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ಈ ಮೂಲಕ ತಮ912 ೋರು(ೆ)ೕ.ೆ."
The police, conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against
these accused for the afore-quoted offences in C.C. in 1863 of
2021. The summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in column
No.7 reads as follows:
"ಈ Kೋ‚ಾ ೋಪuÁ ಪತMದ ಾಲಂ.ನಂ.6ರ !ಾ -1 ರವರ ಮಗ ಾದ ಆgï ೋ ಾ
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ಎಂದು [ೆiqನ ವರದ ೆ ಹಣ ಾ +ಾನSಕ3ಾ ;ಂSಸು7)ದ4Vಂದ, ಈ ;ಂ!ೆಯನು (ಾಳPಾರKೆ
ಆ . ೋ ಾ ಈ ೆ e.ಾಂಕ:24-10-2020 ರಂದು aೆಳ ನ ಾವ 5-14 ಗಂkೆ ಸಮಯದ12 ತನ ಗಂಡನ
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aೇಸತು) ಆ . ೋ ಾ ಈ ೆ aೇ ೆ KಾV KಾV ಾಣKೆ, ಆ ೆ 3ಾಸ ದ4 ತನ ಗಂಡನ ಮ.ೆಯ ಮಹ ಯ
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DzÀÝjAzÀ J-1 jAzÀ J-3 DgÉÆæUÀ¼ÀÄ ¨sÁgÀwÃAiÀÄ zÀAqÀ ¸ÀA»vÉAiÀÄ PÀ®A.498(J),
304(©) ¸À»vÀ 34 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀ®A.3 & 4 ªÀgÀzÀQëuÉ ¤µÉÃzsÀ PÁAiÉÄÝ jÃvÁå ²PÁëºÀðgÁVgÀÄvÁÛgÉ."
The concerned Court commits the case to the Court of Sessions and
the matter is pending in S.C.No.697 of 2021. With the facts being
as afore-said and the summary of the charge sheet the allegation
is, the daughter of the complainant was being harassed on demand
of dowry of Rs.4-5 lakhs on every occasion and used to hurl abusive
comments upon the looks of the daughter of the complainant. The
daughter of the complainant, at the time of commission of suicide,
leaves behind a death note. In the death note she scribes that no
one is responsible for her death and further narration is that the
husband was not happy with her. The handwriting of the daughter
of the complainant is also confirmed. In such circumstances,
whether presumption of innocence can be drawn against these
petitioners/husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law and quash
the proceedings is what is required to be considered.
9. At the outset, I deem it appropriate to consider whether
the death note can be relied upon, to quash the proceedings in
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., in the
peculiar facts of this case. Identical issue is considered by the Apex
Court in the case of NARESH KUMAR V. STATE OF HARYANA1,
wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:
".... .... ....
11. We may now refer to the suicide note. It, inter
alia, states:
"All the doors are closed for me. Besides this, no
other way is available to me and I adopted the way
which I liked."
The tenor of the suicide note clearly shows that the
deceased was in helpless condition and she found no
other way to come out of the situation. The suicide note
cannot be taken to be encyclopaedia of the entire
situation in which the deceased was placed. It is not
possible to infer from the said note that the deceased
was happy in her matrimonial home. Mere mention that
nobody may be held responsible, while also stating that
all the doors were closed for her and she had no other
way available (except to leave the world), is not enough
to exonerate the appellant. When a young married girl
finds herself in helpless situation and decides to end her
life, in absence of any other circumstance, it is natural to
infer that she was unhappy in her matrimonial home. A
suicide note cannot be treated as conclusive of there
being no one responsible for the situation when evidence
on record categorically points to harassment for dowry.
2015 (1) SCC 797
12. One cannot lose sight of the fact that
unfortunately the menace of dowry deaths still exists in
our society and has been the subject of expert studies.
