2). b(i). Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any
other appropriate writ order or direction declaring that the
acquisition notification dated 14.10.1992 & 23.03.1993
issued under section 4(1) & 6(1) of the LA Act bearing no
LAQ(2) SR 13/92-93 stands lapsed in view of the fact that
the possession of the land never taken and award not
passed.
b(ii). Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other
appropriate writ order or direction declaring that the
acquisition notification dated 14.10.1992 & 23.03.1993
issued under section 4(1) & 6(1) of the LA Act bearing no
LAQ(2) SR 13/92-93 stands lapsed in view of the fact that
scheme for which it was issued was not implemented.
2. Case of the petitioners Nos.1 to 3 is that they along
Taluk, Bengaluru. That the said lands were notified for
Section 6(1). Aggrieved by the same, petitioners 1 to 3 had
order dated 01.02.2000 passed in the aforesaid writ petition.
3. Petitioners herein preferred a Special Leave Petition
confirming the order passed by the Division Bench. A review
petition filed by the petitioners was also dismissed.
4. Further case of the petitioners is that in the meanwhile
road and industrial purposes. Thus the original purpose for
which the aforesaid lands were acquired no longer survives.
5. That though an award is stated to have been passed
disbursed to the petitioners. The possession of the land has
not been taken as prescribed under the provisions of law. No
developments have taken place. Respondents have never
utilised the land and have thus abandoned the project.
6. In the aforesaid factual aspects of the matter
7. Sri. Madhusudan R. Naik, learned Senior counsel
(b). That in terms of Section 11A of the Act, 1894 the Collector
is required to make an award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894
within a period of two years from the date of declaration and if
no award is made within the said period, entire
proceedings/acquisition of land shall lapse.
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
(c). Thus referring to Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, learned Senior counsel submits that the passing of the
award on 25.05.1996 was thus beyond the stipulated statutory
period of two years. Thus, in view of non-compliance of
statutory requirement of passing the award within two years
from the date of declaration, by operation of law the process of
acquisition has lapsed.
(d). He further refers to Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of the
Act, 2013 in that he submits that admittedly award was passed
on 25.05.1996, which is five years prior to coming into force of
Act, 2013 and that neither the compensation is paid nor
possession of the property has been taken. In justification of
his submission learned Senior counsel takes this Court through
the Communications dated 01.04.2015, 09.06.2021,
endorsement dated 15.04.2021, 18.10.2024, produced along
with the memos dated 11.06.2021, 21.04.2024 and
24.10.2024 respectively. In that he points out that the intra
office correspondence between the respondent authorities
would indicate that though the land purported to have been
acquired back in the year 1992 and award having been passed
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
in the year 1996 the award amount has neither been deposited
nor paid to the petitioners.
(e). Further as late as 01.04.2015 none other than the
respondent No.2 has sought for handing over the possession of
the property which fortifies the case of the petitioners that
there is complete non compliance of the requirement of Section
24(2) of the Act, 2013. Thus, he submits that in view of the
statutory provisions of law referred to above namely Section
11A of the Act, 1894 and Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 the
acquisition proceedings required to be declared as having
lapsed.
(f). He relies upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case
of Vijay Narayan Thatte and others Vs State of
Maharashtra and others reported in (2009) 9 SCC 1992.
Referring to paragraph Nos.22-28 of the said Judgment,
learned Senior counsel submits that in view of the scheme of
the Act, the provisions providing for acquisition would operate
on their own and no amount of any intervening factors would
stop the operation of the Act. Elaborating the said submission,
learned Senior counsel refers to earlier orders passed by the
Division Bench in writ appeal and confirmed by the Apex Court.
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
In that he submits that the writ petition was allowed on
01.02.2000 quashing the acquisition proceedings. While the
writ appeal was allowed on 02.07.2003. Therefore, relying
upon the aforesaid Judgment of the Vijay Narayan Thatte and
others, learned Senior counsel emphatically submit that mere
filing of the writ petition, passing of the orders in writ appeal
and confirmation by the Apex Court would not stop the
operation of law governing lapsing of acquisition as provided
under the statute. Hence, he submits that the petition requires
to be allowed.
8. Learned AGA appearing for respondent-State in
response submits that;
(a) when the writ petition was filed by the petitioners the
challenge was only with respect to the notification issued under
Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, 1894 and no grounds with regard
to lapsing of the acquisition was raised.
