State Of Karnataka vs Prakash Ramdreddi Huli
2022 Latest Caselaw 1715 Kant

              IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
                      DHARWAD BENCH

           DATED THIS THE 4TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2022

                           BEFORE

           THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

                CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2863/2012

BETWEEN:

STATE OF KARNATAKA
LOKAYUKTA POLICE, DHARWAD
                                                ...APPELLANT.

(BY SHRI GURUDEV GACHCHINAMATH, ADVOCATE.)

AND:

PRAKASH RAMREDDI HULI
AGE: 50 YEARS, OCC: VILLAGE
ACCOUNTANT AND INCHARGE
REVENUE INSPECTOR, ANNIGERI,
TQ: NAVALGUND, DIST: DHARWAD
                                               ...RESPONDENT.

(BY SHRI B V SOMAPUR AND SMT.NANDINI SOMAPUR, ADVOCATE.)


      THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 378(1)(B)
AND SECTION 378(3) OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973,
SEEKING TO GRANT LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT
AND ORDER OF ACQUITTAL PASSED BY THE III ADDL. DISTRICT &
SESSIONS & SPECIAL JUDGE, DHARWAD, ON 08.02.2012, IN SPL.
(K.L.A.) C.C.NO.06/2009 IN FAVOUR OF THE RESPONDENT/ACCUSED
FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 7, 13(1)(D)
READ WITH SECTION 13(2) OF THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION
ACT, 1988, TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF
ACQUITTAL PASSED BY THE III-ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS &
SPECIAL JUDGE, DHARWAD, IN SPL. (K.L.A.) C.C.NO.06/2009, BY
ALLOWING THE PRESENT APPEAL AND CONVICT AND SENTENCE THE
                                      2




RESPONDENT/ACCUSED PERSON FOR THE OFFENCES FOR WHICH HE
WAS CHARGED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW,
ETC.,.

     THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING THIS DAY, THE
COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

                            JUDGMENT

The subject appeal is preferred by the Karnataka

Lokayukta against the judgment and order of acquittal dated

8.02.2012, passed by the III Additional District & Sessions and

Special Judge, Dharwad, in Special (K.L.A.) C.C. No.06/2009,

acquitting the respondent for offences punishable under

Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 ('the Act' for short).

2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeal,

as borne out from the pleadings, are as follows:-

The respondent was at the relevant point working as

Village Accountant in Annigeri village, Navalgund Taluk. On

2.7.2008, the allegation is that he has demanded a sum of

Rs.2,000/- as illegal gratification from the hands of the

complainant to mutate his name in the revenue records

pertaining to land bearing Sy.No.321/4-3 of Hallikeri Village in

Navalgund Taluk, which measures about 1.06 acres. The

complainant had purchased the same from one Basappa Barker.

On such demand, proceedings of trap were laid by the

Lokayukta sleuths. Pursuant to the trap proceedings, a criminal

case is registered for offences punishable under Sections 7,

13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. This led to

registration of Special (K.L.A.) C.C.No.6 of 2009.

3. The appellant in order to prove its case before the

criminal Court marked about 52 documents as Exs.P1 to P52

and examined 10 witnesses as PWs-1 to 10. On the other hand,

the respondent neither examined any witness nor marked any

document in defense. The trial Court by its judgment dated

8.2.2012 acquitted the respondent of the offences punishable as

aforesaid on the ground that there was no evidence against the

accused of the demand and acceptance as was alleged. It is this

judgment and order of acquittal that is called in question in the

case at hand.

4. Heard Shri Gurudev Gachchinamath, the learned

counsel for the appellant and Smt.Nandini Somapur, learned

counsel for the respondent.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant

would vehemently argue and contend that the evidence of

PW.5, the shadow witness was material enough to have proved

the guilt against the respondent and no other witness whether

turned hostile or supported the prosecution need to be

considered. The trial Court has erred in acquitting the

respondent of the offences punishable under the provisions of

the Act. He would seek reversal of the order of acquittal and

conviction of the respondent.

6. On the other hand, the learned counsel Smt.Nandini

Somapur, representing the respondent would vehemently refute

the submissions and would contend that the statement of the

learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the evidence of

PW.5 is enough to convict the respondent is made in the wake

of all other witnesses turning hostile. Therefore, there was no

evidence against the respondent. Even PW.5 has not completely

supported the case of the prosecution and he has only partially

supported it. Therefore, the judgment and order of acquittal

passed by the trial Court does not warrant any interference, is

her submission.

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the

submissions made by the respective learned counsel for the

parties and perused the material on record.