The Law Commission, in its 91st Report dated 10-8-1983,
recommended reform of the law to deal with the situation
which led to incorporation of Section 304-B IPC, making
"dowry death" an offence and Section 113-B in the
Evidence Act which provides for raising a presumption as
to dowry death in case of an unnatural death within
seven years of marriage when it is shown that a woman
was subjected to harassment for dowry soon before her
death. These aspects have been considered by this Court
in Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(2003) 8 SCC
80 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 2016] and other judgments.
13. The circumstances have thus to be appreciated in the
light of the above social and legislative background. As already
noted, in the present case, there is plethora of evidence to
prove the demand of dowry "soon before the death" giving rise
to the presumption against the appellant.
14 [Ed. : Para 14 corrected vide Official
Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2015 dated 19-1-2015.] .
As regards the claim for parity of the case of the appellant with
his mother and brother who have been acquitted, the High
Court has rightly found his case to be distinguishable from the
case of his mother and brother. The husband is not only
primarily responsible for safety of his wife, he is expected to be
conversant with her state of mind more than any other relative.
If the wife commits suicide by setting herself on fire, preceded
by dissatisfaction of the husband and his family with the dowry,
the inference of harassment against the husband may be
patent. Responsibility of the husband towards his wife is
qualitatively different and higher as against his other relatives.
15. On proof of the essential ingredients mentioned in
Section 113-B, if the statutory presumption arises against the
accused which shifts the burden on the accused, the accused
must give cogent explanation. Failure to give an explanation or
giving of false explanation can be taken as an additional
circumstance against him. The requirement of allegations of
demand of dowry against the relatives of the husband may have
to be more specific and the Court may be more cautious in
dealing with such allegations, if there is any doubt about
overimplication, but responsibility of the husband may be
obvious from the circumstances. In these circumstances, the
case of the appellant cannot stand on a par with his mother and
brother who have been acquitted by the High Court, by way of
caution against overimplication, as well as for want of cogent
evidence against them. The case of the husband stands on a
different footing.
16. Thus, we have no hesitation in upholding the
conviction and sentence of the appellant as we do not find any
reason to interfere with the concurrent orders of the courts
below in convicting and sentencing the appellant."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Case before the Apex Court was against an order of conviction
on a death note. The death note indicated that no one was
responsible for the death of the victim therein. The Apex Court
holds in an offence under Section 304B of the IPC merely because
the deceased had scribed that no one is responsible, it should not
quash the proceedings.
10. In yet another judgment the Apex Court in the case of
V.K. MISHRA v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND2 refuses to acquit the
husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law who had sought such
acquittal, only on the score that the deceased at the time of
(2015) 9 SCC 588
commission of suicide had left a death note which blamed none.
The Apex Court holds as follows:
".... .... ....
28. Vijay Kumar Sharma (PW 6), tenant neighbour of the
accused, has stated that he never heard any shouting,
screaming from the house of the appellants and the couple was
living happily. Placing reliance upon the evidence of this witness,
appellants contended that had there been any dowry demand,
there would have been disharmony among the couple which
would have definitely been known to neighbours like PW 6. It is
to be noted that in a case where demand of dowry is alleged
such demands are confined within the four walls of the house
and known only to the members of both sides of the family. In
such cases, independent and direct evidence with regard to the
occurrences is ordinarily not available. That is why the
legislature has introduced Sections 113-A and 113-B in the
Evidence Act by permitting presumption to be raised in certain
circumstances. Evidence of PW 6, in our view, does not in
anyway advance the case of the appellants.
29. The defence placed much reliance upon three
documents: (i) the suicide note written by the deceased;
(ii) inland letter allegedly found in the trunk and lapses in
the investigation; and (iii) the letter said to have been
written by the deceased victim to her brother-in-law. The
appellants vehemently contended that PW 14
investigating officer failed to carry out fair investigation
regarding the above three documents and submitted that
those three documents become more vital on account of
belated and self-contradictory evidence with regard to
demand of dowry.
30. Mr Mukesh Giri, learned Additional Advocate General
appearing for the State, and Mr Ratnakar Dash, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the informant submitted that the
appellants have fabricated three letters probably on legal advice
and produced the same at a belated stage while making
application for bail and the appellants have not taken any steps
to prove the genuineness of the documents and rightly those
documents were rejected by the trial court as well as by the
High Court.
