Karnataka High Court
Smt. Sangeeta W/O. Mahanteshwara ... vs Mahanteshwara S/O. Basappa ... on 30 May, 2022
Bench: E.S.Indireshpresided Byesij
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RPFC No. 100062 of 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 30th DAY OF MAY, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE E.S.INDIRESH
REV.PET FAMILY COURT NO. 100062 OF 2017 (-)
BETWEEN:
SMT. SANGEETA W/O. MAHANTESHWARA HOSAMANI,
AGE: 37 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O: CLO. HEMANNA PADIYAPPA NAGAMMANAVAR,
PUROHIT NAGAR, HOUSE NO.2,
KALGHATGI ROAD,
DHARWAD.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. S.B.DODDEGOUDA, ADVOCATE FOR
SMT. SUMANGALA A CHAKALABBI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
MAHANTESHWARA S/O. BASAPPA HOSAMANI,
VN AGE: 42 YEARS, OCC: DTP OPERATOR,
BADIGER
R/O: GAJENDRAGAD, TQ: RON,
Digitally signed DIST: GADAG.
by V N BADIGER
Date: 2022.06.02
11:27:01 +0530
...RESPONDENT
(SRI. N.R.KUPPELUR, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. S.S.KOLIWAD, ADVOCATEADVOCATE)
THIS RPFC FILED UNDER SEC.19(4) OF THE FAMILY COURT
ACT, 1984, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DTD:31.03.2017,
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RPFC No. 100062 of 2017
IN CRL.MISC. NO.135/2014, ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL JUDGE,
FAMILY COURT, DHARWAD, DISMISSING THE PETITION FILED
UNDER SEC.125 OF CR.P.C.
THIS PETITO N C OMING O N FOR FINAL HEA RING
THIS DAY, THE COURT MA DE THE FOLLOWI NG:
ORDER
1. In this petition, the petitioner has challenged the
order dated 31/3/20217 passed in Crl.Misc. No.135/2014
on the file of the Family Court, Dharwad, dismissing the
petition.
2. The relevant facts for the adjudication of the petition
are that the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent was solemnized on 26/5/2009 at Ron. It is
further stated in the claim petition that the petitioner was
not taken care of by the respondent and due to the
harassment meted out from the respondent, the petitioner
has left the matrimonial home and started residing with
her parents. Accordingly, the petitioner has filed Crl.Misc.
No.135/2014 before the Family Court, Dharwad seeking
maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C.
RPFC No. 100062 of 2017
3. On receipt of summons, the respondent entered
appearance and resisted the petition. To prove the case,
the petitioner was examined as PW.1 and produced 11
documents which were marked as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.11. On
the other hand, respondent examined two witnesses as
RW.1 and 2 and produced 14 documents which were
marked as Ex.R.1 to Ex.R.14. The family Court, after
considering the material on record, by order dated
31/3/2017 rejected the petition. Feeling aggrieved by the
same, petitioner has presented this petition.
4. I have heard Sri.S.B. Doddegouda, learned counsel
on behalf of Smt.Sumngala A Chaklabbi, learned counsel
for the petitioner and Sri.N.R.Kuppellur, learned counsel on
behalf of Sri.S.S.Koliwad, learned counsel for the
respondent.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
contended that, the Family Court rejected the petition
based on the ground that the petitioner has refused to
reside in the matrimonial home and she is qualified to eke
RPFC No. 100062 of 2017
out her livelihood, are incorrect. He further contended that
the Family Court has not properly appreciated the material
on record. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the
petitioner sought for interference of this Court.
6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent sought to justify the impugned order passed by
the Family Court. He further contended that the Family
Court, taking into consideration the material on record, has
rightly rejected the petition which does not call for
interference in this petition.
7. I have carefully considered the reasons assigned by
the Principal Judge, Family Court. The undisputed facts of
the case are that the petitioner and the respondent are the
husband and wife and their marriage was solemnized on
26/5/2009. Perusal of the impugned order would indicate
that the petitioner had serious medical aliments and in this
regard she had taken treatment. I have also noticed that
the petitioner herein was working as teacher at St. John's
Primary School for few days and thereafter, she left the job
RPFC No. 100062 of 2017
and residing with her parents. Perusal of para 12 of the
impugned order would indicate that the petitioner was
seriously ill and had taken treatment at KLE Hospital,
Belagavi with regard to multiple organ failure.
