Karnataka High Court
Sri G.S.Veeranagowdar S/O Shivana ... vs Shri. Dr. Alok Mohan Ips Dg And Igp Of ... on 18 December, 2023
Author: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
Bench: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
®
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2023
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL
WRIT PETITION NO.106667/2023 (S-KAT)
BETWEEN:
G.S.VEERANAGOWDAR,
S/O. SHIVANA GOWDA,
AGE: 40 YEARS, OCC: WORKING AS CIVIL
POLICE CONSTABLE
R/AT:DHANESWRI COLONY,
HOUSE NO: 51, GOPANAKOPPA,
HUBBALLI-580 032
.......PETITIONER
(BY SRI.GOURI SHANKAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. DG & IGP OF POLICE,
KARNATAKA STATE,
NRUPATUNGA ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 001
2. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
HUBBALLI-DHARWAD-580 020
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. G.K.HIREGOUDAR, GOVT. ADVOCATE)
THIS WRIT PETIITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 & 227 OF
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO SET - ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
ORDER DATED 16.06.2023 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE KARNATAKA
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, AT BELAGAVI BENCH IN CTA
NO.2061 OF 2022 IN APPLICATION NO.7667/2018 VIDE ANNEXURE-
E AND DIRECT THE RESPONDENTS TO PAY THE ARREARS WITH
RESPECT TO CHARGE NO.1 AS STATED IN ORDER DATED
03.08.2020 IN APPLICATION NO.7667/2018 VIDE ANNEXURE-A1 TO
THE PETITIONER, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
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THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD, RESERVED ON
05.12.2023 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER,
VIJAYKUMAR A PATIL, J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
This petition is filed assailing the order dated 16.06.2023
passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal,
Belagavi Bench (hereinafter referred to as 'Tribunal') in CTA
No.2061/2022 and sought further direction to the respondents
to pay the arrears with respect to charge No.1 which is
pertaining to withholding of arrears of pay for certain period for
unauthorized absence as stated in the order dated 03.08.2020
in Application No.7667/2018.
2. Brief facts leading to filing of this petition are the
petitioner was working as Civil Constable at Keshwapur Police
Station, Hubballi. On certain misconduct, he was kept under
suspension by the second respondent vide order dated
04.07.2013. The allegation of serious misconduct was that the
petitioner threatened one Siddappa with intention to kill him by
country made pistol by firing and assaulting him with deadly
weapon. The jurisdictional police registered FIR against the
petitioner, he was arrested and was in judicial custody. The
suspension order was revoked on 17.03.2014 and the
petitioner was posted in Excise Enforcement and Lottery
Prohibition Special Police Station, Hubballi. Second respondent
vide order dated 17.07.2014, appointed Additional
Commissioner of Police, Traffic Sub-Division, Hubballi as the
enquiry officer. The petitioner was issued with charge memo
dated 04.09.2014, charges levelled against the petitioner read
as under:
1) On 21.06.2011 on the pretext of ill health has
received MHS book and passport and went on
medical leave and reported for duty on 06.03.2013
but he has not produced the medical documents in
support of medical leave, thereby shown
indifference and irresponsibility in duties.
2) On 16.04.2013 at 22.30 hours he along with others
went to Kabbenur village in a Innova car bearing
No.KA-47/M-206 with a view to kill Sri siddappa
Sankappa Kardigudda, fired bullet from a country
made pistol, tried to assault in a deadly weapons,
abused in a filthy language, committed the criminal
act and shown misbehavior and irresponsibility in
duties.
3) By committing the criminal acts, he become
responsible for registering Criminal case in Crime
No.97/2013 u/s 143, 147, 148, 307, 114, 504 r/w
149 IPC and Sections 25 & 28 Indian Arms Act, in
Dharwad Rural Police Station, he shown grave
negligence and irresponsibility in duties.
4) He has shown grave negligence, irresponsibility in
duties, for having arresting on 17.04.2013 at 11:55
hours by the Dharwad police taking him to judicial
custody.