31. So far as the suicide note is concerned, Archana
is said to have stated that she is taking the step "suicide"
because her mental condition is not good and that
nobody should be held responsible for her act. It is
pertinent to note that suicide note was not discovered
during investigation but it was later produced by the
appellants. When PW 1 (father of Archana) was
confronted with the suicide note, PW 1 denied it to be in
the handwriting of Archana. Appellants have not taken
steps to prove the suicide note to be in the handwriting of
Archana. Even assuming the suicide note to be true, the
fact remains that the death of Archana was unnatural.
The contents of the suicide note does not affect
consistent version of PW 1 and PW 2."
(Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner
that the death note blames none and the law cannot blame them, is
noted only to be rejected, as it is for the petitioners to come out
clean in a full blown trial.
11. The other issue would be, whether there is a prima facie
case made out by the petitioners in their favour seeking quashment
of the proceedings. The relationship between the accused No.1 and
the daughter of the complainant, after marriage, lasted only for one
year. Therefore, the death happens barely after a year of marriage.
The emphasis that is laid by the counsel learned for the petitioners
is, that they are themselves well off and there was no necessity to
demand dowry. This is a pure question of fact, which undoubtedly
requires evidence. In identical circumstances of seriously disputed
questions of facts, in a case concerning dowry death, as obtaining
under Section 304-B of the IPC, this Court in the case of
NIRANJAN HEGDE vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA3 had held as
follows:
".... .... ....
9. The marriage between the petitioner and the daughter
of the complainant who is now dead is not in dispute. The
contention of strained relationship between the petitioner and
the deceased is also borne out from the records. The complaint
itself narrates that the deceased had left the matrimonial house
and was residing at her parental house. Whether this can be
enough circumstance to drive home any of the allegations under
Sections 304B, 498A or Section 313 of the IPC is what falls for
consideration at this juncture in the case at hand? The daughter
of the complainant commits suicide on 12-06-2022. The
complainant on 13-06-2022 registers the complaint / report of
death before Sanjay Nagar Police Station, Bangalore. The
report so registered on that date is germane to be noticed and it
reads as follows:-
"It is to report that my daughter S.V.Raksha has
committed suicide by hanging in my house. She was
married to a planter Mr.Niranjan Hegde of Thannodi,
Chikkamaglur Dist. in the year 2017 Dec. She was not
Crl.P.No.5657 of 2022 disposed on 08.07.2022
finding her life comfortable with him eversince she got
married. His parents and we too have had workedout to
make the life of the couple happy but was still unresolved.
My daughter Raksha was working for Infosys. She use to
be in pains all through. Her in-laws also had tried to
make the couple happy they too have not succeeded.
Raksha was working from home living in her room
was seen not in mood last evening.
Today 13th Jun 2022 around 9.30 a.m. our made
Nirmala had gone to her room to call for her tea and
found Rakshas body was hanging from ceiling of her bed
room in the I floor. As she started crying we asked her
what happened she showed us the hanging body of the
Raksha. I saw the dead body with my wife Dr.Ambujakshi
and it was a shock and unexpected death. Raksha was
unhappy in her life although had studied B.E., M.Tech and
MBA. Her married life misery could have driven her to
take the ultimate step to end her life. I have tried to
inform her in-laws but the calls were not reachable,
however, informed her husband Mr .Niranjan Hegde about
his wifes suicide. She might have committed her suicide
last night i.e.12th Jun 22 after 09=00 pm.
Please take necessary legal action deem
necessary."
The narration in the complaint by the father of the complainant
herein is that though she married in the year 2017; she was not
finding her life comfortable ever since she got married; has
serious problems with her husband and narrates that she had
died by hanging herself from the ceiling of her bedroom in the
parental house. This was the initial report that was made to the
police by the father of the deceased. On the next day, a
detailed complaint is registered on getting to know several facts.
