Karnataka High Court

Pardhanani Chatrabhuj Bassarmal vs M/S. Omr Investments Llp on 15 April, 2024

Author: M.Nagaprasanna

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

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                                                         NC: 2024:KHC:14866
                                                       WP No. 3133 of 2024
                                                   C/W WP No. 6855 of 2023



                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                         DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF APRIL, 2024

                                          BEFORE
                        THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
                        WRIT PETITION NO. 3133 OF 2024 (GM-RES)
                                            C/W
                        WRIT PETITION NO. 6855 OF 2023 (GM-RES)


                   IN W.P.NO.3133/2024

                   BETWEEN:

                   PARDHANANI CHATRABHUJ BASSARMAL,
                   S/O LATE BASSARMAL
                   HOTCHAND PARDHANANI,
                   AGED ABOUT 82 YEARS,

                   PERMANENT R/AT FLAT NO.1504,
                   AL MAS TOWERS,
                   DUBAI MARINA,
Digitally signed   PO BOX 5418,
by NAGAVENI
Location: HIGH
                   DUBAI, UAE AND BANGALORE,
COURT OF           RESIDENT AT NO. 46/3,
KARNATAKA
                   FAIR FIELD LAYOUT,
                   RACE COURSE ROAD,
                   BANGALORE - 560 001,

                   BY HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER,

                   MR. M. SAHADEVA REDDY,
                   AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS,
                   S/O LATE SRI. M. BASI REDDY,
                   R/AT NO.185, AMAR JYOTHI LAYOUT,
                                 -2-
                                             NC: 2024:KHC:14866
                                           WP No. 3133 of 2024
                                       C/W WP No. 6855 of 2023



5TH MAIN, DOMLUR INNER RING ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 071.
                                                   ...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. SATYANAND B S., ADVOCATE)

AND:

M/S. OMR INVESTMENTS LLP,
A LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP,
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE
AT 1ST FLOOR, EMBASSY POINT,
NO.150, INFANTRY ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 001.

REPRESENTED BY
MR. P. R. RAMAKRISHNAN,
PARTNER AND AUTHORISED SIGNATORY OF
M/S. OMR INVESTMENTS LLP.
                                                 ...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI.PRABHULING NAVADGI, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
    SRI.AJESH KUMAR S., ADVOCATE)

        THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C. PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDERS DATED
08.01.2024, PASSED IN CR.RP.254 OF 2023, ON THE FILE OF
THE LEARNED LXVIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS
JUDGE AT BANGALORE (CCH NO.69) AND CONSEQUENTLY,
QUASH      THE     ENTIRE       CRIMINAL    PROCEEDINGS      IN
CR.R.P.NO.254 OF 2023, ON THE FILE OF THE LEARNED LXVIII
ADDITIONAL       CITY   CIVIL    AND    SESSIONS    JUDGE    AT
BANGALORE (CCH.NO.69) PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE - A AND
ETC.,
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                                        NC: 2024:KHC:14866
                                     WP No. 3133 of 2024
                                 C/W WP No. 6855 of 2023



IN W.P.NO.6855/2023

BETWEEN:

PARDHANANI CHATRABHUJ BASSARMAL,
S/O LATE BASSARMAL
HOTCHAND PARDHANANI,

PERMANENT R/AT FLAT NO.1504,
AL MAS TOWERS,
DUBAI MARINA,
PO BOX 5418,
DUBAI, UAE AND BANGALORE,
RESIDENT AT NO. 46/3,
FAIR FIELD LAYOUT,
RACE COURSE ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 001,

BY HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER,

MR. M. SAHADEVA REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS,
S/O LATE SRI. M. BASI REDDY,
R/AT NO.185, AMAR JYOTHI LAYOUT,
5TH MAIN, DOMLUR INNER RING ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 071.
                                             ...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. SATYANAND B S., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1.   M/S. OMR INVESTMENTS LLP,
     A LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP,
     HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE
     AT 1ST FLOOR, EMBASSY POINT,
     NO.150, INFANTRY ROAD,
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                                        NC: 2024:KHC:14866
                                      WP No. 3133 of 2024
                                  C/W WP No. 6855 of 2023



     BANGALORE - 560 001.

     REPRESENTED BY THE 2 TO 7.