3. Petitioner submitted his explanation to the
aforesaid charges, enquiry was conducted, enquiry report was
accepted after considering the petitioner's reply. The second
respondent passed an order dated 14.07.2017 for removal of
the petitioner from services by treating the period from
04.07.2013 to 21.03.2014 as suspension period. The petitioner
assailed the order of the second respondent before the first
respondent appellate authority and the appellate authority vide
order dated 07.07.2018 rejected the appeal of the petitioner.
4. Petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders,
approached the Tribunal in Application No.7667/2018. The
Tribunal allowed the said application by quashing the impugned
orders vide order dated 03.08.2020 by directing the
respondents to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential
benefits within two months from the date of receipt of the copy
of the order. The respondent-State challenged the Tribunal's
order dated 03.08.2020 in W.P. No.102599/2021 and the same
came to be dismissed on 03.09.2021. The respondent-State
filed Special Leave Petition No.16711/2021. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition vide order
dated 08.11.2021.
5. The petitioner initiated contempt proceedings in
CTA No.1037/2021 alleging willful disobedience of the order of
the Tribunal dated 03.08.2020 passed in Application
No.7667/2018. The Tribunal vide order dated 11.11.2021,
dropped the contempt proceedings. Thereafter the petitioner
submitted a representation to the respondent-State for revision
of pay scale and payment of back wages. Failure of the
respondents to consider the representation of the petitioner
and non-compliance of the order of the Tribunal dated
03.08.2020 passed in Application No.7667/2018, the petitioner
filed second contempt petition in CTA No.2061/2022. The said
contempt proceedings were dropped by the Tribunal vide order
dated 16.06.2023 which is challenged in the present petition.
6. Sri Gourishankar Mot, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner submits that the Tribunal has committed a
grave error in dropping the contempt proceedings. The
respondent-State has failed to pay the arrears of salary as
directed by the Tribunal in its order dated 03.08.2020. The
finding of the Tribunal that the order dated 19.11.2021,
04.01.2022 and 07.10.2022 placed by the respondent along
with a memo indicates that the arrears of pay pertaining to
period from 14.07.2017 to 11.11.2021 is also paid to the
petitioner is incorrect. It is submitted that the charges levelled
against the petitioner were not proved as held by the Tribunal
in Application No.7667/2018 which has been confirmed by this
Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Hence, dropping of
contempt proceedings by the Tribunal was based on the
compliance affidavit of the respondent is contrary to law and
evidence on record as the petitioner has been reinstated
pursuant to the orders of the Tribunal. However, the
respondents have failed to pay the consequential benefits and
failed to pay the arrears as directed by the Tribunal. He seeks
to allow the writ petition by setting aside the impugned order
dated 16.06.2023 passed by the Tribunal in CTA
No.2061/2022. Further, prayed to issue direction to the
respondents to pay arrears irrespective of charge No.1 as
stated by the Tribunal.
7. Per contra, Sri Girish K. Hiregoudar, learned
Government Advocate submits that the present writ petition is
not maintainable as the challenge in the present petition is
arising out of the contempt proceedings of the Tribunal.
Hence, the petitioner has to file an appeal under Section 19 of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short '1971 Act') to the
Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is submitted that the exercise of the
power by the Tribunal is under Section 17 of the Administrative
Tribunal Act, 1985 (for short '1985 Act'). Hence, the writ
petition under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of
India is not maintainable before this Court. It is further
submitted that the exercise of power by the Tribunal under
Section 17 of the 1971 Act is the same as of the High Court.
Hence, judicial review of the orders of the Tribunal exercising
its power under Section 17 is not amenable to the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court. It is also submitted that even on
merits insofar as the claim of the petitioner for payment of
arrears with respect of charge No.1, there is no adjudication of
the allegation of charge No.1 before the Tribunal which was
kept pending till the Medical Board Certificate is received with
regard to the claim of the petitioner and until the said
certificate is received from the Medical Board, the petitioner's
claim cannot be considered. Hence, he seeks dismissal of the
petition.
8. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner,
learned Government Advocate, perused the material available
on record.
