Karnataka High Court

Smt. Shakuntala D/O Siddappa ... vs State Of Karnataka on 20 February, 2025

Author: B.M.Shyam Prasad

Bench: B.M.Shyam Prasad

                                            -1-
                                                      NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB
                                                      WP No. 105057 of 2021




                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH

                        DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025

                                         PRESENT

                        THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.M.SHYAM PRASAD

                                            AND

                     THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR

                          WRIT PETITION NO. 105057 OF 2021 (S-KAT)

                BETWEEN:
                SMT. SHAKUNTALA
                D/O SIDDAPPA CHINNIWALA
                AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
                R/A KANDYARVONI,
                NEAR KAMMAN KATTI,
                YALABURGA POST AND TALUK,
                KOPPAL DISTRICT-583 236.

                                                              ...PETITIONER

                (BY SRI. V. LAKSHMINARAYANA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
Digitally
                SRI. VEERESH R. BUDIHAL, ADVOCATE)
signed by
ANJALI M
Location:
High Court of   AND:
Karnataka,
Dharwad         1.    STATE OF KARNATAKA
Bench                 REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
                      EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
                      VIKAS SOUDHA,
                      BENGALURU-560001.

                2.    THE COMMISSIONER FOR PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS
                      NRUPATHUNGA ROAD, BENGALURU-560001.


                3.    THE DIRECTOR OF VOCATIONAL EDUCATION,
                      NEW PUBLIC OFFICES, NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
                                -2-
                                       NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB
                                       WP No. 105057 of 2021




     BENGALURU-560001.

4.   THE SPECIAL OFFICER AND SELECTION
     COMMITTEE FOR RECRUITMENT
     TO THE POSTS OF TEACHERS,
     DEPT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
     K.G. ROAD, BENGALURU-560009.

5.   THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
     OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION,
     KOPPAL DISTRICT,
     KOPPAL-583226.
                                       ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. G.K. HIREGOUDAR, GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE)

        THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226

AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO, ISSUE

A    WRIT OF      CERTIORARI   AND QUASH   THE   ORDER    BY

KARNATAKA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AT BELAGAVI DATED

23.12.2020     PASSED     IN    APPLICATION   NO.7697/2015

(ANNEXURE-H) AS ARBITRARY, VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14

READ WITH ARTICLE 16 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA &

ETC.,



        THIS WRIT PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS

DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:


CORAM:     THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.M.SHYAM PRASAD

            AND

            THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR
                                       -3-
                                                    NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB
                                                    WP No. 105057 of 2021




                               ORAL ORDER

(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.M.SHYAM PRASAD)

The petitioner is the applicant in A.

No.7697/2015 with the Karnataka State Administrative

Tribunal, Belagavi [Tribunal], and she has filed this

application with the Tribunal calling in question the

stipulation in the notification dated 17.07.2007 that those

who have passed Job Oriented Diploma Course [JOC] will

not be eligible for recruitment to the post of Special Teachers

in Government Higher / Modern Primary Schools. The

petitioner's application, which is filed in the year 2015, is

belated, and as such, the petitioner has filed an application

[I.A. No.II] for condonation of delay1.

2. The Tribunal by its order dated 23.12.2020 has

rejected the application [and the application for condonation

of delay] opining that the petitioner has failed to justify the

delay of over seven and a half years in availing her remedy.

The Tribunal has considered certain circumstances, apart

1 The application is filed beyond one year and this application is filed under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act,1985

NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB

from certain precedential authorities, to arrive at its decision

as aforesaid, and these circumstances are as follows.

[i] The concerned Selection Committee for Recruitment

has issued notification dated 01.02.2007 for the

recruitment of Special Teachers.

[ii] The petitioner has filed her application claiming

reservation under category 3A for the post of a

Physical Education Grade-II.

[iii] The petitioner's name is mentioned in the final

selection list after verification of documents, but

she is not called for counselling.

[iv] On 17.07.2007, the Selection Committee has

published a notification informing those who were

in the final selection list but with JOC, that they

will not be eligible for recruitment.