2.   MR.JITENDRA VIRWANI,
     MANAGING PARTNER, PROMOTER
     AND GUARANTOR OF
     M/S.OMR INVESTMENT LLP

3.   MR. P. R. RAMAKRISHNAN,
     PARTNER AND AUTHORISED SIGNATORY OF
     M/S. OMR INVESTMENTS LLP

4.   MR.A.T.GOPINATH,
     PARTNER AND AUTHORISED
     SIGNATORY OF
     M/S.OMR INVESTMENTS LLP

5.   MR.NARPAT SINGH CHORARIA,
     PARTNER AND AUTHORISED
     SIGNATORY OF
     M/S.OMR INVESTMENTS LLP

6.   MR.RAJESH BAJAJ,
     PARTNER AND AUTHORISED
     SIGNATORY OF
     M/S.OMR INVESTMENTS LLP

7.   MR.RAJESH KAIMAL,
     AUTHORISED SIGNATORY OF
     M/S.OMR INVESTMENTS LLP

     RESPONDENTS 2 TO 7 ARE
     WORKING AT 1ST FLOOR,
     EMBASSY POINT, NO.150,
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                                             NC: 2024:KHC:14866
                                           WP No. 3133 of 2024
                                       C/W WP No. 6855 of 2023



     INFANTRY ROAD,
     BANGALORE - 560 001.
                                                 ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.PRABHULING NAVADGI, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
    SRI.AJESH KUMAR S., ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO R7)

      THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C. PRAYING TO MODIFY THE IMPUGNED ORDERS DATED
28.02.2023 PASSED BY THE LEARNED XXI ADDL. CHIEF
METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE AT BANGALORE IN CC NO.9809
OF   2022   AND   CONSEQUENTLY         ENHANCE    THE   INTERIM
COMPENSATION PAYABLE BY THE RESPONDENTS TO THE
PETITIONER FIXED AT 05 PERCENT TO 20 PERCENT OF THE
CHEQUE      AMOUNT      I.E.,    FROM      RS.20,52,72,939    TO
RS.82,10,91,755    AS   SOUGHT        BY   THE   PETITIONER   BY
ALLOWING THE APPLICATION FILED BY THE PETITIONER
UNDER SECTION 143A, NI ACT, PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE - A
AND ETC.,

      THESE PETITIONS, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,

THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

                            ORDER

In W.P.No.3133/2024:

The petitioner is before this Court calling in question an

order dated 08.01.2024 passed by the Court of Session in

Crl.R.P.No.254/2023 and has sought quashment.

NC: 2024:KHC:14866

2. Heard Sri. Satyanand B.S., learned counsel

appearing for the petitioner, Sri. Prabhuling Navadgi, learned

Senior counsel appearing for the respondent and have perused

the material on record.

3. The petitioner and the respondent had a

transaction. The transaction between the petitioner and the

respondent led to disputes. The dispute leads to initiation of

proceedings by the present petitioner under Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ('the Act' for short). The

initiation of the proceedings was brought before this Court in

W.P.No.8225/2022 c/w W.P.No.8227/2022. This Court in terms

of its order dated 04.07.2022, dismissed the petition filed by

the present respondents challenging the initiation of

proceedings under Section 138 of the Act. The present case

does not concern the said issue. The proceedings before the

learned Magistrate have gone on. The issue that has led the

petitioner to this Court in the subject petition is an order

passed by the Court of Session, which reverses the order

passed by the learned Magistrate granting 5% of the amount

involved in the cheque to be interim compensation to be paid to

NC: 2024:KHC:14866

the petitioner. The petitioner files an application under Section

143-A of the Act before the concerned Court. The concerned

Court passes an order of grant of 5% of the cheque amount to

be the interim compensation in terms of Section 143-A(1) of

the Act. This was called in question by the present respondents

before the Court of Session, which sets the order aside and

leads the fate of the petitioner in limbo. It is therefore the

petitioner is before this Court in the subject petition. The

development after the subject petition is the law being laid

down by the Apex Court as to what should be considered at the

time of grant of any interim compensation under Section 143-A

of the Act.

