Karnataka High Court
Sri C Bheemaraju vs Smt Muniyamma on 19 February, 2025
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WP No. 22085 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
WRIT PETITION NO. 22085 OF 2024 (SCST)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI. C. BHEEMARAJU,
S/O CHANDRAMATI MUDALIAR,
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO. 1396,
5TH MAIN, D BLOCK,
2ND STAGE, RAJAJINAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 010.
2. M/S. CENTURY PRIME PROPERTIES PVT. LTD.,
A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER COMPANIES ACT,
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE ATNO. 10/1,
GROUND FLOOR,
LAKSHMINARAYANA COMPLEX,
PALACE ROAD, BANGALORE - 560 052,
Digitally signed by
MAHALAKSHMI B M REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY
Location: HIGH MR. RAGHAVENDRA K.G.
COURT OF
KARNATAKA ...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. CHANDAN K, ADVOCATE A/W
SRI. ABHISHEK PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SMT. MUNIYAMMA,
D/O LATE NARAYANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
RESIDING AT ANIGHATTA VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK,
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WP No. 22085 of 2024
BANGALORE RURAL - 562 110.
2. SMT. VENKATALAKSHMI,
W/O LATE RAVI,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
RESIDING AT ANIGHATTA VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK,
BANGALORE RURAL - 562 110.
3. SRI. MANOJ @ MANU
S/O LATE RAVI
AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS,
RESIDING AT ANIGHATTA VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK,
BANGALORE RURAL - 562 110.
4. KUMARI ANUSHA
D/O LATE RAVI
AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS,
RESIDING AT ANIGHATTA VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK,
BANGALORE RURAL - 562 110.
5. SRI. RAJANNA
S/O LATE NARAYANAPPA
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
RESIDING AT ANIGHATTA VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK,
BANGALORE RURAL - 562 110.
6. SMT. MUNILAKSHMAMMA,
D/O LATE NARAYANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
RESIDING AT ANIGHATTA VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK,
BANGALORE RURAL - 562 110.
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WP No. 22085 of 2024
7. SRI. MUNIYAPPA,
S/O LATE NARAYANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
RESIDING AT ANIGHATTA VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK,
BANGALORE RURAL - 562 110.
8. SRI. NAGARAJU
S/O LATE NARAYANAPPA
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
RESIDING AT ANIGHATTA VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK,
BANGALORE RURAL - 562 110.
9. SRI. NARAYANASWAMY,
S/O LATE NARAYANAPPA
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
RESIDING AT ANIGHATTA VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK,
BANGALORE RURAL - 562 110.
10. SMT. MUNIKAYAMMA,
W/O LATE KOMAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
RESIDING AT ANIGHATTA VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK,
BANGALORE RURAL - 562 110.
11. SRI. MUNITHIMMARAYAPPA
S/O LATE APPANNA,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
RESIDING AT ANIGHATTA VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK,
BANGALORE RURAL - 562 110.
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WP No. 22085 of 2024
12. SRI. DINESH BHANDARI,
S/O SRI. B.C. BHANDARI,
AGED MAJOR,
RESIDING AT NO. 33,
3RD STAGE, L N COMPLEX,
KEMPANNA LAYOUT,
BANGALORE - 560 002.
13. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
DODDABALLAPUR SUB DIVISION
DODDABALLAPUR ROAD,
DODDABALLAPUR,
BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT - 561 203.
14. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT,
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDING,
1ST FLOOR, BEERASADNRA VILLAGE,
KUNDANA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK
BANGALORE RURAL - 562 110.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. MUNIKRISHNA M, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1 TO R9;
SRI. YOGESH D. NAIK, AGA FOR R13 AND R14;
VIDE ORDER DATED 17.08.2024, NOTICE TO R10, R11
AND R12 DISPENSED WITH)
THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECT QUASHING
THE ORDER DATED 16.07.2024 PASSED IN
L.N.D./S.C/S.T(A)21/2023 BY THE DC, BANGALORE RURAL
DISTRICT I.E. THE R-14, WHEREIN THE R-14 HAS ALLOWED
THE APPEAL PREFERRED BY THE R-1 TO 9 UNDER SEC 5A OF
THE KARNATAKA SCHEDULE CASTE AND TRIBE (PROHIBITION
OF TRANSFER OF CERTAIN LANDS) ACT, 1979 WHICH IS
ANNEXED AS ANNEXURE-A AND ETC.,
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
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WP No. 22085 of 2024
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioner has called in question the order passed
by the Deputy Commissioner dated 16.07.2024 reversing
the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner and by
the impugned order allowed the appeal preferred by
respondent Nos.1 to 9 filed under Section 5A of the
Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe
(Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for
short 'the PTCL Act').
