after the
compromise decree had already taken effect.
17. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for
defendant Nos.4 and 5 are not applicable to the case on hand.
18. The appeal is devoid of merits and is liable to be
dismissed. Accordingly, we answer the above point in the
negative and proceed to pass the following;
ORDER
The appeal is dismissed.
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No order as to the costs.
In view dismissal of the appeal, pending I.As., if any, do
not survive for consideration and the same are dismissed.
Sd/-
(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(G BASAVARAJA)
JUDGE
RSH, MBS / CT-CMU
