Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 10547 Kant
Judgement Date : 8 July, 2022
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 08TH DAY OF JULY, 2022 R
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.2776 OF 2022
BETWEEN:
1. SRI SHIVASWAMY
S/O SOMBAYYA
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.49/A, 11TH CROSS
GANESHNAGAR, KODIGEHALLI
BENGALURU - 560 092.
2. SRI A.M.MANOHARA
S/O A.N.MAHADEVAREDDY
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.3
SURYA RESIDENCY
BALAJI LAYOUT
BENGALURU - 560 092.
3. SRI ANAND KARMOKAR
S/O VIJAYKARMOKAR
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.3/11
1ST MAIN ROAD, AMCO LAYOUT
KODIGEHALLI,
NEAR IMPACT COLLEGE
BENGALURU NORTH
KARNATAKA - 560 092.
4. SMT. BASANTHI RANI PAUL
W/O R.N.PAUL
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
2
RESIDING AT NO.76, 2ND CROSS ROAD
DINNUR WHITE HOUSE
R.T.NAGAR
BENGALURU - 32.
5. SRI PALASH KARMOKAR
S/O .L.H.KARMOKAR
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS
S/O VIJAYKARMOKAR
RESIDING AT NO.3
1ST MAIN ROAD, AMCP LAYOUT
SAHAKARNAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 092.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI NITIN RAMESH, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY KODIGEHALLI POLICE STATION
REPRESENTED BY
THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
BENGALURU DISTRICT
HIGH COURT BUILDINGS
BENGALURU - 560 009.
2. SMT.P.C.LEELAVATHI
W/O CHANDRASHEKAR
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.123
5TH CROSS, 3RD MAIN
MAHAGANAPATHI NAGAR
W.C.ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 040.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1;
SRI SAMPAT ANAND SHETTY, ADVOCATE FOR R2)
3
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET IN
C.C.NO.5835/2019 IN CR.NO.163/2018 FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S
143, 427, 447, 448, 506 R/W 149 OF IPC REGISTERED BY
KODIGEHALLI POLICE STATION, BENGALURU DISTRICT, PENDING
ON THE FILE OF VII ADDL.C.M.M., BENGALURU AND ALL
CONSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 30.06.2022, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:-
ORDER
The petitioners are before this Court calling in question
proceedings in C.C.No.5835 of 2019 pending before the VII
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore arising out of
Crime No.163 of 2018 registered for offences punishable under
Sections 143, 427, 447, 448, 506 and 149 of the IPC.
2. Heard Sri Nitin Ramesh, learned counsel for petitioners,
Smt. K.P.Yashodha, learned High Court Government Pleader for
respondent No.1 and Sri Sampat Anand Shetty, learned counsel for
respondent No.2.
3. Brief facts, as projected by the prosecution, are as
follows:-
The 2nd respondent is the complainant. On 01-08-2018 the
complainant registers a complaint before the Kodigehalli Police
Station that on 13-01-2018 at about 9-00 a.m. the petitioners/
accused have allegedly trespassed into her house, threatened her
tenants to vacate the house, caused loss by disconnecting
electricity. It is further alleged that the accused even have
trespassed into houses belonging to others. Based upon the said
complaint, a criminal case came to be registered in Crime No.163 of
2018 for offences punishable under Sections 143, 427, 447, 448,
506 and 149 of the IPC. The police, on conduct and completion of
investigation, filed a charge sheet against the petitioners for the
aforesaid offence in C.C.No.5835 of 2019. On filing of the charge
sheet and cognizance being taken by the learned Magistrate, the
petitioners have knocked the doors of this Court in the subject
petition. This Court, by its order dated 19-04-2022, has granted an
interim order of stay of all further proceedings against the
petitioners and the proceedings have since then not proceeded
further.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would
contend that the issue in the case at hand is purely civil in nature,
the complainant is trying to arm twist the petitioners for having lost
all the litigations concerning the property. The learned counsel
would further submit that the incident, according to the complaint,
had taken place on 13-01-2018 but the complaint is registered after
about seven months on 2-08-2018. If trespass, intimidation or any
other offence that is alleged had happened on 13-01-2018 nothing
stopped the complainant from registering the crime immediately,
but is registered after 7 months. This fact would be enough
circumstance to demonstrate mala fide action on the part of the
complainant in registering the complaint.