(b) that though the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 claimed to have sold
the property in favour of the petitioner Nos.4 and 5, the said
aspect of the matter was not brought to the notice either
before the Division Bench of this Court or before the Hon'ble
Apex Court.
- 10 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
(c) that since the petitioners have not raised the issue of
lapsing of acquisition they have forfeited their contention
regarding lapsing of the proceedings and they cannot be
allowed to urge in the subsequent proceedings.
(d) that totally 07 acres and 18 guntas of land was acquired,
out of which portion of land had already been utilized except
the portion of the land which the petitioners are claiming to be
vacant. Learned AGA however clarifies that no portion of land
in Sy.No.128 is utilised. Thus he submits that the invocation
of provisions of Sections 11 of the Act, 1894 and Section 24 of
the Act, 2013 would be of no avail. Hence, seeks for dismissal
of the petition.
9. Sri. R.V. Jayaprakash, learned counsel appearing for
the respondent Nos.4 and 5 vehemently opposing the very
maintainability of the writ petition submits that;
(a) the petition is filed at the instance of the petitioner
Nos.4 and 5, who are the purchasers of the subject property
subsequent to issuance of notification. As such they have no
locus standi to maintain the same.
- 11 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
(b) Relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court
in case of Shivakumar and another Vs. Union of India and
others reported in (2019) 10 SCC 229, learned counsel
vehemently submits that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court is clear, in that a subsequent purchaser is not having
locus-standi to challenge the acquisition including raising the
ground under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.
(c) that admittedly petitioner Nos.1 to 3 having sold the
property during the pendency of the proceedings have lost all
rights and the said alienation is hit by doctrine of lis-pendence.
Therefore, petitioner Nos.1 to 3 cannot be heard to say that
they are aggrieved in any manner by the acquisition process.
Since, the sale in favour of petitioner Nos.4 and 5 is prohibited
by law which is void-ab initio, no benefit can be given either
under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 or otherwise as held by
the Hon'ble Apex Court. Thus he submits that the petition
requires to be dismissed at the threshold.
(d) On merits, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.4
and 5 referring to Possession Certificate (¸ÀħzÀÄð¥ÀvÀæ) dated
31.12.2018 as per Annexure-R2 submits that acquisition has
been completed in every aspect including taking over of the
- 12 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
possession and the possession handed over to the respondent
No.2 by the Tahsildar. Thus, he submits that all the aspects
requiring completion of acquisition have been met with, leaving
no grounds to the petitioner to be urged. Hence seeks for
dismissal of the petition.
10. Learned Senior counsel in response to the reliance
placed by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.4 and 5
to the case of Shivakumar (Supra) points out that merely
because petitioner Nos.1 to 3 have alienated the property, they
would not lose the right to question the acquisition, inasmuch
as, even as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Shivakumar (supra), the right to seek compensation would
continue. He further submits that the said judgment was
rendered in the context, the purchase was subsequent to
issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1894 and
which was operating un-interruptedly, whereas in the instant
case the said notification has been quashed by the learned
Single Judge and there was no impediment in petitioner Nos.1
to 3 alienating the land in favour petitioner Nos.4 and 5.
11. Heard and perused the records.
- 13 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
12. Issuance of notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the
Act, 1894 seeking to acquire the land belonging to the
petitioner Nos.1 to 3 is not in dispute. There is also no dispute
of the fact that the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 had approached this
Court in W.P.No.25361-364/1994 which was though allowed by
order dated 01.02.2000 in favour of the petitioner Nos.1 to 3,
quashing the acquisition, the same was subsequently reversed
by the Division Bench of this Court by its order dated
02.07.2003 passed in W.A.No.5899-5902/2000 and confirmed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court. It appears petitioner Nos.1 to 3
have sold the property in favour of petitioner Nos.4 and 5 in
terms of deed of sale dated 09.04.2003.
13. Adverting to the contention raised by the respondent
Nos.4 and 5 regarding maintainability of the petition and
reliance placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Shivakumar (Supra), though there cannot be any
dispute with regard to the principles of law laid down therein,
the facts at hand are distinguishable. In that, petitioner Nos.1
to 3 herein have sold the subject property in favour of
petitioner Nos.4 and 5 on 09.04.2003, which is the date
subsequent to the order dated 01.02.2000 passed by the Co-
- 14 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
ordinate Bench of this Court quashing the notifications and
before passing of the order dated 02.07.2003 by the Division
Bench of this Court in W.A.No.5899-5902/2000 setting aside of
the said order of the learned Single Judge.