9. The respondent authorities have kept the petitioner
under suspension on the basis of serious misconduct and
thereafter enquiry was conducted and punishment of removal
from service was inflicted on the petitioner which was assailed
before the Tribunal. The Tribunal vide order dated 03.08.2020
in an Application No.7667/2018 by a well reasoned order has
set aside the order of punishment and directed the respondent-
State to reinstate the petitioner with all the consequential
benefits. The said order has attained finality as the writ
petition in W.P.No.102599/2021 was rejected which was
challenged SLP No.16711/2021 before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court and the same came to be dismissed vide order dated
08.11.2021. Admittedly, the petitioner has filed a contempt
petition before the Tribunal in CTA No.1037/2021 alleging
willful disobedience of the order of the Tribunal dated
03.08.2020 passed in Application No.7667/2018. The Tribunal
has passed the following order:
"Learned Additional Government Advocate has filed
a memo along with Annexure-R1 dated 09.11.2021 by
which complainant is issued with the order reinstating
him into service. Learned counsel for the complainant
also states that in view of the order dated 09.11.2021
passed by complying the order of this Tribunal which is
confirmed by Hon'ble High Court and Apex Court, the
Contempt Application may be dropped."
2. Accordingly, the Contempt Application is
dropped."
10. On perusal of the aforesaid order of the Tribunal, it
is evident that the Tribunal has recorded the compliance of its
order based on the submissions of the learned AGA as well as
of the complainant. Be that as it may, thereafter the petitioner
has submitted representations to the respondent authorities
seeking for payment of arrears of revision of pay scale and
payment of back wages which was not considered by the
respondents. Hence, he filed second contempt petition in CTA
No.2061/2022 alleging the willful disobedience of the order
dated 03.08.2020 passed in Application No.7667/2018 against
which, the earlier contempt petition was filed and the Tribunal
has dropped the contempt proceedings. The Tribunal in second
contempt proceedings, considering the rival submissions of the
parties and taking note of the compliance affidavit along with
orders placed by the respondent-State has proceeded to pass
the following order:
"7. We have considered the rival submissions
made by the learned Counsels and perused the
compliance affidavit along with annexures produced by
the learned AGA and the objection filed by the
complainant to the compliance affidavit. The complainant
has requested to issue a direction to the accused to pay
arrears of the period from 14.07.2017 to 11.11.2021 and
the consequential benefits. The complainant is admitting
that the accused have partly complied the order by
reinstating the complainant into service, but the arrears
of pay for the period from 14.07.2017 to 11.11.2021 is
not paid. The orders passed by the accused on
19.11.2021, 04.01.2022 and 07.10.2022 along with the
Memo filed by the learned AGA are perused. After the
complainant was reinstated into service, even the arrears
of pay pertaining to the period from 14.07.2017 to
11.11.2021 is also paid to the complainant. Hence the
contention taken by the complainant that a direction be
issued to the respondents to pay arrears for the period
14.07.2017 to 11.11.2021 cannot be sustained. Since the
arrears for the period from 14.07.2017 to 11.11.2021 is
also paid to the complainant, we are the opinion that the
direction issued by this Tribunal in a.No.7667/2018 on
03.08.2020 is complied by the accused."
11. The aforesaid order of the Tribunal clearly indicates
that the respondents have paid the arrears as claimed by the
petitioner and dropped the second contempt proceedings. The
petitioner has assailed the second order of the Tribunal wherein
it has dropped the contempt proceedings against the
respondent-accused. The respondent-State has not filed the
objections to the present petition. However, it has raised the
preliminary objection on maintainability of the writ petition and
further submitted that the arrears what was required to be paid
to the petitioner was paid and insofar as the charge No.1 which
was not the subject matter before the Tribunal would be
considered only on receipt of the medical certificate from the
Medical Board with regard to the petitioner's unauthorized
absence.