4. Both the learned counsel appearing for the

petitioner and the learned Senior counsel representing the

respondent would agree and admit that the issue in the lis

stands answered by the judgment rendered by the Apex Court

in the case of RAKESH RANJAN SHRIVASTAVA V. STATE OF

JHARKHAND AND ANOTHER1. The result of it being covered

on all its fours by the judgment rendered by the Apex Court will

2024 SCC OnLine SC 309

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be the obliteration of the order passed by the Court of Session

as well as that of the learned Magistrate and the matter being

remitted back to the hands of the learned Magistrate to

consider the application afresh bearing in mind the

observations made in the course of the order passed by the

Apex Court. The Apex Court in the case of RAKESH RANJAN

SHRIVASTAVA at paragraph Nos.7 to 22 has held as follows:

"7. Section 143A was brought on the statute book by Act No. 20 of 2018 with effect from 1st September 2018. Section 143A reads thus:

"143-A. Power to direct interim compensation.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Court trying an offence under Section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant--

(a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and

(b) in any other case, upon framing of charge. (2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty per cent of the cheque amount.

(3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque.

(4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within

NC: 2024:KHC:14866

such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant.

(5) The interim compensation payable under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine under Section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974).

(6) The amount of fine imposed under Section 138 or the amount of compensation awarded under Section 357 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered as interim compensation under this section."

(emphasis added)

8. In the statement of objects and reasons, it was stated that unscrupulous drawers of the cheques prolong the proceedings of a complaint under Section 138 by filing appeals and obtaining a stay. Therefore, injustice is caused to the payee of a dishonoured cheque, who has to spend considerable time and resources in Court proceedings to realise the value of the cheque. It was further observed that such delays compromise the sanctity of the cheque transactions. Therefore, it was proposed to amend the N.I. Act to address the issue of undue delay in the final resolution of the cheque dishonour cases. It was also stated that the proposed amendments would strengthen the credibility of cheques and help trade and commerce.

9. We may note here that by the same Act No. 20 of 2018, Section 148 was brought on the statute book, which provides that in an appeal preferred by the drawer against conviction under Section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such a sum which shall be a minimum 20 per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the Trial Court. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 148 clarifies that the amount payable under sub-section (1) of Section 148 is in addition to interim compensation paid by the appellant/accused under Section 143A. There are no separate objects and reasons set out for the addition of Section 148.

MANDATORY OR DIRECTORY

10. There is no doubt that the word "may" ordinarily does not mean "must". Ordinarily, "may" will not be construed as "shall". But this is not an inflexible rule. The use of the word

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NC: 2024:KHC:14866

"may" in certain legislations can be construed as "shall", and the word "shall" can be construed as "may". It all depends on the nature of the power conferred by the relevant provision of the statute and the effect of the exercise of the power. The legislative intent also plays a role in the interpretation of such provisions. Even the context in which the word "may" has been used is also relevant.

11. The power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is to direct the payment of interim compensation in a summary trial or a summons case upon the recording of the plea of the accused that he was not guilty and, in other cases, upon framing of charge. As the maximum punishment under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is of imprisonment up to 2 years, in view of clause (w) read with clause (x) of Section 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, 'the Cr. P.C.'), the cases under Section 138 of the N.I. Act are triable as summons cases. However, sub-section (1) of Section 143 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr. P.C., the learned Magistrate shall try the complaint by adopting a summary procedure under Sections 262 to 265 of the Cr. P.C. However, when at the commencement of the trial or during the course of a summary trial, it appears to the Court that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or for any other reason it is undesirable to try the case summarily, the case shall be tried in the manner provided by the CrPC. Therefore, the complaint under Section 138 becomes a summons case in such a contingency. We may note here that under Section 259 of the Cr. P.C., subject to what is provided in the said Section, the learned Magistrate has the discretion to convert a summons case into a warrant case. Only in a warrant case, there is a question of framing charge. Therefore, clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 143A will apply only when the case is being tried as a warrant case. In the case of a summary or summons trial, the power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A can be exercised after the plea of the accused is recorded.

12. Under sub-section (5) of Section 143A, it is provided that the amount of interim compensation can be recovered as if it were a fine under Section 421 of the Cr. P.C. Therefore, by a legal fiction, the interim compensation is treated as a fine for the purposes of its recovery. Section 421 of the Cr. P.C. deals with the recovery of the fine imposed by a criminal court while passing the sentence.