14. As rightly contended by the learned Senior counsel
appearing for the petitioners there was no impediment for
petitioner Nos.1 to 3 in conveying the property in favour of
petitioner Nos.4 and 5 during the interregnum i.e., between the
order dated 01.02.2000 passed by the learned Single Judge
quashing the acquisition and the order dated 02.07.2003
passed by the Division Bench of this Court setting aside the
order of the learned Single Judge. On a query by this Court, it
is clarified that there was no interim order of any nature,
whatsoever passed in the writ appeal staying the operation of
the order of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court. Thus,
petitioner Nos.1 to 3 have sold the property during the period
when there was no subsistence of any notification for
acquisition.
15. However, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.4
and 5 hasten to add that the sale was during the pendency of
the proceedings, therefore the same is hit by doctrine of lis-
- 15 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
pendence. That may be an aspect operating in a different
context but would not amount to prohibition or causing
impediment for alienation or would not make sale "void ab
initio", as contemplated and adverted to in the judgment of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shivakumar (Supra). Thus
the facts obtained in the present proceedings are
distinguishable from the facts involved in the case of
Shivakumar (Supra). Yet another aspect to be seen is that in
the case of Shivakumar (supra) as seen at paragraph No.17,
even according to the averments made in the writ petition
therein, possession of land had been taken over in the year
2000 and unauthorized colonies had come up in the area. In
the instant case land is admittedly still in the possession of the
petitioners and possession has not been taken for over 33
years.
16. Also pertinent to note as contended by the learned
counsel for the petitioner after quashing of the notification by
learned Single Judge by order dated 01.02.2000 in
W.P.No.25361-364/1994, the respondent-State itself had
admittedly notified very same land comprising in Sy.No.128/1,
128/2 and 128/3 under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act by its
- 16 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
Notification dated 08.05.2003. In other words the respondent-
State itself had treated the acquisition made by it under Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 in the year 1992 having stood quashed or
abandoned, the respondent-State has not filed the writ appeal.
The sale of land by petitioners 1 and 3 in favour of petitioners 4
and 5 was thus at a period when there was no
operation/subsistence of notifications under Section 4(1) and
under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as the said
notifications had been quashed by order dated 01.02.2000 as
noted above. It is submitted that the challenge to the
acquisition made by the respondent-State under Section 28(4)
of the KIAD Act is still pending consideration. Be that as it
may, the fact remains that purchase made by the petitioner
Nos.4 & 5, cannot be held to the void ab initio as contended by
the learned counsel for the Respondent No.4 and 5. Moreover
the petitioners No.1 to 3 who were the owners of land have
also joined as petitioners. Therefore under these peculiar facts
and circumstances of the matter in the considered view of this
Court the writ petition is maintainable.
17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Narayan
Thatte and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others
- 17 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
reported in (2009) 9 SCC 92 adverting to the operation of
period of limitation contemplated under Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 at paragraph Nos.22 to 24 has held as
under:
22. In out opinion, when the language of the statute is plain
and clear then the literal rule of interpretation has to be applied
and there is ordinarily no scope for consideration of equity,
public interest or seeking the intention of the legislature. It is
only when the language of the statute is not clear or ambiguous
or there is some conflict, etc. or the plain language leads to
some absurdity that one can depart from the literal rule of
interpretation. A perusal of the proviso to Section 6 shows that
language of the proviso is clear. Hence the literal rule of
interpretation must be applied to it. When there is a conflict
between the law and equity it is the law which must prevail. As
stated in the Latin maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the
law is hard but it is the law''.
23. Learned Attorney General appearing for the respondents
submitted that the judgment of the High Court dated 20.1.2004
permitted the authorities to issue a second Section 6
Notification even beyond the time provided by the proviso to
Section 6 of the Act. He has invited our intention to paragraphs
2 and 3 of the said judgment which reads:-
"2. Having gone through the record of the petition and the file
which is made available to us by Mr. Patil, with respect to the
acquisition of lands of the Petitioners, we are of the view that
the Petitioners did not appear to have been afforded reasonable
opportunity as is required under Section 5A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. No reasons are insisted upon
injustification of this conclusion which we have arrived at as
declaration under Section 6 issued concerning the lands of the
Petitioner dated 29.8.2002 will have to be set aside and the
same is hereby quashed and set aside. The Petitioner need
inspection of the record from the office of the Land Acquisition
Officer, Mr. Patil, A.G.P. Assures that within one week from
today, inspection will be offered to the Petitioners. Dr.
