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Sri D.L.Ramesh vs Sri Marilingaiah
2023 Latest Caselaw 7882 Kant

Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 7882 Kant
Judgement Date : 21 November, 2023

Karnataka High Court

Sri D.L.Ramesh vs Sri Marilingaiah on 21 November, 2023

                                                  -1-
                                                              NC: 2023:KHC:41807
                                                             RSA No. 151 of 2016



                                                                                   R
                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                         DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2023

                                              BEFORE
                   THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

                     REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 151 OF 2016 (MON)

                   BETWEEN:

                   SRI D. L. RAMESH,
                   S/O LINGEGOWDA,
                   AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
                   R/AT DADAMAHALLI VILLAGE,
                   KASABA HOBLI, MALAVALLI TALUK,
                   MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 421
                                                                     ...APPELLANT
                   (BY SRI. VENKATARAMI REDDY E, ADVOCATE)

                   AND:

                   SRI. MARILINGAIAH,
                   S/O LINGEGOWDA @ KARIGOWDA,
Digitally signed
by YAMUNA K        AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
L
                   R/AT NELAMAKANAHALLI VILLAGE,
Location: HIGH
COURT OF           KASABA HOBLI, MALAVALLI TALUK,
KARNATAKA
                   MANDYA DISTRICT - 571 430.
                                                                    ...RESPONDENT
                   (BY SRI. G.M. ANANDA, ADVOCATE)

                          THIS RSA IS FILED UNDER SEC.100 OF CPC., AGAINST
                   THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 08.10.2015 PASSED IN
                   RA.NO.74/2014 ON THE FILE OF THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE
                   AND    J.M.F.C,   MALAVALLI,   ALLOWING    THE   APPEAL   AND
                   SETTING    ASIDE    THE   JUDGMENT   AND     DECREE    DATED
                             -2-
                                             NC: 2023:KHC:41807
                                            RSA No. 151 of 2016




08.03.2013 PASSED IN OS.NO.96/2012 ON THE FILE OF THE
IST ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE, MALLAVALLI.

     THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

                        JUDGMENT

The captioned Second Appeal is filed by the

unsuccessful defendant questioning the judgment and

decree rendered by the Appellate Court in

R.A.No.74/2014, wherein the Appellate Court has reversed

the decree of the Trial Court and plaintiff's suit, seeking

recovery of Rs.66,000/-, based on a promissory note, is

decreed.

2. For the sake of brevity, the rank of the parties

are referred as they are ranked before the Trial Court.

3. Facts leading to the case are as under:

The plaintiff has instituted the present suit seeking

recovery of Rs.1,13,520/- based on a demand promissory

note. The plaintiff contended that defendant approached

him on 03.04.2009 and requested a hand loan of

NC: 2023:KHC:41807

Rs.66,000/-. The plaintiff claimed that he has lent the

money to the defendant in the presence of witnesses and

the defendant, on receipt of a hand loan of Rs.66,000/-,

has executed a promissory note in the presence of two

witnesses. The present suit is filed alleging that the

defendant having availed hand loan has inspite of repeated

requests, failed to repay the amount as agreed by him

under the promissory note.

4. Defendant, on receipt of summons, tendered

appearance, filed written statement and stoutly denied the

entire averments made in the plaint. The defendant

seriously disputed the alleged promissory note and

contended that the plaintiff has misused the signatures

obtained by him on blank papers by giving a false

assurance that he would help him secure bail in

C.C.No.70/2010. The defendant claimed that his

signatures on blank papers were given to accused No.1 in

C.C.No.70/2010 and accused No.1 in collusion with the

present plaintiff, concocted the documents styled as

NC: 2023:KHC:41807

promissory note. The defendant stoutly denied the claim of

the plaintiff that he had availed hand loan from plaintiff.

On these grounds, sought for dismissal of the suit.

5. Plaintiff to substantiate his respective claim has

examined himself as P.W.1 and both the witnesses as

P.Ws.2 and 3 and produced a demand promissory note,

which was marked as Ex.P.1. The defendant's signature

was identified and marked as Ex.P.1(a) while the

signatures of both witnesses were identified and marked

as Ex.P.1(b) and (c). The defendant, to support his

defence, placed reliance on the chargesheet filed in

C.C.No.70/2010, which is marked as Ex.D.1.

6. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground

that the demand promissory note relied on by the plaintiff

is found in conflict with Section 4 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, 'Act'). While reproducing

the relevant portion of the demand promissory note at

paragraph No.14, the Trial Court held that, in terms of

NC: 2023:KHC:41807

definition and explanation to Section 4, the undertaking

given by the payer should be unconditional, and since the

pronote contemplates right to seek recovery in the event

the defendant/maker failed to repay the hand loan of

Rs.66,000/-, the Trial Court was of the view that Ex.P.1

cannot be treated as a demand promissory note. On these

set of reasonings, the Trial court dismissed the suit.