2. The property bearing Sy.No.117/3 measuring 3
acres situated at Bidalur Village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli
Taluk, Bangalore Rural District was granted to one late
Sri.Narayanappa, son of Sri.Lagumappa and saguvali chit
was issued on 23.02.1961. The applicants before the
Assistant Commissioner claim to be the legal
representatives of deceased-Narayanappa. The deceased
Sri.Narayanappa alienated the petition property to
Munithimmarayappa - respondent No.13 herein under the
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registered sale deed dated 21.09.1972 to the extent of 1
acre of the petition property, on 29.09.1972 and
29.12.1972 remaining portion 2 acre was sold in favour of
Late Sri.Komappa (hereinafter referred to as 'Item No 1').
The deceased Sri.Narayanappa alienated the entire 3 acres
in Sy.No.117/3, Komappa inturn conveyed the Item No.1
in favour of petitioner No.1 under a registered sale deed
dated 10.07.1996 and subsequently,
Sri.Munithimarayappa - respondent No.11 conveyed 1 acre
of land (hereinafter referred to as 'Item No.2') in favour of
Sri.Dinesh Bhandari i.e., respondent No.12. It is stated
that respondent No.12 got converted item No.2 for
residential purposes. It is stated that the petitioner has
converted item no 1 for non-agricultural use, pursuant to
which the respondent Nos.1 and 2 and petitioners have
entered into registered exchange deed dated 12.03.2007
wherein the item No.2 purchased by respondent Nos.12
was given to the petitioner and in turn, the petitioner has
given 2 acres of land in another Sy.No.116 of Bidalur
Village to respondent No.12, thus the petitioner is the
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absolute owner of the entire property bearing Sy.No.117/3
measuring 3 acres (hereinafter referred to as the
'scheduled property')
3. Respondent Nos.1 to 9 on 11.02.2008, after the
death of Sri.Narayanappa, filed an application under
Section 5 of the Act seeking resumption and restitution of
the scheduled property. The Assistant Commissioner on
hearing, dismissed the petition on the ground that
respondent Nos.1 to 9 have approached the authority
under the Act after an inordinate delay of 36 years from
the date of execution of the first sale deed in the year
1972. Aggrieved, the respondent Nos.1 to 9 preferred an
appeal before the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy
Commissioner by the impugned order allowed the appeal
and held the sale itself was null and void and ordered the
authority to take possession of the schedule property as
per Section 5(1) of the Act and re-granted the scheduled
property to the applicants. Aggrieved, the petitioner is
before this court.
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4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that the Deputy Commissioner failed to consider
that the application filed seeking resumption by the legal
representatives of the original grantee was after a lapse of
36 years contrary to the settled position of law as held by
Apex Court in the case of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI
VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA1 (NEKKANTI RAMA
LAKSHMI), CHHEDI LAL YADAV AND OTHERS VS.
HARI KISHORE YADAV (D) THR. LRS. AND OTHERS2
(CHHEDI LAL YADAV) AND NINGAPPA VS. DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS3 (NINGAPPA).
5. Per contra, learned Additional Government
Advocate appearing for the State submits that the Deputy
Commissioner has considered the amendment to Section 5
of the Act, the challenge of the amendment is pending
before coordinate bench of this court in
W.P.No.27496/2023 and the present petition needs to
(2020) 14 SCC 232
2017 (6) SCALE 459
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await the order of the coordinate bench of this court. It is
submitted that the petitioner has not challenged the
amendment to Section 5 of the Act and the petition needs
to be dismissed on the said count. The impleading
applicant claiming to be the son of Sri.Narayanappa
through his first wife.
