Judge, Kolar, in Original Suit No.356 of 2014.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are
Court. The appellants are the plaintiffs and the respondents are
3. Plaintiffs filed a suit against the defendants for
schedule property. It is the case of the plaintiffs that, the
Azeez.
4. Late Abdul Azeez had two wives, namely Kairunnissa
and Rahamathunnisa. The first wife, Kairunnissa, had only one
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs and the first defendant are the owners in
Hobli, Srinivasapur Taluk, as tenants in common. The suit
owner/vendor, Mohammed Ghouse @ Sabusab. Since then,
name. The suit schedule property was acquired by the plaintiffs
first defendant with the consent of the plaintiffs.
5. It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the first wife of
Late Abdul Azeez, i.e. Kairunnissa died in the year 1949, the
i.e. Smt. Rahamathunnisa died in the year 2000. The plaintiffs
Azeez and thus, they succeeded to the schedule property.
3 and the first defendant. Plaintiffs and the first defendant are
residing separately. However, they are enjoying the schedule
property as tenants in common. Late Abdul Azeez, the father of
property to any person. Hence, it is liable to be divided among
the plaintiffs and the first defendant equally. Prior to the
to make partition. However, the first defendant obstructed the
and enjoyment over the schedule property. Further, the second
first defendant. In this regard, the plaintiffs questioned the act
of the first defendant. However, the first defendant gave an
evasive reply. Therefore, the plaintiffs constrained to file the
6. After initiation of the suit, the first defendant was
consideration. Further, the suit is barred by law of limitation.
Hence, defendant No.2 prayed for dismissal of the suit.
7. The trial Court, based on the pleadings of the parties,
2. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are in
possession of schedule property and there was an
attempt of interference by the defendants?
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3. Whether the 2nd defendant proves that he is the
bonafide purchaser of the schedule property for
valuable consideration?
4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to plaint reliefs?
5. What order or decree?
8. The plaintiffs, in support of their case, examined on
oath as PWs.1 to 4 and got marked Exs.P1 to P9. Defendant
No.2 examined himself on oath as DW2, but no documents
were marked.
9. The trial Court, after considering the oral and
documentary evidence on record, answered issue Nos.1, 2 and
4 in negative, issue No.3 in the affirmative and consequently,
dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs with costs.
10. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the
trial Court, the plaintiffs have prepared this appeal.
11. Heard Sri Chethan, learned counsel representing
Sri Nishanth A.V., learned counsel for accused Nos.1 (A to C),
and Sri V.B. Shivakumar learned counsel for respondent No.2.
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12. Learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs has
contended that the plaintiffs are the children of Late Abdul
Azeez and Late Rahamathunnisa and in order to substantiate
their contention, plaintiff No.1 relied upon
genealogical tree, Transfer Certificate, Election ID Card and
Ration Card vide Exs.P1, P7, P8 and P9 respectively. These
documents clearly establishes that the name of the plaintiffs'
father as Abdul Azeez. The trial Court without examining these
documents mechanically dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs.
Further, Exs.P8 and P9 are public documents which come within
the purview of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
These legal aspects have not been considered by the trial
Court. Further, the trial Court has failed to consider the fact
that the first defendant being one of the legal heirs of Late
Abdul Azeez has remained ex parte. However, the second
defendant being an outsider has questioned the relationship of
the plaintiffs and the first defendant on untenable grounds.
Without rejecting such plea of the second defendant, the trial
Court proceeded to dismiss the suit based on illogical
consideration.