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NC: 2024:KHC:14866

Thus, recourse can be taken to Section 421 of the Cr. P.C. for recovery of interim compensation, which reads thus:

"421. Warrant for levy of fine.--(1) When an offender has been sentenced to pay a fine, the Court passing the sentence may take action for the recovery of the fine in either or both of the following ways, that is to say, it may--

(a) issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the offender;

(b) issue a warrant to the Collector of the district, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter:

Provided that, if the sentence directs that in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall be imprisoned, and if such offender has undergone the whole of such imprisonment in default, no Court shall issue such warrant unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, it considers it necessary so to do, or unless it has made an order for the payment of expenses or compensation out of the fine under Section 357. (2) The State Government may make rules regulating the manner in which warrants under clause (a) of sub-

section (1) are to be executed, and for the summary determination of any claims made by any person other than the offender in respect of any property attached in execution of such warrant.

(3) Where the Court issues a warrant to the Collector under clause (b) of subsection (1), the Collector shall realise the amount in accordance with the law relating to recovery of arrears of land revenue, as if such warrant were a certificate issued under such law:

Provided that no such warrant shall be executed by the arrest or detention in prison of the offender."

13. Non-payment of interim compensation by the accused does not take away his right to defend the prosecution. The interim compensation amount can be recovered from him treating it as fine. The interim compensation amount can be recovered by the Trial Court by issuing a warrant for attachment and sale of the movable property of the accused. There is also a power vested with

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NC: 2024:KHC:14866

the Court to issue a warrant to the Collector of the District authorising him to realise the interim compensation amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, belonging to the accused. For recovery of the interim compensation, the immovable or movable property of the accused can be sold by the Collector. Thus, non-payment of interim compensation fixed under Section 143A has drastic consequences. To recover the same, the accused may be deprived of his immovable and movable property. If acquitted, he may get back the money along with the interest as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 143A from the complainant. But, if his movable or immovable property has been sold for recovery of interim compensation, even if he is acquitted, he will not get back his property. Though, the N.I. Act does not prescribe any mode of recovery of the compensation amount from the complainant together with interest as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 143A, as subsection (4) provides for refund of interim compensation by the complainant to the accused and as sub-section (5) provides for mode of recovery of the interim compensation, obviously for recovery of interim compensation from the complainant, the mode of recovery will be as provided in Section 421 of the CrPC. It may be a long-drawn process involved for the recovery of the amount from the complainant. If the complainant has no assets, the recovery will be impossible.

14. At this stage, we may note sub-section (1) of Section

148. Section 148 reads thus:--

"148. Power of Appellate Court to order payment pending appeal against conviction.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974), in an appeal by the drawer against conviction under section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court:

Provided that the amount payable under this sub- section shall be in addition to any interim compensation paid by the appellant under section 143A.

(2) The amount referred to in subsection (1) shall be deposited within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as

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may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the appellant.

(3) The Appellate Court may direct the release of the amount deposited by the appellant to the complainant at any time during the pendency of the appeal:

Provided that if the appellant is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the appellant the amount so released, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant."

15. Sub-section (1) of Section 148 confers on the Appellate Court a power to direct the appellant/accused to deposit 20 per cent of the compensation amount. It operates at a different level as the power thereunder can be exercised only after the appellant/accused is convicted after a full trial.

16. In the case of Section 143A, the power can be exercised even before the accused is held guilty. Sub-section (1) of Section 143A provides for passing a drastic order for payment of interim compensation against the accused in a complaint under Section 138, even before any adjudication is made on the guilt of the accused. The power can be exercised at the threshold even before the evidence is recorded. If the word 'may' is interpreted as 'shall', it will have drastic consequences as in every complaint under Section 138, the accused will have to pay interim compensation up to 20 per cent of the cheque amount. Such an interpretation will be unjust and contrary to the well-

settled concept of fairness and justice. If such an interpretation is made, the provision may expose itself to the vice of manifest arbitrariness. The provision can be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In a sense, subsection (1) of Section 143A provides for penalising an accused even before his guilt is established. Considering the drastic consequences of exercising the power under Section 143A and that also before the finding of the guilt is recorded in the trial, the word "may" used in the provision cannot be construed as "shall". The provision will have to be held as a directory and not mandatory. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that the word "may" used in Section 143A, cannot be construed or interpreted as "shall". Therefore, the power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary.