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel representing the
2nd respondent/complainant would seek to refute the submissions
to contend that the complainant is in possession of the property
and the petitioners had sought to trespass into the property and
destroyed belongings of all the persons who are on rent in the
property belonging to the complainant. However, he would accept
the fact of registering the complaint after seven months and
attributes the said delay for following up in the civil proceedings
that were pending between the parties. He would seek that it is a
matter of trial in which the petitioners will have to come out clean.
6. The learned High Court Government Pleader would also toe
the lines of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent in her
submission that this is a matter of trial for the petitioners to come
out clean since charge sheet is already filed by the police.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and perused the material
on record.
8. The allegation of the complainant in the complaint
registered on 02-08-2018 is that the petitioners seven months
ago trespassed into the property and created ruckus, took away
the belongings and have intimidated the tenants residing in the
property allegedly belonging to the complainant. It is the case of
the petitioners that the land in Sy.No.11 of Kodigehalli Village
Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk was acquired by the
Bangalore Development Authority ('BDA' for short) by issuance of
preliminary notification on 3-01-1985 and later a final notification
on 25-09-1986 for the benefit of NTI Housing Co-operative Society.
The 1st petitioner by way of a registered sale deed dated
14-03-2013 purchased the said property from the Society and later
got all the revenue records mutated into his name. Likewise, all the
petitioners have purchased their portions of property on different
dates by way of registered sale deeds and are in possession of the
property and residing in the said addresses.
9. It is a matter of record that the complainant along with one
Channabasanagouda Polis Patil and others challenged the aforesaid
acquisition made in the year 1986 before this Court in Writ Petition
No.4470 of 2019. This Court by its order dated 2.02.2022 dismissed
the claim of the complainant and another by clearly holding that
possession was handed over to the Society on 25-10-2003 after the
BDA taking over possession on 13-06-2002. The observations of
this Court, insofar as they are germane for the present lis, are as
follows:
"8. The material on record disclose that it is the specific contention urged by the petitioners that petitioner No.1 had acquired the suit schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 10-08-1983 and formed the lay-
out in the same and sold some of the sites in favour of petitioners 2 to 9 during the period 31-03-1995 to 4-08- 2014. Meanwhile, the subject land was notified for acquisition vide preliminary notification dated 3-01- 1985 and final notification dated 22-09-1986; since there were litigations including W.P.No.292 of 1987 challenging the said notifications till the same were disposed of on 11.10.1993, the award was passed on 14-09-1995, pursuant to which, possession was taken by the SLAO on 15-02-2002 followed by a notification dated 13-06-2002 issued under Section 16(2) of the L.A.Act; thereafter, the subject land was handed over to the possession of 3rd respondent-Society on 25-10- 2003, pursuant to which, sites have been sold/allotted in favour of its members including respondents 5 to 9. It is therefore, clear that petitioners 2 to 9 herein claimed to be the purchasers of portions of the subject land after issuance of preliminary and final notifications dated 3-01- 1985 and 22-09-1986 respectively; It follows there from that petitioners 2 to 9 being subsequent purchasers do not have locus standi to challenge the preliminary and final notifications, which were undisputedly issued prior to them purchasing their respective portions as stated supra and consequently, the claim and contention of petitioners 2 to 9 is not maintainable and liable to be rejected, since the said sale deeds in favour of petitioners 2 to 9 after issuance of the aforesaid notifications are null and void as held by the Apex Court in the case of Shivkumar and another v. Union of India and others - (2019) 10 SCC 229."
... ... ... ...
16. A perusal of the said order makes it amply clear that the same cannot be treated as conclude as having reserved any liberty in favour of petitioner No.1 and consequently, the said order in W.A.No.1993 of 2013 cannot be relied upon by petitioner No.1 in support of his case. In this context, it is necessary to state that despite repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenging the impugned notification, petitioner No.1 is attempting to circumvent all the earlier orders passed against him with mala fide intention and ulterior motives which cannot be countenanced by this Court in the present petition. Under these circumstances, even this
contention urged by the petitioners is liable to be rejected.
17. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the material on record obtaining in the instant case, I do not find any merit in this petition and the same is liable to be dismissed."
(Emphasis supplied)
The complainant in the impugned complaint along with others
preferred a review petition before the learned Judge who had
rejected their claim in Review Petition No.394 of 2022 by order of
this Court dated 21-04-2022 holding that the order did not suffer
from any error apparent on the face of the record. This was in
vindication of the claim of the petitioners that they are in
possession of the property pursuant to the sale deeds executed in
their favour and the contrary claim was rejected by this Court.
10. In the teeth of the claim of the complainant, and the
order passed by this Court, it is germane to notice the complaint
that is registered by the complainant. The complaint is registered
on 02.08.2018 for an incident that has happened seven months ago
i.e., on 13-01-2018 at 9.00 a.m. The narration in the complaint
clearly indicates that there are civil proceedings pending between
the parties in O.S.No.403 of 2018 to 407 of 2018. The complaint
reads as follows:
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F §UÉÎ ªÀiÁ£Àå ¥ÀæzÁs £À £ÀUÀgÀ ¹«¯ï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¸ÉµÀ£ïì £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄ ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ gÀ°è N.J¸ï. £ÀA.1354/2018, 1355/2018, 1172/2018 zÁªÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß zÁR°¹zÀÄÝ, «ZÁgÀuÉ £ÀqɹzÀ ªÀiÁ£Àå £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀĪÀÅ ¢£ÁAPÀ:20/02/2018 gÀAzÀÄ ªÉÄîÌAqÀªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÝ vÁvÁ̰PÀ vÀqÉAiÀiÁeÉÕAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¤ÃrgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
DzÀÝjAzÀ ¸ÀzÀj J¸ï.²ªÀ¸Áé«Ä, J.JA.ªÀÄ£ÉÆÃºÀgï, D£ÀAzï, PÀªÀiÁðPÀgï, ²æÃªÀÄw §¸ÀAw gÁt ¥Ë¯ï, ¥Á¯Éñï PÀªÀiÁðPÀgï ºÁUÀÆ EvÀgÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÝ ¸ÀÆPÀÛ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ PÀæªÀÄ dgÀÄV¹ £ÀªÀÄUÉ ¸ÀÆPÀÛ gÀPÀëuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¤Ãr £ÁåAiÀÄ zÉÆgÀQ¹PÉÆqÀ¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ vÀªÀÄä°è PÉÆÃgÀÄvÉÛêÉ.
ªÀAzÀ£ÉUÀ¼ÉÆA¢UÉ, vÀªÀÄä «±Áé¹ ¸À»/-
(°Ã¯ÁªÀw ¦.¹.)"
The Police after investigation filed a charge sheet in the case
against the petitioners. The summary of the charge sheet as found
in column No.7 reads as follows:
"zÉÆÃµÁgÉÆÃ¥Àt ¥ÀnÖ PÁ®A £ÀA.2 & 4 gÀ°è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹gÀĪÀ J1 jAzÀ J5 gÀªÀgÉV£À DgÉÆÃ¦vÀgÀÄ ¢£ÁAPÀ 13/01/2018 gÀAzÀÄ ¨É½UÉÎ ¸ÀĪÀiÁgÀÄ 9-00 UÀAmÉ ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄzÀ°è ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ £ÀUÀgÀ PÉÆrUɺÀ½î ¥Éưøï oÁuÁ ¸ÀgÀºÀ¢Ý£À, CªÉÆÌà ¯ÉÃOmï, 1£Éà PÁæ¸ï£À°ègÀĪÀ ¥ÁnÃ¯ï «ºÁgï ¯ÉÃOmï £À°ègÀĪÀ ¸ÉÊmï £ÀA.1, 2 , 4, 8 & 9 gÀ ¸ÀéwÛUÉ CwPÀæªÀÄ ¥ÀæªÉñÀ ªÀiÁr ªÀÄ£ÉUÀ½UÉ C¼ÀªÀr¹zÀÝ «zÀÄåvï «ÄÃlgï ¨ÉÆÃqïðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß QvÉÛ¸ÉzÀÄ, ªÀÄ£ÉUÀ¼À°è ªÀ¸ÀªÁVzÀݪÀjUÉ F ¸ÉÊlÄUÀ¼ÀÄ £ÀªÀÄUÉ ¸ÉÃjzÀÄÝ, F §UÉÎ £ÁªÀÅ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è zÁªÉ ºÀÆrgÀÄvÉÛêÉ, F PÀÆqÀ¯Éà ¤ÃªÀÅ ªÀÄ£ÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß SÁ° ªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃV JAzÀÄ ºÉzÀj¹ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ ¸ÁªÀiÁ£ÀÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÉÆgÀUÉ J¸ÉzÀÄ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ°è ªÁ¸ÀªÁVzÀݪÀgÀ£ÀÄß SÁ° ªÀiÁr¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