The further complaint is registered on 14-06-2022, which is in
detail and reads as follows:
14-6-2022
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«dAiÀÄPÀĪÀiÁgï
14/6/22."
(Emphasis added)
A perusal at the complaint registered on 14-06-2022 would
indicate circumstances which would touch upon the ingredients
of the offence, as the father narrates on 12-06-2022 the
petitioner and the deceased were in long conversation and after
the conversation it is the narration in the complaint that the
daughter was in deep mental stress and tears. The complaint
also narrates that when the daughter was pregnant in the year
2019, the petitioner husband takes her to a hospital and gets
forcible abortion to her. The complaint also narrates transfer of
certain money at intermittent intervals to the son-in-law. In the
teeth of this complaint, it is germane to notice the allegations
made qua the offences punishable under the IPC. Section 304B
of the IPC which is the crux of the allegations reads as follows:
"304B. Dowry death.--(1) Where the death of a
woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs
otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven
years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before
her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by
her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be
called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be
deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section,
"dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than seven years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life."
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 304B of the IPC directs that when a death
of a woman is caused by burns or bodily injury or
otherwise occurs under normal circumstances within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon
before her death she was subjected to cruelty by her
husband or any relative of her husband in connection
with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called
'dowry death' and such husband or relative shall be
deemed to have caused her death. The daughter of the
complainant commits suicide on the night of 12-06-2022.
The complaint narrates that on the night of 12-06-2022
just before the fateful incident she was in conversation
with her husband. Whether the conversation with the
husband before her death has led to commission of
suicide or it was collective harassment for years that has
exploded in the said commission of suicide is a matter to
be necessarily tried, as prima facie the complaint
narrates such instances which could become ingredients
of Section 304B of the IPC.
10. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent
No.2 has placed on record the transactions between the account
of the father of the deceased and the son-in-law which narrates
certain amounts being transferred intermittently. So are the
amounts transferred from the account of the husband/petitioner
to his wife. But, nonetheless from the father-in-law, there are
transfers of amounts to the son-in-law. The quantum of amount
is not the issue, but the transfer of amounts would require
evidence as to whether it was demand of dowry or otherwise.
The phrase 'soon before' as obtaining under Section 304B IPC
has been interpreted by the Apex Court while interpreting
Section 304B of the IPC. A three Judge Bench of the Apex Court
in the case of KANS RAJ v. STATE OF PUNJAB4 has held as
follows:
"15. It is further contended on behalf of the
respondents that the statements of the deceased referred to
the instances could not be termed to be cruelty or
harassment by the husband soon before her death. "Soon
before" is a relative term which is required to be considered
under specific circumstances of each case and no
straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-
limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of
proximity test. The term "soon before" is not
synonymous with the term "immediately before" and
is opposite of the expression "soon after" as used and
understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the
Evidence Act. These words would imply that the
interval should not be too long between the time of
making the statement and the death. It contemplates
the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to
be understood and determined under the peculiar
circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths,
the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or
harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a
particular instance but normally refer to a course of
conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time.
If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is
shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be
"soon before death" if any other intervening
circumstance showing the non-existence of such
treatment is not brought on record, before such
alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not,
(2000) 5 SCC 207
however, mean that such time can be stretched to
any period. Proximate and live link between the effect
of cruelty based on dowry demand and the
consequential death is required to be proved by the
prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or
harassment based upon such demand and the date of
death should not be too remote in time which, under
the circumstances, be treated as having become stale
enough."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court holds that there cannot be straight jacket
formula for interpretation of the phrase 'soon before'. It is a
relative term which is required to be considered under specific
circumstances of each case. 'Soon before' is not synonymous
with the term 'immediately before'. The Apex Court in a later
judgment in the case of SURINDER SINGH v. STATE OF
HARYANA5 while again dealing with Section 304B of the IPC
has held as follows:
"15. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 states that:
"113-B.Presumption as to dowry death.--When
the question is whether a person has committed the dowry
death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
death such woman has been subjected by such person to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such
person had caused the dowry death."