6. To the submission made by learned Additional
Government Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits placing reliance on decisions of the division bench
of this court in GOURAMMA ALIAS GANGAMMA VS.
THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER HAVERI AND OTHERS4
(GOURAMMA), SMT.M.MANJULA AND OTHERS VS. THE
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS5
(SMT.M.MANJULA) and AKKAYAMMA VS. THE STATE
OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS6 (AKKAYAMMA) submits
that the three division bench of this court have taken into
consideration that the question of delay is a matter of
W.P.No.100101/2024 disposed of on 29.07.2024
W.A.No.210/2023 dated 25.11.2024
W.A.No.1081/2023 dated 25.11.2024
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limitation which the statute is silent about and clause (c) &
(d) now introduced to Section 5(i) of the Act did not bring
any change in the statutory scheme and the division
bench. It is also brought to the notice of this court that
during the pendency of this writ petition, the
respondent Nos.1 to 9 had entered into a registered
confirmation deed on 11.02.2025. Learned counsel for
the petitioner submits that the petition is squarely covered
by decision stated supra.
7. This court has accordingly considered the rival
contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties
and perused the material on record.
Section 5 of the Act reads as under:
5. Resumption and restitution of
granted lands.- (1) Where, on application by
any interested person or on information given in
writing by any person or suo-motu, and after
such enquiry as he deems necessary, the
Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the
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transfer of any granted land is null and void
under sub-section (1) of section 4, he may,-
(a) by order take possession of such land
after evicting all persons in possession thereof
in such manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that no such order shall be made
except after giving the person affected a
reasonable opportunity of being heard;
(b) restore such land to the original
grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not
reasonably practicable to restore the land to
such grantee or legal heir; such land shall be
deemed to have vested in the Government free
form all encumbrances. The Government may
grant such land to a person belonging to any of
the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in
accordance with the rules relating to grant of
land.
(2) Subject to the orders of the Deputy
Commissioner under section 5A, any order
passed under 2 sub-section (1) and (1A) shall
be final and shall not be questioned in any court
of law and no injunction shall be granted by any
court in respect of any proceeding taken or
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about to be taken by the Assistant
Commissioner in pursuance of any power
conferred by or under this Act.
(3) For the purposes of this section, where
any granted land is in the possession of a
person, other then the original grantee or his
legal heir, it shall be presumed, until the
contrary is proved, that such person has
acquired the land by a transfer which is null and
void under the provisions of sub-section (1) of
section 4.
8. The deceased Sri.Narayanappa alienated the
petition property through various sale deeds and the first
registered sale deed was in the year 1972 in favour of
Sri.Munithimarayappa. Subsequently, the property has
changed its hands from several purchasers. Admittedly,
the application filed under Section 4 and 5 of the Act for
restoration of the land was in the year 2008. The
application for restoration of the land was filed after more
than 36 years after the first sale. There is absolutely no
explanation offered by the applicants for the delay in filing
the application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act before the
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appropriate authority. In the absence of any reasons
explaining the delay, the Assistant Commissioner was
justified in dismissing the claim of the petitioner. The
decision of the Apex court in the case of NEKKANTI
RAMA LAKSHMI aptly applies to the present facts, as in
the said decision, what fell for consideration was the
laches and no explanation for the laches that militate on
record and against the justice. The case of NEKKANTI as
stated supra does not speak of limitation period at all,
what was discussed was the long lapse of time between
the alienation of the granted land and filing of claim for its
resumption. The division bench of this court in
GOURAMMA's case has held at para 3 as under:
"3. Having heard the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant and the learned
Government Advocate, we decline indulgence in the
matter for the following reasons:
(a) The subject land does not answer the
definition of 'granted land' in terms of Section 2(b)
of the 1978 Act cannot be much disputed, inasmuch
as the grant was not on account of social status of
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the grantee. The said grant was originally made in
1930 and later in 1958. The sale of this land
happened vide registered Sale Deed dated
05.12.1972. The buyer, in turn, sold a part of the
land to one Mr.Mahadevappa vide registered Sale
Deed dated 16.04.1976. Admittedly, the resumption
application filed earlier was rejected vide order
dated 30.12.2002 and appeal against the same also
came to be turned down vide order 27.08.2004.