Tulzapurkar states that the Petitioner will file their objections
within two weeks thereafter.
3. All parties agree that hearing contemplated under Section 5A
by the Special Land Acquisition Officer should be completed
- 18 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
within two months thereafter as far as possible. Dr. Tulzapurkar
makes a statement on instructions from the Petitioner that the
objections with respect to the period within which Section 6
notification has to be issued from the date of Section 4
notification, will not be raised by the Petitioner if the Petitioners
are finally aggrieved by the 5A report and subsequent
declaration under Section 6. Needless to say that the Special
Land Acquisition Officer should pass a reasoned Order when he
considers the objections from the Petitioners. The entire
proceeding will be based on Section 4 notice which has led to
the present proceedings and that notice will continue to govern
the acquisition of these lands."
24. In our opinion, there can be no estoppel against a Statute.
Since the Statute is very clear, the period of limitation provided
in Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 of the Act has to be
followed, and concessions of the counsel can have no effect. As
already stated above, the proviso is mandatory in nature, and
must operate with its full rigour vide Ashok Kumar Vs. State of
Haryana (2007) 3SCC 470 (para 17).
18. The principles of law enunciated by the Apex Court in
the aforesaid paragraphs are similar to the situation
contemplated under Sections 11 and 11A of the Act 1895, same
can also be inferred and extended to the operation of provisions
contained under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. In other
words, lapsing of acquisition is by operation of law, should
there be non-compliance of the timeline contemplated under
these Sections. It may be that a specific and express
declaration of lapsing is required to be granted but that alone
cannot prevent the operation of law making the acquisition
- 19 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
ineffective for non-compliance of the timeline stipulated under
these provisions save by any order by the Court of law.
19. On facts, admittedly the final notification was issued
on 05.05.1994 and the document produced at Annexure-J to
the petition would indicate that the award is stated to have
been passed on 25.05.1996. In terms of Section 11A the
award ought to have been passed within a period of two years
from the date of publication of the declaration and that if no
award was passed within the said period the entire proceedings
for acquisition would lapse. The award admittedly having been
passed beyond the statutory period of said two years operation
of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act will come into effect
resulting in consequential lapsing of acquisition.
20. Though the award is stated to have been passed on
25.05.1996 which is clearly more than five years, prior to
coming into force of the Act, 2013, the same in neither paid
nor deposited and no possession of land is admittedly taken by
the State, as such the provision of Section 24(2) of the Act,
2013 would also come into effect.
21. In this regard necessary to refer the correspondence
produced along with memo dated 11.06.2021 namely the
- 20 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
information furnished under the Right to Information Act by the
Special Land Acquisition officer vide communication dated
09.06.2021 reads as under:
ಕ ಾ ಟಕ ಸ ಾ ರ
3 ೇ, ಮಹ , ೕ ಯಂ ಾ , ೆ ೕಶ ರಯ ೇಂದ ೆಂಗಳ ರು-560 001
¸ÀASÉå:J¯ïJPÀÆå(3) J¸ï.Dgï/04/92-93
¢£ÁAPÀ:09.06.2021
ಷಯ:- !ಾ"# ೋ%ರುವ ಬ(ೆ).
ಉ+ೇಖ:- - ೕ ಅರ ಂ/ ಕು!ಾ0 ರವರ ಅ1 2 ಾಂಕ: 3-04-2021.