16. Section 304-B IPC states that:
"304-B.Dowry death.--(1) Where the death of a
woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs
otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven
years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her
death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection
with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called
'dowry death', and such husband or relative shall be
deemed to have caused her death."
17. Thus, the words "soon before" appear in Section
113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section 304-B
(2014) 4 SCC 129
IPC. For the presumptions contemplated under these
sections to spring into action, it is necessary to show that
the cruelty or harassment was caused soon before the
death. The interpretation of the words "soon before" is,
therefore, important. The question is how "soon before"?
This would obviously depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case. The cruelty or harassment differs from case to case.
It relates to the mindset of people which varies from person to
person. Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical. Mental cruelty
is also of different shades. It can be verbal or emotional like
insulting or ridiculing or humiliating a woman. It can be giving
threats of injury to her or her near and dear ones. It can be
depriving her of economic resources or essential amenities of life.
It can be putting restraints on her movements. It can be not
allowing her to talk to the outside world. The list is illustrative and
not exhaustive. Physical cruelty could be actual beating or causing
pain and harm to the person of a woman. Every such instance of
cruelty and related harassment has a different impact on
the mind of a woman. Some instances may be so grave as to
have a lasting impact on a woman. Some instances which
degrade her dignity may remain etched in her memory for a
long time. Therefore, "soon before" is a relative term. In
matters of emotions we cannot have fixed formulae. The
time-lag may differ from case to case. This must be kept in
mind while examining each case of dowry death.
18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment of this
Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207: 2000 SCC
(Cri) 935] where this Court considered the term "soon before". The
relevant observations are as under: (SCC pp. 222-23, para 15)
"15. ... 'Soon before' is a relative term which is
required to be considered under specific circumstances of each
case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any
time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of
proximity test. The term 'soon before' is not synonymous with
the term 'immediately before' and is opposite of the expression
'soon after' as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration
(a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the
interval should not be too long between the time of making the
statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time
which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined
under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to
dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of
cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a
particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct.
Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the
cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have
persisted, it shall be deemed to be 'soon before death' if any
other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of
such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged
treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean
that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and
live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand
and the consequential death is required to be proved by the
prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment
based upon such demand and the date of death should not be
too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated
as having become stale enough."
Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of dowry,
cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand and the
date of death. The test of proximity will have to be applied.
But, it is not a rigid test. It depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case and calls for a pragmatic and
sensitive approach of the court within the confines of law."
(Emphasis Supplied)
11. The Apex Court also considers Section 113B of the
Evidence Act, 1872 wherein the presumption as to dowry death
is against the accused unless otherwise proved. The Apex Court
also interprets the phrase 'soon before' as obtaining in Section
304B of the IPC. The Apex Court in a later judgment in the case
of STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. JOGENDRA AND
ANOTHER6 has again interpreted the phrase 'soon before' as
not to be synonymous of the phrase 'immediately before'. Any
limited interpretation given to the word 'soon before' will defeat
the very spirit of the statute itself. The Apex Court has held as
follows:
"9. The most fundamental constituent for attracting the
provisions of Section 304-B IPC is that the death of the woman
must be a dowry death. The ingredients for making out an offence
under Section 304-B have been reiterated in several rulings of this
Court. Four prerequisites for convicting an accused for the offence
punishable under Section 304-B are as follows:
(i) that the death of a woman must have been caused
by burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than
under normal circumstance;
(2022) 5 SCC 401
(ii) that such a death must have occurred within a
period of seven years of her marriage;
(iii) that the woman must have been subjected to cruelty
or harassment at the hands of her husband, soon
before her death; and
(iv) that such a cruelty or harassment must have been
for or related to any demand for dowry.
10. As the word "dowry" has been defined in Section 2 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short "the Dowry Act"), the
said provision gains significance and is extracted below:
"2. Definition of "dowry".--In this Act, "dowry"
means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be
given either directly or indirectly:
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party
to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or
by any other person, to either party to the
marriage or to any other person;
at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with
the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower
or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal
law (Shariat) applies.