12. To appreciate the rival contentions, more
particularly, with regard to maintainability of the writ petition, it
would be useful to refer the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of T. Sudhakar Prasad Vs. Government of
Andhra Pradesh reported in (2001) 1 SCC 516. It would be
useful to extract the relevant portion of the judgment:
"17. It is thus clear that the Constitution Bench
has not declared the provisions of Article 323-
A(2)(b) or Article 323-B(3)(d) or Section 17 of the Act
ultra vires the Constitution. The High Court has, in its
judgment under appeal, noted with emphasis the Tribunal
having been compared to like "courts of first instance"
and then proceeded to hold that the status of
Administrative Tribunals having been held to be
equivalent to court or Tribunals subordinate to the High
Court the jurisdiction to hear their own contempt was lost
by the Administrative Tribunals and the only course
available to them was either to make a reference to High
Court or to file a complaint under Sections
193, 219 and 228 of IPC as provided by Section 30 of the
Act. The High Court has proceeded on the reasoning that
the Tribunal having been held to be subordinate to the
High Court for the purpose of Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution and its decisions having been subjected to
judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution, the right to file an appeal to
the Supreme Court against an order passed by the
Tribunal punishing for contempt under Section 17 of the
Act was defeated and on these twin grounds Section 17 of
the Act became unworkable and unconstitutional. We do
not find any basis for such conclusion or inference being
drawn from the judgments of this Court in the cases of
Supreme Court Bar Assn. Vs. Union of India or L. Chandra
Kumar Vs. Union of India or any other decision of this
Court. The Constitution Bench has in so many words said
that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under
Articles 226/227 could not be taken away by conferring
the same on any court or Tribunal and jurisdiction
hitherto exercised by the High Court now legislatively
conferred on Tribunals to the exclusion of High Court on
specified matters, did not amount to assigning Tribunals a
status of substitute for the High Court but such
jurisdiction was capable of being conferred additionally or
supplementally on any Court or Tribunal which is not a
concept strange to the scheme of the Constitution more
so in view of Articles 323-A and 323-B. Clause (2)(b)
of Article 323-A specifically empowers the Parliament to
enact a law specifying the jurisdiction and powers,
including the power to punish for contempt, being
conferred on the Administrative Tribunals constituted
under Article 323-A. Section 17 of the Act derives its
legislative sanctity therefrom. The power of the High
Court to punish for contempt of itself under Article 215 of
the Constitution remains intact but the jurisdiction, power
and authority to hear and decide the matters covered by
sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act having been
conferred on the Administrative Tribunals the jurisdiction
of the High Court to that extent has been taken away and
hence the same jurisdiction which vested in the High
Court to punish for contempt of itself in the matters now
falling within the jurisdiction of Tribunals if those matters
would have continued to be heard by the High court has
now been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals
under Section 17 of the Act. The jurisdiction is the same
as vesting in the High Courts under Article 215 of the
Constitution read with the provisions of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971. The need for enacting Section 17 arose,
firstly, to avoid doubts, and secondly, because the
Tribunals are not "courts of record". While holding the
proceedings under Section 17 of the Act the Tribunal
remains a Tribunal and so would be amenable to
jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution subject to the well-established rules of self-
restraint governing the discretion of the High Court to
interfere with the pending proceedings and upset the
interim or interlocutory orders of the Tribunals. However
any order or decision of Tribunal punishing for contempt
shall be appealable only to the Supreme Court within 60
days from the date of the order appealed against in view
of the specific provision contained in Section 19 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Section 17 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Section 17 of
Administrative Tribunals Act is a piece of legislation by
reference. The provisions of Contempt of Courts Act are
not as if lifted and incorporated in the text
of Administrative Tribunals Act (as is in the case of
legislation by incorporation); they remain there where
they are yet while reading the provisions of Contempt of
Courts Act in the context of Tribunals, the same will be so
read as to read the word "Tribunal" in place of the word
"High Court" wherever it occurs, subject to the
modifications set out in Section 17 of the Administrative
Tribunals Act. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 provides for appeals. In its text also by virtue
of Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
the word "High Court" shall be read as "Tribunal". Here,
by way of abundant caution, we make it clear that the
concept of intra-Tribunal appeals i.e. appeal from an order
or decision of a member of a Tribunal sitting singly to a
Bench of not less than two Members of the Tribunal is
alien to the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The
question of any order made under the provisions of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by a Member of the
Tribunal sitting singly, if the rules of business framed by
the Tribunal or the appropriate Government permit such
hearing, being subjected to an appeal before a Bench of
two or more Members of Tribunal therefore does not
arise. Any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for
contempt is appealable under Section 19 of the Act to the
Supreme Court only. The Supreme Court in the case of L.