3ೕಲ5ಂಡ ಷಯ ೆ5 ಸಂಬಂ78ದಂ9ೆ, ೆಂಗಳ ರು ದ:ಣ 9ಾಲೂಕು, ೆಂ(ೇ%
UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸À.£ÀA. 128/1, 128/2J. 128/2©, 128/3J. 128/3<, 128/4< gÀ
d«ÄãÀÄ ೆ.ಎ>.ಆ[email protected] ಸಂAೆB(ೆ ಭೂAಾ 7ನEಾFದುG, ಸದ% ಪ ಕರಣದI
Jಾ ಥLಕ ಅ7ಸೂಚ ೆ 4(1) 2 ಾಂಕ: 14-10-1992 Nಾಗೂ ಅಂ#ಮ ಅ7ಸೂಚ ೆ
6(1) 2 ಾಂಕ: 05-05-1994ರI Nೊರ ಸ+ಾFರುತPQೆ. ಅದರಂ9ೆ ಕ ಮ ಸಂRೆ :
22(3) 2..04/92-93 ರಂ9ೆ ಐ#ೕಪ ನುT ರUಸ+ಾFರುತPQೆ. ಸದ% ಭೂಪ%Nಾರದ
VತPವನುT ಭೂ!ಾIಕ%(ೆ Wೕ ರುವ ಬ(ೆ) !ಾ"# ಲಭ ರುವX2ಲ / Nಾಗೂ
ಸದ% ಪ -Tತ ಜLೕನುಗಳZ ಭೂ!ಾIಕರ ವಶದI[ೕ ಇರುತPQೆ. ಭೂ ೋ% ಾ
ಸಂAೆBಯವ%(ೆ ಸದ% ಜLೕWನ ಸುಬದು ವ"8 ೊಡುವ ಬ(ೆ) !ಾನ ,
ಉಪ ]ಾ(ಾ7 ಾ%ಗಳZ, ೆಂಗಳ ರು ದ:ಣ ಉಪ ]ಾಗ ರವ%(ೆ ೋರ+ಾFQೆ
ಎಂಬ !ಾ"#ಯನುT ಈ ಮೂಲಕ ತಮ(ೆ #_ಯಪ ಸ+ಾFQೆ.
ೇಷ ಭೂAಾ 7ೕ ಾ7 ಾ%ಗಳZ,
ೆಂಗಳ ರು
ರವ%(ೆ:
- ೕ ಅರ ಂ/ ಕು!ಾ0,
<.@.ಎಂ +ೇಔa,
- 21 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
22. It is necessary also to refer the Communication
issued by the Chief Traffic Manager to the Special Land
Acquisition Officer reads as under:
ೆಂಗಳ ರು ಮNಾನಗರ Aಾ%(ೆ ಸಂAೆB
ಮುಖ ಸಂbಾರ ವ ವAಾBಪಕರು (Eಾ) ರವರ ಕcೇ%, ೇಂದ ಕcೇ%, ಾಂ#ನಗರ,
ೆಂಗಳ ರು-27,
ಸಂ. ೆಮAಾಸಂ/ ೇಕ/ಸಂ/Eಾdಜ /ಆ8P/12ಎ/2015-16 ¢£ÁAPÀ: : 01-04-2015
ೇಷ ಭೂAಾ 7ೕ ಾ7 ಾ%ಗಳZ,
ೇಷ ಭೂAಾ 7ೕ ಾ7 ಾ%ಗಳ ಕcೇ%, 3 ೇ ಮಹ , ೆ ೕಶ ರಯ ೇಂದ ,
ೕ ಯಂ ಾ ,
ೆಂಗಳ ರು-560001.
!ಾನ eೆ,
ಷಯ: ೆಂಗಳ ರು ದ:ಣ 9ಾಲೂಕು, ೆಂ(ೇ% Nೋಬ_, ೆಂ(ೇ% (ಾ ಮದ ಸ.ನಂ.
126, 127, 128 ರI 7-15 ಎಂಗು ಜLೕನನುT ಕ ಾ ಟಕ eಾಜ ರAೆP Aಾ%(ೆ
ಸಂAೆBಯ ಪರEಾF ಭೂAಾ 7ೕನಪ 8 ೊಂ ರುವ ಬ(ೆ).