[v] Resultantly, 30 candidates [including the petitioner]

are excluded from the final selection list in the year

2007 and others appointed. The petitioner has filed

her application in the year 2015 with the Tribunal.

NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB

3. The Tribunal has found that the petitioner

cannot explain either delay or laches by simply averring that

her ailing mother was bedridden for a very long time or that

therefore she could not concentrate on the outcome of the

selection notification and seek redressal of her grievance.

The Tribunal, relying upon the decisions of the Apex Court

in Prakash K. and others v. State of Karnataka and

others2 and State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava3 on

upsetting completed selection processes when there is

laches and the similarly placed persons being extended the

same benefit in matters of employment, has opined that the

petitioner cannot draw support from the second proposition

when there is delay and laches.

4. The petitioner has sought for parity contending

that those who like her were excluded from the final

selection list on the ground that candidates with JOC will

not be qualified are given appointments after certain

proceedings. In fact, Sri. V. Lakshminarayana, the learned

2 [1996] 11 SCC 563 3 [2015] 1 SCC 347

NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB

senior counsel for the petitioner, relies upon the following

circumstances to contend that this Court must intervene

with the Tribunal's impugned order on the ground that in

matters of employment similarly placed persons must be

treated equally, especially when there is a declaration in rem

by Courts. The details of the proceedings relied upon are as

follows.

[a] Those who are excluded from the final list in the

circumstances as stated first have filed their

petitions before this Court [W.P. Nos.29919-

928/2009 and connected matters], after being

unsuccessful in their applications with the

Tribunal. These petitioners have relied upon a

decision W.P. Nos.29048-29055/2002 and

connected matters by a Division Bench of this

Court way back in the year 2002, and it is

declared in this decision that JOC would be

equivalent to the Pre-University Course [PUC] and

those with JOC cannot be excluded from the

selection process when the prescribed educational

qualification is PUC.

NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB

[b] These writ petitions in W.P. Nos.29919-928/2009

and connected matters have been allowed on

20.06.2011 once again reiterating that JOC is

equivalent to PUC, and therefore, the Government

cannot exclude those with JOC from recruitment

process. These successful petitioners in the

aforesaid writ petitions, consequent to the orders

as aforesaid, have been issued with appointments.

[c] Sri. Hanumesh H., another candidate who is

excluded from the final list like the applicant, has

been issued with the appointment order as a

Physical Education Teacher on 13.01.2020

consequent to the orders in his application in

Application No.2791/2012 with the Tribunal in

the year 2012. This is during the pendency of the

petitioner's application with the Tribunal.

5. Sri. V. Lakshminarayana contends that the

petitioner's exclusion from the final selection list, at the first

instance, was contrary to the declared position on

NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB

equivalence between JOC and PUC [a decision in rem] , and

thereafter with the similarly placed candidates having been

appointed because of the Court's intervention, the petitioner

cannot be denied the same benefit. The learned senior

counsel relies upon the following decisions of the Apex Court

to underscore his argument.

B.C. Nagaraj and another v The State of Karnataka and others in Civil Appeal Nos.5529- 5530/20234:

The Apex Court in this decision was examining the

grievance as regards the extension of UGC pay scales

to certain physical instructors in Government Grade

Colleges in Karnataka. The Apex Court, while opining

that similarly placed persons cannot be denied the

same relief, has intervened directing the State

Government to extend the benefit of a certain UGC

pay scale. However, the question of delay in seeking

vindication of a right to seek employment in a

belatedly filed application / petition did not arise for

consideration.

4 This Civil Appeal is disposed of on 13.09.2023

NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB

Lt. Col. Suprita Chandel v. Union of India and others in Civil Appeal No.1943/20225:

This dispute relates to the concerned appellant's

grievance about being refused permission to take up

departmental examination for permanent

commission with the Army. In the case of others who

had similar grievance, the Armed Forces Tribunal

granted benefit, but the concerned appellant was

denied. The appellant she contended that she could

not join the others because she was in the advance

stage of pregnancy.