7. Plaintiff feeling aggrieved by the judgment and

decree of the Trial Court, preferred an appeal before the

appellate Court. The Appellate Court has independently

assessed the entire material on record. The Appellate

Court has also given anxious consideration to the

definition of Section 4 of the Act and has also examined

the recitals found in the pronote. On re-assessing the

recitals in the pronote and having examined Section 4 of

the Act, the Appellate Court was of the view that the

undertaking given by the defendant/maker is not in any

way contrary to Section 4 of the N.I.Act. It is in this

background, the Appellate Court was not inclined to concur

NC: 2023:KHC:41807

with the reasons assigned by the Trial Court while applying

Section 4 of the Act in the present case on hand. The

Appellate Court also held that the reasons assigned by the

Trial Court are patently erroneous and accordingly

reversed the reasonings as well as the decree passed by

the Trial Court. Consequently, the Appellate Court has

allowed the appeal and decreed the suit.

8. Heard learned counsel appearing for the

defendant and learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff.

Perused the divergent findings of the Courts below.

9. On examining the material on record, this Court

would find that the plaintiff, to substantiate his claim, has

placed reliance on a demand promissory note executed by

the defendant. To prove the due execution, the plaintiff

has examined two witnesses, who have identified the

defendant's signature on the pronote.

10. Before a document can be treated as a

promissory note, the recitals of the promissory note

NC: 2023:KHC:41807

should demonstrate, both in form and in intent, an express

undertaking on the face of the instrument to pay the

money before it can be held to be a promissory note.

Section 4 of the Act defines a "Promissory note" as under:

"Section 4 of the Act defines, "A promissory note is an instrument in writing (note being a bank-note or a currency note) containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money to or to the order of a certain person, or to the bearer of the instruments."

11. An instrument to be a promissory note must

possess the following elements:

1. It must be in writing: A mere verbal promise to pay is not a promissory note. The method of writing (either in ink or pencil or printing etc.) is unimportant, but it must be in any form that cannot be altered easily.

2. It must certainly an express promise or clear understanding to pay: There must be an express undertaking to pay. A mere acknowledgement is not enough. The following are not promissory notes as there is no promise to pay."

12. On reading the definition and the elements to

constitute a promissory note, it can be gathered that an

instrument to constitute a promissory note should contain

NC: 2023:KHC:41807

a promise at the hands of a maker to pay the amount

unconditionally. A conditional undertaking destroys the

character of an otherwise negotiable instrument. What

can be inferred from the wordings in Section 4 of the Act is

that there should be an "unconditional undertaking"; the

promise must not depend upon the happening of some

outside contingency or events. It must be payable

absolutely and the maker must be certain. The note itself

must show clearly who is the person agreeing to

undertake the liability to pay the amount. The promise

should be to pay money and money only and the amount

should be certain.

13. The trial Court though has culled out the relevant

portion of the promissory note, but however, has misread

the provisions of Section 4 of Act and has also misread

and misunderstood the object of securing an unconditional

undertaking from the maker. I deem it fit to cull out the

undertaking given by the defendant/maker, which reads as

under:

NC: 2023:KHC:41807

"¸ÀzÀj ªÉƧ®VUÉ ªÀiÁºÉAiÀiÁ£À ±ÉÃPÀqÀ JgÀqÀÄ gÀÆ. §rØ ¸ÉÃj¹ PÉÆqÀ®Ä §zÀÞ£ÁVzÀÄÝ PÁ®PÁ®PÉÌ ¤ªÀÄUÉ §rØ ¥ÁªÀw ªÀiÁqÀÄvÀÛ §AzÀÄ ¸ÀzÀj ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß ¤ÃªÀÅ £À¤ßAzÀ ªÁ¥À¸ÄÀ ì ¥ÀqÉAiÀÄ®Ä C¥ÉÃPÉë ¥ÀqÀĪÀ ªÉÃ¼É ¤ªÀÄUÁUÀ°Ã ¤«ÄäAzÀ C£ÀĪÀÄw ºÉÆA¢zÀªÀjUÁUÀ°Ã AiÀiÁªÀ «zsÀªÁzÀ ¸À§Æ§Ä ºÉüÀzÉà vÀPÀgÁgÀÄ ªÀiÁqÀzÉà ¤ªÀÄä ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀÄgÀÄ ¥ÁªÀw ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä §zÀÞgÁVgÀÄvÉÛãÉ. ºÁUÉãÁzÀgÀÆ ¥ÁªÀw ªÀiÁqÀzÉà EzÀÝ ¥ÀPÀëzÀ°è ¤ÃªÀÅ £À¤ßAzÀ®Æ £À£Àß ZÀgÀ¹ÜgÀ D¹ÛUÀ¼À ªÀÄÆ®PÀ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ jÃvÁå «¯Éà ªÀiÁrPÉÆ¼Àî®Ä £À£ÀßzÁzÀ vÀAmÉ vÀgÀPÁgÀÄUÀ½gÀĪÀÅ¢¯ÁèªÉAzÀÄ M¦à §gɹPÉÆlÖ ¥ÁæA¸Àj¥ÀvÀæ."

