Karnataka High Court
Sri J B Rangaswamy vs Shri Mahesh B on 1 April, 2025
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NC: 2025:KHC:14631
MFA No. 8910 of 2013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.8910 OF 2013(MV-I)
BETWEEN:
SRI. J. B. RANGASWAMY,
AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS,
S/O BOPPANNA,
RESIDING AT NO.653,
7TH CROSS, MUNESHWAWRA EXTENSION,
LAGGERE,
BANGALORE.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. S.G.HEGDE., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SHRI. MAHESH B,
S/O JUNJANNA,
MAJOR,
R/AT NO.110, 8TH CROSS,
17TH MAIN, FF COLONY,
LAGGERE MAIN ROAD,
KURUBARAHALLI,
Digitally signed by
BANGALORE - 560 058.
MEGHA MOHAN
Location: HIGH
COURT OF 2. M/S. ICICI LOMBARD GENERAL
KARNATAKA INSURANCE CO.LTD.,
ZENITH HOUSE,
KESHAV RAO,
KHADE MARG,
OPPOSITE RACE COURSE,
MAHALAKSHMI,
MUMBAI - 400 034.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. A.N.KRISHNA SWAMY, ADVOCATE FOR R2;
R1 SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED)
THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 173(1) OF MV ACT AGAINST THE
JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 12.4.2013 PASSED IN MVC
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MFA No. 8910 of 2013
NO.3916/2011 ON THE FILE OF THE III ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL
JUDGE, MEMBER, MACT, BANGALORE, DISMISSING THE CLAIM
PETITION FOR COMPENSATION.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR HEARING, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI
ORAL JUDGMENT
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the judgment and award
passed in M.V.C.No.3916/2011 dated 12.04.2013 by the III
Additional Senior Civil Judge and M.A.C.T, Bangalore, claimant
is before this Court.
2. The claim petition is filed seeking compensation of
an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- for the injuries sustained by the
claimant in the road traffic accident. The facts of the case are
that on 04.08.2010 at about 10.30 a.m., when the claimant
was going on a motorcycle as a pillion rider, the rider of the
motorcycle rode the same with high speed in a rash and
negligent manner and dashed against the motorcycle on which
the claimant was travelling. Due to which, the claimant has fell
down and has sustained simple as well as grievous injuries and
he had suffered pain and agony and financial loss.
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3. The Tribunal by order impugned had dismissed the
petition filed by the claimant seeking compensation under
Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. So, coming to such
a conclusion, the findings of the Tribunal are that on behalf of
the claimant, he had examined PWs.1 to 4. Exs.P.1 to P.22
were marked. On behalf of the respondents, RW.1 was
examined and Exs.R.1 to R.6 were marked. In discharge
summary, it is recorded that the claimant had fell from a two
wheeler after being knocked down by a four wheeler. It is the
observation of the Tribunal that when his own document says
that a four wheeler is involved in the accident and that there is
a delay of three days in giving the complaint, shows that this
vehicle is implicated in the case for the purpose of claiming the
compensation. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that
the claimant had failed to prove that the accident had
happened because of the involvement of the offending vehicle
as stated in the petition, which is a two-wheeler. The vehicle
involved as per the medical records is a four-wheeler and
accordingly dismissed the petition.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-
claimant submits that the Ex.P16 is the initial document, which
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does not speak about or refer to any four wheeler. It is only
about fall from two wheeler after being knocked down and after
that all the other documents, it is shown about the involvement
of a four wheeler. He submits that in fact the police have
registered a crime against the offending vehicle, the driver and
the insurer and after conducting the full-fledged investigation,
the charge sheet is also filed. It is the contention of the learned
counsel that in claims of this nature where application is filed
seeking compensation, the burden of proof is on the
preponderance of probability, but not beyond reasonable doubt.
It is submitted that when the Insurance Company is asserting a
particular aspect, the burden lies on the Insurance Company to
prove the same. He relied on the judgments wherein the
Hon'ble Apex Court had observed that reversing the said
finding by the High Court was erroneous. He had relied on the
judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mangla ram v.
Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Others1, Sunita
and others v. Rajasthan State Road Transport
Corporation and others2 and Janabai and others v. ICICI
(2018) 5 SCC 656
(2020) 13 SCC 486
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Lombard General Ins. Co. Ltd3 and the judgment of the
Madras High Court in Vahida Banu and others v. Parveen
Travels(P) Ltd. and another4. He relied on paragraph
numbers 21, 22, 25, 27 and 28 in Sunita's case (supra) which
reads as under:
"21. We have no hesitation in observing that
such a hyper technical and trivial approach of the
High Court cannot be sustained in a case for
compensation under the Act, in connection with a
motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of a
family member. Recently, in Mangla Ram v.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [Mangla Ram v.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 656 :
(2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 819]
(to which one of us, Khanwilkar, J. was a party),
this Court has restated the position as to the
approach to be adopted in accident claim cases. In
that case, the Court was dealing with a case of an
accident between a motorcycle and a jeep, where
the Tribunal had relied upon the FIR and charge-
sheet, as well as the accompanying statements of
the complainant and witnesses, to opine that the
police records confirmed the occurrence of an
accident and also the identity of the offending jeep
but the High Court had overturned [Pratap Singh v.
Mangla Ram, 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 3765] that
finding inter alia on the ground that the oral
evidence supporting such a finding had been
discarded by the Tribunal itself and that reliance
solely on the document forming part of the police
record was insufficient to arrive at such a finding.
Disapproving that approach, this Court, after
adverting to multitude of cases under the Act,
noted as follows: (Mangla Ram case [Mangla Ram
2022 ACJ 2003.
2023 ACJ 661
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v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 656 :
(2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 335 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 819] ,
SCC pp. 667-71, paras 22-25)
"22. The question is: Whether this approach
of the High Court can be sustained in law? While
dealing with a similar situation, this Court in Bimla
Devi [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC
530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)
1101] noted the defence of the driver and
conductor of the bus which inter alia was to cast a
doubt on the police record indicating that the
person standing at the rear side of the bus,
suffered head injury when the bus was being
reversed without blowing any horn. This Court
observed that while dealing with the claim petition
in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988, the Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by
the pleadings of the parties, its function is to
determine the amount of fair compensation. In
paras 11-15, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp.
533-34)
'11. While dealing with a claim petition in
terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988, a Tribunal stricto sensu is not
bound by the pleadings of the parties; its
function being to determine the amount of
fair compensation in the event an accident
has taken place by reason of negligence of
that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that
occurrence of an accident having regard to
the provisions contained in Section 166 of
the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a
claim petition but that would not mean that
despite evidence to the effect that death of
the claimant's predecessor had taken place
by reason of an accident caused by a motor
vehicle, the same would be ignored only on
the basis of a post-mortem report vis-à-vis
the averments made in a claim petition.
12. The deceased was a constable. Death
took place near a police station. The post-
mortem report clearly suggests that the
deceased died of a brain injury. The place of
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accident is not far from the police station. It
is, therefore, difficult to believe the story of
the driver of the bus that he slept in the bus
and in the morning found a dead body
wrapped in a blanket. If the death of the
constable had taken place earlier, it is
wholly unlikely that his dead body in a small
town like Dharampur would remain
undetected throughout the night particularly
when it was lying at a bus-stand and near a
police station. In such an event, the court
can presume that the police officers
themselves should have taken possession of
the dead body.
13. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has
rightly proceeded on the basis that
apparently there was absolutely no reason
to falsely implicate Respondents 2 and 3.
The claimant was not at the place of
occurrence. She, therefore, might not be
aware of the details as to how the accident
took place but the fact that the first
information report had been lodged in
relation to an accident could not have been
ignored.
14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of
the claimant's witnesses might have
occurred but the core question before the
Tribunal and consequently before the High
Court was as to whether the bus in question
was involved in the accident or not. For the
purpose of determining the said issue, the
Court was required to apply the principle
underlying the burden of proof in terms of
the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence
Act, 1872 as to whether a dead body
wrapped in a blanket had been found at the
spot at such an early hour, which was
required to be proved by Respondents 2 and
3.