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13. Learned counsel has further contended that, the trial
Court has not considered the oral and documentary evidence of
the plaintiffs and also testimonies of PWs.3 and 4, who are
independent witnesses. They were well aware of the
background of the family members of Late Abdul Azeez and the
plaintiffs. Further, the trial Court has not considered the aspect
that Ex.P2-Mutation Register, wherein the fact that the
plaintiffs being the children of the second wife of Abdul Azeez
have given consent for the said entry is clearly and
categorically recorded. Ex.P2 is also a public document. The
trial Court ought to have considered the evidentiary value of
Ex.P2. The trial Court has erroneously held that the plaintiffs
have not made out any grounds and they have not made any
complaint against the first defendant in respect of the suit
schedule property. Further, as soon as the plaintiffs possession
were interfered by the second defendant, they made necessary
enquiries and thereupon came to know about the alleged
execution of sale deed in favour of the second defendant by the
first defendant, without the consent of the plaintiffs. Therefore,
the plaintiffs made a demand for their share in the schedule
property to the first defendant. As no response was given by
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the first defendant, the plaintiffs filed the suit for partition for
their legitimate share. The second defendant failed to examine
the mode of acquisition of title by the first defendant and this
aspect has not been considered by the trial Court. The trial
Court has not at all considered the pleadings of the parties and
their evidence in proper perspective and dismissed the suit of
the plaintiffs without any basis. Thus, on these grounds, he
prayed to allow the appeal.
14. Learned counsel for respondent No.2/defendant No.2
has taken the contention that the trial Court, after considering
the oral and documentary evidence on record, has dismissed
the suit of the plaintiffs, which calls for no interference by this
Court. He further contended that respondent No.2 has disputed
the relationship between the plaintiffs and the first defendant
and their alleged possession over the suit schedule property.
Thus, he prayed to dismiss the appeal.
15. Learned counsel for defendant No.2 has relied upon
the following judgments:
i. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another
v. Bajrang Lal, (2014) 4 SCC 693
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ii. Biswanath Prasad and Others v. Dwarka Prasad and
Others, AIR 1974 SC 117
iii. Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharashtra and
Others, (2005) 7 SCC 605
iv. Paramesh and Another v. S. Hanumantharayappa and
Another, (2012)(2) AIR Kar R 289
v. Dolgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra and Others,
AIR 1959 SC 914
vi. Smt. Puttasiddamma and Others v. Siddaraju and Others,
2015 (2) KCCR 1368
vii. Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik and
Another, AIR 2014 SC 932
viii. V. R. Kamath v. Divisional Controller, Karnataka State
Road Transport Corporation and Others,
AIR 1997 Karnataka 275
ix. Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra
and Others, AIR 2013 SC 58
x. Union of India and Others v. Vasavi Co-op. Housing
Society Ltd. and Others, AIR 2014 SC 937
xi. Municipal Corporation, Gwalior v. Puran Singh alias Puran
Chand and Others, AIR 2014 SC 2665
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xii. State of A. P. and Others v. M/s. Star Bone Mill and
Fertiliser Co., 2013 (3) KCCR SN 252 (SC)
xiii. Sri Prakash v. Smt. Doddathayamma and Others,
2014 (4) KCCR 2967.
xiv. Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh Alias Chhotu Singh
and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 681.
xv. Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal and
Another, (2003) 8 SCC 745.
xvi. Selvi J. Jayalalitha and Others v. State, by the
Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption
Special Investigation Cell, Chennai, 2015 (2) KCCR SN
182.
APPRECIATION OF LAW AND ANALYSIS
16. At the outset, we may remind ourselves of the
observations made in regard to personal laws by Hon'ble
Sri Justice J.S. Khehar, the then Chief Justice of India, in his
dissenting judgment in Shayara Bano v. Union of India and
Others1, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph Nos.240
and 322 has held as under:
(2017) 9 SCC 1
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"240. xxx xxx xxx
Reference was also made to the definition of the
term Personal Law in Conflict of Laws 188 (7th
Edn., 1974) by R.H. Graveson, who defined the
term as under:
"The idea of the Personal Law is based on
the conception of man as a social being,
so that those transactions of his daily life
which affect him most closely in a
personal sense, such as marriage, divorce,
legitimacy, many kinds of capacity, and
succession, may be governed universally
by that system of law deemed most
suitable and adequate for the purpose."
(emphasis in original)
322. "Personal law" has a constitutional protection.
This protection is extended to "Personal Law"
through Article 25 of the Constitution. It needs to
be kept in mind that the stature of "Personal Law"
is that of a fundamental right. The elevation of
"Personal Law" to this stature came about when the
Constitution came into force. This was because
Article 25 was included in Part III of the
Constitution. Stated differently, "Personal Law" of
every religious denomination is protected from
invasion and breach, except as provided by and
under Article 25."