8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute and are

therefore not reiterated. The trap that was laid on the allegation

of demand of Rs.2,000/- as illegal gratification to mutate the

name of the complainant has led to registration of the case and

the entire proceedings. The trial Court based upon the

arguments advanced and the documents produced, formulated

the following points for its consideration:

10. Therefore, the points which arise for my consideration are;

1. Whether the prosecution proves beyond reasonable, that the accused while working as the village accountant of Hallikeri village in Navalaginda taluk and being the in-charge Revenue Inspector-Annigeri Circle, Navalgunda taluk, demanded and accepted illegal gratification of Rs.2,000/- from P.W.02 Mallappa Kalasappa Kumbar (C.W.01), as alleged?

2. Whether the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that,

the accused has committed criminal misconduct as alleged?

3. Whether the application filed by the prosecution u/s.340 Cr.P.C. deserves to be allowed?

4. What order?

9. The first point that was formulated for consideration

was whether the prosecution proved the case against the

respondent beyond all reasonable doubt. Accused No.2 is the

complainant. It is on his allegation the entire proceedings

sprang. The complaint was marked as Ex.P26. It is not in

dispute that the complainant-PW-2 turned hostile during the

proceedings. All other witnesses whom the prosecution wanted

to examine turned hostile in the proceedings. PW-5, who

according to the prosecution was the shadow witness to say that

he was also in the chamber when the complainant had

approached the respondent with regard to mutation of his name

in the khata also did not support the case of the prosecution in

its entirety. The case of the complainant was that the land that

was purchased was coming within the jurisdiction of the Village

Accountant of Hallikeri village but the respondent was Village

Accountant of Annigeri Village. The action that was made was

for mutation of khata of Hallikeri village and not Annigeri village.

Therefore, the premise on which the case was registered was

arose. The relevant findings of the trial Court are extracted

hereunder for the purpose of ready reference:

13. The fact that, the accused being the Village Accountant was in-charge Revenue inspector of Annigeri circle during the relevant period is not in dispute.

It is also an undisputed fact that, P.W.02 having purchased 01.06 acres of land from one Basappa Barker, had filed an application in the office of Village Accountant of Hallikeri in Navalgund taluk for mutation of his name in the khata of that property and it was still pending.

14. On the fact of entrustment of tainted money to P.W.02 under Ex.P.02 pre-trap panchanama, as stated supra apart from the testimony of P.W.02 the prosecution has also relied upon the testimony of P.Ws. 01 AND 03 its witnesses. P.Ws. 01 and 03 through have deposed corroborating the version of this panchanama that, when P.W.02 produced Lokayukta Inspector sum of Rs.2000/- stating that the accused-Village Accountant had asked for that amount as bribe, the same was smeared with phenolphthalein powder and observing the formalities, it was entrusted to P.W.02, but P.W.02 himself has given a clean go-bye to the prosecution version of the case in that regard stating that, it was one Kamareddi (P.W.-05)- the Village Accountant of Hallikeri village had taken him to Lokayuktha Office and where the officers having recorded some writings obtained his signature

without disclosing its contents. Be that as it may, it was only a formality followed so as to be cautious to prove that was the same money the accused had received as bribe and so recovered also from his possession.

15. But what is the evidence of P.W.-02 on the fact of demand and acceptance of bribe money? It is his evidence that, from Lokayukta office he was taken to Taluka Office, Navalgund where the accused was there and as told by Lokayukta Officers he having placed money on the table of the accused had come out; the accused had not made demand for money at any point of time to mutate his name in the Khata of property purchased by him or that he had filed any report with Lokayukta office alleging so. Further, P.W.-01 the shadow witness has also not supported the prosecution on this material fact. However his evidence is not consistent with the evidence of P.W.02. It is his evidence that, P.W.02 who sat before the accused in the latter's room was in conversation and having accepted money from P.W.02 the accused kept in the pocket of his shirt and which he could hardly hear and accused having accepted the tainted money kept in his pocket.

Therefore when the prosecution cross- examined P.W.02, he denying the leading suggestions made in line with the prosecution version of the case has also contradicted his otherwise statements as per Ex.P.28 to 35 before the Investigating Officer on the material facts and so also P.W.-01 as per EX.P25. The prosecution has not brought out any material in their cross-examination in support of any fact to constitute the offence alleged. Therefore, though P.Ws.01 and 03 have supported the pre-trap proceeding and in the absence any cogent, corroborative and reliable evidence on the material fact demand and receipt, it is of any assistance to hold the accused is guilty of

the offence alleged and more particularly when P.W-02 himself has not supported it.