Explanation-I. * * *
Explanation II.--The expression "valuable security" has
the same meaning as in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860)."
11. In a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Rajinder
Singh v. State of Punjab [Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015)
6 SCC 477 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] , Section 2 of the Dowry Act
has been split into six distinct parts for a better understanding of
the said provision, which are as follows : (SCC p. 485, para 8)
"8. A perusal of Section 2 shows that this definition can
be broken into six distinct parts:
(1) Dowry must first consist of any property or
valuable security-- the word "any" is a word of width
and would, therefore, include within it property and
valuable security of any kind whatsoever.
(2) Such property or security can be given or even
agreed to be given. The actual giving of such property or
security is, therefore, not necessary.
(3) Such property or security can be given or agreed to
be given either directly or indirectly.
(4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not
only by one party to a marriage to the other but also by the
parents of either party or by any other person to either party
to the marriage or to any other person. It will be noticed that
this clause again widens the reach of the Act insofar as those
guilty of committing the offence of giving or receiving dowry is
concerned.
(5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time.
It can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage. Thus, it
can be many years after a marriage is solemnised.
(6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with
the marriage of the parties. Obviously, the expression "in
connection with" would in the context of the social evil sought
to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean "in relation
with" or "relating to"."
(emphasis supplied)
12. In the light of the above provision that defines the
word "dowry" and takes in its ambit any kind of property or
valuable security, in our opinion, the High Court fell into an
error by holding that the demand of money for construction
of a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand.
In Appasaheb case [Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9
SCC 721 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 468] referred to in the impugned
judgment [Jogendra v. State of M.P., Criminal Appeal No. 48 of
2004, decided on 10-9-2008 (MP)] , this Court had held that a
demand for money from the parents of the deceased woman to
purchase manure would not fall within the purview of "dowry",
thereby strictly interpreting the definition of dowry. This view has,
however, not been subscribed to in Rajinder Singh case [Rajinder
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri)
225] wherein it has been held that the said decision as also the one
in Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P. [Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P.,
(2013) 3 SCC 684 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 15] , do not state the law
correctly. Noting that the aforesaid decisions were distinct from
four other decisions of this Court viz. Bachni Devi v. State of
Haryana [Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana, (2011) 4 SCC 427 :
(2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 280] , Kulwant Singh v. State of
Punjab [Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 177 :
(2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 339] , Surinder Singh v. State of
Haryana [Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (2014) 4 SCC 129 :
(2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 769] and Raminder Singh v. State of
Punjab [Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 12 SCC 582 :
(2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 116] , the Court opined that keeping in
mind the fact that Section 304-B was inserted in IPC to
combat the social evil of dowry demand that has reached
alarming proportions, it cannot be argued that in case of an
ambiguity in the language used in the provision, the same
ought to be construed strictly as that would amount to
defeating the very object of the provision. In other words,
the Court leaned in favour of assigning an expansive
meaning to the expression "dowry" and held thus: (Rajinder
Singh case [Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC
477: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] , SCC p. 491, para 20)
"20. [Ed. : Para 20 corrected vide Official Corrigendum
No. F.3/Ed.B.J./16/2015 dated 6-4-2015.] Given that the
statute with which we are dealing must be given a fair,
pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as to fulfil the
object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the
judgment in Appasaheb case [Appasaheb v. State of
Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 468]
followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal [Vipin
Jaiswal v. State of A.P., (2013) 3 SCC 684 : (2013) 2 SCC
(Cri) 15] do not state the law correctly. We, therefore,
declare that any money or property or valuable security
demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time
after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the
death of a married woman, would necessarily be in
connection with or in relation to the marriage unless,
the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point
otherwise."
(emphasis supplied)
13. The Latin maxim "Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat" i.e. a liberal construction should be put up on
written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and
carry into effect, the intention of the parties, sums it up.