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17. Mohammedan Law, being the personal law, possesses
its own legal principles and regulations which govern family
relationships in matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance,
custody and guardianship. Its distinctive feature sets it apart
from other personal laws on fundamental issues. It is pertinent
to examine the legal principles, if any, governing partition
under Mohammedan law.
18. Tahir Mahmood, in his book, 'The Muslim Law of
India', 2nd Edition, Chapter 12 (Law of Inheritance) Paragraph
II, has provided for various concepts related to succession in
Muslim Law which distinguish it from other personal laws:
"II. Muslim Law-Concepts known and unknown:
1. The Muslim law of succession is basically
different from the parallel indigenous systems of
India. The doctrine of janmswatvavada (right by
birth), which constitutes the foundation of the
Mitakshara law of succession, is wholly unknown to
Muslim law. The law of inheritance in Islam is
relatively close to the classical Dayabhaga law,
though it differs also form that on several
fundamental points. The modern Hindu law of
succession (as laid down in the Hindu Succession
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Act, 1956) is, however, much different from both
the aforesaid classical systems; it has a remarkable
proximity, in certain respects, to the Muslim law of
inheritance.
2. The division of heritage (daya) into sapratibandh
('obstructed') and apratibandh ('unobstructed')-
self-acquired and ancestral- is equally foreign to
Muslim law. Whatever property one inherits
(whether from his ancestors or from others) is, at
Muslim law, one's absolute property- whether that
person is a man or a woman.
3. In Muslim law, so long as a person is alive he or
she is the absolute owner of his or her property;
nobody else (including a son) has any right,
whatsoever, in it. It is only when the owner dies-
and never before- that the legal rights of the heirs
accrue. There is, therefore, no question of a would
be- heir dealing in any way with his future right to
inherit.
4. The Indian legal concepts of 'joint' or 'undivided'
family, 'coparcenary', karta, 'survivorship', and
'partition', etc., have no place in the law of Islam. A
father and his son living together do not constitute
a 'joint family'; the father is the master of his
property; the son (even if a minor) of his, if he has
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any. The same is the position of brothers or others
living together.
5. Unlike the classical Indian law, female sex is no
bar to inherit property. No woman is excluded from
inheritance only on the basis of sex. Women have,
like men, right to inherit property independently,
not merely to receive maintenance or hold property
'in lieu of maintenance'. Moreover, every woman
who inherits some property is, like a man, its
absolute owner; there is no concept of either
stridhan or a woman's 'limited estate' reverting to
others upon her death.
6. The same scheme of succession applies whether
the deceased was male or a female. This is one of
those salient features of Muslim law of succession
which distinguish it from modern Hindu law of
inheritance."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. The position on devolution of property under
Mohammedan Law has been succinctly captured in Chapter 22-
Law of Succession and Inheritance of Mulla on Mohammedan
Law 5th Edition in the following terms: "all properties devolve
by succession, so the rights of heirs come into existence only
on the death of the ancestor. The whole property vests in
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them." The Mohammedan Law has well defined rules of
inheritance that come into effect upon the death of the
ancestor, and its policy has been to restrain the owner from
interfering in such well-defined rules. Transfer of property, if
required to be made during the lifetime of a person, they may
do so primarily by way of gift (hiba). Other methods include the
writing of a Will, but even therein certain restrictions have been
postulated.
20. Prior to looking to the above said sources, a general
understanding of partition would also be instructive. Advanced
Law Lexicon2 defined partition as a separation between joint
owners or tenants in common of their respective interests in
land, and setting apart such interest, so that they may enjoy
and possess the same in severalty. In Shub Karan Bubna @
Shub Karan Prasad Bubna v. Sita Saran Bubna and
others3, partition was defined at paragraph Nos.5 and 6 as
under:
P Ramanatha Aiyar 3rd Edition Reprint 2009
(2009) 9 SCC 689
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"5. "Partition" is a redistribution or adjustment of
pre-existing rights, among co-owners/coparceners,
resulting in a division of lands or other properties
jointly held by them into different lots or portions
and delivery thereof to the respective allottees. The
effect of such division is that the joint ownership is
terminated and the respective shares vest in them
in severalty.