Even prior to this, there were resumption orders
that were set aside by a learned Single Judge in
W.P. No.2608/2000 vide order dated 22.11.2000,
remitting the matter back for fresh consideration.
That is how the subsequent application came to be
moved; that was rejected vide order dated
30.12.2002. Even appeal met the same fate vide
order 23.12.2003.
(b) When above was the state of things as per
record, it is ununderstandable as to how persons
claiming under the original grantee could move
another application afresh on 27.08.2004. The
Assistant Commissioner could not have allowed the
said application vide order dated 22.11.2004. It
sounds strange that even the Deputy Commissioner
dismissed the appeal against the same vide order
dated 17.03.2011. The records reveal that the first
alienation took place vide Sale Deed dated
05.12.1972 and the subject application for
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resumption was filed on 27.08.2004. In the
meanwhile, the Re-grant of the land was obtained
since it was a "hereditary land" falling within the
precincts of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition
Act, 1961. Apparently, there is a time gap of about
thirty-two years spanning between alienation and
the filing of resumption application. There is
absolutely no explanation whatsoever for the laches
that militate on record and against justice. Thus, the
case squarely fits into the Apex Court decision in
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs State Of
Karnataka7, that tardy and belated claims should
not be favoured. This reasoning has animated the
impugned judgment, rightly and therefore, the
same cannot be faltered.
(c) The vehement submission of learned counsel
for the appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has amended
the provisions of Section 5 of the 1978 Act by
adding clauses (c) & (d) to sub-section (1) of the
said Section and therefore, the concept of
"limitation and delay" has to remain miles away.
These new clauses read as under:
"(c) notwithstanding anything conained in
any law, there shall be no limitation of time to
invoke the provisions of this Act.
(2020) 14 SCC 232
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(d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply
to all cases pending before all the competent
authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the
cases under this section."
It hardly needs to be stated that at no point of time,
the 1978 Act prescribed any period of limitation for
moving application for the resumption of granted
land after it is alienated.
(d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable
with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the
existing legal position. Such duplication happened
even in English legislative history, hardly needs to
be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of
limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses
(c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the
Act, do not bring any change in the statutory
scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what
the statute has been all through, so far as the
limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that
there was no limitation period earlier and there is no
limitation period now too. Laches, which would
involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of
Equity.
(e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of "limitation
period" at all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of
time between alienation of granted land and the
filing of claim for its resumption. Observations
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occurring in para 8 of the decision lend support to
this view:
"8. However, the question that arises is
with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act
which enables any interested person to make
an application for having the transfer
annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act.
This Section does not prescribe any
period within which such an application can
be made. Neither does it prescribe the period
within which suo motu action may be taken.
This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav &
Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. &
Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case
of Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors.
(C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on
14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in
law that whether Statute provided for a
period of limitation, provisions of the Statute
must be invoked within a reasonable time. It
is held that action whether on an application
of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken
within a reasonable time. This relief was
granted to the farmers due to flood in the
Kosi River which make agricultural operations
impossible. An application for restoration was
made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in
that background that this Court upheld that it
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was unreasonable to do so. We have no
hesitation in upholding that the present
application for restoration of land made by
respondent-Rajappa was made after an
unreasonably long period and was liable to be
dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the
judgments of the Karnataka High Court,
namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy
Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law
Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of
Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal,
303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy
Commissioner, Chitradurga District,
Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh.
N.4B holding that there is no limitation
provided by Section 5 of the Act and,
therefore, an application can be made at any
time, are overruled. ....."
(Emphasis is ours)
Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in
the above case has not been altered by the subject
amendment, even in the least.
(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates
might have taken place about the observations of
the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases
while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does
not lend credence to the contention that the said
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amendment intends to invalidate the law declared
by the highest court of the country which it did after
considering all aspects of the matter including the
sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended
to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have
employed a different terminology. We repeat that,
ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period
of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is
decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are
repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches
in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of
the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate.
(g) There is a marked difference between 'delay &
laches' that operate in equity and 'limitation & delay'
that obtain in law. The following observations of the
Apex Court in Union of India Vs. N.Murugesan8
make out this point:
"Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay,
laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and
interconnected on many occasions. However,
they have their distinct characters and distinct
elements. One can say that delay is the genus
to which laches and acquiescence are species.
Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a
(2022) 2 SCC 25 at para 20, 21 & 22
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species by name acquiescence. However,
there may be a case where acquiescence is
involved, but not laches. These principles are
common law principles, and perhaps one could
identify that these principles find place in
various statutes which restrict the period of
limitation and create nonconsideration of
condonation in certain circumstances.... The
underlying principle governing these concepts
would be one of estoppel. The question of
prejudice is also an important issue to be
taken note of by the court.
Laches.
21. The word "laches" is derived from
the French language meaning "remissness and
slackness". It thus involves unreasonable
delay or negligence in pursuing a claim
involving an equitable relief while causing
prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on
the part of a party to do an act which law
requires while asserting a right, and therefore,
must stand in the way of the party getting
relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are
the length of the delay and the nature of acts
done during the interval. As stated, it would
also involve acquiescence on the part of the
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party approaching the court apart from the
change in position in the interregnum.
Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court
of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who
knocks its doors when his acts would indicate
a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he
has put the other party in a particular position,
and therefore, it would be unreasonable to
facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a
man responsible for his conduct on equity is
not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy."
(h) We are told at the Bar that the subject
Amendment has been put in challenge in W.P.
No.27496/2023 and that, matter is pending
consideration. We make it clear that construction of
a statute is one thing and its validity is another. We
do not want to say even a word about the validity,
that is being examined by the learned Single Judge
before whom the matter is pending. We have only
placed our interpretation on the amended provisions
of the Act and nothing beyond.
(i) Before parting with this case, we are
constrained to observe that, legislative process is not
simple and easy. It has to be undertaken with a lot
of care, caution & expertise. Law speaks through
language. If language is not properly employed what
is said is not what is meant; if what is said is not
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what is meant, what needs to be done remains
undone or misdone. A linguistic defect thus may
defeat the intent of legislation. More is not
necessary to specify."
9. The later judgment of the Division bench of this
Court headed by our Chief Justice in the case of
SMT.M.MANJULA AND OTHERS VS. THE DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS held at para No.4 as
under:
4. The legal provisions and development of law in
the subject deserve to be noticed. While 'granted
land' is defined in Section 3(b) of the Act, Section
4 of the Act deals with the prohibition of transfer of
granted lands, to provide that notwithstanding
anything in any law, agreement, contract or
instrument, any transfer of granted land made either
before or commencement of the Act, in terms of the
contravention of the grant or in contravention of the
law in that regard or in breach of sub-Section (2)
of Section 4, such transfer shall be treated as null
and void, not to give any NC: 2024:KHC:51015-
DB right, title or interest in favour of the person to
whom the land is transferred.
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4.1 As per sub-Section (2), no person shall after
commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by
transfer any granted land without the previous
permission of the Government. Under sub-Section
(3), the provisions in sub- Sections (1) and (2) are
made applicable to the sale of any land in execution
of any decree or award, etc., of the Court. Section
5 of the Act deals with the resumption and restitution
of granted lands.
4.2 Section 5 as it stood originally, reads as under,
"5. Resumption and restitution of granted lands-
(1) Where, on application by any interested person
or on information given in writing by any person or
suo-motu, and after such enquiry as he deems
necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied
that the transfer of any granted land is null and void
under Sub-section (1) of Section 4, he may,-
(a) by order take possession of such land after
evicting all persons in possession thereof in such
manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that no such order shall be made except
after giving the person affected a reasonable
opportunity of being heard;
(b) restore such land to the original grantee or his
legal heir.
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Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the
land to such grantee or legal heir; such land shall be
deemed to have vested in the Government free form
all encumbrances. The Government may grant such
land to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled
Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the
rules relating to grant of land.
(1-A) After an enquiry referred to in Sub- section (1)
the Assistant Commissioner may, if he is satisfied
that transfer of any granted land is not null and void
pass an order accordingly.
(2) Subject to the orders of the Deputy
Commissioner under Section 5-А, any order passed
under sub-sections (1) and (1-A) shall be final and
shall not be questioned in any court of law and no
injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of
any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the
Assistant Commissioner in pursuance of any power
conferred by or under this Act. (3) For the purposes
of this Section, where any granted land is in the
possession of a person, other then the original
grantee or his legal heir, it shall be presumed, until
the contrary is proved, that such person has
acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void
under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 4."
