Karnataka High Court

Lakshmamma vs Rajegowda on 25 July, 2023

Bench: S Rachaiah

                          -1-
                                 CRL.RP No. 262 of 2015



  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
       DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF JULY, 2023
                       BEFORE
        THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S RACHAIAH
   CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO. 262 OF 2015
BETWEEN:
LAKSHMAMMA
W/O RAJEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
R/AT THIRUMALEGOWDARA VATARA
NEAR DURGAMMA TEMPLE
5TH CROSS, VALLABAI ROAD
HASSAN - 573 201.
                                          ...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. SANTHOSH KUMAR M.B, ADVOCATE)
AND:
RAJEGOWDA
S/O. DODDEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
R/AT. CHANDRASHEKARA VATARA
NEAR VENKATADRI MEDICALS
DODDI ROAD, HASSAN - 573 201.
                                         ...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. GIRISH B BALADARE, ADVOCATE)
     THIS CRL.RP IS FILED U/S.397 R/W 401 CR.P.C,
PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER PASSED
BY THE ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE IN CRL.A.NO.56/2012
DATED 29.04.2014, AND FURTHER PLEASE TO CONFIRM THE
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF MAINTENANCE PASSED BY THE II
ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC HASSAN IN CRL.
MISC.28/2009 DATED 30.03.2012 IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

     THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN
HEARD AND RESERVED ON 08.06.2023, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER, THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE
THE FOLLOWING:-
                               -2-
                                       CRL.RP No. 262 of 2015



                           ORDER

1. This Criminal Revision Petition is filed by the

petitioner, seeking to set aside the judgment and order dated

29.04.2014 in Crl.A.No.56/2012 on the file of the Court of the

Additional Sessions Judge at Hassan and further seeks for

confirmation of order of maintenance passed by the Court of II

Additional Civil Judge and J.M.F.C., Hassan dated 30.03.2012 in

Crl.Mis.No.28/2009.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE ARE AS UNDER:

2. It is the case of the petitioner is that, her marriage

with the respondent was solemnized on 17.6.1982. The

petitioner lived with the respondent for a period of 20 years.

The couple had three children. It is the contention of the

petitioner that, she was being harassed by the respondent,

both physically and mentally, on every day. Even though she

tried to live with the respondent by adjusting to the physical

and mental cruelty, she could not tolerate the cruelty of the

respondent. The petitioner further stated that, day-by-day, the

respondent used to increase the cruelty, consequently, she had

to leave the matrimonial home and started residing separately.

Since the petitioner was unable to lead her life independently

without any means, she had to file Miscellaneous Petition and

CRL.RP No. 262 of 2015

sought for the relief under the Protection of Women from

Domestic Violence Act (for short "DV Act").

3. To prove the case of the petitioner, she examined

herself as PW.1 and also examined PWs.2 and 3 to substantiate

her case and also got marked Exhibits P1 to P10. On the other

hand, the respondent examined himself as RW.1 and got

marked Exhibits R1 to R8. The Trial Court after appreciating

the oral and documentary evidence on record, allowed the

petition partly and directed the respondent to pay maintenance

to the petitioner a sum of Rs.5,000/- per month and also

directed the respondent to pay compensation of Rs.2,00,000/-

within two months from the date of the order.

4. Being aggrieved by the same, the respondent

herein had preferred an appeal before the Appellate Court, the

Appellate Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent

herein and set aside the order passed by the Trial Court.

Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner is before this

Court.

5. Heard Shri Santhosh Kumar M B, learned counsel

for the petitioner and Shri Girish B Baladare, learned counsel

for the respondent.

CRL.RP No. 262 of 2015

6. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the

petitioner that, the findings given by the Appellate Court in

allowing the appeal filed by the respondent herein is opposed to

the facts and evidence on record, hence, the same is liable to

be set aside. It is further submitted that, the maintenance

must be awarded to the wife, even at any point of time, if she

shared the household with the husband / respondent.

Admittedly, the petitioner married the respondent in the year

1982 and stayed with the respondent till 2005. During the said

period, she had suffered at the hands of the respondent, as she

could not tolerate the cruelty, she had to come out of the

house.

7. It is further submitted that, the Appellate Court

without appreciating the evidence and law properly, set aside

the order of the Trial Court which is unsustainable and the

same is required to be set aside. To substantiate the

argument, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of JUVERIA ABDUL MAJID

PATNI v. ATIF IQBAL MANSOORI1.

(2014) 10 SCC 736

CRL.RP No. 262 of 2015

8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent

vehemently justified the order of the Appellate Court and

submits that, since the petitioner had failed to establish that,

prior to filing of the petition, she lived with the respondent and

she was being subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home,

the Appellate Court after re-appreciating the evidence of PW.1,

concluded that, the petitioner herein had failed to establish the

domestic violence, which she had undergone in the matrimonial

home and rightly set aside the order passed by the Trial Court.

Hence, interference with the well reasoned order passed by the

Appellate Court may not be warranted and the order of the

Appellate Court may be restored by dismissing the petition.

9. Having heard the rival contentions urged by the

learned counsels for the respective parties and also perused the

findings of the Appellate Court, it is necessary to refer the

definition of "domestic relationship" which is defined under

Section 2(f) of the DV Act and also "shared household" which is

defined under Section 2(s) of the DV Act.

"2. Definitions.--In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,--

(f) "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared

CRL.RP No. 262 of 2015

household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;

(s) "shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a house hold whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household;"

10. On careful reading of the above provisions and the

definitions assigned under the DV Act, it clarifies that, one who

seeks the remedy under the DV Act must establish the

"domestic relationship" and "shared household" against whom

they sought for relief.

CRL.RP No. 262 of 2015

11. Now it is relevant to refer the dictum of Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of Indra Sarma v. V.K.V.Sarma2,

para Nos.22, 34 and 35.

"22. We have to first examine whether the appellant was involved in a domestic relationship with the respondent. Section 2(f) refers to five categories of relationship, such as, related by consanguinity, marriage, relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, family members living together as a joint family, of which we are, in this case, concerned with an alleged relationship in the nature of marriage.

Relationship in the nature of marriage

34. Modern Indian society through the DV Act recognizes in reality, various other forms of familial relations, shedding the idea that such relationship can only be through some acceptable modes hitherto understood. Section 2(f), as already indicated, deals with a relationship between two persons (of the opposite sex) who live or have lived together in a shared household when they are related by:

(a) Consanguinity

(b) Marriage

(c) Through a relationship in the nature of marriage

(d) Adoption

(2013) 15 SCC 755

CRL.RP No. 262 of 2015

(e) Family members living together as joint family.

35. The definition clause mentions only five categories of relationships which exhausts itself since the expression "means", has been used. When a definition clause is defined to "mean" such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive. Section 2(f) has not used the expression "include" so as to make the definition exhaustive. It is in that context we have to examine the meaning of the expression "relationship in the nature of marriage".

12. On careful reading of the dictum of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, it makes it clear that, certain category of

persons are recognized and construed as they are living in a

relationship. The said aggrieved person proves that, he or she

has lived together with the respondent in the shared household

at any point of time before filing the petition, he or she is

entitled for maintenance. Any point of time means, soon

before filing the petition or considerable time, not beyond the

stretch of imagination.

13. On considering the definition and also the dictum of

the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it appears that, the petitioner had

left the house of the respondent in the year 2005 and started