DgÉÆÃ¦vÀgÀÄ ¸ÀéwÛ£À «µÀAiÀĪÁV ¹¹ºÉZï-15£Éà £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è zÁªÉ ºÀÆrzÀÄÝ, zÁªÉ «ZÁgÀuÉAiÀİègÀĪÁUÀ¯Éà ¸ÀévÀÄÛUÀ½UÉ CwPÀæªÀÄ ¥ÀæªÉñÀ ªÀiÁr, UÀ¯ÁmÉ ªÀiÁr, ªÀÄ£ÉUÀ¼À°èzÀݪÀjUÉ ¨ÉzÀj¹ CªÀgÀ UÀÈºÉÆÃ¥ÀAiÉÆÃV ªÀ¸ÀÄÛUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ºÉÆgÉUÉ ºÁQ ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß SÁ° ªÀiÁr¹, «ÄÃlgï ¨ÉÆÃqïðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß QvÉÛ¸ÉzÀÄ, ¸ÀéwÛ£À ªÀiÁ°ÃPÀjUÉ CPÀæªÀÄ £ÀµÀÖªÀÅAlÄ ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ vÀ¤SɬÄAzÀ ¸Á©ÃvÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
DzÀÝjAzÀ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀgÀ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ PÀ®A jÃvÁå ²PÁëºÀð C¥ÀgÁzsÀªÉ¸ÀVzÀÄÝ, F zÉÆÃµÁgÉÆÃ¥Àt ¥ÀnÖ."
What is stated in the complaint is verbatim repeated in the
summary of the charge sheet. The complaint itself was registered
after seven months of the alleged incident that too for offences
punishable under Sections 427 and 447 of the IPC as preliminary
offences.
11. In the light of the said allegations, it is necessary to
notice Sections 447 and 427 of the IPC. Section 447 reads as
follows:
"447. Punishment for criminal trespass.--Whoever commits criminal trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."
Section 447 deals with punishment for criminal trespass and directs
that whoever commits criminal trespass shall be punished. Section
441 defines what is criminal trespass and reads as follows:
"441. Criminal trespass.--Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit "criminal trespass"."
Section 427 deals with mischief causing damages to one's property.
Mischief is as defined under Section 425 of the IPC.
Both Sections 425 and 427 of the IPC read as follows:
"425. Mischief.--Whoever with intent to cause, or knowing that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to the public or to any person, causes the destruction of any property, or any such change in any property or in the situation thereof as destroys or diminishes its value or utility, or affects it injuriously, commits "mischief".
Explanation 1.--It is not essential to the offence of mischief that the offender should intend to cause loss or damage to the owner of the property injured or destroyed. It is sufficient if he intends to cause, or knows that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to any person by injuring any property, whether it belongs to that person or not.
Explanation 2.--Mischief may be committed by an act affecting property belonging to the person who commits the act, or to that person and others jointly."
... ... ... ...
"427. Mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees.--Whoever commits mischief and thereby causes loss or damage to the amount of fifty rupees or upwards, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
Section 447 which deals with criminal trespass hinges upon the
complainant being in possession of the property, as one can
trespass a property not belonging to the accused but belonging to
the complainant and cause mischief or damage under Section 427
of the IPC. Therefore, Section 447 of the IPC which directs
punishment for criminal trespass has in itself, a civil flavour.