ಉ+ೇಖ: 1) ಸ ಾ ರದ ಪತ ದ ಸಂRೆ ಕ !ಾಂಕ:ಆ0 22 ಭೂAಾ ೆ 93/
2:28.3.1994
2) ತಮf ಕcೇ% ಪತ ನಂ:ಎg.ಕು (3) ಡ>.ಆ04/92-93 ¢£ÁAPÀ: 07.06.2012
3) ¨ÉªÀĸÁ¸ÀA/PÉÃPÀ/¸ÀA/ªÁtÂdå/ ಆ8P /12J/5533/2012-13 ¢£ÁAPÀ:14.02.2013
4) ¨ÉªÀĸÁ¸ÀA/PÉÃPÀ/¸ÀA/ªÁtÂdå/ ಆ8P ì/12J/1612/2014-15 ¢£ÁAPÀ:23.07.2014
5) ¨ÉªÀĸÁ¸ÀA/PÉÃPÀ/¸ÀA/ªÁtÂdå/ ಆ8P ì/12J/3386/2014-15 ¢£ÁAPÀ:20.12.2014
6) ¨ÉªÀĸÁ¸ÀA/PÉÃPÀ/¸ÀA/ªÁtÂdå/ ಆ8P /12J/3762/2014-15 ¢£ÁAPÀ:16.01.2015
7) ೆಮAಾಸಂ/ ೇಕ/ಸಂ/Eಾdಜ /ಆ8P/12ಎ/3834/2014-15 ¢£ÁAPÀ:23.01.2015
3ೕಲ5ಂಡ ಷಯ ೆ5 ಸಂಬಂ78ದಂ9ೆ, ೆಂಗಳ ರು ದ:ಣ 9ಾಲೂಕು,
ೆಂ(ೇ% Nೋಬ_, ೆಂ(ೇ% (ಾ ಮದ ಸEೆ ನಂ.126, 127, ಮತುP 128 ರI ಒಟುi 7-
15 ಎ/ಗು ಜLೕನನುT ಕ ಾ ಟಕ eಾಜ ರAೆP Aಾ%(ೆ ಸಂAೆBಯ ಪರEಾF
ಭೂAಾ 7ೕನ ಪ ಸಲು ೇಷ 1+ಾ7 ಾ%ಗಳZ, ೆಂಗಳ ರುರವರ ಪತ ದ ಸಂRೆ :
J¯ÉJPÀÆå2/J¸ï.Dgï/13-92-93 ¢£ÁAPÀ 14.10.1992gÀAvÉ ¨sÀƸÁé¢üãÀ PÁAiÉÄÝ PÀ®A
4(1) gÀ C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£É ಪ ಕ@ಸ+ಾFQೆ. ಉ+ೇಖ ಪತ ದಂ9ೆ ಸ ಾ ರದ ಪತ ದನ ಯ
- 22 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
ಾ[G ಕಲಂ 6(1) ರ ಅ7ಸೂಚ ೆ ಅನುVೕದ ೆjಾF 2 ಾಂಕ: 05.05.94 ರಂದು
ಕ ಾ ಟಕ eಾಜ ಪತ ದI ಪ ಕ@ಸ+ಾFQೆ. ಈ ಸಂಬಂಧ ರೂ.25,86,087/-ಗಳನುT
1992 ರI[ೕ ಕ ಾ ಟಕ eಾಜ ರAೆP Aಾ%(ೆ ಸಂAೆBಯು Jಾವ#8ರುತPQೆ.
ತದನಂತರ ಸ ಾ % ಆQೇಶ ಸಂRೆ :Aಾ%ಇ:127:@ಆ0.ಎ:96,
2 ಾಂಕ:07.08.1997 ರಂ9ೆ ಈ ಸ ತುP ೆಂಗಳ ರು ಮNಾನಗರ Aಾ%(ೆ ಸಂAೆB(ೆ
ಹAಾPಂತರEಾFರುತPQೆ. ಸಂAೆB(ೆ ಭೂAಾ 7ೕನEಾFರುವ ಜLೕನುಗಳI ಸEೆ
ನಂ.126 ಮತುP 127 ರIನ 1-02 ಎ/ಗು ಜLೕನನುT 2 ಾಂಕ:25.05.1999 ರಂದು
ಸಂAೆBಯ Aಾ 7ೕನ ೆ5 Wೕಡ+ಾFQೆ. ಉ_ದ ಜLೕWನ !ಾIೕಕರು ಭೂAಾ 7ೕನ
ಕು%ತು !ಾನ ಉಚl ಾ jಾಲಯದI VಕದG3ಯನುT QಾಖI8ದGರು, ಇದರ
bಾರmೆಯ ನಂತರ !ಾನ ಉಚl ಾ jಾಲಯವX ಸಂAೆBಯ ಪರEಾF #ೕಪ ನುT
Wೕ ರುತPQೆ. ನಂತರ ಸದ% #ೕn ನ ರುದo ಭೂ!ಾIೕಕರು !ಾನ ಸpೕ ಚl
ಾ jಾಲಯದI 3ೕಲfನ ಸI8ದುG, ಅIಯೂ ಸಹ ಭೂAಾ 7ೕನ ಪ q [ಯನುT
ಎ#P" 2ರುತPQೆ.