Chandra Kumar has nowhere said that orders of Tribunal
holding the contemnor guilty and punishing for contempt
shall also be subject to judicial scrutiny of High Court
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution in spite of
remedy of statutory appeal provided by Section 19 of the
Contempt of Courts Act being available. The distinction
between orders passed by Administrative Tribunal on
matters covered by Section 14 (1) of Administrative
Tribunals Act and orders punishing for contempt
under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act read
with Section 17 of Administrative Tribunals Act, is this :
as against the former there is no remedy of appeal
statutorily provided, but as against the later statutory
remedy of appeal is provided by Section 19 of Contempt
of Courts Act itself.
18. Subordination of Tribunals and courts
functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of a High
Court can be either judicial or administrative or both. The
power of superintendence exercised by the High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution is judicial
superintendence and not administrative superintendence,
such as one which vests in the High Court under Article
235 of the Constitution over subordinate courts. Vide para
96 of L. Chandra Kumars case, the Constitution Bench did
not agree with the suggestion that the Tribunals be made
subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts
within whose territorial jurisdiction they fall, as our
constitutional scheme does not require that all
adjudicatory bodies which fall within the territorial
jurisdiction of any High Court should be subject to its
supervisory jurisdiction. Obviously, the supervisory
jurisdiction referred to by the Constitution Bench in para
96 of the judgment is the supervision of the
administrative functioning of the Tribunals as is spelt out
by discussion made in paras 96 and 97 of the judgment.
19. Jurisdiction should not be confused with
status and subordination. The Parliament was motivated
to create new adjudicatory fora to provide new, cheap and
fast-track adjudicatory systems and permitting them to
function by tearing off the conventional shackles of the
strict rule of pleadings, strict rule of evidence, tardy trials,
three/four-tier appeals, endless revisions and reviews -
creating hurdles in fast flow of stream of justice. The
administrative Tribunals as established under Article 323-
A and the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 are an
alternative institutional mechanism or authority, designed
to be not less effective than the High Court, consistently
with the amended constitutional scheme but at the same
time not to negate judicial review jurisdiction of
constitutional courts. Transfer of jurisdiction in specified
matters from the High Court to the administrative
Tribunal equates the Tribunal with the High Court in so far
as the exercise of judicial authority over the specified
matters is concerned. That, however, does not assign the
administrative Tribunals a status equivalent to that of the
High Court nor does that mean that for the purpose of
judicial review or judicial superintendence they cannot be
subordinate to the High Court. It has to be remembered
that what has been conferred on the Administrative
Tribunal is not only jurisdiction of the High Court but also
of the subordinate courts as to specified matters. The
High Courts are creatures of the Constitution and their
Judges hold constitutional office having been appointed
under the Constitution. The Tribunals are creatures of
statute and their Members are statutorily appointed and
hold statutory office. In State of Orissa V. Bhagaban
Sarangi, (1995) 1 SCC 399, it was held that
administrative Tribunal is nonetheless a Tribunal and so it
is bound by the decision of the High Court of the state
and cannot side-track or bypass it. Certain observations
made in the case of T.N. Seshan, Chief Election Commr.
of India Vs. Union of India, (1995) 4 SCC 611, may
usefully be referred to. It was held that merely because
some of the service conditions of the Chief Election
Commissioner are akin to those of the Supreme Court
Judges, that does not confer the status of a Supreme
Court Judge on the CEC. This court observed : (SCC
Headnote)
"Of late it is found that even personnel
belonging to other fora claim equation with
High Court or Supreme Court Judges merely
because certain jurisdictions earlier exercised
by those Courts are transferred to them not
realising the distinction between constitutional
and statutory functionaries."
We are therefore clearly of the opinion that there is
no anathema in the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction of High
Court and in that sense being supplemental or additional
to the High Court but at the same time not enjoying
status equivalent to High Court and also being subject to
judicial review and judicial superintendence of the High
Court."