In this context, the Apex Court, while reiterating the

settled law that where a citizen aggrieved by an

action of the Government Department has

approached the Court and obtained a declaration of

law in his / her favour other similarly situate cannot

be denied the benefit of such declaration, has opined

that, in the special circumstances of the case, the

concerned petitioner could not be non-suited on the

ground of delay.

5 This Civil Appeal is disposed of on 09.12.2024

- 10 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB

Ram Autar Singh Yadav v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others in Civil Appeal No.13806/20246:

The Apex Court, in the circumstances where a Sub-

Inspector of Police denied the benefit of a medal for

gallantry, has held it would be iniquitous and

inappropriate to deny a relief for no better reason

than that the relief has been belatedly claimed and

the High Courts must not dismiss the Writ Petitions

on the ground of delay and laches mechanically

without considering all the relevant facts and

circumstances.

6. At the outset, this Court must refer to the

decision in State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava

[supra] wherein it is held as follows:

22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14

6 This Civil Appeal is disposed of on 04.12.2024

- 11 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB

of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.

22.2. However, this principle is subject to well- recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.

22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all

- 12 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB

similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, [1997] 6 SCC 721]. On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.

7. Sri G.K. Hiregoudar, the learned Principal

Government Advocate, is heard, and the petitioner's

grievance with the Tribunal's order is examined in the

circumstances peculiar to the case and the law declared that

[i] the High Courts must not dismiss petitions mechanically

on the ground of delay and laches without considering all

the facts and circumstances and [ii] those, who did

challenge the action but wake up late only because the

others have succeeded, cannot be extended the benefit of

equal treatment unless there is declaration in rem.

- 13 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB

8. This Court must observe that those candidates

with whom the petitioner claims parity approached the

Tribunal immediately after the decisions to exclude and

these persons grievances are redressed in the year 2011

when the State Government filed a Memo in W.P.

Nos.29919-928/2009 and connected matters accepting that

they would be accommodated but on conditions. This Court

has referred to the conditions later part of this order. The

petitioner who did not act after the exclusion from the final

selection list has also not acted immediately after the orders

of this Court in W.P. Nos.29919-928/2009 and connected

matters in the year 2011, and she has filed her application

only in the year 2015 after almost four years.

9. The petitioner, when she is seeking appointment

which could block the vacancy for another, should bring out

circumstances to justify the inability to take action between

2007 and 2011, and again, during the relevant period

between 2011 and 2015. The petitioner, as against this

requirement has only stated that her ailing mother's health

deteriorated and she was bedridden, and as such, she could

- 14 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB

not immediately approach this Court. These assertions are

too general and wholly unsubstantiated. Therefore, the

petitioner also cannot draw support from the appointment of

Sri. Hanumesh H in the year 2020. His application with the

Tribunal is in the year in 2012 [Application No. 2791/2012].

10. This Court, in these circumstances cannot but

opine that the petitioner must take the consequence of

laches and acquiescence unless she can establish that, as

stated in State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava

[supra], the orders in W.P. Nos.29919-928/2009 and

connected matters are orders in rem. In this regard, this

Court must also refer to the subsequent decision of the Apex

Court in U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Ram Gopal7 where it is

reiterated that the rule on delay and laches will not apply

when a judgment is in rem. The relevant part reads as

under:

We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however, apply to judgments which are delivered in rem. The State and its instrumentalities are expected in

7 (2021) 13 SCC 225

- 15 -

NC: 2025:KHC-D:3483-DB

such category of cases to themselves, extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of courts. This distinction between operation of delay and laches to judgments delivered in rem and in personam, is lucidly captured in State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava.

11. The petitions in W.P. Nos.29919-928/2009 and

connected matters are allowed on a Memo by the State

Government stating that, in the case of those particular

petitioners, it will issue appointment orders placing them at

the bottom of the list without upsetting the others selected

and appointed, and consequentially, the Tribunal's order in

A. No. 3428/2007 is set aside and a month is granted for

issuance of appointment orders stipulating that the

concerned petitioners will not be entitled to back wages or

seniority. This Court must opine that the order in W.P.

Nos.29919-928/2009 and connected matters is an order on

consent in the case of specific persons, and hence, not a