Therefore, Section 447 as defined under Section 441 of the IPC is
an interplay between a civil right and a crime.
12. If possession is not with the complainant, she can hardly
contend that the accused have trespassed into the property of the
complainant. Her possession in the case at hand is determined by
this Court in the aforesaid writ petition while observing that the
BDA had already acquired the property for a particular purpose in
the year 1986 and the complainant being in possession was not
accepted. Civil cases are also pending against each other.
Therefore, if the complainant is not in possession of the property,
there can be no allegation of criminal trespass into such property,
in which accused themselves are in possession.
13. Criminal trespass as obtaining under Section 447 of the
IPC and defined under Section 441 of the IPC can be committed
only when a person enters into or upon any property, which is in
possession of another with intent to commit an offence or
intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such
property. If possession itself is not with the complainant as is held
by this Court (supra), there can be no offence of criminal trespass
into the property not belonging to the complainant. If there is no
criminal trespass into the property, causing damage under Section
427 of the IPC, by way of mischief of destruction of property also
cannot be alleged, as they are inseparable, in the peculiar facts of
this case.
14. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.2 that respondent No.2 is in possession of the
property holds no water, in the light of the finding rendered by the
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court albeit in a different proceeding. The
other ground that the 2nd respondent would urge is that the criminal
petition is preferred after 3 years after registration of the crime and
the petition should be dismissed on account of delay. This
statement is noted only to be repelled, as delay in every case would
not disentitle the accused for a relief if it is available in law and this
Court at its discretion, in exercise of its power under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C., to prevent miscarriage of justice, can interfere despite
delay, in a given case.
15. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the
2nd respondent in the case of PRITI SARAF AND ANOTHER v.
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANOTHER - 2021 SCC Online 206
and in the case of SAU.KAMAL SHIVAJI POKARNEKAR v. THE
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS - (2019) 14 SCC 350
are of no avail as they are inapplicable to the facts of the case at
hand. PRITI SARAF was concerning offences punishable under
Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC. The finding of the Apex Court
therein was inducement and criminal breach trust was writ large in
the facts of that case. The Apex Court holds that merely because
the matter is civil in nature or civil proceedings are pending, the
Court should not quash the proceedings. The same goes with the
case of KAMAL SHIVAJI POKARNEKAR (supra) which would also
direct that merely because civil proceedings are pending, the same
should not be quashed if the complaint discloses prima facie
offence. There again, the offences were of forgery and using a
forged document to gain benefit. It is considering those offences
qua the facts obtaining in those cases the Apex Court holds that
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. ought not to have been
exercised.
16. The facts obtaining in the case at hand are clearly
different from the facts obtaining before the Apex Court. The case
at hand is for offence under Section 447 of the IPC, for which the
most relevant factor would be exclusive possession of the property,
on which the accused is alleged to have trespassed. If exclusive
possession is not with the complainant, the complaint of criminal
trespass into the property and damage to that property under
Section 427 of the IPC can hardly be alleged, as observed
hereinabove. The petitioners have also placed abundant material by
way of documents that are unimpeachable and of sterling quality,
which would undoubtedly overpower the documents and
submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent
No.2. If Sections 427 and 447 of the IPC cannot be seen to be
present in the case at hand, the other offences for the ones
punishable under Sections 448, 506 and even 143 of the IPC can
hardly be alleged, as Section 447 deals with criminal trespass into a
property. Section 448 makes house trespass a punishment and
Section 427 damage to the property by way of mischief.
17. If the possession of the property itself is in doubt, driving
home the offences beyond all reasonable doubt, would without
doubt become doubtful. On such a premise, if further proceedings
are permitted to continue against the petitioners, notwithstanding
the fact that charge sheet has been filed by the Police, would
become an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of
justice.
18. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) All proceedings in C.C.No.5835 of 2019 pending
before the VII Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bangalore stand quashed, qua petitioner.
(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the
course of the order are only for the purpose of
consideration of the case of the petitioner under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the same shall not bind or
influence any further proceedings before any judicial
fora.
Consequently, I.A.No.2/2022 stands disposed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
bkp CT:MJ
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