Interpretation of a provision of law that will defeat the very
intention of the legislature must be shunned in favour of an
interpretation that will promote the object sought to be
achieved through the legislation meant to uproot a social
evil like dowry demand. In this context, the word "dowry"
ought to be ascribed an expansive meaning so as to
encompass any demand made on a woman, whether in
respect of a property or a valuable security of any nature.
When dealing with cases under Section 304-B IPC, a
provision legislated to act as a deterrent in the society and
curb the heinous crime of dowry demands, the shift in the
approach of the courts ought to be from strict to liberal,
from constricted to dilated. Any rigid meaning would tend to
bring to naught, the real object of the provision. Therefore,
a push in the right direction is required to accomplish the
task of eradicating this evil which has become deeply
entrenched in our society.
14. In the facts of the instant case, we are of the opinion
that the trial court has correctly interpreted the demand for money
raised by the respondents on the deceased for construction of a
house as falling within the definition of the word "dowry". The
submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents that
the deceased was also a party to such a demand as she had on her
own asked her mother and maternal uncle to contribute to the
construction of the house, must be understood in the correct
perspective. It cannot be lost sight of that the respondents had
been constantly tormenting the deceased and asking her to
approach her family members for money to build a house and it
was only on their persistence and insistence that she was
compelled to ask them to contribute some amount for constructing
a house. The Court must be sensitive to the social milieu from
which the parties hail. The fact that the marriage of the deceased
and Respondent 1 was conducted in a community marriage
organisation where some couples would have tied the knot goes to
show that the parties were financially not so well off. This position
is also borne out from the deposition of PW 1 who had stated that
he used to bear the expenses of the couple. Before the marriage of
the deceased also, PW 1 had stated that he used to bear her
expenses and that of her mother and brother (his sister and
nephew) as her father had abandoned them. In this background,
the High Court fell in an error in drawing an inference that since
the deceased had herself joined her husband and father-in-law, the
respondents herein and asked her mother or uncle to contribute
money to construct a house, such demand cannot be treated as a
"dowry demand". On the contrary, the evidence brought on record
shows that the deceased was pressurised to make such a request
for money to her mother and uncle. It was not a case of complicity
but a case of sheer helplessness faced by the deceased in such
adverse circumstances.
15. Now, coming to the second point urged by the learned
counsel for the State that the High Court has overlooked the fact
that Geeta Bai had been subjected to cruelty/harassment at the
hands of the respondents soon before her death, which submission
is strictly contested by the learned counsel for the respondents, we
may note that the meaning of the expression "soon before her
death" has been discussed threadbare in several judgments.
In SurinderSingh [Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (2014) 4
SCC 129 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 769] , while relying on the provisions
of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 (for short "the Evidence
Act") and Section 304-B IPC, where the words "soon before her
death" find mention, the following pertinent observations have
been made : (SCC pp. 137-39, paras 17-18)
"17. Thus, the words "soon before" appear
in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and
also in Section 304-B IPC. For the presumptions
contemplated under these sections to spring into
action, it is necessary to show that the cruelty or
harassment was caused soon before the death.
The interpretation of the words "soon before" is,
therefore, important. The question is how "soon
before"? This would obviously depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case. The cruelty or
harassment differs from case to case. It relates to the
mindset of people which varies from person to person.
Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical. Mental
cruelty is also of different shades. It can be verbal or
emotional like insulting or ridiculing or humiliating a
woman. It can be giving threats of injury to her or her
near and dear ones. It can be depriving her of economic
resources or essential amenities of life. It can be putting
restraints on her movements. It can be not allowing her
to talk to the outside world. The list is illustrative and
not exhaustive. Physical cruelty could be actual beating
or causing pain and harm to the person of a woman.
Every such instance of cruelty and related harassment
has a different impact on the mind of a woman. Some
instances may be so grave as to have a lasting impact
on a woman. Some instances which degrade her dignity
may remain, etched in her memory for a long
time. Therefore, "soon before" is a relative term.
In matters of emotions we cannot have fixed
formulae. The time-lag may differ from case to
case. This must be kept in mind while examining
each case of dowry death.