15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal
has rightly taken a holistic view of the
matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind
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that strict proof of an accident caused by a
particular bus in a particular manner may
not be possible to be done by the claimants.
The claimants were merely to establish their
case on the touchstone of preponderance of
probability. The standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt could not have been
applied. For the said purpose, the High Court
should have taken into consideration the
respective stories set forth by both the
parties.'
(emphasis supplied)
The Court restated the legal position that the
claimants were merely to establish their case on
the touchstone of preponderance of probability and
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot
be applied by the Tribunal while dealing with the
motor accident cases. Even in that case, the view
taken by the High Court to reverse similar findings,
recorded by the Tribunal was set aside.
23. Following the enunciation in Bimla Devi case
[Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 :
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101]
,this Court in Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand
[Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC 635 :
(2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 828 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 605]
noted that when filing of the complaint was not
disputed, the decision of the Tribunal ought not to
have been reversed by the High Court [Amir Chand
v. Parmeshwari, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 9302] on
the ground that nobody came from the office of the
SSP to prove the complaint. The Court appreciated
the testimony of the eyewitnesses in paras 12 & 13
and observed thus: (Parmeshwari case
[Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC 635 :
(2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 828 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 605] ,
SCC p. 638)
'12. The other ground on which the High
Court dismissed [Amir Chand v.
Parmeshwari, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 9302]
the case was by way of disbelieving the
testimony of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such
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disbelief of the High Court is totally
conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to
the appellant but as a good citizen, Umed
Singh extended his help to the appellant by
helping her to reach the doctor's chamber
in order to ensure that an injured woman
gets medical treatment. The evidence of
Umed Singh cannot be disbelieved just
because he did not file a complaint himself.
We are constrained to repeat our
observation that the total approach of the
High Court, unfortunately, was not
sensitised enough to appreciate the plight
of the victim.
13. The other so-called reason in the High
Court's order was that as the claim petition
was filed after four months of the accident,
the same is 'a device to grab money from
the insurance company'. This finding in the
absence of any material is certainly
perverse. The High Court appears to be not
cognizant of the principle that in a road
accident claim, the strict principles of proof
in a criminal case are not attracted. ...'
22. It is thus well settled that in motor
accident claim cases, once the foundational fact,
namely, the actual occurrence of the accident, has
been established, then the Tribunal's role would be
to calculate the quantum of just compensation if
the accident had taken place by reason of
negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle and,
while doing so, the Tribunal would not be strictly
bound by the pleadings of the parties. Notably,
while deciding cases arising out of motor vehicle
accidents, the standard of proof to be borne in
mind must be of preponderance of probability and
not the strict standard of proof beyond all
reasonable doubt which is followed in criminal
cases.
25. The Tribunal had justly accepted the
appellants' contention that the respondents did not
challenge the propriety of the said FIR No. 247 of
2011 (Ext. 1) and charge-sheet (Ext. 2) before any
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authority. The only defence raised by the
respondents to this plea was that the said FIR No.
247 of 2011 was based on wrong facts and was
filed in connivance between the appellant
complainants and the police, against which the
respondents complained to the in-charge of the
police station and the District Superintendent of
Police but to no avail. Apart from this bald
assertion, no evidence was produced by the
respondents before the Tribunal to prove this
point. The filing of the FIR was followed by the
filing of the charge-sheet against Respondent 2 for
offences under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A IPC
and Sections 134/187 of the Act, which, again,
reinforces the allegations in the said FIR insofar as
the occurrence of the accident was concerned and
the role of Respondent 2 in causing such accident.
Be that as it may, the High Court has not even
made a mention, let alone record a finding, of any
impropriety against FIR No. 247/2011 (Ext. 1) or
charge-sheet (Ext. 2) or the conclusion reached by
the Tribunal in that regard. Yet, the FIR and
charge-sheet has been found to be deficient by the
High Court.