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4.3 It would be noticed from the aforesaid provision
that there is no prescription of time limit for
resumption or restitution of the land which is null
and void under Section 4(1) of the Act. However,
various judicial decisions, prominent amongst is
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of Karnataka
[(2020) 14 SCC 232], which was in the very context
of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. It was held therein
that the application made for restitution of the land
after delay of 25 years, was not liable to be
acceptable in law, as it was after unreasonable delay.
It was held that there was no annulment of transfer
could be allowed. 4.3.1 It was observed and held in
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), "However, the
question that arises is with regard to terms
of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested
person to make an application for having the transfer
annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This
section does not prescribe any period within which
such an application can be made. Neither does it
prescribe the period within which suo motu action
may be taken.
This Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari
Kishore Yadav & Ors., [2017 (6) Scale 459] and also
in the case of Ningappa vs. Deputy Commissioner &
Ors. [C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011]
reiterated a settled position in law that whether
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statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions
of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable
time. It is held that action whether on an application
of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a
reasonable time.'' (para 8) 4.3.2 It was further
stated, "An application for restoration was made
after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that
background that this Court upheld that it was
unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in
upholding that the present application for restoration
of land made by respondent Rajappa was made after
an unreasonably long period and was liable to be
dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the
judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R.
Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1)
Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs.
The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District,
Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B
holding that there is no limitation provided
by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application
can be made at any time, are overruled. ......"
4.4 While the aforesaid law that relief of setting aside
of transfer could not be granted after unreasonably
long period and the applications made under Section
5 for restitution or resumption of the land by a
person could not be acted upon in favour of such
person on the ground of delay, the legislature
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intervened to proceed to amend Section 5 by virtue
Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes
(Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands)
(Amendment) Act, 2023, notified in the Gazette
Notification dated 27nd July 2023. Thereby sub-
clauses (c) and (d) were inserted, namely, "(c)
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there
shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions
of this Act.
(d) The provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all
cases pending before all the competent authorities
and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under
this section."
4.5 It was stated at the bar that the validity of the
aforesaid amendment is challenged in Writ Petition
No.27496 of 2023 which is pending before the
learned Single Judge of this Court. This judgment
does not travel anything on merit of the said validity
proceedings.
However, the aspects which emerged in light of the
law laid down in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra),
vis-à-vis the amendment in Section 5 and the
situation obtained, came to be dealt with by the
coordinate bench of this Court at Dharwad in Smt.
Gouramma alias Gangamma vs. Deputy
Commissioner, Haveri, which was Writ Appeal
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No.100101 of 2024 decided on 29th July 2024. 4.6.1
After noticing the amendment in Section 5, the
division bench observed thus, in para 3(d), "The
Amendment Act that is made applicable with
retrospective effect is only a duplication of the
existing legal position. Such duplication happened
even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be
mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of
limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses
(c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the
Act, do not bring any change in the statutory
scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what
the statute has been all through, so far as the
limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that
there was no limitation period earlier and there is no
limitation period now too. Laches, which would
involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of
Equity."
It was observed that in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi
(supra), did not speak of limitation period, but
focused on the long lapse of time in making the
application for restitution of the land, by quoting
paragraph 8 above from the said decision, the
division bench then held as per para 3(f), "It may be
true, that the legislative debates might have taken
place about the observations of the Apex Court in
Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the
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Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence
to the contention that the said amendment intends
to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of
the country which it did after considering all aspects
of the matter including the sense of equity & justice.
If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of
Nekkanti, it would have employed a different
terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is
decided by computing the period of limitation
prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided
keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat
in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ
jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the
Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate."
4.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in Union
of India vs. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25], the
division bench highlighted the nice distinction
between 'delay and latches', as against 'limitation'. It
was observed that the 'limitation' is a prescription of
time for taking an action as contemplated by the
legislature, whereas the concept of 'delay and
latches' has a different connotation to operate. 4.8
The coordinate bench of this Court in Smt.