14. On reading the undertaking, it nowhere indicates

that it contravenes the provisions of Section 4 of the Act.

What the maker has stated while offering an undertaking

is in the event he fails to pay the amount, the payer is at

liberty to proceed against his property. This latter part of

the undertaking does not alter the express undertaking

given by him. The latter part of the undertaking even

otherwise is available to the payer in the event the maker

of the instrument fails to honour the undertaking given

under the instrument. The term "unconditional

undertaking" conveys the absolute nature of promise,

emphasizing the absence of any contingencies or

- 10 -

NC: 2023:KHC:41807

conditions that might impede or alter the payment

obligations.

15. In the context of Section 4 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, the incorporation of an "unconditional

undertaking" within a promissory note is intricately

designed to afford paramount protection to the payer, as

opposed to conferring undue advantage upon the maker of

the note. The term "unconditional undertaking" epitomizes

the absolute commitment of the maker to honor the

specified payment without contingent qualifiers or

hindrances.

16. The emphasis on an unconditional commitment

serves as a shield for the payer by fostering certainty and

predictability in financial transactions. It ensures that the

payer, whether an individual or entity, can rely upon the

unequivocal promise made by the note's creator. This legal

construction mitigates the risk of arbitrary revocation or

- 11 -

NC: 2023:KHC:41807

alteration of the payment obligation, thereby safeguarding

the interests of the payer.

17. The pronote culled out supra clearly reveals that

the defendant has given an unconditional undertaking that

he would repay the amount without raising any objections

and failure to make the payment, discretion is given to the

payer to recover it by initiating proceedings against the

properties held by the defendant/maker. The Trial Court,

referring to this latter part of the condition, has come to

the conclusion that the right conferred on the payer to

recover by initiating proceedings is found to be in conflict

with Section 4 of the Act. The said contention of the

defendant cannot be acceded to. What Section 4

contemplates is that the promissory note should contain

an unconditional undertaking signed by the maker to pay a

certain sum of money. This unconditional undertaking is

found in the present promissory note, marked as Ex.P.1.

However, the maker, i.e., the defendant herein, has

further indicated that the payer is at liberty to proceed

- 12 -

NC: 2023:KHC:41807

against the property in the event he fails to repay the

amount. This additional condition, which is found in the

latter part of the document, does not, in my view,

contravene the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. What

defines a promissory note is that there must be an express

undertaking on the part of the maker to pay the money

before it can be held to be a promissory note. Such an

unconditional undertaking is found in Ex.P.1. The latter

part of the undertaking given by the maker himself will not

take away the character of the promissory note as

contemplated under Section 4 of the Act. The latter part of

the undertaking found in the pronote, vide Ex.P.1, infact

gives additional protection to the payer to recover the

amount in the manner known to law in the event

defendant fails to repay the hand loan. The right conferred

on the payer to recover in accordance with law does not in

any way dilute the requisite unconditional undertaking,

which is requisite to constitute a document as a pronote.

- 13 -

NC: 2023:KHC:41807

18. On examining the reasons assigned by the Trial

Court, this Court is more than satisfied that the Trial Court

not only misread Section 4 of the Act but also misread the

recitals found in Ex.P.1/promissory note. What an

unconditional undertaking means is an unconditional

undertaking given by the maker that he would repay the

amount availed by him under the document. Therefore, I

am of the view that the findings and conclusions recorded

by the Trial Court suffer from serious perversity. The

Appellate Court has rightly reassessed the entire material

on record and there is proper appreciation of the material

on record. The Appellate Court has also rightly interpreted

and applied Section 4 of the Act while decreeing the

plaintiff's suit.

19. In the light of discussion made supra, I do not

find that any substantial question of law would arise for

consideration. The regular second appeal is devoid of

merits and accordingly stands dismissed.

- 14 -

NC: 2023:KHC:41807

19. In view of dismissal of second appeal, all pending

applications, if any, do not survive for consideration and

stand disposed of.

Sd/-

JUDGE

hdk

 
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