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in subsequent decisions
i.e., in the case of R. Mohanjan and others vs. Shefali
Sengupta and others, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 761 has
reiterated the enunciation of law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme court in the case of T. Sudhakar Prasad referred
supra.
14. The power to punish for contempt has been
envisaged on the Tribunal under Section 17 of the 1985 Act,
bestowing same jurisdiction, powers and the authority in
respect of contempt of itself as a High Court has under the
provisions of the 1971 Act. Section 19 of the 1971 Act provides
an appeal from any order or the decision of the Tribunal in
exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt an appeal lie
to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, any order referred in
Section 19 of the Act does not include the order of dropping of
the contempt proceeding. The order or a decision of the
Tribunal should be with regard to the imposition of punishment
and not otherwise. Hence, the contention that the exercise of
power or passing of any order by the Tribunal under Section 17
of the 1985 Act is appealable, does not merit consideration.
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
Maharastra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and another reported
in (1996) 4 SCC 411 and Midnapore Peoples' Co-operative
Bank Limited and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others,
reported in (2006) 5 SCC 399 has held that, the appeal under
Section 19 is maintainable before the Hon'ble Supreme Court
when the Tribunal exercise its jurisdiction to punish for
contempt.
16. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of L. Chandra kumar Vs. Union of India,
reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 in paragraph Nos.91 and 92
has held as under:
"91. It has also been contended before us that
even in dealing with cases which are properly before
the Tribunals, the manner in which justice is
dispensed by them leaves much to be desired.
Moreover, the remedy provided in the parent
statutes, by way of an appeal by special leave
under Article 136 of the Constitution, is too costly
and inaccessible for it to be real and effective.
Furthermore, the result of providing such a remedy
is that the docket of the Supreme Court is crowded
with decisions of Tribunals that are challenged on
relatively trivial grounds and it is forced to perform
the role of a First Appellate Court. We have already
emphasised the necessity for ensuring that the High
Courts are able to exercise judicial superintendence
over the decisions of Tribunals under Article 227 of
the Constitution. In R.K. Jain case, after taking note
of these facts, it was suggested that the possibility
of an appeal from the Tribunal on questions of law to
a Division Bench of a High Court within whose
territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal falls, be pursued.
It appears that no follow-up action has been taken
pursuant to the suggestion. Such a measure would
have improved matters considerably. Having regard
to both the afore-stated contentions, we hold that all
decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant
to Article 323-A or Article 323-B of the Constitution,
will be subject to the High Court's writ jurisdiction
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a
Division Bench of the High Court within whose
territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls.
92. We may add here that under the existing
system, direct appeals have been provided from the
decisions of all Tribunals to the Supreme Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution. In view of our
above-mentioned observations, this situation will
also stand modified. In the view that we have taken,
no appeal from the decision of a Tribunal will directly
lie before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution; but instead, the aggrieved party will be
entitled to move the High Court under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution and from the decision of
the Division Bench of the High Court the aggrieved
party could move this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution."
17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid
Judgment has made it clear that, no appeal can be filed directly
to the Hon'ble Supreme Court from the decision of the Tribunal
passing an order under Section 14 of the 1985 Act, but the
aggrieved party can file the writ petition under Articles 226 &
227 of the Constitution of India and such a petition shall lie
before the Division Bench of the High Court. Applying the same
analogy in the absence of any provision of statutory appeal to
challenge the order of the Tribunal dropping of the contempt
proceeding, the aggrieved party can maintain the writ petition
under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, however,
while exercising the power under Articles 226 & 227 by the
High Courts, it cannot sit as an appellate forum. The High Court
before examining the orders of the Tribunal of dropping of the
contempt proceeding shall consider the entertainability of the
writ petition keeping in mind the settled principles of law that,
the tribunal exercises power of contempt akin to that of High
Court unless the order of tribunal is perverse, in violation of
principles of natural justice or exceeds its jurisdiction, then only
the High Courts shall entertain the writ petitions assailing the
orders of the Tribunal in dropping of the contempt proceedings.