6. A partition of a property can be only among
those having a share or interest in it. A person who
does not have a share in such property cannot
obviously be a party to a partition. "Separation of
share" is a species of "partition". When all co-
owners get separated, it is a partition. Separation
of share(s) refers to a division where only one or
only a few among several co-owners/coparceners
get separated, and others continue to be joint or
continue to hold the remaining property jointly
without division by metes and bounds. For
example, where four brothers owning a property
divide it among themselves by metes and bounds,
it is a partition. But if only one brother wants to get
his share separated and other three brothers
continue to remain joint, there is only a separation
of the share of one brother."
(Emphasis supplied)
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21. Let us now turn to the position as it is under
Mohammedan Law. The right of an heir-apparent comes into
existence for the first time on the death of the ancestor, and he
is not entitled until then to any interest in the property to which
he would succeed as an heir, if he survived the ancestor as per
the Mulla Principles of Mohammedan Law.
22. In view of the aforesaid proposition, let us now turn
our attention to the next question arising for adjudication, i.e.
the claim of the plaintiffs that they are the children of Abdul
Azeez and Rahamathunnisa. According to the plaintiffs, they
are the tenants in common along with the first defendant, but
in view of the relationship disputed by the second defendant,
no doubt who is an outsider, still the burden is cast upon the
plaintiffs to prove the relationship that they are the children of
Abdul Azeez and Rahamathunnisa.
23. From perusal of oral and documentary evidence on
record, it appears that the plaintiffs have not placed any special
or specific evidence as required under Sections 50 and 60 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1972, in order to prove the
relationship between Abdul Azeez and Rahamathunnisa and to
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prove that Abdul Azeez and Rahamathunnisa were living
together, cohabitated for a longtime as husband and wife and
out of which, the plaintiffs were born. Further, there is no
pleading and proof as to the existence of relationship between
Abdul Azeez and Rahamathunnisa and therefore, the Court
cannot give a benefit of presumption to Ex.P2-Mutation
Register extract only on the ground that it is a revenue entry.
Therefore, the plaintiffs are called upon to prove the
relationship first. Secondly, in the evidence of DW1, it is stated
that as the first defendant disclosed him that he is the only son
of Abdul Azeez and Kairunnissa, the second defendant
purchased the schedule property under Ex.P6-Registered Sale
Deed. When the oral testimony of PWs.2 to 4 are gone through,
there is no material evidence to establish that Abdul Azeez
married Rahamathunnisa and plaintiff Nos.1 to 5 were born to
Abdul Azeez and Rahamathunnisa. In the evidence led by PW2,
there is a reference to the fact that the plaintiffs are children of
Abdul Azeez, but this witness himself does not know fully about
the family affairs of Abdul Azeez. Therefore, even the plaintiffs
have failed to establish their relationships with Abdul Azeez and
his alleged second wife, Rahamathunnisa, and they are born
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out of the wedlock of Abdul Azeez and Rahamathunnisa, then
the schedule property becoming their family property and both
the plaintiffs and the first defendant are tenants in common
cannot be accepted at all. Further, PW1, who is the first
plaintiff, examined on oath and tendered for chief-examination,
but due to medical grounds, he was not tendered for cross-
examination. Therefore, his evidence was discarded by the trial
Court. PW2, who is the second plaintiff, gave his evidence and
reiterated the contents of the plaint averments. According to
the oral testimony of PW2, all the plaintiffs had given consent
for the first defendant to effect change of katha in his name in
respect of the schedule property. On the basis of Pavathivarsu,
the first defendant transferred the katha in his name, but
taking advantage of the fact, the first defendant alienated the
schedule property in favour of the second defendant. According
to PW2, as they are legal heirs with the first defendant, they
are also entitled for a definite share in the schedule property.