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17. Even sub-section (1) of Section 148 uses the word "may". In the case of Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi1, this Court, after considering the provisions of Section 148, held that the word "may" used therein will have to be generally construed as "rule" or "shall". It was further observed that when the Appellate Court decides not to direct the deposit by the accused, it must record the reasons. After considering the said decision in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal1, this Court, in the case of Jamboo Bhandari v. Madhya Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Limited2, in paragraph 6, held thus:

"6. What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of Section 148 NI Act. Hence, normally, the appellate court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the appellate court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded."

(Emphasis added)

18. As held earlier, Section 143A can be invoked before the conviction of the accused, and therefore, the word "may" used therein can never be construed as "shall". The tests applicable for the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 148 can never apply to the exercise of jurisdiction under subsection (1) of Section 143A of the N.I. Act.

FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHILE EXERCISING DISCRETION

19. When the court deals with an application under Section 143A of the N.I. Act, the Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application under sub-section (1) of Section 143A. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act, by itself, is no ground to direct the payment of interim compensation. The reason is that the presumption is rebuttable. The question of applying the presumption will arise at the trial. Only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case, a direction can be issued to pay interim compensation. At this stage, the fact that the accused is in

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financial distress can also be a consideration. Even if the Court concludes that a case is made out for grant of interim compensation, the Court will have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. Even at this stage, the Court will have to consider various factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant and the paying capacity of the accused. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie a plausible defence, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation. We may note that the factors required to be considered, which we have set out above, are not exhaustive. There could be several other factors in the facts of a given case, such as, the pendency of a civil suit, etc. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all the relevant factors.

20. In the present case, the Trial Court has mechanically passed an order of deposit of Rs. 10,00,000/- without considering the issue of prima facie case and other relevant factors. It is true that the sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- represents less than 5 per cent of the cheque amount, but the direction has been issued to pay the amount without application of mind. Even the High Court has not applied its mind. We, therefore, propose to direct the Trial Court to consider the application for grant of interim compensation afresh. In the meanwhile, the amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- deposited by the appellant will continue to remain deposited with the Trial Court.

21. Hence, impugned orders are set aside, and the application made by the complainant in Complaint Petition No. 1103/2018 under Section 143A (1) of the N.I. Act is restored to the file of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bokaro. The learned Judge will hear and decide the application for the grant of interim compensation afresh in the light of what is held in this judgment. The amount deposited by the appellant of Rs. 10,00,000/- shall be invested in a fixed deposit till the disposal of the said application. At the time of disposing of the application, the Trial Court will pass an appropriate order regarding refund and/or withdrawal and/or investment of the said amount.

22. Subject to what is held earlier, the main conclusions can be summarised as follows:

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a. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary. The provision is directory and not mandatory. The word "may" used in the provision cannot be construed as "shall."

b. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors. c. The broad parameters for exercising the discretion under Section 143A are as follows:

i. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration.

ii. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case.

iii. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation. iv. If the Court concludes that a case is made out to grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. While doing so, the Court will have to consider several factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant, etc. v. There could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not exhaustive."

In the light of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court

quoted supra which lays down the parameters of consideration

of an application under Section 143-A of the Act, the learned

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Magistrate now will have to redo its exercise of considering the

application filed under Section 143-A of the Act.

5. Learned Senior counsel, Sri. Prabhuling Navadgi

submits that he would want to urge contentions before the

concerned Court on the merit of the challenge and seeks leave

of this Court, to direct the learned Magistrate to permit him to

urge all those contentions which had been left unurged when

the writ petition was dismissed on 04.07.2022. The said

submission would not merit acceptance, for the reason that the

scope of the present petition is an examination of an order

passed by the Court of Session under Section 143-A of the Act

as also the order of the learned Magistrate again under Section

143-A of the Act. While answering a challenge to the said

order, this Court would not travel beyond what is necessary to

be answered.

6. It is needless to observe that all contentions of both

the parties shall remain open.

7. For the aforesaid reasons, the following order:

i. The writ petition is allowed.

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ii. The impugned order dated 08.01.2024 passed in Crl.R.P.No.254/2023 by the LXVIII Additional City civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, is allowed.

iii. The matter is remitted back to the hands of the learned Magistrate to reconsider the application filed by the petitioner under Section 143-A of the Act seeking interim compensation, bearing in mind the observations made in the course of the order of the Apex Court in the judgment noted supra.


             iv.    It is made clear that the learned Magistrate
                    shall     consider       the      entire     issue     qua
                    Section 143-A of            the    Act without       being