27. The Tribunal's reliance upon FIR No.
247/2011 (Ext. 1) and charge-sheet (Ext. 2) also
cannot be faulted as these documents indicate the
complicity of Respondent 2. The FIR and charge-
sheet, coupled with the other evidence on record,
inarguably establishes the occurrence of the fatal
accident and also point towards the negligence of
Respondent 2 in causing the said accident. Even if
the final outcome of the criminal proceedings
against Respondent 2 is unknown, the same would
make no difference at least for the purposes of
deciding the claim petition under the Act. This
Court in Mangla Ram [Mangla Ram v. Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 656 : (2018) 3
SCC (Civ) 335 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 819] , noted
that the nature of proof required to establish
culpability under criminal law is far higher than the
standard required under the law of torts to create
liability.
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28. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in
upholding the finding recorded by the Tribunal that
there was an accident on 28-10-2011 at around 7
a.m. between the motorcycle driven by Sitaram
bearing Registration No. RJ 25 SA 6923 and a bus
belonging to Respondent 1 (the Rajasthan State
Road Transport Corporation) bearing Registration
No. RJ 26/PA 0042 coming from the opposite
direction and being driven rashly and negligently
by Respondent 2, which resulted in the death of
Sitaram.
Relying on these judgments, learned counsel for the
claimant submits that the Tribunal failed to consider the
evidence in its proper perspective and in fact, the Tribunal has
fastened the burden on the claimant for proving the things
which are asserted by the Insurance Company. It is submitted
that if the matter is remanded and an opportunity is given to
the claimant, he would examine the witnesses in support of his
case. He submits that the dismissal of the claim petition by the
Tribunal is contrary to law and contrary to the evidence on
record. As such, the judgment and award passed by the
Tribunal needs to be set aside and the matter may be
remanded back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent -
Insurance Company submits that the Tribunal had rightly
dismissed the petition. It is submitted that when the claim
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petition is filed under Section 166 of the M.V.Act, the burden
lies on the claimant, which the claimant has failed to discharge
and there are no grounds to interfere with the well considered
judgment passed by the Tribunal.
6. Having heard the learned counsels on either side,
perused the material on record. The claim petition is filed under
Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act. The accident had taken
place on 04.08.2010. The complaint was given on 07.08.2010
after three days from the date of accident. The medical records
plays a significant role in these claims. As immediately after the
accident, the claimant must have been taken to the hospital
and the MLC register and other documents will show as to how
the accident had taken place. Except Ex.P16, all the documents
show that the motor cycle was hit by a four wheeler. The
Tribunal had considered those documents which are filed by the
claimant. If the complaint is given on the same day, the things
would have been altogether different. But in this case, the
complaint is given after three days and now the vehicle that is
involved in the accident is a two wheeler, there is a discrepancy
between the medical and the police records. As the claimant
had placed before the Court all those documents, he cannot ask
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the Court to rely on those documents partly. Once the
document is marked, the Court has to consider the entire
document. Now, in this case, the burden lies on the claimant, in
the light of the documents produced by him that there is a
discrepancy in the medical documents and he should have
examined somebody to elicit the truth or otherwise of the said
document. Admittedly, he has not examined anyone.
7. Then coming to whether it is preponderance of
probability or beyond reasonable doubt. There is no dispute on
the proposition that in these matters, the burden of proof is on
the testimony of preponderance of probability. But in a case
where basing on the documents that are placed by the claimant
himself, the claimant cannot say that the burden lies on the
Insurance Company to prove. In those circumstances, the
Tribunal had rightly held that claimant had failed to prove the
accident and in the facts and circumstances of this nature,
complaint that is given three days after the accident assumes
significance. In each and every case, giving a complaint
belatedly would not be affect the case, but it depends upon the
fact and circumstance of each case. In this case, under these
facts and circumstances, it will have an impact and it will affect
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the case of the claimant and the Tribunal had rightly considered
all these aspects.
8. Then coming to the submission of the learned
counsel with regard to remand of this matter. The accident had
happened on 04.08.2010 and for the purpose of examining the
doctor or the medical records or anybody and remanding the
matter in 2025 will not serve any useful purpose and this Court
finds no reasons to remanding the matter back to the Tribunal.
i) Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
ii) Registry is directed to return the Trial Court Records
to the Tribunal, along with certified copy of the
judgment passed by this Court forthwith without
any delay.
iii) Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand
closed.
SD/-
(LALITHA KANNEGANTI)
JUDGE
KA, ct: BHK