The plaintiffs have relied upon Ex.P2-Mutation Register extract,
wherein there is a reference to the fact that, the plaintiffs are
the children of the second wife of Abdul Azeez and they have
given consent for said mutation register extract. Hence, Ex.P2
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has come into existence. From perusal of Ex.P2, it appears that
there is a reference that the name of the plaintiffs is shown in
Ex.P2 and with their consent, the mutation was changed in the
name of the first defendant. However, from perusal of the
cross-examination of PW2, it clearly establishes that, they have
not furnished any documents to show that their mother is
Rahamathunnisa and their father is Abdul Azeez. Further, they
have not furnished any document to show that they were
cultivating the schedule property as tenants in common. When
the important aspect of the plaintiffs' relationship with Abdul
Azeez is not proved, reference made to Ex.P2-Mutation Register
extract cannot be accepted. Further, the schedule property is
being enjoyed by the plaintiffs and the first defendant as
tenants in common is also not established by the plaintiffs.
Admittedly, the first defendant conveyed his absolute right, title
and interest over the schedule property in favour of the second
defendant under the Registered Sale Deed dated 8-2-2007 for
valuable consideration. Hence, the second defendant acquired
lawful right, title and interest over the schedule property and
continuous to be in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
same since the date of purchase i.e., 8-2-2007, whereas the
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plaintiffs have filed the suit for partition on 20-11-2014, that
too, after a lapse of seven and half years.
24. From cross-examination of PW2, it clearly establishes
that prior to the registration of sale deed or after the
registration of sale deed; the plaintiffs never issued any legal
notice to the first defendant calling upon to answer as to
alienation made by him in favour of the second defendant. No
criminal case has been registered against the first defendant or
the second defendant alleging fraud or undue influence.
Further, the plaintiffs never objected for change of katha or
they never submitted any application before the Revenue
Authority claiming their rights in respect of the schedule
property. The plaintiffs in categorical terms admitted that they
never entered the land and cultivated the same. So the
admission of PW2 goes a long way in showing before the Court
that the suit filed by the plaintiffs appears to be collusive in
nature.
25. The plaintiffs are relying upon Ex.P2-Mutation
Register extract. A perusal of the mutation entry shows that
the first defendant got admitted his name. The mutation entry
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clearly indicates that the property was mutated from the name
of the father of the first defendant to the name of the first
defendant. The purpose of mutation entry as is well settled in
only limited to revenue records. They do not, in any way,
translate to or confer any title in regard to subject matter
property. Some decisions reflecting this position of laws are as
follows:
26. In SAWARNI v. INDER KAUR AND OTHERS
reported in (1996) 6 SCC 223, wherein the Hon'ble Apex
Court at paragraph No.7 held as under:
"7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and having scrutinised the judgment of the trial
Judge as well as that of the lower appellate court,
we find sufficient force in all the contentions raised
by the learned counsel for the appellant. At the
outset, it may be noticed that the plaintiff had filed
the suit claiming half interest for herself and
claiming half interest in favour of the husband and
sons of Roori and, therefore, the learned Additional
District Judge was wholly in error to hold that the
plaintiff could not have filed the suit in question. In
view of the rival stand of the parties the main
question that arose for consideration was whether
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Roori was the daughter of Gurbax Singh or Inder
Kaur, Defendant 5 was the daughter of the same
Gurbax Singh? The learned trial Judge after
elaborate discussion of the evidence on record both
oral and documentary came to the positive
conclusion that it was Roori who was the daughter
of Gurbax Singh as alleged by the plaintiff and not
Inder Kaur. The lower appellate court without
focusing its attention on the weighty reasons
advanced by the trial court and without examining
the materials on record in that respect even did not
set aside the said finding of the trial Judge and yet
reversed the decree of the trial Judge. We have no
hesitation to come to the conclusion that the said
judgment of the Additional District Judge is wholly
unsustainable in law. The crucial point being as to
who was the second daughter of Gurbax Singh,
namely Roori or Inder Kaur, and the trial Judge
having come to the positive conclusion that it was
Roori who was the second daughter of Gurbax
Singh, the lower appellate court was not justified in
not considering the material evidence as well as the
reasons advanced by the trial Judge and merely