ೆಂ(ೇ% (ಾ ಮದ ಸEೆ .ನಂ.128 ರ ಧ "¸ÉìಗಳIರುವ ಜLೕನನುT ಸಂAೆB(ೆ
ಹAಾPಂತ%ಸುವಂ9ೆ ಉ+ೇಖದ ಪತ ಗಳI ಹಲEಾರು ಾ% ೋರ+ಾF, ಈ
ಷಯEಾF 9ಾವXಗಳZ ಉಪ ]ಾ(ಾ7 ಾ%ಗಳZ, ೆಂಗಳ ರು ದ:ಣ ಉಪ ]ಾಗ
ರವ%(ೆ ಉ+ೇಖ-2 ರಂ9ೆ ಪತ ಬeೆದು ಭೂAಾ 7ೕನ ಾ[G ಕಲಂ 47 ರಂ9ೆ
Aಾ 7ೕನ ಪ 8 ೊಡಲು ೋ%ರು#Pೕ%. ಆದರೂ ಸಹ ಸದ% ಜLೕನು ಸಂAೆB(ೆ
ಹAಾPಂತರEಾFರುವX2ಲ.
ಪ ಸುPತ, ಈ ನಡುEೆ ೆಂ(ೇ% (ಾ ಮದ ಸEೆ ನಂ: 126, 127, 128 ರI ಸಂAೆB(ೆ
ಭೂAಾ 7ೕನEಾFರುವ 7 ಎಕeೆ 15 ಗುಂrೆ ಜLೕWನI RಾಸFಯವರು ಹಣ ಪsೆದು
ಮಣtನುT ತುಂ<ಸು#PರುವXದು ಕಂಡು ಬಂ2ರುತPQೆ. ಈ ಸಂಬಂಧ 9ಾವXಗಳZ ಮಣುt
Nಾಕು#PರುವXದನುT ತsೆಯುವಂ9ೆ Nಾಗೂ ಸಂAೆBಯ ಪರEಾF ಭೂAಾ 7ೕನEಾFರುವ
ಜLೕನನುT ಅಳ9ೆ !ಾ ಸಂAೆB(ೆ ಹAಾPಂತ%ಸುವಂ9ೆ ಈ ಮೂಲಕ ತಮfನುT
ೋರ+ಾFQೆ.
ತಮf ಾ 8,
ªÀÄÄRå ¸ÀAZÁgÀ ªÀåªÀ¸ÁÜ¥ÀPÀgÀÄ (ªÁ)
23. Necessary also to refer to the documents produced
along with memo dated 18.10.2024 which is a notice issued by
the Special Land Acquisition Officer reads as under:
- 23 -
NC: 2025:KHC:1088
ಕ ಾ ಟಕ ಸ ಾ ರ
£ÀA. J¯ïJPÀÆå(3)J¸ïDgï/04/92-93 ೇಷ ಭೂAಾ 7ೕ ಾ7 ಾ%ಗಳ ಕcೇ%,
3 ೇ ಮಹ , ೕ ಯಂ ಾ ,
ೆ ೕಶ ರಯ ೇಂದ , ೆಂಗಳ ರು.
¢£ÁAPÀ: 18-10-2024.
#ಳZವ_ ೆ
ಷಯ: ೆಂಗಳ ರು ದ:ಣ 9ಾಲೂಕು, ೆಂ(ೇ% Nೋಬ_, ೆಂ(ೇ% UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸À.£ÀA.128/1,
128/2J. 128/2©, 128/3J. 128/3<, 128/4< ರ ಜLೕW(ೆ ಸಂಬಂ78ದಂ9ೆ ಪ%Nಾರ
ಪsೆ2ರುವ ಬ(ೆ) !ಾ"# ೋ%ರುವ ಕು%ತು.