8. In the light of the factual aspects of the case as well
as the scope and ambit of Section 125 of Cr.P.C., it is
useful to refere to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Smt. Sudha Devi and another V/s. State of UP,
reported in, 2015 Cri. L.J.3339, wherein at Paragrahs No.
14, 15 it is held as under:
"14. Now it may not be out of place to
extract the relevant section of 125(2)
of Cr.P.C. herein below :-
"125. Order for maintenance of wives,
children and parents.-(2) Any such allowance
for the maintenance or interim maintenance
and expenses of proceeding shall be payable
from the date of the order, or, if so ordered,
from the date of the application for
maintenance or interim maintenance and
RPFC No. 100062 of 2017
expenses of proceeding, as the case may
be."
15. As is obvious that the aforesaid section
does not contain any such requirement that
the reasons ought to be accorded or assigned
by the court while directing the maintenance
to be paid from the date of application, there
is no reason to read in the section something
which is not written there. At several places
in several sections of the Code of Criminal
Procedure there is a statutory mandate to
record the reasons while adopting a
particular course which a court may deem fit
to adopt. There is no reason to attribute
negligence or ignorance to the wisdom of the
legislature. If the legislation in its wisdom
has not chosen to lay down condition or has
not chosen to mandate a certain course or
modality to be adopted while doing
something, then the language of the statutes
ought not to be strained or tortured to give
out to a particular meaning or a particular
interpretation. Such a construction will be all
the more bad if it leads to the disadvantage
of one for whose benefit the legislation has
RPFC No. 100062 of 2017
been brought in existence and the statute
enacted. The very object of
introducing Section 125 of Cr.P.C. has been
to save the vagrancy of destitute wives who
had been suffering neglect at the hands of
their husbands who were under the legal as
well as moral obligation to maintain their
wives and children. It appears that the two
phrases used in Section 125 of Cr.P.C. that,
"from the date of order, or, if so ordered
from the date of the application", might have
been aimed to indicate a guiding
presumption for those cases where it may
not have been specifically mentioned in the
judgment as to from which date the amount
of maintenance shall be payable. If in a given
case the court simply passes the order that
certain amount is to be paid to the wife and
it has not been made explicit or express in
the order as to from which date it shall be
payable it shall be then presumed that the
husband shall be liable to pay the amount of
maintenance from the date of the order. But,
if the court specifically orders the payment
from the date of the order, there is no need
entering in any presumption. That's why the
RPFC No. 100062 of 2017
legislation in its wisdom seems to have used
the particular phraseology in the sub-section
which it did. If a court wants to make the
husband liable to pay the amount of
maintenance from the date of institution of
the suit it is always open for the court to do
so and it will have to make an order to that
effect also. The use of the word, "if so
ordered" does not indicate anything more. To
impute any interpretation to the sub-section
which makes it a legal requirement to assign
reasons before making an order in the event
of fixing up the amount of maintenance from
the date of application is, in the view of this
Court, not a very sound interpretation. With
greatest respect to the views expressed by
the Hon'ble Judges in the aforesaid
judgments, this Court has not been able to
persuade itself to agree with the same. The
Division Bench decision given in Jagat
Narain's case too has a binding effect on the
Benches of lesser strength, and even in that
view of the matter also this Court adopts the
same view."
RPFC No. 100062 of 2017
9. In the light of the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex
Court with regard to scope and ambit of Section 125 of
Cr.P.C., I am of the view that the reasons assigned by the
Prl Judge, Family Court is incorrect in dismissing the
petition on the ground that the petitioner is a MA. BEd.
Graduate; is having immovable property at Dharwad, are
not the basis for rejection of the petition and in that view
of the matter, I am of the view that the petition requires
reconsideration by learned Prl. Judge, Family Court.
In the light of the observation made above, I pass the
following:
ORDER
1. The Revision Petition is allowed;
2. Order dated 31/3/2017 in Crl. Misc. No.135/
2014 by the Prl. Judge, Family Court,
Dharwad is set aside and the matter is
remitted back to the Family Court, Dharwad
for fresh consideration, after affording
opportunity of hearing on both the sides;
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RPFC No. 100062 of 2017
3. In order to avoid further delay in the matter,
parties are directed to appear before the
Family Court, Dharwad on 16/6/2022 without
awaiting for the notice from the concerned
Family Court;
4. Learned Family Judge is directed to dispose of
the petition within six months from the date of
the receipt certified copy of this order;
5. It is made clear that Prl. Judge, Family Court
shall not be influenced by the observations
made by this Court in this order.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Vb/-