coming to the conclusion that the evidence on the
file does not prove Roori to be the daughter of
Gurbax Singh. Further, the lower appellate court has
not come to any positive finding that Inder Kaur was
the daughter of Gurbax Singh. He has been swayed
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away by the so-called mutation in the revenue
record in favour of Inder Kaur. Mutation of a
property in the revenue record does not create or
extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on
title. It only enables the person in whose favour
mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in
question. The learned Additional District Judge was
wholly in error in coming to a conclusion that
mutation in favour of Inder Kaur conveys title in her
favour. This erroneous conclusion has vitiated the
entire judgment. That apart, as it would be seen,
the learned trial Judge had considered the oral
evidence adduced on behalf of the parties to
establish the respective stand as to who was the
second daughter of Gurbax Singh and on perusal of
the same came to the conclusion that it was Roori
who was the second daughter of Gurbax Singh. The
Additional District Judge has not even discussed
anything about the said oral evidence and the
reasonings advanced by the learned trial Judge in
coming to the conclusion that it was Roori who was
the second daughter of Gurbax Singh. Non-
consideration of the oral evidence adduced by the
parties, by the lower appellate court vitiates the
ultimate conclusion on the question whether Roori
was the daughter of Gurbax Singh or not. It is
further seen that Gurdip Kaur, widow of Gurbax
Singh had executed a Will in respect of the entire
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estate in favour of the plaintiff and Roori and after
the death of Gurdip Kaur a succession certificate
had been issued by the civil court under the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 in favour of the plaintiff and
the said Roori. The said succession certificate and
rights flowing therefrom cannot be ignored.
Admittedly no attempt has been made by
Defendants 1 to 4 to annul the succession certificate
on the grounds available under the Succession Act.
The Additional District Judge committed serious
error of law in not considering the said Will and the
succession certificate in question which
unequivocally clinches the matter and thereby the
ultimate judgment of the Additional District Judge is
vitiated. The High Court also was in error in not
examining these questions and dismissing the
second appeal in limine."
27. In JITENDRA SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH AND OTHERS. reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC
802, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph No.7 held
as under:
"7. Right from 1997, the law is very clear. In the
case of Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh (D) By Lrs.,
reported in (1997) 7 SCC 137, this Court had an
occasion to consider the effect of mutation and it is
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observed and held that mutation of property in
revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes
title to the property nor has it any presumptive
value on title. Such entries are relevant only for the
purpose of collecting land revenue. Similar view
has been expressed in the series of decisions
thereafter."
28. Further, the aforesaid position of law was recently
reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
P. KISHORE KUMAR v. VITTAL K. PATKAR reported in 2023
SCC OnLine SC 1483.
29. Proceeding to the factual circumstances of the case,
the relationship of the plaintiffs with the first defendant is not
proved and they also not placed any record to show that Abdul
Azeez is the husband of Rahamathunnisa. The oral testimonies
of PWs.1 to 4 do not offer any relevant details which can show
that Abdul Azeez and Rahamathunnisa are husband and wife
and these plaintiffs born out of the wedlock of Abdul Azeez and
Rahamathunnisa and they cultivated the schedule property as
tenants in common.
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30. Having considered the material on record, we do not
find any reason to take a view differing from the trial Court in
disbelieving the testimonies of these witnesses. A perusal of the
trial Court judgment lends credence to this conclusion for the
testimonies as extracted therein are nothing but vague, it
seems that the witnesses were trying desperately to make
relevant testimonies grasping at a standard of feeding memory.
That apart, there is no mention of these witnesses in the
mutation entry.
31. As a result of our discussion in the foregoing
paragraphs, we do not find any fault with the reasoning given
by the trial Court. Thus, the judgment and decree dated
20-8-2016 rendered by the Court of the Principal Senior Civil
Judge, Kolar, in Original Suit No.356 of 2014, is confirmed.
Thus, the appeal stands dismissed.
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In view of the dismissal of the main appeal, pending
applications, if any, shall stand dismissed.
Sd/-
(K.SOMASHEKAR)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(VENKATESH NAIK T)
JUDGE
KVK