18. In this connection we may refer to the
judgment of this Court in Kans Raj v. State of
Punjab [Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207:
2000 SCC (Cri) 935] where this Court considered the
term "soon before". The relevant observations are as
under: (SCC pp. 222-23, para 15)
'15. ... "Soon before" is a relative term which is
required to be considered under specific circumstances
of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid
down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is
pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term "soon
before" is not synonymous with the term "immediately
before" and is opposite of the expression "soon after"
as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a)
of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the
interval should not be too long between the time of making the
statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time
which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined
under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to
dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence
of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not
restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a
course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a
period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand
for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed
to be "soon before death" if any other intervening
circumstance showing the non-existence of such
treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged
treatment and the date of death. It does not, however,
mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate
and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry
demand and the consequential death is required to be proved
by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or
harassment based upon such demand and the date of death
should not be too remote in time which, under the
circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough.'
Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of dowry,
cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand and the date of
death. The test of proximity will have to be applied. But, it is not a
rigid test. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case
and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive approach of the court within
the confines of law."
(emphasis supplied)
16. In Rajinder Singh [Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2015) 6 SCC 477 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] , falling back on the
rulings in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [Kans Raj v. State of Punjab,
(2000) 5 SCC 207 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 935] , Dinesh v. State of
Haryana [Dinesh v. State of Haryana, (2014) 12 SCC 532 : (2014)
6 SCC (Cri) 839] and Sher Singh v. State of Haryana [Sher
Singh v. State of Haryana, (2015) 3 SCC 724 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri)
422] , it has been emphasised that "soon before" is not
synonymous to "immediately before" and the following
observations have been made : (Rajinder Singh case [Rajinder
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri)
225] , SCC p. 493, para 24)
"24. We endorse what has been said by these two
decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen.
What must be borne in mind is that the word "soon"
does not mean "immediate". A fair and pragmatic
construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led
to the enactment of Section 304-B would make it clear that the
expression is a relative expression. Time-lags may differ
from case to case. All that is necessary is that the
demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the
continuing cause for the death of the married woman
under Section 304-B."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the contention of the learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner that ingredients of Section 304B of the IPC are
not satisfied in the case at hand is unacceptable. The contention
is that it should be 'soon before death' and soon before death is
required to be interpreted as 'immediately before death' and the
deceased leaving matrimonial house two years ago would not
mean immediately before death, are all repellable, as it is too
far-fetched to be considered at this juncture. The FIR is
registered for offences punishable under Section 304B of the
IPC along with other offences. The complaint and the narration
prima - facie indicate ingredients of Section 304B of the IPC."
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court in the afore-quoted judgment had considered several
aspects which may become the ingredients of Section 304B of the
IPC. If not all, few of the findings are directly applicable to the facts
obtaining in the case at hand.
12. Too much emphasis is laid on the death note of the
daughter of the complainant. The Apex Court considers those very
issues and convicts or affirms conviction of the husband and the
members of the family, notwithstanding the death note blaming
none. It is rather unfortunate that the age-old menace of dowry
death still exists in our society today. Though progression has
happened on every front, the cases of this kind which project the
menace of dowry death is regressive. The offences are the ones
punishable under Sections 498A and 304B of the IPC. Therefore,
merely based upon the death note of the victim, which at all times
would require evidence of circumstances in which the suicide
happens or the death note is scribed, quashment of the proceedings
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is not a course available to this
Court. Therefore, I decline to interfere to obliterate the
proceedings against the petitioners.
13. Finding no merit in the petition, the petition should
necessarily meet its dismissal and is accordingly dismissed.
It is made clear that the observations made in the course of
this order are only for the purpose of considering the case of the
petitioners under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The same would not
bind or influence any proceedings pending against the petitioners
before any other fora.
Interim order of any kind operating shall stand dissolved.
Consequently, I.A.No.2 of 2024 also stands disposed.
Sd/-
______________________
JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
Bkp
CT:MJ/SS