16. Even otherwise, what is pertinent to note, it is in evidence that, the application submitted by P.W.02 for entering his name in the khata of the property which he had purchased, was not pending with the accused instead, it was with one Kamareddi (P.W.-04)-the Village Accountant of Hallikeri. In fact, P.W.-04 himself has admitted this fact in cross- examination stating specifically that, during the relevant period no work of P.W.02 was pending with the accused-in-charge Revenue Inspector. Further, it is also his evidence in cross-examination that, soon after the receipt of "J" form from the office of Sub- Registrar it will be forwarded to the concerned Village Accountant and in fact "J" form and other papers relating to the property of P.W.02 were in his possession and custody as he was supposed to wait for 30 days after their receipt and thereafter by making endorsement with regard to the objections received if any, the file was to be sent back to Taluka Office and the originals of Ex.P.37 to 40 were not pending with the accused as on that date. So is the categorical evidence of P.W.09-Tahashildar also. That being so, the receipt of tainted money by the accused from P.W.02 even is to be held as proved, it was not as gratification to do any official act in favour of P.W.02.

10. In the light of the fact that all the witnesses have

turned hostile except the shadow witness PW.5, who also

supports the case of the prosecution partially cannot be a

ground for interfering with the well reasoned order of the trial

Court.

11. It is trite law that ordinarily the order of acquittal

passed by the trial Court would not be interfered with unless the

order of acquittal is perverse. I do not find any perversity in the

order passed by the trial Court acquitting the respondent of the

offences under the Act. The Apex Court while laying down

parameters for interference with the order of acquittal in the

case of RAMESH BABULAL DOSHI v. STATE OF GUJARAT -

(1996) 9 SCC 225 has held as follows:

"7. Before proceeding further it will be pertinent to mention that the entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal was patently wrong for it did not at all address itself to the question as to whether the reasons which weighed with the trial court for recording the order of acquittal were proper or not. Instead thereof the High Court made an independent reappraisal of the entire evidence to arrive at the above-quoted conclusions. This Court has repeatedly laid down that the mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the trial court can be legitimately arrived at by the appellate court on reappraisal of the evidence cannot constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere with an order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that the entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly

erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then -- and then only -- reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions. In keeping with the above principles we have therefore to first ascertain whether the findings of the trial court are sustainable or not."

Later the Apex Court in the case of CHANDRAPPA AND

OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA - (2007) 4 SCC 415 has

held as follows:

"42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law.

Secondly,   the     accused     having
secured     his      acquittal,    the

presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

Considering the aforesaid judgments the Apex Court in the

latest judgment in the case of MOHAN ALIAS SRINIVAS

ALIAS SEENA ALIAS TAILOR SEENA Vs. STATE OF

KARNATAKA - 2021 SCC ONLINE SC 1233 has held as

follows:

"23. This court, time and again has laid down the law on the scope of inquiry by an Appellate court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. We do not wish to multiply the aforesaid principle except placing reliance on a recent decision of this court in Anwar Ali v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, (2020) 10 SCC 166:

"14.2. When can the findings of fact recorded by a court be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under : (Babu case [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179])

"20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material.

The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies

logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn.

[Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131], Excise & Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [Excise & Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312], Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 665], Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501], Aruvelu [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 :

(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288] and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v.

State of A.P. [Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372] )"

It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 :

1999 SCC (L&S) 429], that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.

14.3. In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh [Vijay Mohan Singh v.

State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586], this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 CrPC and the interference by the High Court [State of Karnataka v. Vijay Mohan Singh, 2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10732] in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under:

"31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 :

1978 SCC (Cri) 108]. In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused.

Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under:

'10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently

and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.'

31.1. In Sambasivan [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320], the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by

the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under:

'8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Doshi case [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972] viz.

first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-

considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was

patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand.

Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.'

31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan [K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 410], after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found

that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.

31.3. In Atley [Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653], in para 5, this Court observed and held as under:

'5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion

that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.

It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-

established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence.

It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.

If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to

a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC 1207 : AIR 1952 SC 52]; Wilayat Khan v.

State of U.P. [Wilayat Khan v.

State of U.P., 1951 SCC 898 :

AIR 1953 SC 122]) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.'

31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy [K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 305], this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule."

12. The Apex Court in all these cases has delineated the

scope of interference by the High Court while entertaining an

appeal under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, in the light

of the facts obtaining in the case at hand and the judgment of

the trial Court directing acquittal based on cogent reasoning and

in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court (supra), I do

not find any warrant to interfere with the order of acquittal.

Sequentially the appeal fails and is dismissed.

SD JUDGE Mrk/-