ಉ+ೇಖ: - ೕ ಪದf ಾಭ ರವರ ಮನ 2 ಾಂಕ: 16-10-2024
******
3ೕIನ ಷಯ ೆ5 ಸಂಬಂ78ದಂ9ೆ, ೆಂಗಳ ರು ದ:ಣ 9ಾಲೂಕು, ೆಂ(ೇ% Nೋಬ_,
ೆಂ(ೇ% UÁæªÀÄzÀ ¸À.£ÀA. 128/1, 128/2J. 128/2©, 128/3J. 128/3<, 128/4< gÀ d«ÄãÀÄ
ೆ.ಎ>.ಆ[email protected] ಸಂAೆB(ೆ ಭೂAಾ 7ೕನEಾFದುG, ಸದ% ಪ ಕರಣದI Jಾ ಥLಕ ಅ7ಸೂಚ ೆ
4(1)ನುT 2 ಾಂಕ: 14-10-1992 ರI Nಾಗೂ ಅಂ#ಮ ಅ7ಸೂಚ ೆ 6(1)ನುT 2 ಾಂಕ: 05-
05-1994 ರI Nೊರ ಸ+ಾFರುತPQೆ. ಅದರಂ9ೆ ಕ ಮ ಸಂRೆ : ಎgಎಕೂ (3)ಎ>ಆ0/04/92-
93 ರಂ9ೆ ಐ#ೕಪ ನುT ರUಸ+ಾFರುತPQೆ. ಸದ% ಐ#ೕn ನಂ9ೆ ಸ.ನಂ.126 ಮತುP 127 ರ
ಭೂ!ಾIೕಕರು, ¥ÀjºÁgÀ ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉ¢zÀÄÝ, ¸À.£ÀA.128/1, 128/2J. 128/2©, 128/3J.
128/3<, 128/4< gÀ ಭೂಪ%Nಾರದ VತPವX ಭೂ!ಾIೕಕ%(ೆ ಸಂQಾಯEಾFರುವX2ಲ
Nಾಗೂ ಪ%Nಾರದ ಹಣವನುT !ಾuಯ 8 g ಾ jಾಲಯ ೆ5 vೇವd ಆFರುವX2ಲ ಎಂಬ
!ಾ"#ಯನುT ಈ ಮೂಲಕ ತಮ(ೆ #_ಯಪ 8Qೆ.
ರವ%(ೆ,
- ೕ ಪದf ಾಭ,
ೆಂ(ೇ% (ಾ ಮ,
ೆಂಗಳ ರು ದ:ಣ 9ಾಲೂಕು.
ೆಂಗಳ ರು ನಗರ 1+ೆ.
24. The perusal of the contents of documents dated
09.06.2021 extracted hereinabove would clearly manifests that
though the award stated to have been passed, it is stated that
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NC: 2025:KHC:1088
no material is available with regard to deposit or disbursement
of the compensation to the petitioners-land owners. Contents
of document dated 01.04.2015, the Communication addressed
by Chief Traffic Manager to the Special Land Acquisition Officer
as extracted hereinabove would evidence that no possession
has been taken over by the respondent-Authorities and that the
land owners have filled the land with mud. Contents of Notice
dated 18.10.2024 extracted hereinabove, further clarifies that
the compensation in respect of land in Sy.Nos.126 and 127
have been received by the owners of the said land and that the
compensation in respect of land in Sy.Nos.128/1, 128/2a,
128/2b, 128/3a, 128/3b, 128/4b belonging to the petitioner
Nos.1 to 3 has neither been disbursed nor been deposited
before the Civil Court. Thus, the aforesaid material placed on
record would manifestly indicate complete non-compliance of
the requirement contemplated under Sections 11 and 11A of
the Act, 1894 as well as Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013. The
acquisition proceedings therefore cannot be held to have been
completed.
25. In that view of the matter, this Court do not see any
reason not to allow the petition. Accordingly following:
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NC: 2025:KHC:1088
ORDER
(i). Writ petition is allowed.
(ii). The acquisition in respect of the property
belonging to the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 herein is
held to have lapsed in the light of provisions
contained under Sections 11 and 11A of the
Act, 1894 as well as Section 24 (2) of the Act,
2013. However the Respondent-State is at
liberty to initiate acquisition proceedings
afresh in respect of said lands in accordance
with provisions of the Act, 2013, if so advised.
SD/-
(M.G.S. KAMAL)
JUDGE
RL