Gouramma (supra), proceeded on the above
reasoning to clarify that the issues were examined
without touching the aspects of validity of
amendment which is pending adjudication. It was
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held in Smt. Gouramma (supra) that on the ground
of latches, the court would be justified in denying the
relief of setting aside the transfer and restoring the
land to the applicant when he has approached the
court after unreasonable delay and his approaching
the court is marred by latches
10. Another division of this court in the case of
AKKAYAMA stated supra has taken a similar view placing
reliance on the decision of the division bench in the case
of Gouramma, Manjula. The three division bench of this
court has observed that there was no limitation period
prescribed earlier which the statute is silent about and the
amendment so introduced does not bring any change in
the statutory scheme and there is no limitation period now
too. In Gouramma's case, court in the case of Nekkanti
has not been altered by the subject of amendment, even
in the least. The Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti has
held at para 8 as under;
8. However, the question that arises is with
regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which
enables any interested person to make an
application for having the transfer annulled as void
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under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not
prescribe any period within which such an
application can be made. Neither does it prescribe
the period within which suo motu action may be
taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav &
Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.,
2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case
of Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A.
No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011)
reiterated a settled position in law that whether
Statute provided for a period of limitation,
provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a
reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an
application of the parties, or suo motu, must be
taken within a reasonable time.
This relief was granted to the farmers due to
flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural
operations impossible. An application for restoration
was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in
that background that this Court upheld that it was
unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in
upholding that the present application for
restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa
was made after an unreasonably long period and
was liable to be dismissed on that ground.
Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High
Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy
Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal,
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523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4)
Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs.
The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District,
Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B
holding that there is no limitation provided by
Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application
can be made at any time, are overruled.
11. In the present facts, the sale has taken place in
the year 1972 pursuant to which the property has changed
hands, the nature of the agricultural lands have also been
changed. The apex court in the case of CHHEDI LAL
YADAV stated supra, has held at para 13 as under:
13. In our view, where no period of
limitation is prescribed, the action must be
taken, whether suo motu or on the application
of the parties, within a reasonable time.
Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would
depend on the circumstances of each case and
the purpose of the statute. In the case before
us, we are clear that the action is grossly
delayed and taken beyond reasonable time,
particularly, in view of the fact that the land was
transferred several times during this period,
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obviously, in the faith that it is not encumbered
by any rights.
12. The Apex court was of the view that if there is
inordinate, unexplained and unjustified delay on the part
of the applicant in seeking restoration of the land, such
inaction would create a right in favour of other party.
Therefore, the Apex Court was of the view that time must
be reckoned reasonably, not only in order to preserve the
rights and advantages which party possesses but equally
to protect each party from losses he ought not to suffer.
The registered sale deeds are public documents and after
verifying the public documents, if citizens enter into
further transaction believing such public documents to be
genuine, the subsequent alienations cannot be set at
naught by showing leniency to aggrieved party who has
slept over his rights, if rights are crystallized on account
of inaction on the part of the original grantee. The said
application has to be rejected on this count also. All these
significant details are not taken into consideration by both
the authorities. Therefore, I am of the view that the law
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laid down by the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of
CHHEDI LAL YADAV VS. HARI KISHORE YADAV is
also squarely applicable to the present case on hand.
13. In the light of the decisions stated supra, the
order passed by the Deputy Commissioner allowing the
resumption application needs to be set aside.
14. At this stage, the impleading applicant submits
that the impleading applicants claim to be legal
representatives of original grantee i.e., Narayanappa. The
dispute is inter se between respondent Nos.1 to 9 and the
impleading applicants. It is brought to the notice of this
court that the impleading applicants have already
approached the civil court at Devanahalli, this court
refrains from saying anything about their rights and the
same is pending adjudication before the civil court and this
court pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The writ petition is allowed.
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(ii) The impugned order passed by the
Deputy Commissioner is hereby set
aside. In the light of the order passed
by the Deputy Commissioner, the order
of the Assistant Commissioner stands
restored.
(iii) The application filed by respondent
Nos.1 to 9 is rejected.
In view of the disposal of the writ petition,
pending IAs does not survive for consideration, stands
disposed of.
Sd/-
______________________
JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
SS
CT: BHK