The Tribunals have been conferred with the similar power of
that of High Court when it comes to the exercise of power
under Section 17 of the 1985 Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
in L. Chandarkumar's case has nowhere said that, the order
of the Tribunal holding the contemnor guilty and punishing for
contempt shall also be subject to judicial scrutiny of the High
Court under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India in
spite of remedy of statutory appeal provided under Section 19
of the Contempt of Courts Act being available. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of R. Mohanraj and others,
referred supra has made a distinction between the orders
passed by the Administrative Tribunal on the matters covered
under Section 14(1) of the 1985 Act and the orders of the
Tribunal for contempt under Section 19 of the Act read with
Section 17 of the 1985 Act holding that, as against the orders
under Section 14 (1) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, no
statutory remedy of appeal is provided under the Act, hence
the aggrieved person can invoke the writ jurisdiction under
Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, however, the
order under Section 17 of the Act, the remedy of appeal is
provided under Section 19 of the said Act, hence, the High
Courts should refrain from entertaining the writ petitions under
Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, when there is a
challenge to the order of the Tribunal under Section 17
punishing the party for contempt, however, if the Tribunal
drops the contempt proceedings no statutory remedy of appeal
is provided, hence, aggrieved party can maintain the writ
petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India,
however, the High Court while considering such a petition shall
keep in mind the well established rules of self restraint
governing the discretion to interfere with the orders of the
Tribunal.
18. The Administrative Tribunals are established under
the provisions of the 1985 Act to adjudicate or try the
administrative disputes and complaints with regard to the
recruitment, conditions of service and the conditions of the
service of the person appointed to the public services and the
posts in connections with the affairs of the Union or of any
State or any local or other authority within the territory of India
under the control of Government of India or of any Corporation
or Society owned or controlled by the Government in pursuance
to Article 323-A of the Constitution of India and matter
connected therewith and incidental thereto. The 1985 Act is a
complete Code by itself. Section 28 of the 1985 Act excludes
the jurisdiction of all the Courts except the jurisdiction of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of Article 136 of the Constitution of
India and the Labour Courts and the other Authorities under
the Industrial Disputes Act. The Constitution Bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandarkumar has
considered in detail the ambit of the Administrative Tribunals
Act, 1985.
19. This Court after considering the enunciation of law
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred supra and the scheme
of the 1985 Act and the 1971 Act is of the considered view
that, the aggrieved person can maintain the writ petition under
Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India against the order
of the Tribunal dropping of the contempt proceedings while
exercising its power under Section 17 of the 1985 Act in the
absence of any specific remedy of appeal under the aforesaid
provisions of law. However, the writ courts cannot sit as an
appellate authority over such orders. The writ court while
exercising its power shall keep in mind that the Tribunal
exercises the contempt jurisdiction akin to the jurisdiction of
the High Courts. No doubt, the Tribunal has no power as of the
High Court under Articles 215 of the Constitution of India. The
High Courts shall refrain itself from interfering with the
Tribunal's order of dropping of the contempt proceedings unless
the impugned order is without jurisdiction or exceeds the
jurisdiction, or order is in violation of principles of natural
justice or order is perverse and contrary to the settled
principles of law. Contempt is between the Court and the
contemnor or any one claiming under him, the complaint is
only an informant of willful disobedience of the order of the
Court. It is the Court which has to look into the facts and
circumstances of the case as to the conduct of the accused and
has to come to a conclusion as to whether such act of the
accused is in willful disobedience of the order of the Court,
which affect the majesty of law and the Courts. In light of the
above, this Court is of the considered view that the High Court
should be slow while executing its power of judicial review of
dropping of the contempt proceedings by the Tribunals.
20. This Court on considering the material available on
record holds that, the writ petition is maintainable by overruling
the objection of the State, however, this Court refrains from
setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal as the
impugned order, is a well reasoned order passed after
considering the compliance affidavit of the State. It is always
open for the petitioner to avail other legal remedies available
under the law, if the petitioner's grievance is still subsisting.
21. With the above observations, the writ petition is
dismissed as devoid of merits. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE
Naa/Svh
